FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 4]

Whether God Is Supremely One?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not supremely _one._ For "one" is so

called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater

or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are

called "one."

Obj. 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what

is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity.

But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible.

Therefore God is not more _one_ than unity is _one_ and a point is

_one._

Obj. 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good.

Therefore what is essentially _one_ is supremely _one._ But every

being is essentially _one,_ as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv).

Therefore every being is supremely _one;_ and therefore God is not

_one_ more than any other being is _one._

_On the contrary,_ Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called

one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place."

_I answer that,_ Since _one_ is an undivided being, if anything is

supremely _one_ it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided.

Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch

as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined;

since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He

is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor

potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple,

as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Hence it is manifest that God is

_one_ in the supreme degree.

Reply Obj. 1: Although privation considered in itself is not

susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is

subject to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in

the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more

divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it

is called more, or less, or supremely, _one._

Reply Obj. 2: A point and unity which is the principle of number, are

not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some

subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely _one._ For as a

subject cannot be supremely _one,_ because of the difference within

it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.

Reply Obj. 3: Although every being is _one_ by its substance, still

every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the

substance of some things is compound and of others simple.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 83 / 722 题