Whether God is the Same as His Essence or Nature?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or
nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of
God--i.e. the Godhead--is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that
God is not the same as His essence or nature.
Obj. 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for
every agent produces its like. But in created things the _suppositum_
is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his
humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.
_On the contrary,_ It is said of God that He is life itself, and not
only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the
life" (John 14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same
as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His
very Godhead.
_I answer that,_ God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand
this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the
nature or essence must differ from the _suppositum,_ because the
essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of
the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the
definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this
that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now
individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not
included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh,
these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in
the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the
accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not
included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is
man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has
humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical;
but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the
principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal
constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other
hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which
individualization is not due to individual matter--that is to say, to
_this_ matter--the very forms being individualized of themselves--it
is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting _supposita._
Therefore _suppositum_ and nature in them are identified. Since God
then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead,
His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.
Reply Obj. 1: We can speak of simple things only as though
they were like the composite things from which we derive our
knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to
signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist
which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His
simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are
in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect
understands, but not that there is any composition in God.
Reply Obj. 2: The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly,
but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective,
precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by
divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and
therefore, in them _suppositum_ is not the same as nature.
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