The following pages, extracted from an introduction to a new edition to
"Cetywayo and His White Neighbours," written in 1888, are reprinted
here, because they contain matter of interest concerning the more
recent history of the Transvaal Boers.
_Extract from Introduction to New Edition of 1888._
The recent history of the Transvaal, now once more a republic, will
fortunately admit of brief treatment. It is, so far as England is
concerned, very much a history of concession. For an account of the
first Convention I must refer my readers to the remarks which I have
made in the chapter of this book headed "The Retrocession of the
Transvaal." It will there be seen that the Transvaal Volksraad only
ratified the first convention, which was wrung from us (Sir Evelyn
Wood, to his honour be it said, dissenting) after our defeats at Lang's
Nek, Ingogo, and Majuba, as a favour to the British Government, which
in its turn virtually promised to reconsider the convention, if only
the Volksraad would be so good as to ratify it. This convention was
ratified in October 1881. In June 1883 the Transvaal Government[14]
telegraphs briefly to Lord Derby through the High Commissioner that the
Volksraad has "resolved that time has come to reconsider convention."
Lord Derby quickly telegraphs back that "Her Majesty's Government
consent to inquire into the working of convention." Human nature is
frail, and it is impossible to help wishing that Lord Palmerston or
Disraeli had been appointed by the Fates to answer that telegram. But
we have fallen upon different days, and new men have arisen who appear
to be suited to them; and so the convention was reconsidered, and on
the 27th of February 1884 a new one was signed, which is known as the
convention of London. It begins by defining boundaries to which the
"Government of the South African Republic will strictly adhere, ... and
will do its utmost to prevent any of its inhabitants from making any
encroachments upon the said boundaries." The existence of the New
Republic in Zululand is a striking and practical comment on this
article. Article ii. also provides for the security of the amended
southwest boundary. The proclamation of 16th September 1884 (afterwards
disallowed by the English Government), by which the South African
Republic practically annexed the territories of Montsioa and Moshette,
already for the most part in the possession of its freebooters, very
clearly illustrates its anxiety to be bound by this provision. Art xii.
provides for the independence of the Swazis; and by way of illustrating
the fidelity with which it has been observed, we shall presently have
occasion to remark upon the determined attempts that have continually
been made by Boer freebooters to obtain possession of Swaziland--and so
on.
[14] [C. 3659], 1883.
In order to make these severe restrictions palatable to the burghers of
a free and haughty Republic, Lord Derby recommends Her Majesty's
Government to remit a trifling sum of £127,000 of their debt due to the
Imperial Treasury, which was accordingly done. On the whole, the
Transvaal had no reason to be dissatisfied with this new treaty, though
really the whole affair is scarcely worth discussing. Convention No. 2
is almost as much a farce and a dead letter as was Convention No. 1. It
is, however, impossible to avoid being impressed with the really
remarkable tone, not merely of equality, but of superiority, adopted by
the South African Republic and its officials towards this country. To
take an instance. The Republic had found it convenient to wage a war of
extermination upon some Kafir chiefs. Two of these, Mampoer and Njabel,
fell into its hands. Her Majesty's Government was, rightly or wrongly,
so impressed with the injustice of the sentence of death passed upon
these unfortunates, that, acting through Mr. Hudson, the British
Resident at Pretoria, it strained every nerve to save them. This was
the upshot of it. In a tone of studied sarcasm, His Honour the State
President "observes with great satisfaction the great interest in these
cases which has been manifested by your Honour and Her Majesty's
Government." He then goes on to say that, notwithstanding this
interest, Mampoer will be duly and effectually hung, giving the exact
time and place of the event, and Njabel imprisoned for life, with hard
labour. Finally, he once more conveys "the hearty thanks of the
Government and the members of the Executive Council for the interest
manifested in these cases,"[15] and remains, &c.
[15] [C. 3841], 1884, p 148.
The independence of Swaziland was guaranteed by the convention of 1884.
Yet the Blue-books are full of accounts of various attempts made by
Boers to obtain a footing in Swaziland. Thus in November 1885
Umbandine, the king of Swaziland, sends messengers to the Governor of
Natal through Sir T. Shepstone, in which he states that in the winter
Piet Joubert, accompanied by two other Boers and an interpreter, came
to his kraal and asked him to sign a paper "to say that he and all the
Swazis agreed to go over and recognise the authority of the Boer
Government, and have nothing more to do with the English."[16] Umbandine
refused, saying that he looked to and recognised the English
Government. Thereon the Boers, growing angry, answered, "Those fathers
of yours, the English, act very slowly; and if you look to them for
help, and refuse to sign this paper, we shall have scattered you and
your people, and taken possession of the land before they arrive. Why
do you refuse to sign the paper? You know we defeated the English at
Majuba." Umbandine's message then goes on to say that he recognises the
English Government only, and does not wish to have dealings with the
Boers. Also, in the following month, we find him making a direct
application to the Colonial Office through Mr. David Forbes,[17] praying
that his country may be taken under the protection of Her Majesty's
Government.
[16] [C. 4645], 1886, p. 64.
[17] Ibid. p. 70.
More than one such attempt to secure informal rights of occupation in
Swaziland appears to have been made by the Transvaal Boers. Mr. T.
Shepstone, C.M.G., is at present acting as Resident to Umbandine,
though he has not, it would seem, any regular commission from the Home
Government authorising him to do so, probably because it does not
consider that its rights in Swaziland are such as to justify such an
assumption of formal authority over the Swazis. However this may be,
Umbandine could not have found a better man to protect his interests.
Of course, when acts like that of Piet Joubert are reported to the
Government of the South African Republic and made the subject of a
remonstrance by this country, all knowledge of them is repudiated, as
it was repudiated in the case of the invasion of Zululand.
It is part of the policy of the Transvaal only to become an accessory
after the fact. Its subjects go forth and stir up trouble among the
natives, and then probably the Boer Government intervenes "in the
interests of humanity," and takes, or tries to take, the country. This
process is always going on, and, unless the British Government puts a
stop to it, always will go on. We shall probably soon hear that it is
developing itself in the direction of Matabeleland. A country the size
of France, which could without difficulty accommodate a population of
from eight to ten millions of industrious folk, is not large enough for
the wants of a Boer people, numbering something under fifty thousand
souls. Every young Boer must have his six or more thousand acres of
land on which to lord it. It is his birthright, and if it is not
forthcoming he goes and takes it by force from the nearest native
tribe. Hence these continual complaints. Of course, there are two ways
of looking at the matter. There is a party that does not hesitate to
say that the true policy of this country is to let the Boers work their
will upon the natives, and then, as they in turn fly from civilisation
towards the far interior, to follow on their path and occupy the lands
that they have swept. This plan is supported by arguments about the
superiority of the white races and their obvious destiny of rule. It
is, I confess, one that I look upon as little short of wicked. I could
never discern a superiority so great in ourselves as to authorise us,
by right divine as it were, to destroy the coloured man and take his
lands. It is difficult to see why a Zulu, for instance, has not as much
right to live in his own way as a Boer or an Englishman. Of course,
there is another extreme. Nothing is more ridiculous than the length to
which the black brother theory is sometimes driven by enthusiasts. A
savage is one thing, and a civilised man is another; and though
civilised men may and do become savages, I personally doubt if the
converse is even possible. But whether the civilised man, with his gin,
his greed, and his dynamite, is really so very superior to the savage
is another question, and one which would bear argument, although this
is not the place to argue it. My point is, that his superiority is not
at any rate so absolutely overwhelming as to justify him in the
wholesale destruction of the savage and the occupation of his lands, or
even in allowing others to do the work for him if he can prevent it.
The principle might conceivably be pushed to inconvenient and indecent
lengths. Savagery is only a question of degree. When all true savages
have been wiped out, the most civilised and self-righteous among the
nations may begin to give the term to those whom they consider to be on
a lower scale than themselves, and apply the argument also. Thus there
are "cultured" people in another land who do not hesitate to say that
the humble writers of these islands are rank and rude barbarians not to
be endured. Supposing that, being the stronger, they also _applied
the argument_, it would be inconvenient for some of us, and perhaps
the world would not gain so very much after all. But this is a
digression, only excusable, if excusable at all, in one who has endured
a three weeks' course of unmitigated Blue-book. To return.
The process of absorption attempted in Swaziland, and brought to a
successful issue in Zululand, also went forward merrily in
Bechuanaland, till recently, under the rule of Mankorane, chief of the
Batlapins, and Montsioa, chief of the Baralongs. These two chiefs have
always been devoted friends and adherents of the English Government,
and consequently are not regarded with favour by the Boers. Shortly
after the retrocession of the Transvaal, a rival to Mankorane rose up
in the person of a certain Massou, and a rival to Montsioa named
Moshette. Both Massou and Moshette were supported by Boer fillibusters,
and what happened to Usibepu in Zululand happened to these unfortunate
chiefs in Bechuanaland. They were defeated after a gallant struggle,
and two Republics called Stellaland and Goschen were carved out of
their territories and occupied by the fillibusters. Fortunately for
them, however, they had a friend in the person of the Rev. John
Mackenzie, to whose valuable work, "Austral Africa," I beg to refer the
reader for a fuller account of these events. Mr. Mackenzie, who had for
many years lived as a missionary among the Bechuanas, had also mastered
the fact that it is very difficult to do anything for South Africa in
this country unless you can make it a question of votes, or, in other
words, unless you can bring pressure to bear upon the Government.
Accordingly he commenced an agitation on behalf of Mankorane and
Montsioa, in which he was supported by various religious bodies, and
also by the late Mr. Forster and the Aborigines Protection Society. As
a result of this agitation he was appointed Deputy to the High
Commissioner for Bechuanaland, whither he proceeded early in 1884 to
establish a British protectorate. He was gladly welcomed by the
unfortunate chiefs, who were now almost at their last gasp, and who
both of them ceded their rights of government to the Queen. Hostilities
did not, however, cease, for on the 31st July 1884 the fillibusters
again attacked Montsioa, routed him, and cruelly murdered Mr. Bethell,
his English adviser. Meanwhile Mr. Mackenzie's success was viewed with
very mixed feelings at the Cape. To the English party it was most
acceptable, but the Dutch,[18] and more numerous party, looked on it
with alarm and disgust. They did not at all wish to see the Imperial
power established in Bechuanaland; so pressure was put upon Sir
Hercules Robinson, and through him on Mr. Mackenzie, to such an extent
indeed as to necessitate the resignation of the latter. Thereon the
High Commissioner despatched a Cape politician, Mr. Cecil Rhodes, and
his own private secretary, Captain Bower, R.N., to Bechuanaland. These
gentlemen at once set to work to undo most of what Mr. Mackenzie had
done, and, generally speaking, did not advance either British or native
interests in Bechuanaland. At this point, taking advantage of the
general confusion, the Government of the South African Republic issued
a proclamation placing both Montsioa and Moshette under its protection,
as usual "in the interests of humanity."
[18] By the Dutch party I mean the anti-Imperial and
retrogressive party. It must be remembered that many of the
now educated and progressive Boers do not belong to this.
But the agitation in England had, fortunately for what remained of the
Bechuana people, not been allowed to drop. Her Majesty's Government
disallowed the Boer proclamation, under Article iv. of the convention
of London, and despatched an armed force to Bechuanaland, commanded by
Sir Charles Warren. This good act, I believe I am right in saying, we
owe entirely to the firmness of Sir Charles Dilke and Mr. Chamberlain,
who insisted upon its being done. Meanwhile Messrs. Upington and
Sprigg, members of the Cape Government, hastened to Bechuanaland to
effect a settlement before the arrival of Sir Charles Warren's force.
This settlement, though it might have been agreeable to the
fillibusters and the anti-Imperialists generally, was disallowed by Her
Majesty's Government as unsatisfactory, and Sir Charles Warren was
ordered to occupy Bechuanaland. This he accordingly did, taking Mr.
Mackenzie with him, very much against the will of the anti-English
party, and, be it added, of Sir Hercules Robinson. Indeed, if we may
accept Mr. Mackenzie's version of these occurrences, which seems to be
a fair one, and adequately supported by documentary evidence, the
conduct of Sir Hercules Robinson towards Mr. Mackenzie would really
admit of explanation. As soon as the freebooters saw that the Imperial
Government was really in earnest, of course there was no more trouble.
They went away, and Sir Charles Warren took possession of Bechuanaland
without striking a single blow. He remained in the country for nearly a
year arranging for its permanent pacification and government, and as a
result of his occupation, on the 30th September 1885, all the territory
south of the Molopo River was declared to be British territory, and
made into a quasi crown colony, the entire extent of land, including
the districts ruled over by Khama, Sechele, and Gasitsive, being about
160,000 square miles in area. I believe that the new colony of British
Bechuanaland is proving a very considerable success. Every provision
has been made for native wants, and its settlement goes on apace. There
is no reason why, with its remarkable natural advantages, it should not
one day become a great country, with a prosperous white, and a loyal
and contented native population. When this comes about it is to be
hoped that it will remember that it owes its existence to the energy
and firmness of Mr. Mackenzie, Sir Charles Dilke, Mr. Chamberlain, and
Sir Charles Warren.
It is probably by now dawning upon the mind of the British public that
when we gave up the Transvaal we not only did a cowardly thing and
sowed a plentiful crop of future troubles, we also abandoned one of the
richest, if not the richest, country in the world. The great
gold-fields which exist all over the surface of the land are being
opened up and pouring out their treasures so fast that it is said that
the Transvaal Government, hitherto remarkable for its impecuniosity,
does not know what to do with its superfluous cash. To what extent this
will continue it is impossible to say, but I for one shall not be
surprised if the output should prove to be absolutely unprecedented.
And with gold in vast quantities, with iron in mountains, and coal-beds
to be measured by the scores of square miles, with lead and copper and
cobalt, a fertile soil, water, and one of the most lovely climates in
the world, what more is required to make a country rich and great? Only
one thing, an Anglo-Saxon Government, and that we have taken away from
the Transvaal. Whether the English flag has vanished for ever from its
borders is, however, still an open question. The discovery of gold in
such quantities is destined to exercise a very remarkable influence
upon the future of the Transvaal. Where gold is to be found, there the
hardy, enterprising, English-speaking diggers flock together, and
before them and their energy the Boer retreats, as the native retreats
and vanishes before the rifle of the Boer. Already there are many
thousands of diggers in the Transvaal; if the discoveries of gold go
on and prove as remunerative as they promise to be, in a few more years
their number will be vastly increased. Supposing that another five
years sees sixty or seventy thousand English diggers at work in the
Transvaal, is it to be believed that these men will in that event allow
themselves to be ruled by eight or nine thousand hostile-hearted Boers?
Is it to be believed, too, that the Boers will stop to try and rule
them? From such knowledge as I have of their character I should say
certainly not. They will _trek_, anywhere out of the way of the
Englishman and his English ways, and those who do not _trek_ will
be absorbed.[19] Should this happen, it is, of course, possible, and
even probable, that for some time the diggers, fearing the vacillations
of Imperial policy, would prefer to remain independent with a
Republican form of Government. But the Englishman is a law-abiding and
patriotic creature, and as society settled itself in the new community,
it would almost certainly desire to be united to the Empire and
acknowledge the sovereignty of the Queen. So far as a judgment can be
formed, if only the gold holds out the Transvaal will as certainly fall
into the lap of the Empire as a green apple will one day drop from the
tree--that is, if it is not gathered.
[19] The occupation of Rhodesia has now made it impossible
for the Boers to trek out of reach of the English and their
flag.--H. R. H.
Now it is quite possible that the Germans, or some other power, may try
to gather the Transvaal apple. The Boers are not blind to the march of
events, and they dislike us and our rule. Perhaps they might think it
worth their while to seek German protection, and unless we are prepared
to say "no" very firmly indeed--and who knows, in the present condition
of Home politics, what we are prepared to do from one day to
another?--Germany would in such a case almost certainly think it worth
her while to give it. Very likely the protection, when granted, would
in some ways resemble that which the Boer himself, his breast aglow
with love of peace and the "interests of humanity," is so anxious to
extend to the misguided native possessor of desirable and well-watered
lands. Very likely, in the end, the Boer would be sorry that he did not
accept the ills he knew of. But that is neither here nor there. So far
as we are concerned, the mischief would be done. In short, should the
position arise, everything will depend upon our capacity of saying
"no," and the tone in which we say it. It will not do to rely upon our
London convention, by which the Transvaal is forbidden to conclude
treaties with outside powers without the consent of this Government.
The convention has been broken before now, and will be broken again, if
the Boers find it convenient to break it, and know that they can do so
with impunity. Meanwhile we must rest on our oars and watch events. One
thing, however, might and should be done. Some person having weight and
real authority--if he were quite new to South Africa so much the
better--should be appointed as our Consul to watch over the welfare of
Englishmen and our Imperial interests at Pretoria, and properly paid
for doing so. It is difficult to find a suitable man unless he is
adequately salaried and supported.
But quite recently this country has awakened to the knowledge that
Delagoa Bay is important to its South African interests, though how
important it perhaps does not altogether realise. For years and years
the colony of Natal has been employed in the intermittent construction
of a railway with a very narrow gauge, which is now open as far as
Ladysmith, or to within a hundred miles of the Transvaal border. Natal
is very poor, and in common with the rest of South Africa, and indeed
of the world, has lately been passing through a period of great
commercial depression. The Home Government has refused to help it to
construct its railways (if it had done so, how many hundreds of
thousand pounds would have been saved to the British taxpayer during
the Zulu and Boer wars!), and has equally refused to allow it to borrow
sufficient money to get them constructed, with the result that a large
amount of the interior trade has already been deflected into other
channels. And now a fresh and very real danger, not only to Natal, but
to all Imperial interests in South Africa, has sprung into sudden
prominence, that is, in this country, for in Africa it has been
foreseen for many years. Above Zululand is situated Amatongaland, which
reaches to the southern shore of one of the finest harbours in the
world, Delagoa Bay. This great bight, in which half a dozen navies
could ride at anchor, the only really good haven on the coasts of South
Africa, is fifty-five miles in width and twenty in depth, that is, from
east to west It is separated from the Transvaal, of which it is the
natural port, by about ninety miles of wild and sparsely inhabited
country.
The ownership of this splendid port was for many years in dispute
between this country and the Portuguese, with whose dominions of
Mozambique it is connected by a strip of coast, and who have a small
fort upon it. This dispute was finally referred by Lord Granville in
1872 to the decision of Marshal MacMahon, and on this occasion, as on
every other in which this country has been weak enough to go to
arbitration, that decision was given against us. Into the merits of the
case it is not necessary to enter, further than to say, as has already
been recently pointed out by a very able and well-informed correspondent
of the _Morning Post_, that it is by no means clear by what right the
matter was referred to arbitration at all. The Amatongas are in
possession of the southern shore of the bay, including, I believe, the
Inyack Peninsula and Inyack Island, and they are an independent people.
The Swazis also abut on it, and they are independent. What warrant had
we to refer their rights to the arbitration of Marshal MacMahon? The
evidence of the exercise of any Portuguese sovereignty over these
countries is so shadowy that it may be said never to have existed;
certainly it does not exist now. This is a point, but it is nothing
more. We must take things as we find them, and we find that the
Portuguese have been formally declared and admitted by us to be the
owners of Delagoa Bay.
Now, so long as we held the Transvaal it did not so much matter who had
the sovereignty of the Bay, since a railway constructed from there
could only run to British territory. But we gave up the Transvaal,
which is now virtually a hostile state, and the contingency which has
been so long foreseen in South Africa, and so blindly overlooked at
home, has come to pass--the railway is in course of rapid completion.
What does this mean to us? At the best, it means that we lose the
greater part of the trade of South-eastern Africa; at the worst, that
we lose it all. In other words, it means, putting aside the question of
our Imperial needs and status in Africa, a great many millions a year
in hard cash out of the national pocket. Let us suppose that the worst
happens, and that the Germans get a footing either in the Transvaal or
Delagoa Bay. Obviously they will stop our trade in favour of their own.
Or let us suppose that the Transvaal takes advantage of one of our
spasms of Imperial paralysis, such as afflicted us during the
_régime_ of Lord Derby, and defies the provision in the convention
which forbids them to put a heavier tax upon our goods than upon those
of any other nation. In either event our case would be a bad one, for
our road from the eastern coast to the vast interior is blocked. But it
is of little use crying over spilt milk, or anticipating evils which it
is our duty to try to avert, and which in all probability still could
be averted by a sound and consistent policy.
To begin with, both Swaziland and Amatongaland can be annexed to the
Empire. It is true that the independence of the first of these
countries is guaranteed by Article xii. of the convention of London of
1884. Here is the exact wording:--"The independence of the Swazis
within the boundary-line of Swaziland, as indicated in the first
article of this convention, will be fully recognised." But England has
for years exercised a kind of protective right over Swaziland--a right,
as I have already shown, fully acknowledged and frequently appealed to
by the Swazis themselves. And for the rest, what is the obvious meaning
of this provision? It means that the independence of Swaziland is
guaranteed against Boer encroachments; its object was to protect the
Swazis from extermination at the hands of the Boers. Further, the Boers
have again and again broken this article of the convention in their
repeated attempts to get a foothold in Swaziland. It has now become
necessary to our interests that the Swazis should come under our rule,
as indeed they are most anxious to do, and a way should be found by
which this end can be accomplished.
Then as to Amatongaland, or Maputaland, as it is sometimes called, only
a month or two ago an embassy from the Queen of that country waited on
the Colonial Office, praying for British protection. It is not known
what answer they received; let us trust that it was a favourable
one.[20] The protection that should be accorded to the Amatongas, both
in their interests and our own, is annexation to the British Empire
upon such terms as might be satisfactory to them. The management of
their country might be left to them, subject to the advice of a
Resident, and the enforcement of the ordinary laws respecting life and
property common to civilised states. Drink and white men might be
strictly excluded from it, unless the Amatongas should wish to welcome
the latter. But the country, with its valuable but undefined rights
over Delagoa Bay, should belong to England, for whoever owns Swaziland
and Amatongaland will in course of time be almost certain to own the
Bay also. It must further be remembered that circumstances have already
given us certain rights over the Amatongas. They regarded Cetywayo as
their suzerain, and it was, I believe, at his instance that Zambila was
appointed regent during the minority of her son. As we have annexed
what remains of Zululand, Cetywayo's suzerainty has consequently passed
to us.
[20] I understand that the treaty which we have concluded
with Amatongaland (where, by the way, it is said a new
harbour has been discovered) binds the authorities of that
country not to cede territory to any other Power. But there
is nothing in such a treaty to prevent, say Portugal or the
Boers, from taking possession of the land by force of arms.
Were the country annexed to the Crown, or a British
Protectorate established, they would not dare to do this.
_Note._--This has since been done.--H. R. H.
Meanwhile, can nothing be done by direct treaty with the Portuguese? A
little while ago the Bay could no doubt have been acquired for a very
moderate consideration, but those golden opportunities have been
allowed to slip from hands busy weaving the web of party politics. Now
it is a different affair. Delagoa Bay is of no direct value to Portugal
except for the honour and glory of the thing. Portugal has never done
anything with it, any more than she has with her other African
possessions, and never will do anything with it. But it has become very
valuable, indeed, so far as its South African interests are concerned,
almost vital, to this country, and of that fact Portugal is perfectly
well aware. Consequently, if we want the Bay we must pay for it, if not
in cash, at the offer of which the Portuguese national pride might be
revolted, then in some other equivalent. Surely a power like England
could find a way of obliging one like Portugal in return for this small
concession. Or an exchange of territory might be effected. Perhaps
Portugal might be inclined to accept of some of our possessions on the
West Coast or an island or two in the West Indies. It is hard to
suppose that there is no way out of the trouble; but if indeed there is
none, why, then, one must be found, or we must be content to lose a
great part of our African trade.
The reader who has followed me through this brief and imperfect summary
of recent events in South Africa will see how varied are its interests,
how enormous its areas, and how vast its wealth. In that great country
England is still the paramount power. Her prestige has, indeed, been
greatly shaken, and she is sadly fallen from her estate of eight or
nine years gone. But she is still paramount; and if she has to face the
animosity of a section of the Boers, she can, notwithstanding her many
crimes against them, set against it the love and respect of every
native in the land, with the exception, perhaps, of a few self-seekers
and intriguers. The history of the next twenty years, and perhaps of
the next ten, will decide whether this country is to remain paramount
or whether South Africa is to become a great Dutch, English-hating
Republic. There are some who call themselves Englishmen, and who
possessed by that strange itch which prompts them to desire any evil
that can humble their country in the face of her enemies, or can bring
about the advantage of the rebel to the injury of the loyal subject, to
whom this last event would be most welcome, and who have not hesitated
to say that it would be welcome. To such there is nothing to be said.
Let them follow their false lights and earn the wonder of true-hearted
men and the maledictions of posterity.
But, addressing those of other and older doctrines, I would ask what
such an event would mean? It would mean nothing less than a great
national calamity; it would mean the utter ruin of the native tribes;
and, to come to a reason which has a wider popularity, for as I think
Mr. S. Little says in his work on South Africa, "the argument to the
pocket is the best argument to the man," it would mean the loss of a
vast trade, which, if properly protected, will be growing while we are
sleeping. And this calamity can yet be averted; the mistakes and
cowardice of the past can still be remedied, at any rate to a great
extent; the door is yet open. We have many difficulties to face, among
the chief of which are the Transvaal, the question of Delagoa Bay, and
last, but not least, the question of the Dutch party at the Cape, which
may be numerically the strongest party. When, in our mania for
representative institutions, we thrust responsible government upon the
Cape, we placed ourselves practically at the mercy of any chance
anti-English majority. It is possible that in the future we may find
some such majority urging upon an English Ministry the desirability of
the separation of the Cape Colony from the Empire, and may find also
that the prayer meets with favourable attention from those to whom
there is but one thing sacred, the rights of a majority, and especially
of an agitating majority.
But let not the country be deceived by any such representations. The
natives too have a right to a voice in the disposal of their fortunes
and their lands. They are the majority in the proportion of three to
one, and let any doubter go and ask of them, anywhere from the Zambesi
to Cape Agulhas, whether they would rather be ruled by the Queen or by
a Boer Republic, and hear the answer. When it was a question of
surrendering the Transvaal we heard a great deal of the rights of some
thirty thousand Boers, and very little, or rather nothing, of the
rights of the million natives who lived in the country with them, and
to whom that country originally belonged. And yet, if the reader will
turn to that part of this book which deals with the question, he will
find that they had an opinion, and a strong one. No settlement of South
African questions that does not receive adequate consideration from a
native point of view can be a just settlement, or one which the Home
Government should sanction. Moreover, the Cape is not by any means
entirely anti-English at heart, as was shown clearly enough by the
number and enthusiasm of the loyalist meetings when its Ministry was
attempting to undo Mr. Mackenzie's work in Bechuanaland in the
interests of the Patriot-party.
Still, it is possible that movements may arise under the fostering care
of the Africander Bond and its sympathisers, having for object the
separation of the colony from the Empire, or other ends fatal to
Imperial interests; and in this case the Home Government should be
prepared to disallow and put a final stop to them. We cannot afford to
lose our alternative route to India and to throw these great
territories into the hands of enemies, from which they would very
probably pass into those of commercial rivals. In such an event all
that would be required is a show of firmness. If once it was known that
an English Ministry really meant what it said, and that its promises
made in the Queen's name were not liable to be given the lie by a
succeeding set of politicians elected on another platform, there would
be an end to disloyalty and agitation in South Africa. As it is,
loyalists, remembering the experiences of the last few years, are
faint-hearted, never knowing if they will meet with support at home,
while agitators and enemies wax exceeding bold.
Our system of party government, whatever may be its merits, if any, as
applied to Home politics, is a great enemy to the welfare and progress
of our Colonies, the affairs of which are, especially of late years,
frequently used as stalking-horses to cover an attack upon the other
side. Could not the two great parties agree to rule Colonial affairs,
and especially South African affairs, out of the party game? Could not
the policy of the Colonial Office be guided by a Commission composed of
members of different political opinions, and responsible not to party,
but to Parliament and the country, instead of by a succession of
Ministers as variable and as transitory as shadows? Lord Rosebery and
Mr. Chamberlain, for instance, are Radicals; but, putting aside party
tactics and exigencies, are their views upon Colonial matters so widely
different from those of, let us say, Sir Michael Hicks Beach and Lord
Carnarvon that it would be impossible for these four gentlemen to act
together on such a Commission? Surely they are not; and perhaps a day
may come when the common-sense of the country will lead it to adopt
some such system which would give to the Colonies a fixed and
intelligent control aiming at the furtherance of the joint interests of
the Empire and its dependencies. If it ever does, that day will be a
happy one for all concerned.
Meanwhile, there is, so far as South Africa is concerned, a step that
might be taken to the great benefit of that country, and also of our
Imperial aims, and that is the appointment of a High Commissioner who
would have charge of all Imperial as distinguished from the various
Colonial interests. This appointment has already been advocated with
ability by Mr. Mackenzie in the last chapter of his book, "Austral
Africa," and it is undoubtedly one that should receive the
consideration of the Government. Such an officer would not supersede
the Governors of the various colonies or the administrators of the
native territories, although, so far as Imperial interests were
concerned, they would be primarily responsible to him. At present there
is no central authority except the Colonial Office, and Downing Street
is a long way off and somewhat overworked. Each Governor must
necessarily look at South African affairs from his own standpoint and
through local glasses. What is wanted is a man of the first ability,
whose name would command respect abroad and support at home; and
several such men could be found, who would study South African politics
as a whole as an engineer studies a map, and who would set himself to
conciliate and reconcile all interests for the common welfare and the
welfare of the mother-country. Such a man, or rather a succession of
such men, might, if properly supported, succeed in bringing about a
very different state of affairs from that which has been briefly
reviewed and considered in these pages. They might, little by little,
build up a South African Confederation, strong in itself and loyal to
England, that shall in time become a great empire. For my part,
notwithstanding the difficulties and dangers which we have brought upon
ourselves, and upon the various South African territories and their
inhabitants, I believe that such an empire is destined to arise, and
that it will not take the form of a Dutch Republic.
APPENDIX.
I.
THE POTCHEFSTROOM ATROCITIES, &c.
There were more murders and acts of cruelty committed during the war at
Potchefstroom, where the behaviour of the Boers was throughout both
deceitful and savage, than at any other place.
When the fighting commenced a number of ladies and children, the wives
and children of English residents, took refuge in the fort. Shortly
after it had been invested they applied to be allowed to return to
their homes in the town till the war was over. The request was refused
by the Boer commander, who said that as they had gone there, they might
stop and "perish" there. One poor lady, the wife of a gentleman well
known in the Transvaal, was badly wounded by having the point of a
stake, which had been cut in two by a bullet, driven into her side. She
was at the time in a state of pregnancy, and died some days afterwards
in great agony. Her little sister was shot through the throat, and
several other women and children suffered from bullet wounds, and fever
arising from their being obliged to live for months exposed to rain and
heat, with insufficient food.
The moving spirit of all the Potchefstroom atrocities was a cruel
wretch of the name of Buskes, a well-educated man, who, as an advocate
of the High Court, had taken the oath of allegiance to the Queen.
One deponent swears that he saw this Buskes wearing Captain Fall's
diamond ring, which he had taken from Sergeant Ritchie, to whom it was
handed to be sent to England, and also that he had possessed himself of
the carriages and other goods belonging to prisoners taken by the
Boers.[21] Another deponent (whose name is omitted in the Blue Book for
precautionary reasons) swears, "That on the next night the patrol again
came to my house accompanied by one Buskes, who was secretary of the
Boer Committee, and again asked where my wife and daughter were. I
replied, in bed; and Buskes then said, 'I must see for myself.' I
refused to allow him, and he forced me, with a loaded gun held to my
breast, to open the curtains of the bed, when he pulled the bedclothes
half off my wife, and altogether off my daughter. I then told him if I
had a gun I would shoot him. He placed a loaded gun at my breast, when
my wife sprang out of bed and got between us."
[21] Buskes was afterwards forced to deliver up the ring.
I remember hearing at the time that this Buskes (who is a good
musician) took one of his victims, who was on the way to execution,
into the chapel and played the "Dead March in Saul," or some such
piece, over him on the organ.
After the capture of the Court House a good many Englishmen fell into
the hands of the Boers. Most of these were sentenced to hard labour and
deprivation of "civil rights." The sentence was enforced by making them
work in the trenches under a heavy fire from the fort. One poor fellow,
F. W. Finlay by name, got his head blown off by a shell from his own
friends in the fort, and several loyal Kafirs suffered the same fate.
After these events the remaining prisoners refused to return to the
trenches till they had been "tamed" by being thrashed with the butt end
of guns, and by threats of receiving twenty-five lashes each.
But their fate, bad as it was, was not so awful as that suffered by Dr.
Woite and J. Van der Linden.
Dr. Woite had attended the Boer meeting which was held before the
outbreak, and written a letter from thence to Major Clarke, in which he
had described the talk of the Boers as silly bluster. He was not a paid
spy. This letter was, unfortunately for him, found in Major Clarke's
pocket-book, and because of it he was put through a form of trial,
taken out and shot dead, all on the same day. He left a wife and large
family, who afterwards found their way to Natal in a destitute
condition.
The case of Van der Linden is somewhat similar. He was one of Raaf's
Volunteers, and as such had taken the oath of allegiance to the Queen.
In the execution of his duty he made a report to his commanding officer
about the Boer meeting, and which afterwards fell into the hands of the
Boers. On this he was put through the form of trial, and, though in the
service of the Queen, was found guilty of treason and condemned to
death. One of his judges, a little less stony-hearted than the rest,
pointed out that "when the prisoner committed the crime martial law had
not yet been proclaimed, nor the State," but it availed him nothing. He
was taken out and shot.
A Kafir named Carolus was also put through the form of trial and shot,
for no crime at all that I can discover.
Ten unarmed Kafir drivers, who had been sent away from the fort, were
shot down in cold blood by a party of Boers. Several witnesses depose
to having seen their remains lying together close by Potchefstroom.
Various other Kafirs were shot. None of the perpetrators of these
crimes were brought to justice. The Royal Commission comments on these
acts as follows:--
"In regard to the deaths of Woite, Van der Linden, and Carolus, the
Boer leaders do not deny the fact that those men had been executed, but
sought to justify it. The majority of your Commissioners felt bound to
record their opinion that the taking of the lives of these men was an
act contrary to the rules of civilised warfare. Sir H. de Villiers was
of opinion that the executions in these cases, having been ordered by
properly constituted court martial of the Boers' forces after due
trial, did not fall under the cognisance of your Commissioners.
"Upon the case of William Finlay the majority of your Commissioners
felt bound to record the opinion that the sacrifice of Finlay's life,
through forced labour under fire in the trenches, was an act contrary
to the rules of civilised warfare. _Sir H. de Villiers did not feel
justified by the facts of the case in joining in this expression of
opinion_ (sic). As to the case of the Kafir Andries, your Commissioners
decided that, although the shooting of this man appeared to them, from
the information laid before them, to be not in accordance with the
rules of civilised warfare, under all the circumstances of the case, it
was not desirable to insist upon a prosecution."
"The majority of your Commissioners, although feeling it a duty to
record emphatically their disapproval of the acts that resulted in the
deaths of Woite, Van der Linden, Finlay, and Carolus, yet found it
impossible to bring to justice the persons guilty of these acts."
It will be observed that Sir H. de Villiers does not express any
disapproval, emphatic or otherwise, of these wicked murders.
But Potchefstroom did not enjoy a monopoly of murder.
In December 1880, Captain Elliot, who was a survivor from the Bronker
Spruit massacre, and Captain Lambart, who had been taken prisoner by
the Boers whilst bringing remounts from the Free State, were released
from Heidelberg on parole on condition that they left the country. An
escort of two men brought them to a drift of the Vaal river, where they
refused to cross, because they could not get their cart through, the
river being in flood. The escort then returned to Heidelberg and
reported that the officers would not cross. A civil note was then sent
back to Captain Elliot and Lambart, signed by P. J. Joubert, telling
them "to pass the Vaal river immediately by the road that will be shown
to you." What secret orders, if any, were sent with this letter has
never transpired; but I decline to believe that, either in this or in
Barber's case, the Boer escort took upon themselves the responsibility
of murdering their prisoners, without authority of some kind for the
deed.
The men despatched from Heidelberg with the letter found Lambart and
Elliot wandering about and trying to find the way to Standerton, They
presented the letter, and took them towards a drift in the Vaal.
Shortly before they got there the prisoners noticed that their escort
had been reinforced. It would be interesting to know, if these extra
men were not sent to assist in the murder, how and why they turned up
as they did and joined themselves to the escort. The prisoners were
taken to an old and disused drift of the Vaal river and told to cross.
It was now dark, and the river was much swollen with rain; in fact,
impassable for the cart and horses. Captains Elliot and Lambart begged
to be allowed to outspan till the next morning, but were told that they
must cross, which they accordingly attempted to do. A few yards from
the bank the cart stuck on a rock, and whilst in this position the Boer
escort poured a volley into it. Poor Elliot was instantly killed, one
bullet fracturing his skull, another passing through the back, a third
shattering the right thigh, and a fourth breaking the left wrist. The
cart was also riddled, but strange to say, Captain Lambart was
untouched, and succeeded in swimming to the further bank, the Boers
firing at him whenever the flashes of lightning revealed his
whereabouts. After sticking some time in the mud of the bank he managed
to effect his escape, and next day reached the house of an Englishman
called Groom, living in the Free State, and from thence made his way to
Natal.
Two of the murderers were put through a form of trial, after the
conclusion of peace, and acquitted.
The case of the murder of Dr. Barber is of a somewhat similar character
to that of Elliot, except that there is in this case a curious piece of
indirect evidence that seems to connect the murder directly with Piet
Joubert, one of the Triumvirate.
In the month of February 1881, two Englishmen came to the Boer laager
at Lang's Nek to offer their services as doctors. Their names were Dr.
Barber, who was well known to the Boers, and his assistant, Mr. Walter
Dyas, and they came, not from Natal, but the Orange Free State. On
arrival at the Boer camp they were at first well received, but after a
little while seized, searched, and tied up all night to a disselboom
(pole of a waggon). Next morning they were told to mount their horses,
and started from the camp escorted by two men who were to take them
over the Free State line.
When they reached the Free State line the Boers told them to get off
their horses, which they were ordered to bring back to the camp. They
did so, bade good-day to their escort, and started to walk on towards
their destination. When they had gone about forty yards Dyas heard the
report of a rifle, and Barber called out, "My God, I am shot!" and fell
dead.
Dyas went down on his hands and knees and saw one of the escort
deliberately aim at him. He then jumped up, and ran dodging from right
to left, trying to avoid the bullet. Presently the man fired, and he
felt himself struck through the thigh. He fell with his face to the
men, and saw his would-be assassin put a fresh cartridge into his rifle
and aim at him. Turning his face to the ground he awaited his death,
but the bullet whizzed past his head. He then saw the men take the
horses and go away, thinking they had finished him. After waiting a
while he managed to get up and struggled to a house not far off; where
he was kindly treated and remained till he recovered.
Some time after this occurrence a Hottentot, named Allan Smith, made a
statement at Newcastle, from, which it appears that he had been taken
prisoner by the Boers and made to work for them. One night he saw
Barber and Dyas tied to the disselboom, and overheard the following,
which I will give in his own words:--
"I went to a fire where some Boers were sitting; among them was a
low-sized man, moderately stout, with a dark brown full beard,
apparently about thirty-five years of age I do not know his name.
_He was telling his comrades that he had brought an order from Piet
Joubert_ to Viljoen, to take the two prisoners to the Free State
line _and shoot them there_. He said, in the course of conversation,
'Piet Joubert het gevraacht waarom was de mensche neet dood geschiet
toen hulle bijde eerste laager gekom het' ('Piet Joubert asked why were
the men not shot when they came to the first laager.') They then saw me
at the fire, and one of them said, 'You must not talk before that
fellow; he understands what you say, and will tell everybody.
"Next morning Viljoen told me to go away, and gave me a pass into the
Free State. He said (in Dutch), 'You must not drive for any Englishman
again. If we catch you doing so we will shoot you, and if you do not go
away quick, and we catch you hanging about when we bring the two men to
the line, we will shoot you too.'"
Dyas, who escaped, made an affidavit with reference to this statement
in which he says, "I have read the foregoing affidavit of Allan Smith,
and I say that the person described in the third paragraph thereof as
bringing orders from Piet Joubert to Viljoen, corresponds with one of
the Boers who took Dr. Barber and myself to the Free State, and to the
best of my belief he is the man who shot Dr. Barber."
The actual murderers were put on their trial in the Free State, and, of
course, acquitted. In his examination at the trial, Allan Smith says,
"It was a young man who said that Joubert had given orders that Barber
had to be shot.... It was not at night, but in the morning early, when
the young man spoke about Piet Joubert's order."
Most people will gather, from what I have quoted, that there exists a
certain connection between the dastardly murder of Dr. Barber (and the
attempted murder of Mr. Dyas) and Piet Joubert, one of that "able"
Triumvirate of which Mr. Gladstone speaks so highly.
I shall only allude to one more murder, though more are reported to
have occurred, amongst them that of Mr. Malcolm, who was kicked to
death by Boers,--and that is Mr. Green's.
Mr. Green was an English gold-digger, and was travelling along the main
road to his home at Spitzcop. The road passed close by the military
camp at Lydenburg, into which he was called. On coming out he went to a
Boer patrol with a flag of truce, and whilst talking to them was shot
dead. The Rev. J. Thorne, the English clergyman at Lydenburg, describes
this murder in an affidavit in the following words:--
"That I was the clergyman who got together a party of Englishmen and
brought down the body of Mr. Green who was murdered by the Boers and
buried it. I have ascertained the circumstances of the murder, which
were as follows:--Mr. Green was on his way to the gold-fields. As he
was passing the fort, he was called in by the officers, and sent out
again with a message to the Boer commandant. Immediately on leaving the
camp, he went to the Boer guard opposite with a flag of truce in his
hand; while parleying with the Boers, who proposed to make a prisoner
of him, he was shot through the head."
No prosecution was instituted in this case. Mr. Green left a wife and
children in a destitute condition.
II.
PLEDGES GIVEN BY MR GLADSTONE'S GOVERNMENT AS TO THE RETENTION OF
THE TRANSVAAL AS A BRITISH COLONY.
The following extracts from the speeches, despatches, and telegrams of
members of the present Government, with reference to the proposed
retrocession of the Transvaal, are not without interest:--
During the month of May 1880, Lord Kimberley despatched a telegram to
Sir Bartle Frere, in which the following words occur: "_Under no
circumstances can the Queen's authority in the Transvaal be
relinquished._"
In a despatch dated 20th May, and addressed to Sir Bartle Frere, Lord
Kimberley says, "That the sovereignty of the Queen in the Transvaal
could not be relinquished."
In a speech in the House of Lords on the 24th May 1880, Lord Kimberley
said:--
"There was a still stronger reason than that for not receding; it was
impossible to say what calamities such a step as receding might not
cause. We had, at the cost of much blood and treasure, restored peace,
and the effect of our now reversing our policy would be to leave the
province in a state of anarchy, and possibly to cause an internecine
war. For such a risk, he could not make himself responsible. The number
of the natives in the Transvaal was estimated at about 800,000, and
that of the whites less than 50,000. Difficulties with the Zulus and
frontier tribes would again arise, and, looking as they must to South
Africa as a whole, the Government, after a careful consideration of the
question, came to the conclusion _that we could not relinquish the
Transvaal_. Nothing could be more unfortunate than uncertainty in
respect to such a matter."
On the 8th June 1880, Mr. Gladstone, in reply to a Boer memorial, wrote
as follows:--
"It is undoubtedly a matter for much regret that it should, since the
Annexation, have appeared that so large a number of the population of
Dutch origin in the Transvaal are opposed to the annexation of that
territory, but it is impossible now, to consider that question as if it
were presented for the first time. We have to do with a state of things
which has existed for a considerable period, during which _obligations
have been contracted, especially, though not exclusively, towards the
native population, which cannot be set aside_. Looking to all the
circumstances, both of the Transvaal and the rest of South Africa, and
to the necessity of preventing a renewal of disorders, which might lead
to disastrous consequences, not only to the Transvaal but to the whole
of South Africa, _our judgment it that the Queen cannot be advised to
relinquish the Transvaal_."
Her Majesty's Speech, delivered in Parliament on the 6th January 1881,
contains the following words: "A rising in the Transvaal has recently
imposed upon me the duty of _vindicating my authority_."
These extracts are rather curious reading in face of the policy adopted
by the Government, after our troops had been defeated.
III.
A BOER ON BOER DESIGNS.
I reprint here a letter published in _The Times_ of 14th October
1899, together with a prefatory note added by the editor of that
journal. This epistle seems to me worthy of the study of thinking men.
Much of it, most of it indeed, is mere brutal vapouring, false in its
facts, false in its deductions; remarkable only for the livid hues of
hate with which it is coloured. Yet in this vile concoction, the work
evidently of a half-educated member of the Cape Dutch party, or perhaps
of an Afrikander Irishman of the stamp of the late notorious Fenian
Aylward, appear statements built upon a basis of truth which we should
do well to lay to heart. I allude principally to the question of our
food supply and to the possible behaviour of the electorate in the
event of a great war under pressure of want and high prices. (See
paragraph 3 of the letter of "P. S.") In a very different work, "A
Farmer's Year," pages 179 and 380, I have attempted to treat of this
great matter which elsewhere has been dealt with also by others more
able and perhaps better qualified. Until it is reasonably certain that
under any circumstances which we can conceive the price of food stuffs
will not be raised to a prohibitive point, it can never be said that
the future of Great Britain is assured beyond all probable doubt. When
will this problem receive the attention it deserves at the hands of our
Governments and of those over whom they rule?
We have received the following letter, appropriately headed "Boer
Ignorance." The writer bears a well-known Dutch name, and gives as his
late address the name of a well-known town in a Dutch district of Cape
Colony:--
_To the Editor of the "Times."_
SIR,--In your paper you have often commented on what you are
pleased to call the ignorance of my countrymen, the Boers. We are
not so ignorant as the British statesmen and newspaper writers, nor
are we such fools as you British are. We know our policy, and we do
not change it. We have no opposition party to fear nor to truckle
to. Your boasted Conservative majority has been the obedient tool
of the Radical minority, and the Radical minority has been the
blind tool of our farseeing and intelligent, President. We have
desired delay, and we have had it, and we are now practically
masters of Africa from the Zambezi to the Cape. All the Afrikanders
in Cape Colony have been working for years for this end, for they
and we know the facts.
1. The actual value of gold in the Transvaal is at least 200,000
millions of pounds, and this fact is as well known to the Emperors
of Germany and Russia as it is to us. You estimate the value of the
gold at only 700 millions of pounds, or, at least, that is what you
pretend to estimate it at. But Germany, Russia, and France do not
desire you to get possession of this vast mass of gold, and so,
after encouraging you to believe that they will not interfere in
South Africa they will certainly do so, and very easily find a
_casus belli_, and they will assist us directly and indirectly
to drive you out of Africa.
2. We know that you dare not take any precautions in advance to
prevent the onslaught of the Great Powers, as the Opposition, the
great peace party, will raise the question of expense, and this
will win over your lazy, dirty, drunken working classes, who will
never again permit themselves to be taxed to support your Empire,
or even to preserve your existence as a nation.
3. We know from all the military authorities of the European and
American continents that you exist as an independent Power merely
on sufferance, and that at any moment the great Emperor William can
arrange with France or Russia to wipe you off the face of the
earth. They can at any time starve you into surrender. You must
yield in all things to the United States also, or your supply of
corn will be so reduced by the Americans that your working classes
would be compelled to pay high prices for their food, and rather
than do that they would have civil war, and invite any foreign
Power to assist them by invasion, for there is no patriotism in the
working classes of England, Wales, or Ireland.
4. We know that your country has been more prosperous than any
other country during the last fifty years (you have had no civil
war like the Americans and French to tone up your nerves and
strengthen your manliness), and consequently your able-bodied men
will not enlist in your so-called voluntary army. Therefore you
have to hire the dregs of your population to do your fighting, and
they are deficient in physique, in moral and mental ability, and in
all the qualities that make good fighting men.
5. Your military officers we know to be merely pedantic scholars or
frivolous society men, without any capacity for practical warfare
with white men. The Afridis were more than a match for you, and
your victory over the Sudanese was achieved because those poor
people had not a rifle amongst them.
6. We know that your men, being the dregs of your people, are
naturally feeble, and that they are also saturated with the most
horrible sexual diseases, as all your Government returns plainly
show, and that they cannot endure the hardships of war.
7. We know that the entire British race is rapidly decaying, your
birth-rate is rapidly falling, your children are born weak,
diseased, and deformed, and that the major part of your population
consists of females, cripples, epileptics, consumptives, cancerous
people, invalids, and lunatics of all kinds whom you carefully
nourish and preserve.
8. We know that nine-tenths of your statesmen and higher officials,
military and naval, are suffering from kidney diseases, which
weaken their courage and will-power and makes them shirk all
responsibility as far as possible.
9. We know that your Navy is big, but we know that it is not
powerful, and that it is honeycombed with disloyalty--as witness
the theft of the signal-books, the assaults on officers, the
desertions, and the wilful injury of the boilers and machinery,
which all the vigilance of the officers is powerless to prevent.
10. We know that the Conservative Government is a mere sham, and
that it largely reduced the strength of the British artillery in
1888-89. And we know that it does nor dare now to call out the
Militia for training, nor to mobilise the Fleet, nor to give
sufficient grants to the Line and Volunteers for ammunition to
enable them to become good marksmen and efficient soldiers. We
know that British soldiers and sailors are immensely inferior as
marksmen, not only to Germans, French, and Americans, but also to
Japanese, Afridis, Chilians, Peruvians, Belgians, and Russians.
11. We know that no British Government dares to propose any form of
compulsory military or naval training, for the British people would
rather be invaded, conquered, and governed by Germans, Russians, or
Frenchmen than be compelled to serve their own Government.
12. We Boers know that we will not be governed by a set of British
curs, but that we will drive you out of Africa altogether, and the
other manly nations which have compulsory military service--the
armed manhood of Europe--will very quickly divide all your other
possessions between them.
Talk no more of the ignorance of the Boers or Cape Dutch; a few
days more will prove your ignorance of the British position, and in
a short space of time you and your Queen will be imploring the good
offices of the great German Emperor to deliver you from your
disasters, for your humiliations are not yet complete.
For thirty years the Cape Dutch have been waiting their chance, and
now their day has come; they will throw off their mask and your
yoke at the same instant, and 300,000 Dutch heroes will trample you
under foot.
We can afford to tell you the truth now, and in this letter you
have got it.--Yours, &c.,
P. S.
_October 12._
Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & CO.
Edinburgh & London