Whether Names Applied to God Are Synonymous?
Objection 1: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous
names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But
these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for
the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom.
Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.
Obj. 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same
thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea
to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these
ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these
ideas are vain notions.
Obj. 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more
one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is
supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and
many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify
different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.
_On the contrary,_ All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as
when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to God
are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet
it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts
is Thy name" (Jer. 32:18).
_I answer that,_ These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This
would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to
remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it
would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse
things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even
according to what was said above (A. 2), that these names signify
the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also
clear from what has been said (AA. 1, 2) that they have diverse
meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the
intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since
it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms
conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to
creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply,
whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As
therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there
corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections
of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various
and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one
altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions,
imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied to God
signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and
different aspects, they are not synonymous.
Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous
terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify
different aspects of one thing, do not signify primarily and
absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing
through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty and
vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality
represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.
Reply Obj. 3: The perfect unity of God requires that what are
manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and
unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet
multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold
manner, as things represent Him.
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