CHAPTER I

THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS

BY

BROOKS ADAMS

1913

PREFATORY NOTE

The first chapter of the following book was published, in substantially

its present form, in the _Atlantic Monthly_ for April, 1913. I have to

thank the editor for his courtesy in assenting to my wish to reprint.

The other chapters have not appeared before. I desire also to express my

obligations to my learned friend, Dr. M.M. Bigelow, who, most kindly, at

my request, read chapters two and three, which deal with the

constitutional law, and gave me the benefit of his most valuable

criticism.

Further than this I have but one word to add. I have written in support

of no political movement, nor for any ephemeral purpose. I have written

only to express a deep conviction which is the result of more than

twenty years of study, and reflection upon this subject.

BROOKS ADAMS.

QUINCY, MASSACHUSETTS, May 17, 1913.

CONTENTS

I. THE COLLAPSE OF CAPITALISTIC GOVERNMENT

II. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION

III. AMERICAN COURTS AS LEGISLATIVE CHAMBERS

IV. THE SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM

V. POLITICAL COURTS

VI. INFERENCES

INDEX [not included in this etext]

THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS

CHAPTER I

THE COLLAPSE OF CAPITALISTIC GOVERNMENT

Civilization, I apprehend, is nearly synonymous with order. However much

we may differ touching such matters as the distribution of property, the

domestic relations, the law of inheritance and the like, most of us, I

should suppose, would agree that without order civilization, as we

understand it, cannot exist. Now, although the optimist contends that,

since man cannot foresee the future, worry about the future is futile,

and that everything, in the best possible of worlds, is inevitably for

the best, I think it clear that within recent years an uneasy suspicion

has come into being that the principle of authority has been dangerously

impaired, and that the social system, if it is to cohere, must be

reorganized. So far as my observation has extended, such intuitions are

usually not without an adequate cause, and if there be reason for

anxiety anywhere, it surely should be in the United States, with its

unwieldy bulk, its heterogeneous population, and its complex government.

Therefore, I submit, that an hour may not be quite wasted which is

passed in considering some of the recent phenomena which have appeared

about us, in order to ascertain if they can be grouped together in any

comprehensible relation.

About a century ago, after, the American and French Revolutions and the

Napoleonic wars, the present industrial era opened, and brought with it

a new governing class, as every considerable change in human environment

must bring with it a governing class to give it expression. Perhaps, for

lack of a recognized name, I may describe this class as the industrial

capitalistic class, composed in the main of administrators and bankers.

As nothing in the universe is stationary, ruling classes have their

rise, culmination, and decline, and I conjecture that this class

attained to its acme of popularity and power, at least in America,

toward the close of the third quarter of the nineteenth century. I draw

this inference from the fact that in the next quarter resistance to

capitalistic methods began to take shape in such legislation as the

Interstate Commerce Law and the Sherman Act, and almost at the opening

of the present century a progressively rigorous opposition found for its

mouthpiece the President of the Union himself. History may not be a very

practical study, but it teaches some useful lessons, one of which is

that nothing is accidental, and that if men move in a given direction,

they do so in obedience to an impulsion as automatic as is the impulsion

of gravitation. Therefore, if Mr. Roosevelt became, what his adversaries

are pleased to call, an agitator, his agitation had a cause which is as

deserving of study as is the path of a cyclone. This problem has long

interested me, and I harbor no doubt not only that the equilibrium of

society is very rapidly shifting, but that Mr. Roosevelt has,

half-automatically, been stimulated by the instability about him to seek

for a new centre of social gravity. In plain English, I infer that he

has concluded that industrialism has induced conditions which can no

longer be controlled by the old capitalistic methods, and that the

country must be brought to a level of administrative efficiency

competent to deal with the strains and stresses of the twentieth

century, just as, a hundred and twenty-five years ago, the country was

brought to an administrative level competent for that age, by the

adoption of the Constitution. Acting on these premises, as I conjecture,

whether consciously worked out or not, Mr. Roosevelt's next step was to

begin the readjustment; but, I infer, that on attempting any correlated

measures of reform, Mr. Roosevelt found progress impossible, because of

the obstruction of the courts. Hence his instinct led him to try to

overleap that obstruction, and he suggested, without, I suspect,

examining the problem very deeply, that the people should assume the

right of "recalling" judicial decisions made in causes which involved

the nullifying of legislation. What would have happened had Mr.

Roosevelt been given the opportunity to thoroughly formulate his ideas,

even in the midst of an election, can never be known, for it chanced

that he was forced to deal with subjects as vast and complex as ever

vexed a statesman or a jurist, under difficulties at least equal to the

difficulties of the task itself. If the modern mind has developed one

characteristic more markedly than another, it is an impatience with

prolonged demands on its attention, especially if the subject be

tedious. No one could imagine that the New York press of to-day would

print the disquisitions which Hamilton wrote in 1788 in support of the

Constitution, or that, if it did, any one would read them, least of all

the lawyers; and yet Mr. Roosevelt's audience was emotional and

discursive even for a modern American audience. Hence, if he attempted

to lead at all, he had little choice but to adopt, or at least discuss,

every nostrum for reaching an immediate millennium which happened to be

uppermost; although, at the same time, he had to defend himself against

an attack compared with which any criticism to which Hamilton may have

been subjected resembled a caress. The result has been that the

Progressive movement, bearing Mr. Roosevelt with it, has degenerated

into a disintegrating rather than a constructive energy, which is, I

suspect, likely to become a danger to every one interested in the

maintenance of order, not to say in the stability of property. Mr.

Roosevelt is admittedly a strong and determined man whose instinct is

arbitrary, and yet, if my analysis be sound, we see him, at the supreme

moment of his life, diverted from his chosen path toward centralization

of power, and projected into an environment of, apparently, for the most

part, philanthropists and women, who could hardly conceivably form a

party fit to aid him in establishing a vigorous, consolidated,

administrative system. He must have found the pressure toward

disintegration resistless, and if we consider this most significant

phenomenon, in connection with an abundance of similar phenomena, in

other countries, which indicate social incoherence, we can hardly resist

a growing apprehension touching the future. Nor is that apprehension

allayed if, to reassure ourselves, we turn to history, for there we find

on every side long series of precedents more ominous still.

Were all other evidence lacking, the inference that radical changes are

at hand might be deduced from the past. In the experience of the

English-speaking race, about once in every three generations a social

convulsion has occurred; and probably such catastrophes must continue to

occur in order that laws and institutions may be adapted to physical

growth. Human society is a living organism, working mechanically, like

any other organism. It has members, a circulation, a nervous system, and

a sort of skin or envelope, consisting of its laws and institutions.

This skin, or envelope, however, does not expand automatically, as it

would had Providence intended humanity to be peaceful, but is only

fitted to new conditions by those painful and conscious efforts which we

call revolutions. Usually these revolutions are warlike, but sometimes

they are benign, as was the revolution over which General Washington,

our first great "Progressive," presided, when the rotting Confederation,

under his guidance, was converted into a relatively excellent

administrative system by the adoption of the Constitution.

Taken for all in all, I conceive General Washington to have been the

greatest man of the eighteenth century, but to me his greatness chiefly

consists in that balance of mind which enabled him to recognize when an

old order had passed away, and to perceive how a new order could be best

introduced. Joseph Story was ten years old in 1789 when the Constitution

was adopted; his earliest impressions, therefore, were of the

Confederation, and I know no better description of the interval just

subsequent to the peace of 1783, than is contained in a few lines in his

dissenting opinion in the Charles River Bridge Case:--

"In order to entertain a just view of this subject, we must go back to

that period of general bankruptcy, and distress and difficulty

(1785).... The union of the States was crumbling into ruins, under the

old Confederation. Agriculture, manufactures, and commerce were at their

lowest ebb. There was infinite danger to all the States from local

interests and jealousies, and from the apparent impossibility of a much

longer adherence to that shadow of a government, the Continental

Congress. And even four years afterwards, when every evil had been

greatly aggravated, and civil war was added to other calamities, the

Constitution of the United States was all but shipwrecked in passing

through the state conventions."[1]

This crisis, according to my computation, was the normal one of the

third generation. Between 1688 and 1765 the British Empire had

physically outgrown its legal envelope, and the consequence was a

revolution. The thirteen American colonies, which formed the western

section of the imperial mass, split from the core and drifted into

chaos, beyond the constraint of existing law. Washington was, in his

way, a large capitalist, but he was much more. He was not only a wealthy

planter, but he was an engineer, a traveller, to an extent a

manufacturer, a politician, and a soldier, and he saw that, as a

conservative, he must be "Progressive" and raise the law to a power high

enough to constrain all these thirteen refractory units. For Washington

understood that peace does not consist in talking platitudes at

conferences, but in organizing a sovereignty strong enough to coerce its

subjects.

The problem of constructing such a sovereignty was the problem which

Washington solved, temporarily at least, without violence. He prevailed

not only because of an intelligence and elevation of character which

enabled him to comprehend, and to persuade others, that, to attain a

common end, all must make sacrifices, but also because he was supported

by a body of the most remarkable men whom America has ever produced. Men

who, though doubtless in a numerical minority, taking the country as a

whole, by sheer weight of ability and energy, achieved their purpose.

Yet even Washington and his adherents could not alter the limitations

of the human mind. He could postpone, but he could not avert, the impact

of conflicting social forces. In 1789 he compromised, but he did not

determine the question of sovereignty. He eluded an impending conflict

by introducing courts as political arbitrators, and the expedient worked

more or less well until the tension reached a certain point. Then it

broke down, and the question of sovereignty had to be settled in

America, as elsewhere, on the field of battle. It was not decided until

Appomattox. But the function of the courts in American life is a subject

which I shall consider hereafter.

If the invention of gunpowder and printing in the fourteenth and

fifteenth centuries presaged the Reformation of the sixteenth, and if

the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth was the forerunner of

political revolutions throughout the Western World, we may well, after

the mechanical and economic cataclysm of the nineteenth, cease wondering

that twentieth-century society should be radical.

Never since man first walked erect have his relations toward nature been

so changed, within the same space of time, as they have been since

Washington was elected President and the Parisian mob stormed the

Bastille. Washington found the task of a readjustment heavy enough, but

the civilization he knew was simple. When Washington lived, the fund of

energy at man's disposal had not very sensibly augmented since the fall

of Rome. In the eighteenth, as in the fourth century, engineers had at

command only animal power, and a little wind and water power, to which

had been added, at the end of the Middle Ages, a low explosive. There

was nothing in the daily life of his age which made the legal and

administrative principles which had sufficed for Justinian insufficient

for him. Twentieth-century society rests on a basis not different so

much in degree, as in kind, from all that has gone before. Through

applied science infinite forces have been domesticated, and the action

of these infinite forces upon finite minds has been to create a tension,

together with a social acceleration and concentration, not only

unparalleled, but, apparently, without limit. Meanwhile our laws and

institutions have remained, in substance, constant. I doubt if we have

developed a single important administrative principle which would be

novel to Napoleon, were he to live again, and I am quite sure that we

have no legal principle younger than Justinian.

As a result, society has been squeezed, as it were, from its rigid

eighteenth-century legal shell, and has passed into a fourth dimension

of space, where it performs its most important functions beyond the

cognizance of the law, which remains in a space of but three dimensions.

Washington encountered a somewhat analogous problem when dealing with

the thirteen petty independent states, which had escaped from England;

but his problem was relatively rudimentary. Taking the theory of

sovereignty as it stood, he had only to apply it to communities. It was

mainly a question of concentrating a sufficient amount of energy to

enforce order in sovereign social units. The whole social detail

remained unchanged. Our conditions would seem to imply a very

considerable extension and specialization of the principle of

sovereignty, together with a commensurate increment of energy, but

unfortunately the twentieth-century American problem is still further

complicated by the character of the envelope in which this highly

volatilized society is theoretically contained. To attain his object,

Washington introduced a written organic law, which of all things is the

most inflexible. No other modern nation has to consider such an

impediment.

Moneyed capital I take to be stored human energy, as a coal measure is

stored solar energy; and moneyed capital, under the stress of modern

life, has developed at once extreme fluidity, and an equivalent

compressibility. Thus a small number of men can control it in enormous

masses, and so it comes to pass that, in a community like the United

States, a few men, or even, in certain emergencies, a single man, may

become clothed with various of the attributes of sovereignty. Sovereign

powers are powers so important that the community, in its corporate

capacity, has, as society has centralized, usually found it necessary to

monopolize them more or less absolutely, since their possession by

private persons causes revolt. These powers, when vested in some

official, as, for example, a king or emperor, have been held by him, in

all Western countries at least, as a trust to be used for the common

welfare. A breach of that trust has commonly been punished by

deposition or death. It was upon a charge of breach of trust that

Charles I, among other sovereigns, was tried and executed. In short, the

relation of sovereign and subject has been based either upon consent and

mutual obligation, or upon submission to a divine command; but, in

either case, upon recognition of responsibility. Only the relation of

master and slave implies the status of sovereign power vested in an

unaccountable superior. Nevertheless, it is in a relation somewhat

analogous to the latter, that the modern capitalist has been placed

toward his fellow citizens, by the advances in applied science. An

example or two will explain my meaning.

High among sovereign powers has always ranked the ownership and

administration of highways. And it is evident why this should have been

so. Movement is life, and the stoppage of movement is death, and the

movement of every people flows along its highways. An invader has only

to cut the communications of the invaded to paralyze him, as he would

paralyze an animal by cutting his arteries or tendons. Accordingly, in

all ages and in all lands, down to the nineteenth century, nations even

partially centralized have, in their corporate capacity, owned and cared

for their highways, either directly or through accountable agents. And

they have paid for them by direct taxes, like the Romans, or by tolls

levied upon traffic, as many mediaeval governments preferred to do.

Either method answers its purpose, provided the government recognizes

its responsibility; and no government ever recognized this

responsibility more fully than did the autocratic government of ancient

Rome. So the absolute régime of eighteenth-century France recognized

this responsibility when Louis XVI undertook to remedy the abuse of

unequal taxation, for the maintenance of the highways, by abolishing the

corvée.

Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, the application, by

science, of steam to locomotion, made railways a favorite speculation.

Forthwith, private capital acquired these highways, and because of the

inelasticity of the old law, treated them as ordinary chattels, to be

administered for the profit of the owner exclusively. It is true that

railway companies posed as public agents when demanding the power to

take private property; but when it came to charging for use of their

ways, they claimed to be only private carriers, authorized to bargain as

they pleased. Indeed, it grew to be considered a mark of efficient

railroad management to extract the largest revenue possible from the

people, along the lines of least resistance; that is, by taxing most

heavily those individuals and localities which could least resist. And

the claim by the railroads that they might do this as a matter of right

was long upheld by the courts,[2] nor have the judges even yet, after a

generation of revolt and of legislation, altogether abandoned this

doctrine.

The courts--reluctantly, it is true, and principally at the instigation

of the railways themselves, who found the practice unprofitable--have

latterly discountenanced discrimination as to persons, but they still

uphold discrimination as to localities.[3] Now, among abuses of

sovereign power, this is one of the most galling, for of all taxes the

transportation tax is perhaps that which is most searching, most

insidious, and, when misused, most destructive. The price paid for

transportation is not so essential to the public welfare as its

equality; for neither persons nor localities can prosper when the

necessaries of life cost them more than they cost their competitors. In

towns, no cup of water can be drunk, no crust of bread eaten, no garment

worn, which has not paid the transportation tax, and the farmer's crops

must rot upon his land, if other farmers pay enough less than he to

exclude him from markets toward which they all stand in a position

otherwise equal. Yet this formidable power has been usurped by private

persons who have used it purely selfishly, as no legitimate sovereign

could have used it, and by persons who have indignantly denounced all

attempts to hold them accountable, as an infringement of their

constitutional rights. Obviously, capital cannot assume the position of

an irresponsible sovereign, living in a sphere beyond the domain of law,

without inviting the fate which has awaited all sovereigns who have

denied or abused their trust.

The operation of the New York Clearing-House is another example of the

acquisition of sovereign power by irresponsible private persons.

Primarily, of course, a clearing-house is an innocent institution

occupied with adjusting balances between banks, and has no relation to

the volume of the currency. Furthermore, among all highly centralized

nations, the regulation of the currency is one of the most jealously

guarded of the prerogatives of sovereignty, because all values hinge

upon the relation which the volume of the currency bears to the volume

of trade. Yet, as everybody knows, in moments of financial panic, the

handful of financiers who, directly or indirectly, govern the

Clearing-House, have it in their power either to expand or to contract

the currency, by issuing or by withdrawing Clearing-House certificates,

more effectually perhaps than if they controlled the Treasury of the

United States. Nor does this power, vast as it is, at all represent the

supremacy which a few bankers enjoy over values, because of their

facilities for manipulating the currency and, with the currency, credit;

facilities, which are used or abused entirely beyond the reach of the

law.

Bankers, at their conventions and through the press, are wont to

denounce the American monetary system, and without doubt all that they

say, and much more that they do not say, is true; and yet I should

suppose that there could be little doubt that American financiers might,

after the panic of 1893, and before the administration of Mr. Taft, have

obtained from Congress, at most sessions, very reasonable legislation,

had they first agreed upon the reforms they demanded, and, secondly,

manifested their readiness, as a condition precedent to such reforms, to

submit to effective government supervision in those departments of their

business which relate to the inflation or depression of values. They

have shown little inclination to submit to restraint in these

particulars, nor, perhaps, is their reluctance surprising, for the

possession by a very small favored class of the unquestioned privilege,

whether actually used or not, at recurring intervals, of subjecting the

debtor class to such pressure as the creditor may think necessary, in

order to force the debtor to surrender his property to the creditor at

the creditor's price, is a wonder beside which Aladdin's lamp burns dim.

As I have already remarked, I apprehend that sovereignty is a variable

quantity of administrative energy, which, in civilizations which we

call advancing, tends to accumulate with a rapidity proportionate to the

acceleration of movement. That is to say, the community, as it

consolidates, finds it essential to its safety to withdraw, more or less

completely, from individuals, and to monopolize, more or less strictly,

itself, a great variety of functions. At one stage of civilization the

head of the family administers justice, maintains an armed force for war

or police, wages war, makes treaties of peace, coins money, and, not

infrequently, wears a crown, usually of a form to indicate his

importance in a hierarchy. At a later stage of civilization, companies

of traders play a great part. Such aggregations of private and

irresponsible adventurers have invaded and conquered empires, founded

colonies, and administered justice to millions of human beings. In our

own time, we have seen the assumption of many of the functions of these

and similar private companies by the sovereign. We have seen the East

India Company absorbed by the British Parliament; we have seen the

railways, and the telephone and the telegraph companies, taken into

possession, very generally, by the most progressive governments of the

world; and now we have come to the necessity of dealing with the

domestic-trade monopoly, because trade has fallen into monopoly through

the centralization of capital in a constantly contracting circle of

ownership.

Among innumerable kinds of monopolies none have been more troublesome

than trade monopolies, especially those which control the price of the

necessaries of life; for, so far as I know, no people, approximately

free, have long endured such monopolies patiently. Nor could they well

have done so without constraint by overpowering physical force, for the

possession of a monopoly of a necessary of life by an individual, or by

a small privileged class, is tantamount to investing a minority,

contemptible alike in numbers and in physical force, with an arbitrary

and unlimited power to tax the majority, not for public, but for private

purposes. Therefore it has not infrequently happened that persistence in

adhering to and in enforcing such monopolies has led, first, to attempts

at regulation, and, these failing, to confiscation, and sometimes to the

proscription of the owners. An example of such a phenomenon occurs to

me which, just now, seems apposite.

In the earlier Middle Ages, before gunpowder made fortified houses

untenable when attacked by the sovereign, the highways were so dangerous

that trade and manufactures could only survive in walled towns. An

unarmed urban population had to buy its privileges, and to pay for these

a syndicate grew up in each town, which became responsible for the town

ferm, or tax, and, in return, collected what part of the municipal

expenses it could from the poorer inhabitants. These syndicates, called

guilds, as a means of raising money, regulated trade and fixed prices,

and they succeeded in fixing prices because they could prevent

competition within the walls. Presently complaints became rife of guild

oppression, and the courts had to entertain these complaints from the

outset, to keep some semblance of order; but at length the turmoil

passed beyond the reach of the courts, and Parliament intervened.

Parliament not only enacted a series of statutes regulating prices in

towns, but supervised guild membership, requiring trading companies to

receive new members upon what Parliament considered to be reasonable

terms. Nevertheless, friction continued.

With advances in science, artillery improved, and, as artillery

improved, the police strengthened until the king could arrest whom he

pleased. Then the country grew safe and manufactures migrated from the

walled and heavily taxed towns to the cheap, open villages, and from

thence undersold the guilds. As the area of competition broadened, so

the guilds weakened, until, under Edward VI, being no longer able to

defend themselves, they were ruthlessly and savagely plundered; and

fifty years later the Court of King's Bench gravely held that a royal

grant of a monopoly had always been bad at common law.[4]

Though the Court's law proved to be good, since it has stood, its

history was fantastic; for the trade-guild was the offspring of trade

monopoly, and a trade monopoly had for centuries been granted habitually

by the feudal landlord to his tenants, and indeed was the only means by

which an urban population could finance its military expenditure. Then,

in due course, the Crown tried to establish its exclusive right to

grant monopolies, and finally Parliament--or King, Lords, and Commons

combined, being the whole nation in its corporate capacity,

--appropriated this monopoly of monopolies as its supreme

prerogative. And with Parliament this monopoly has ever since remained.

In fine, monopolies, or competition in trade, appear to be recurrent

social phases which depend upon the ratio which the mass and the

fluidity of capital, or, in other words, its energy, bears to the area

within which competition is possible. In the Middle Ages, when the town

walls bounded that area, or when, at most, it was restricted to a few

lines of communication between defensible points garrisoned by the

monopolists,--as were the Staple towns of England which carried on the

wool trade with the British fortified counting-houses in Flanders,--a

small quantity of sluggish capital sufficed. But as police improved, and

the area of competition broadened faster than capital accumulated and

quickened, the competitive phase dawned, whose advent is marked by Darcy

_v_. Allein, decided in the year 1600. Finally, the issue between

monopoly and free trade was fought out in the American Revolution, for

the measure which precipitated hostilities was the effort of England to

impose her monopoly of the Eastern trade upon America. The Boston Tea

Party occurred on December 16, 1773. Then came the heyday of competition

with the acceptance of the theories of Adam Smith, and the political

domination in England, towards 1840, of the Manchester school of

political economy.

About forty years since, in America at least, the tide would appear once

more to have turned. I fix the moment of flux, as I am apt to do, by a

lawsuit. This suit was the Morris Run Coal Company _v._ Barclay Coal

Company,[5] which is the first modern anti-monopoly litigation that I

have met with in the United States. It was decided in Pennsylvania in

1871; and since 1871, while the area within which competition is

possible has been kept constant by the tariff, capital has accumulated

and has been concentrated and volatilized until, within this republic,

substantially all prices are fixed by a vast moneyed mass. This mass,

obeying what amounts to being a single volition, has its heart in Wall

Street, and pervades every corner of the Union. No matter what price is

in question, whether it be the price of meat, or coal, or cotton cloth,

or of railway transportation, or of insurance, or of discounts, the

inquirer will find the price to be, in essence, a monopoly or fixed

price; and if he will follow his investigation to the end, he will also

find that the first cause in the complex chain of cause and effect which

created the monopoly in that mysterious energy which is enthroned on the

Hudson.

The presence of monopolistic prices in trade is not always a result of

conscious agreement; more frequently, perhaps, it is automatic, and is

an effect of the concentration of capital in a point where competition

ceases, as when all the capital engaged in a trade belongs to a single

owner. Supposing ownership to be enough restricted, combination is

easier and more profitable than competition; therefore combination,

conscious or unconscious, supplants competition. The inference from the

evidence is that, in the United States, capital has reached, or is

rapidly reaching, this point of concentration; and if this be true,

competition cannot be enforced by legislation. But, assuming that

competition could still be enforced by law, the only effect would be to

make the mass of capital more homogeneous by eliminating still further

such of the weaker capitalists as have survived. Ultimately, unless

indeed society is to dissolve and capital migrate elsewhere, all the

present phenomena would be intensified. Nor would free trade, probably,

have more than a very transitory effect. In no department of trade is

competition freer than in the Atlantic passenger service, and yet in no

trade is there a stricter monopoly price.

The same acceleration of the social movement which has caused this

centralization of capital has caused the centralization of another form

of human energy, which is its negative: labor unions organize labor as a

monopoly. Labor protests against the irresponsible sovereignty of

capital, as men have always protested against irresponsible sovereignty,

declaring that the capitalistic social system, as it now exists, is a

form of slavery. Very logically, therefore, the abler and bolder labor

agitators proclaim that labor levies actual war against society, and

that in that war there can be no truce until irresponsible capital has

capitulated. Also, in labor's methods of warfare the same phenomena

appear as in the autocracy of capital. Labor attacks capitalistic

society by methods beyond the purview of the law, and may, at any

moment, shatter the social system; while, under our laws and

institutions, society is helpless.

Few persons, I should imagine, who reflect on these phenomena, fail to

admit to themselves, whatever they may say publicly, that present social

conditions are unsatisfactory, and I take the cause of the stress to be

that which I have stated. We have extended the range of applied science

until we daily use infinite forces, and those forces must, apparently,

disrupt our society, unless we can raise the laws and institutions which

hold society together to an energy and efficiency commensurate to them.

How much vigor and ability would be required to accomplish such a work

may be measured by the experience of Washington, who barely prevailed in

his relatively simple task, surrounded by a generation of extraordinary

men, and with the capitalistic class of America behind him. Without the

capitalistic class he must have failed. Therefore one most momentous

problem of the future is the attitude which capital can or will assume

in this emergency.

That some of the more sagacious of the capitalistic class have

preserved that instinct of self-preservation which was so conspicuous

among men of the type of Washington, is apparent from the position taken

by the management of the United States Steel Company, and by the

Republican minority of the Congressional Committee which recently

investigated the Steel Company; but whether such men very strongly

influence the genus to which they belong is not clear. If they do not,

much improvement in existing conditions can hardly be anticipated.

If capital insists upon continuing to exercise sovereign powers, without

accepting responsibility as for a trust, the revolt against the existing

order must probably continue, and that revolt can only be dealt with, as

all servile revolts must be dealt with, by physical force. I doubt,

however, if even the most ardent and optimistic of capitalists would

care to speculate deeply upon the stability of any government capital

might organize, which rested on the fundamental principle that the

American people must be ruled by an army. On the other hand any

government to be effective must be strong. It is futile to talk of

keeping peace in labor disputes by compulsory arbitration, if the

government has not the power to command obedience to its arbitrators'

decree; but a government able to constrain a couple of hundred thousand

discontented railway employees to work against their will, must differ

considerably from the one we have. Nor is it possible to imagine that

labor will ever yield peaceful obedience to such constraint, unless

capital makes equivalent concessions,--unless, perhaps, among other

things, capital consents to erect tribunals which shall offer relief to

any citizen who can show himself to be oppressed by the monopolistic

price. In fine, a government, to promise stability in the future, must

apparently be so much more powerful than any private interest, that all

men will stand equally before its tribunals; and these tribunals must be

flexible enough to reach those categories of activity which now lie

beyond legal jurisdiction. If it be objected that the American people

are incapable of an effort so prodigious, I readily admit that this may

be true, but I also contend that the objection is beside the issue. What

the American people can or cannot do is a matter of opinion, but that

social changes are imminent appears to be almost certain. Though these

changes cannot be prevented, possibly they may, to a degree, be guided,

as Washington guided the changes of 1789. To resist them perversely, as

they were resisted at the Chicago Convention of 1912, can only make the

catastrophe, when it comes, as overwhelming as was the consequent defeat

of the Republican party.

Approached thus, that Convention of 1912 has more than a passing

importance, since it would seem to indicate the ordinary phenomenon,

that a declining favored class is incapable of appreciating an

approaching change of environment which must alter its social status. I

began with the proposition that, in any society which we now understand,

civilization is equivalent to order, and the evidence of the truth of

the proposition is, that amidst disorder, capital and credit, which

constitute the pith of our civilization, perish first. For more than a

century past, capital and credit have been absolute, or nearly so;

accordingly it has not been the martial type which has enjoyed

sovereignty, but the capitalistic. The warrior has been the capitalists'

servant. But now, if it be true that money, in certain crucial

directions, is losing its purchasing power, it is evident that

capitalists must accept a position of equality before the law under the

domination of a type of man who can enforce obedience; their own

obedience, as well as the obedience of others. Indeed, it might occur,

even to some optimists, that capitalists would be fortunate if they

could certainly obtain protection for another fifty years on terms as

favorable as these. But at Chicago, capitalists declined even to

consider receding to a secondary position. Rather than permit the advent

of a power beyond their immediate control, they preferred to shatter the

instrument by which they sustained their ascendancy. For it is clear

that Roosevelt's offence in the eyes of the capitalistic class was not

what he had actually done, for he had done nothing seriously to injure

them. The crime they resented was the assertion of the principle of

equality before the law, for equality before the law signified the end

of privilege to operate beyond the range of law. If this principle which

Roosevelt, in theory at least, certainly embodied, came to be rigorously

enforced, capitalists perceived that private persons would be precluded

from using the functions of sovereignty to enrich themselves. There lay

the parting of the ways. Sooner or later almost every successive ruling

class has had this dilemma in one of its innumerable forms presented to

them, and few have had the genius to compromise while compromise was

possible. Only a generation ago the aristocracy of the South

deliberately chose a civil war rather than admit the principle that at

some future day they might have to accept compensation for their slaves.

A thousand other instances of similar incapacity might be adduced, but I

will content myself with this alone.

Briefly the precedents induce the inference that privileged classes

seldom have the intelligence to protect themselves by adaptation when

nature turns against them, and, up to the present moment, the old

privileged class in the United States has shown little promise of being

an exception to the rule.

Be this, however, as it may, and even assuming that the great industrial

and capitalistic interests would be prepared to assist a movement toward

consolidation, as their ancestors assisted Washington, I deem it far

from probable that they could succeed with the large American middle

class, which naturally should aid, opposed, as it seems now to be, to

such a movement. Partially, doubtless, this opposition is born of fear,

since the lesser folk have learned by bitter experience that the

powerful have yielded to nothing save force, and therefore that their

only hope is to crush those who oppress them. Doubtless, also, there is

the inertia incident to long tradition, but I suspect that the

resistance is rather due to a subtle and, as yet, nearly unconscious

instinct, which teaches the numerical majority, who are inimical to

capital, that the shortest and easiest way for them to acquire

autocratic authority is to obtain an absolute mastery over those

political tribunals which we call courts. Also that mastery is being by

them rapidly acquired. So long as our courts retain their present

functions no comprehensive administrative reform is possible, whence I

conclude that the relation which our courts shall hold to politics is

now the fundamental problem which the American people must solve, before

any stable social equilibrium can be attained.

Theodore Roosevelt's enemies have been many and bitter. They have

attacked his honesty, his sobriety, his intelligence, and his judgment,

but very few of them have hitherto denied that he has a keen instinct

for political strife. Only of late has this gift been doubted, but now

eminent politicians question whether he did not make a capital mistake

when he presented the reform of our courts of law, as expounders of the

Constitution, as one of his two chief issues, in his canvass for a

nomination for a third presidential term.

After many years of study of, and reflection upon, this intricate

subject I have reached the conviction that, though Mr. Roosevelt may

have erred in the remedy which he has suggested, he is right in the

principle which he has advanced, and in my next chapter I propose to

give the evidence and explain the reasons which constrain me to believe

that American society must continue to degenerate until confusion

supervenes, if our courts shall remain semi-political chambers.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Charles River Bridge _v_. Warren Bridge, II Peters, 608, 609.

[2] Fitchburg R.R. _v_. Gage, 12 Gray 393, and innumerable cases

following it.

[3] See the decisions of the Commerce Court on the Long and Short-Haul

Clause. Atchison, T.&S.F. By. _v_. United States, 191 Federal Rep. 856.

[4] Darcy _v_. Allein, 11 Rep. 84.

[5] 68 Pa. 173.

The Theory of Social Revolutions · 第 1 / 6 章