Objection 1: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22, 23), that "God moves the
spiritual through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of
spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.
Obj. 2: Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and
"after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole,
as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not
eternity; for it is written (Ecclus. 1:1) that eternal "Wisdom is
before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before"
and "after"; and thus it is the same as time.
Obj. 3: Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in
aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no
difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it
is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that
it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false,
since God can reduce them to nothing.
Obj. 4: Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is
infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously
whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is
impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.
_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time
to be separate from aeviternity."
_I answer that,_ Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as
the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to
consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end,
aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end.
This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown
above, in the preceding article; because even if aeviternal things had
always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they
might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even
granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished from eternity,
and from time.
Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the
fact that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that time has
both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity
has "before" and "after" without innovation and veteration. This
theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears
if innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For
since "before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if
aeviternity has "before" and "after," it must follow that with the
receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of
aeviternity must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in
aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to
the things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a
thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has a
changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing
measured, there follows "before" and "after" in the measure, as is
clear from _Physic._ iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing
is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes from its
changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain
"before" and "after." We say then that since eternity is the measure
of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence
of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede from
permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or
consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all
movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others
recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being
neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change;
nevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually or
potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial
being of which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they
have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, who
have an unchangeable being as regards their nature with
changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness
of intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree.
Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean between
eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not
changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this way time has
"before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no "before" and
"after," which can, however, be annexed to it; while eternity has
neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with such at all.
Reply Obj. 1: Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections
and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22, 23) that to be moved through time, is
to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are
measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they
have a share of eternity.
Reply Obj. 2: Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not
eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.
Reply Obj. 3: In the very being of an angel considered absolutely,
there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards
accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be,
is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of
our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison
with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or
was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not
subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do
not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and
non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the
divine power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; but
He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after
he has been.
Reply Obj. 4: The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as
it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying
that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other
creature.
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