‘narcissism’ distinguished from ‘egoism’? In my opinion, narcissism is
the libidinal complement of egoism. When one speaks of egoism one is
thinking only of the _interests_ of the person concerned, narcissism
relates also to the satisfaction of his libidinal needs. It is possible
to follow up the two separately for a considerable distance as practical
motives in life. A man may be absolutely egoistic and yet have strong
libidinal attachments to objects, in so far as libidinal satisfaction in
an object is a need of his Ego: his egoism will then see to it that his
desires towards the object involve no injury to his Ego. A man may be
egoistic and at the same time strongly narcissistic (i.e. feel very
little need for objects), and this again either in the form taken by the
need for direct sexual satisfaction, or in those higher forms of feeling
derived from the sexual needs which are commonly called “love,” and as
such are contrasted with “sensuality.” In all these situations egoism is
the self-evident, the constant element, and narcissism the variable one.
The antithesis of egoism, “altruism,” is not an alternative term for the
investment of an object with Libido; it is distinct from the latter in
its lack of the desire for sexual satisfaction in the object. But when
the condition of love is developed to its fullest intensity altruism
coincides with the investment of an object with Libido. As a rule the
sexual object draws to itself a portion of the Ego’s narcissism, which
becomes apparent in what is called the ‘sexual overestimation’ of the
object. If to this is added an altruism directed towards the object and
derived from the egoism of the lover, the sexual object becomes supreme;
it has entirely swallowed up the Ego.
I think you will find it a relief if, after these scientific phantasies,
which are after all very dry, I submit to you a poetic description of
the ‘economic’ contrast between the condition of narcissism and that of
love in full intensity. I take it from a dialogue between Zuleika and
her lover in Goethe’s _Westöstliche Divan_:—
ZULEIKA:
The slave, the lord of victories,
The crowd, with single voice, confess
In sense of personal being lies
A child of earth’s true happiness.
There’s not a life he need refuse
If his true self he does not miss:
There’s not a thing he cannot lose
If he remains the man he is.
HÂTEM:
So it is held! so well may be!
But down a different track I come
Of all the bliss earth holds for me
I in Zuleika find the sum.
Does she expend her being on me,
Myself grows to myself of cost;
Turns she away, then instantly
I to my very self am lost.
And then with Hâtem all were over;
Though yet I should but change my state;
Swift, should she grace some happy lover,
In him I were incorporate.[52]
The second observation is an amplification of the theory of dreams. The
way in which a dream originates is not explicable unless we assume that
what is repressed in the Unconscious has acquired a certain independence
of the Ego, so that it does not subordinate itself to the wish for sleep
and maintains its investments, although all the object-investments
proceeding from the Ego have been withdrawn for the purpose of sleep.
Only this makes it possible to understand how it is that this
unconscious material can make use of the abrogation or diminution in the
activities of the censorship which takes place at night, and that it
knows how to mould the day’s residue so as to form a forbidden
dream-wish from the material to hand in that residue. On the other hand,
some of the resistance against the wish to sleep and the withdrawal of
Libido thereby induced may have its origin in an association already in
existence between this residue and the repressed unconscious material.
This important dynamic factor must therefore now be incorporated into
the conception of dream-formation which we formed in our earlier
discussions.
Certain conditions—organic illness, painful accesses of stimulation, an
inflammatory condition of an organ—have clearly the effect of loosening
the Libido from its attachment to its objects. The Libido which has thus
been withdrawn attaches itself again to the Ego in the form of a
stronger investment of the diseased region of the body. Indeed, one may
venture the assertion that in such conditions the withdrawal of the
Libido from its objects is more striking than the withdrawal of egoistic
interests from their concerns in the outer world. This seems to lead to
a possibility of understanding hypochondria, in which some organ,
without being perceptibly diseased, becomes in a very similar way the
subject of a solicitude on the part of the Ego. I shall, however, resist
the temptation to follow this up, or to discuss other situations which
become explicable or capable of exposition on this assumption of a
return of the object-Libido into the Ego; for I feel bound to meet two
objections which I know have all your attention at the moment. First of
all, you want to know why when I discuss sleep, illness, and similar
conditions, I insist upon distinguishing between Libido and ‘interests,’
sexual instincts and Ego-instincts, while the observations are
satisfactorily explained by assuming a single uniform energy which is
freely mobile, can invest either object or Ego, and can serve the
purposes of the one as well as of the other. Secondly, you will want to
know how I can be so bold as to treat the detachment of the Libido from
its objects as the origin of a pathological condition, if such a
transformation of object-Libido into Ego-Libido—or into Ego-energy in
general—is a normal mental process repeated every day and every night.
The answer is: Your first objection sounds a good one. Examination of
the conditions of sleep, illness, and falling in love would probably
never have led to a distinction between Ego-Libido and object-Libido, or
between Libido and ‘interests.’ But in this you omit to take into
account the investigations with which we started, in the light of which
we now regard the mental situations under discussion. The necessity of
distinguishing between Libido and ‘interests,’ between sexual and
self-preservative instincts, has been forced upon us by our insight into
the conflict from which the transference neuroses arise. We have to
reckon with this distinction henceforward. The assumption that
object-Libido can transform itself into Ego-Libido, in other words, that
we shall also have to reckon with an Ego-Libido, appears to be the only
one capable of solving the riddle of what are called the narcissistic
neuroses, e.g. dementia præcox, or of giving any satisfactory
explanation of their likeness to hysteria and obsessions and differences
from them. We then apply what we have found undeniably proved in these
cases to illness, sleep, and the condition of intense love. We are at
liberty to apply them in any direction and see where they will take us.
The single conclusion which is not directly based on analytical
experience is that Libido is Libido and remains so, whether it is
attached to objects or to the Ego itself, and is never transformed into
egoistic ‘interests’ and vice versa. This statement, however, is another
way of expressing the distinction between sexual instincts and
Ego-instincts which we have already critically examined, and which we
shall hold to from heuristic motives until such time as it may prove
valueless.
Your second objection too raises a justifiable question, but it is
directed to a false issue. The withdrawal of object-Libido into the Ego
is certainly not pathogenic; it is true that it occurs every night
before sleep can ensue, and that the process is reversed upon awakening.
The protoplasmic animalcule draws in its protrusions and sends them out
again at the next opportunity. But it is quite a different matter when a
definite, very forcible process compels the withdrawal of the Libido
from its objects. The Libido that has then become narcissistic can no
longer find its way back to its objects, and this obstruction in the way
of the free movement of the Libido certainly does prove pathogenic. It
seems that an accumulation of narcissistic Libido over and above a
certain level becomes intolerable. We might well imagine that it was
this that first led to the investment of objects, that the Ego was
obliged to send forth its Libido in order not to fall ill of an
excessive accumulation of it. If it were part of our scheme to go more
particularly into the disorder of dementia præcox I would show you that
the process which detaches the Libido from its objects and blocks the
way back to them again is closely allied to the process of repression,
and is to be regarded as a counterpart of it. In any case you would
recognize familiar ground under your feet when you found that the
preliminary conditions giving rise to these processes are almost
identical, so far as we know at present, with those of repression. The
conflict seems to be the same and to be conducted between the same
forces. Since the outcome is so different from that of hysteria, for
instance, the reason can only lie in some difference in the disposition.
The weak point in the Libido-development in these patients is found at a
different phase of the development; the decisive fixation which, as you
will remember, enables the process of symptom-formation to break out is
at another point, probably at the stage of primary narcissism, to which
dementia præcox finally returns. It is most remarkable that for all the
narcissistic neuroses we have to assume fixation-points of the Libido at
very much earlier phases of development than those found in hysteria or
the obsessional neurosis. You have heard, however, that the concepts we
have elicited from the study of the transference neuroses also suffice
to show us our bearings in the narcissistic neuroses, which are in
practice so much more severe. There is a very wide community between
them; fundamentally they are phenomena of a single class. You may
imagine how hopeless a task it is for anyone to attempt to explain these
disorders (which properly belong to psychiatry) without being first
equipped with the analytic knowledge of the transference neuroses.
The picture formed by the symptoms of dementia præcox, incidentally a
very variable one, is not determined exclusively by the symptoms arising
from the forcing of the Libido back from the objects and the
accumulation of it as narcissism in the Ego. Other phenomena occupy a
large part of the field, and may be traced to the efforts made by the
Libido to reach its objects again, which correspond therefore to
attempts at restitution and recovery. These are in fact the conspicuous,
clamorous symptoms; they exhibit a marked similarity to those of
hysteria, or more rarely of the obsessional neurosis; they are
nevertheless different in every respect. It seems that in dementia
præcox the efforts of the Libido to get back to its objects, that is, to
the mental idea of its objects, do really succeed in conjuring up
something of them, something that at the same time is only the shadow of
them—namely, the verbal images, the words, attached to them. This is not
the place to discuss this matter further, but in my opinion this
reversed procedure on the part of the Libido gives us an insight into
what constitutes the real difference between a conscious and an
unconscious idea.
This has now brought us into the field where the next advances in
analytic work are to be expected. Since the time when we resolved upon
our formulation of the conception of Ego-Libido, the narcissistic
neuroses have become accessible to us; the task before us was to find
the dynamic factors in these disorders, and at the same time to amplify
our knowledge of mental life by a comprehension of the Ego. The
psychology of the Ego, at which we are aiming, cannot be founded upon
data provided by our own self-perceptions; it must be based, as is that
of the Libido, upon analysis of the disturbances and disintegrations of
the Ego. We shall probably think very little of our present knowledge of
the fate of the Libido, gained from the study of the transference
neuroses, when that further, greater work has been achieved. But as yet
we have not got very far towards it. The narcissistic neuroses can
hardly be approached at all by the method which has availed for the
transference neuroses; you shall soon hear why this is. With these
patients it always happens that after one has penetrated a little way
one comes up against a stone wall which cannot be surmounted. You know
that in the transference neuroses, too, barriers of resistance of this
kind are met with, but that it is possible bit by bit to pull them down.
In the narcissistic neuroses the resistance is insuperable; at the most
we can satisfy our curiosity by craning our necks for a glimpse or two
at what is going on over the wall. Our technique will therefore have to
be replaced by other methods; at present we do not know whether we shall
succeed in finding a substitute. There is no lack of material with these
patients; they bring forward a great deal, although not in answer to our
questions; at present all we can do is to interpret what they say in the
light of the understanding gained from the study of the transference
neuroses. The agreement between the two forms of disease goes far enough
to ensure us a satisfactory start with them. How much we shall be able
to achieve by this method remains to be seen.
There are other difficulties, besides this, in the way of our progress.
The narcissistic disorders and the psychoses related to them can only be
unriddled by observers trained in the analytic study of the transference
neuroses. But our psychiatrists do not study psycho-analysis and we
psycho-analysts see too little of psychiatric cases. We shall have to
develop a breed of psychiatrists who have gone through the training of
psycho-analysis as a preparatory science. A beginning in this direction
is being made in America, where several of the leading psychiatrists
lecture on psycho-analytic doctrines to their students, and where
medical superintendents of institutions and asylums endeavour to observe
their patients in the light of this theory. But all the same it has
sometimes been possible for us here to take a peep over the wall of
narcissism, so I will now proceed to tell you what we think we have
discovered in this way.
The disease of paranoia, a chronic form of systematic insanity, has a
very uncertain position in the attempts at classification made by
present-day psychiatry. There is no doubt, however, that it is closely
related to dementia præcox; I have in fact proposed that they should
both be included under the common designation of _paraphrenia_. The
forms taken by paranoia are described according to the content of the
delusion, e.g. delusions of grandeur, of persecution, of jealousy, of
being loved (erotomania), etc. We do not expect attempts at explanation
from psychiatry; as an example, an antiquated and not very fair example,
I grant, I will tell you the attempt which was made to derive one of
these symptoms from another, by means of a piece of intellectual
rationalization: The patient who has a primary tendency to believe
himself persecuted draws from this the conclusion that he must
necessarily be a very important person and therefore develops a delusion
of grandeur. According to our analytic conception, the delusion of
grandeur is the direct consequence of the inflation of the Ego by the
Libido withdrawn from the investment of objects, a secondary narcissism
ensuing as a return of the original early infantile form. In the case of
delusions of persecution, however, we observed things which led us to
follow up a certain clue. In the first place we noticed that in the
great majority of cases the persecuting person was of the same sex as
the persecuted one; this was capable of a harmless explanation, it is
true, but in certain cases which were closely studied it appeared that
the person of the same sex who had been most beloved while the patient
was normal became the persecutor after the disease broke out. A further
development of this becomes possible through the well-known paths of
association by which a loved person may be replaced by someone else,
e.g. the father by masters or persons in authority. From these
observations, which were continually corroborated, we drew the
conclusion that persecutory paranoia is the means by which a person
defends himself against a homosexual impulse which has become too
powerful. The conversion of the affectionate feeling into the hate
which, as is well-known, can seriously endanger the life of the loved
and hated object then corresponds to the conversion of libidinal
impulses into anxiety, which is a regular result of the process of
repression. As an illustration I will quote the last case I had of this
type. A young doctor had to be sent away from the place where he lived
because he had threatened the life of the son of a university professor
there who had previously been his greatest friend. He imputed superhuman
power and the most devilish intentions to this friend; he was to blame
for all the misfortunes which had occurred in recent years to the family
of the patient and for all his ill-luck in public and in private. This
was not enough, however; the wicked friend and his father, the
professor, had caused the war and brought the Russians over the border;
he had ruined his life in a thousand ways; our patient was convinced
that the death of this criminal would be the end of all evil in the
world. And yet his old love for him was still so strong that it had
paralysed his hand when he had an opportunity of shooting his enemy at
sight. In the short conversation which I had with the patient it came to
light that this intimate friendship between the two men went right back
to their school-days; on at least one occasion it had passed beyond the
boundaries of friendship, a night spent together had been the occasion
of complete sexual intercourse. The patient had never developed any of
the feeling towards women that would have been natural at his age with
his attractive personality. He had been engaged to a handsome,
well-connected girl, but she had broken off the engagement because her
lover was so cold. Years after, his disease broke out at the very moment
when he had for the first time succeeded in giving full sexual
gratification to a woman; as she encircled him in her arms in gratitude
and devotion he suddenly felt a mysterious stab of pain running like a
sharp knife round the crown of his head. Afterwards he described the
sensation as being like that of the incision made at a post-mortem to
bare the brain; and as his friend was a pathological anatomist he slowly
came to the conclusion that he alone could have sent him this woman as a
temptation. Then his eyes began to be opened about the other
persecutions of which he had been the victim by the machinations of his
former friend.
But how about those cases in which the persecutor is of a different sex
from that of the persecuted one, and which appear therefore to
contradict our explanation of this disease as a defence against
homosexual Libido? Some time ago I had an opportunity of examining a
case of the kind, and behind the apparent contradiction I was able to
elicit a confirmation. A young girl imagined herself persecuted by a man
with whom she had twice had intimate relations; actually she had first
of all cherished the delusion against a woman who could be recognized to
be a mother-substitute. Not until after the second meeting with him did
she make the advance of transferring the delusional idea from the woman
to the man; so that in this case also the condition that the sex of the
persecutor is the same as that of the victim originally held good also.
In her complaint to the lawyer and the doctor the patient had not
mentioned the previous phase of her delusion and this gave rise to an
apparent contradiction of our theory of paranoia.
The homosexual choice of object is originally more closely related to
narcissism than the heterosexual; hence, when a strong unwelcome
homosexual excitation suffers repudiation, the way back to narcissism is
especially easy to find. I have so far had very little opportunity in
these lectures of speaking about the fundamental plan on which the
course of the love-impulse during life is based, so far as we know it;
nor can I supplement it now. I will only select this to tell you: that
the choice of object, the step forward in the development of the Libido
which comes after the narcissistic stage, can proceed according to two
types. These are: either _the narcissistic type_, according to which, in
place of the Ego itself, someone as nearly as possible resembling it is
adopted as an object; or _the anaclitic type_ (_Anlehnungstypus_)[53] in
which those persons who became prized on account of the satisfactions
they rendered to the primal needs in life are chosen as objects by the
Libido also. A strong Libido-fixation on the narcissistic type of
object-choice is also found as a trait in the disposition of manifest
homosexuals.
You will remember that in the first lecture given this session I
described to you a case of delusional jealousy in a woman. Now that we
have so nearly reached the end you will certainly want to know how we
account for a delusion psycho-analytically. I have less to say about it
than you would expect, however. The inaccessibility of delusions to
logical arguments and to actual experience is to be explained, as it is
with obsessions, by the connection they bear to the unconscious material
which is both expressed by, and held in check by, the delusion or the
obsession. The differences between the two are based on the
topographical and dynamic differences in the two affections.
As with paranoia, so also with melancholia (under which, by the way,
very different clinical types are classified), it has been possible to
obtain a glimpse into the inner structure of the disorder. We have
perceived that the self-reproaches with which these sufferers torment
themselves so mercilessly actually relate to another person, to the
sexual object they have lost or whom they have ceased to value on
account of some fault. From this we concluded that the melancholic has
indeed withdrawn his Libido from the object, but that by a process which
we must call ‘narcissistic identification’ he has set up the object
within the Ego itself, projected it on to the Ego. I can only give you a
descriptive representation of this process, and not one expressed in
terms of topography and dynamics. The Ego itself is then treated as
though it were the abandoned object; it suffers all the revengeful and
aggressive treatment which is designed for the object. The suicidal
impulses of melancholics also become more intelligible on the
supposition that the bitterness felt by the diseased mind concerns the
Ego itself at the same time as, and equally with, the loved and hated
object. In melancholia, as in the other narcissistic disorders, a
feature of the emotional life which, after Bleuler, we are accustomed to
call _ambivalence_ comes markedly to the fore; by this we mean a
directing of antithetical feelings (affectionate and hostile) towards
the same person. It is unfortunate that I have not been able to say more
about ambivalence in these lectures.
There is also, besides the narcissistic, an hysterical form of
identification which has long been known to us. I wish it were possible
to make the differences between them clear to you in a few definite
statements. I can tell you something of the periodic and cyclic forms of
melancholia which will interest you. It is possible in favourable
circumstances—I have twice achieved it—to prevent the recurrence of the
condition, or of its antithesis, by analytic treatment during the lucid
intervals between the attacks. One learns from this that in melancholia
and mania as well as other conditions a special kind of solution of a
conflict is going on, which in all its pre-requisites agrees with those
of the other neuroses. You may imagine how much there remains for
psycho-analysis to do in this field.