MORRIS KNOWLES
Pittsburgh Flood Commission
Early reports of the recent Ohio floods gave many the impression that
the disasters were due to the failure of reservoirs; and as these
reports were not generally corrected later, this impression no doubt
remains in the minds of some. An investigation made during the week
following the disasters showed this to be incorrect; but the escape was
so narrow in some instances that the lesson of reservoirs of this sort
is driven home almost as strongly as if they had failed and caused an
enormous destruction of life and property.
Most of the reservoirs in the flooded districts belonged to the Ohio
state canal system and were constructed to supply water for the canals
in the dry seasons. In addition, the Columbus water supply storage dam
on the Scioto river, was reported to have failed, causing a panic in
Columbus. A number of power dams in various parts of the state were also
the subjects of similar rumors. But these reports were either entirely
without foundation, as in the case of the Columbus dam, or else the dams
were relatively unimportant, so that this article may well be confined
to the canal reservoirs.
The Ohio canal system, built in the second quarter of the last century,
consists of two main divisions—the Ohio Canal, or eastern route,
connecting Lake Erie and the Ohio river by way of the Cuyahoga,
Tuscarawas, Muskingum, Licking and Scioto river valleys; and the Miami
and Erie Canal, or western route, connecting Lake Erie and the Ohio
river by way of the Maumee, Auglaize, and Miami river valleys. In
addition, the Muskingum river was slack-watered below Zanesville.
Numerous lateral, feeder and tributary canals completed a system which
had cost approximately $16,000,000 and which comprised in 1850 over
1,000 miles of canals, more than 300 lift locks and half a dozen
reservoirs.
In the case of each of the main canal routes, water was lacking on the
summit level during the dry season, and the reservoirs were constructed
to supplement the normal flow at such times. The Portage Lakes, just
south of Akron, were dammed about 1840, to supply the summit of the
eastern route; Loramie and Lewistown Reservoirs about 1850–60, for the
western route; and the Licking Reservoir, or Buckeye Lake, about 1832,
for the Licking summit. In addition, Grand Reservoir, the largest in the
state, was built about 1841, to supply the northern slope of the Miami
and Erie Canal.
[Illustration:
LOOKING DOWN THE EAST RESERVOIR CREVASSE
In the wreckage are the remains of a saloon and of a concrete bridge.
]
During the middle of the last century, just prior to the Civil War,
these canals were very active, and brought in a gross revenue, during
some years, of over $500,000. In 1851 the gross earnings were over
$799,000, and the net earnings almost $470,000. But later, the decline
came, as it did on all of the old canals. As the canal section and lock
dimensions were out-grown by the demands of modern traffic, a gradual
abandonment of navigation followed, until now, for many years, there has
been no canal freight traffic at all. Some of the branch and feeder
canals have been officially abandoned, and either left to deteriorate
without attention, or else filled up. Several of the reservoirs were
dedicated by the legislature, by several acts passed since 1894, to use
as public parks and pleasure resorts, with the provision, however, that
they must be maintained for canal purposes.
For the past few years, therefore, the only revenues from the canals
have been from the leasing of lands for oil well drilling and from the
sale of water or water power to private or municipal water works and
industrial plants. An annual appropriation has been made, in addition,
to assist in meeting the expense of maintenance. There has, therefore,
been no great stimulus to comprehensive and thorough work, and probably
a great deal of the maintenance has been of a perfunctory character. The
canals and reservoirs are in charge of a Board of Public Works of three
members, but neither this nor any other state body or official appears
to have had the specific duty of investigating these reservoirs from the
sole point of view of public safety.
The Portage Lakes, about six miles south of Akron, were provided with no
spillway whatever. The only way water could be discharged from them was
through a thirty-six inch pipe. At the beginning of the rain-storm, the
level in the reservoirs was within about one foot of the top of the
embankment. It was not surprising, therefore, that the lakes filled up,
overflowed the low embankment and washed out a crevasse about
twenty-five feet deep and nearly 200 feet wide. The water overflowed a
considerable area of low farm lands.
At the Lewistown Reservoir, which covers 6,000 acres, about a quarter of
a mile of the west embankment was overflowed continuously for a day and
a half. Waves dashed over the top of the south bank for several days.
Both banks were almost despaired of, and a large force of men, including
cottagers and citizens from neighboring towns, worked hard, placing logs
and sand bags, to save them. In this they were successful, but a large
area south of the reservoir was overflowed.
The Loramie Reservoir of 1,830 acres was already filled to above the
spillway level when the rain started, and the water reached a maximum
elevation of about four feet above the 200 foot spillway. Two small
crevasses about twenty and twenty-five feet wide respectively and five
or six feet deep, were washed out at a low portion of the embankment.
The Grand Reservoir is one of the largest artificial bodies of water in
the world and covers about 13,400 acres. The water rose to about two
feet above the ninety-five foot spillway. The water did not come near
overtopping the banks, but heavy waves were driven against and over
them, eroding them seriously at some points, and softening and furrowing
their backs at others. A large force of volunteers worked with the
laborers, filling and placing bags of sand, while a company of state
militia patrolled the banks. No breaks occurred at any point, but the
situation was critical for two or three days.
[Illustration:
REPAIRED BREAK IN LORAMIE RESERVOIR EMBANKMENT.
When the break occurred the water was about four feet over the
spillway.
]
* * * * *
These situations teach a lesson that ought never to need repetition.
Reservoir failures did not contribute measurably to the flood damage in
Ohio. The trouble was caused by excessive and extensive rains.
But even if the reservoirs did not fail with disastrous results, the
margin was a narrow one and the lesson is equally plain. It has long
been an engineering principle that an earth embankment must not be
overtopped. Twenty-four years ago, the Johnstown disaster, due to
insufficient spillway capacity, impressed this upon the whole world. And
it is an interesting parallel, that this was caused by an old reservoir
originally built by the state for canal purposes, and later abandoned
and used for pleasure purposes. Yet in Ohio there were four earth
embankment reservoirs, one of which had no spillway and a far from
sufficient discharge pipe; two of which filled up so that the banks were
overflowed; and one which did not overflow, but which filled up
sufficiently so that waves were driven over the embankments. Nor was the
rainfall one beyond the range of probability. The March storm probably
broke all records for combined intensity, duration and extent. But for
small drainage areas such as these (52 to 114 square miles) the rainfall
was not unprecedented. At least two storms have occurred in Ohio during
the past forty years in which the rainfall in forty-eight hours was
greater than that recorded in any forty-eight hours of the late storm,
at any station, excepting Piqua, which is below the reservoirs in
question. And in at least one storm in the same period, the rainfall for
twenty-four hours was within .06 inch of the highest twenty-four hour
rainfall of last month.
The faults in these reservoirs, then, were not due to a lack of
knowledge as to what to expect, but only to failure to apply knowledge
already gained. In this case, of course, state ownership put an extra
responsibility on Ohio to see that its property was not a menace to its
citizens. But, in any case, the state is the only institution which can
see that such structures are provided with the necessary facilities to
make them safe. Johnstown ought to have taught the necessity of
examining reservoirs and dams, and of enforcing suitable standards of
design and construction. Yet if we examine the statute books of Ohio we
find no legislative provision of this kind whatever. Nor is there any
provision for the study, mapping and gauging of the water resources.
This is a necessary preliminary to a full understanding of the possible
menace from uncontrolled waste.
With only two or three exceptions, conditions are precisely the same
throughout the country. Even in Pennsylvania, which has probably
suffered more grievously from dam failures than any other state, there
is as yet no public knowledge of the design and condition of all dams,
and no authority in any official or body to correct a dangerous
condition.
Must we wait for another Johnstown or an Austin to change these things?
Or will we learn from what might well have occurred in Ohio, and make a
repetition of such disasters impossible? The lesson is plain. Will we
profit by it?