=Source.=--“Speech on Conciliation with America,” _Edmund Burke_. Vol.
i. of his Collected Works. London: G. Bell and Sons. 1909.
I wish, Sir, to repeal the Boston Port Bill, because (independently
of the dangerous precedent of suspending the rights of the subject
during the king’s pleasure) it was passed, as I apprehend, with
less regularity, and on more partial principles, than it ought. The
corporation of Boston was not heard before it was condemned. Other
towns, full as guilty as she was, have not had their ports blocked
up. Even the restraining bill of the present session does not go to
the length of the Boston Port Act. The same ideas of prudence, which
induced you not to extend equal punishment to equal guilt, even
when you were punishing, induced me, who mean not to chastise, but
to reconcile, to be satisfied with the punishment already partially
inflicted.
Ideas of prudence and accommodation to circumstances, prevent you
from taking away the charters of Connecticut and Rhode Island, as
you have taken away that of Massachusetts colony, though the crown
has far less power in the two former provinces than it enjoyed in the
latter; and though the abuses have been full as great, and as flagrant,
in the exempted as in the punished. The same reasons of prudence
and accommodation have weight with me in restoring the charter of
Massachusetts Bay. Besides, Sir, the act which changes the charter of
Massachusetts is in many particulars so exceptionable, that if I did
not wish absolutely to repeal, I would by all means desire to alter it;
as several of its provisions tend to the subversion of all public and
private justice. Such, among others, is the power in the governor to
change the sheriff at his pleasure; and to make a new returning officer
for every special cause. It is shameful to behold such a regulation
standing among English laws.
The act for bringing persons accused of committing murder under the
orders of government to England for trial is but temporary. That act
has calculated the probable duration of our quarrel with the colonies;
and is accommodated to that supposed duration. I would hasten the happy
moment of reconciliation; and therefore must, on my principle, get rid
of that most justly obnoxious act.
The act of Henry the Eighth, for the trial of treasons, I do not mean
to take away, but to confine it to its proper bounds and original
intention; to make it expressly for trial of treasons (and the greatest
treasons may be committed) in places where the jurisdiction of the
crown does not extend.
Having guarded the privileges of local legislature, I would next secure
to the colonies a fair and unbiassed judicature; for which purpose,
Sir, I propose the following resolution: “That, from the time when the
general assembly or general court of any colony or plantation in North
America, shall have appointed by act of assembly, duly confirmed, a
settled salary to the offices of the chief justice and other judges of
the superior court, it may be proper that the said chief justice and
other judges of the superior courts of such colony, shall hold his and
their office and offices during their good behaviour; and shall not
be removed therefrom, but when the said removal shall be adjudged by
his Majesty in council, upon a hearing on complaint from the general
assembly, or on a complaint from the governor, or council, or the house
of representatives severally, or of the colony in which the said chief
justice and other judges have exercised the said offices.”
The next resolution relates to the courts of admiralty.
It is this:--“That it may be proper to regulate the courts of
admiralty, or vice-admiralty, authorized by the fifteenth chapter of
the fourth of George the Third, in such a manner as to make the same
more commodious to those who sue, or are sued, in the said courts, and
to provide for the more decent maintenance of the judges in the same.”
These courts I do not wish to take away; they are in themselves proper
establishments. This court is one of the capital securities of the
act of navigation. The extent of its jurisdiction, indeed, has been
increased; but this is altogether as proper, and is indeed on many
accounts more eligible, where new powers were wanted, than a court
absolutely new. But courts incommodiously situated, in effect, deny
justice; and a court, partaking in the fruits of its own condemnation,
is a robber. The congress complain, and complain justly, of this
grievance.[7]
These are the three consequential propositions. I have thought of
two or three more; but they come rather too near detail, and to the
province of executive government; which I wish parliament always to
superintend, never to assume. If the first six are granted, congruity
will carry the latter three. If not, the things that remain unrepealed
will be, I hope, rather unseemly encumbrances on the building, than
very materially detrimental to its strength and stability.