THIRD ARTICLE [I. Q. 6, Art. 3]

Whether to Be Essentially Good Belongs to God Alone?

Objection 1: It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to

God alone. For as _one_ is convertible with _being,_ so is _good;_ as

we said above (Q. 5, A. 1). But every being is one essentially, as

appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is

good essentially.

Obj. 2: Further, if good is what all things desire, since being

itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good.

But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good

essentially.

Obj. 3: Further, everything is good by its own goodness.

Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is

necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore

its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by

some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also;

therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness

which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first

supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God

are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially.

_I answer that,_ God alone is good essentially. For everything is called

good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is

threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being;

secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its

perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to

something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of

fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own

substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness

and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own

place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own

essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence;

in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others

accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise and

the like, as appears from what is stated above (Q. 3, A. 6); and

He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the

last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every

kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is

good essentially.

Reply Obj. 1: "One" does not include the idea of perfection,

but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its

own essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both

actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided

only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but

not good essentially, as was shown above.

Reply Obj. 2: Although everything is good in that it has

being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore

it does not follow that a creature is good essentially.

Reply Obj. 3: The goodness of a creature is not its very

essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some

added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself

thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it

called being because by it something has being, not because it itself

has being through something else: hence for this reason is it called

good because by it something is good, and not because it itself has

some other goodness whereby it is good.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 56 / 722 题