SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 6]

Whether Names Predicated of God Are Predicated Primarily of Creatures?

Objection 1: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures

rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it,

since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we

know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us

are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from

creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said

primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the

like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied

primarily to creatures rather than to God.

Obj. 3: Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures,

are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says

(De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its

cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily

predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of

health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather

than of God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our

Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named"

(Eph. 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God

and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God

rather than to creatures.

_I answer that,_ In names predicated of many in an analogical sense,

all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and

this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And

since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the

Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily

to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and

secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less

to that first. Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes

into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called

healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the

definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which is called

healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all

names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures

primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only

similitudes to such creatures. For as "smiling" applied to a field

means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the

beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of

"lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His

works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the

signification of names can be defined only from what is said of

creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical

sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the

cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is

good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the creature's

goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its

meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" would apply primarily

to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above (A. 2), these

names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially.

For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify not only that He is

the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a

more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these

names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because

these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the

imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to

creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of

signification which belongs to creatures, as said above (A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the name.

Reply Obj. 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and

to other names, as said above.

Reply Obj. 3: This objection would be valid if these names were

applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for

instance as "healthy" is applied to medicine.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 104 / 722 题