Whether God Is Altogether Simple?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever
is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all
beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which
God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God
altogether simple.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But
with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple;
thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals
than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God
is altogether simple.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and
absolutely simple."
_I answer that,_ The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many
ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is
neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a
body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ
from His _suppositum_; nor His essence from His existence; neither is
there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and
accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is
altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to
its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first
being, as shown above (Q. 2, A. 3). Thirdly, because every
composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite
unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown
above (Q. 2, A. 3), since He is the first efficient cause.
Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and
actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts
actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the
whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any
single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of
dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts
of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although
something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part
(as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water),
nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot
be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume
of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every
composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this
could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which
is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does
not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself,
there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form,
or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary
implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is
strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is
light, composed of things that are dim."
Reply Obj. 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused
things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to
be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from
its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (Q. 4, A. 3).
Reply Obj. 2: With us composite things are better than simple
things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in
one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine
goodness is found in one simple thing (QQ. 4, A. 1, and 6, A. 2).
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