Intention of proposing the Dogma of Infallibility intimated--Bavarian
Note to the Cabinets, February to April, 1869--Arnim and Bismarck.
It was in February, 1869, that the fears and hopes which had long
been more or less distinctly directed to a given point, were both
quickened by fresh light. The _Civiltá Cattolica_, in the letter of
its French correspondent, published suggestions that the Council
should sit for but a short time, that it should proclaim the doctrines
of the Syllabus, and that the infallibility of the Pope should be
adopted by acclamation. It was at once alleged that the finger of Pius
himself gave this sign. The suggestions thus made explain what the
Cardinals consulted in the first instance meant when they hoped that
the Council would not last so long as some might think. They had in
1854 induced the bishops to acclaim a new dogma, and in 1867 to accept
the Syllabus without demur, and surely they could get any portions
of that document which it was necessary, for greater clearness,
to formulate into decrees, passed in the same delightful way; and
this would be still more desirable for the dogma of infallibility.
Archbishop Manning treated the idea of an intended acclamation as a
pleasantry; but he charged the ventilation of it on a wrong time and
on a wrong publication. "_Janus_ first announced the discovery of the
plot."[140] It may have been _Janus_ who first clearly indicated a
certain English prelate as the man chosen by the party of acclamation
to give the signal. But he was long behind the first to announce the
plot. The laity generally were offended and alarmed, at least those
north of the Alps, and many bishops who were ready to vote for the
Curia did not feel flattered at having the whole world informed that
they were not wanted in Rome as judges of the faith, but as adornments
of a grand pageant. The translation or assumption of the body of the
Virgin was also suggested in the same article, as a doctrine which it
was desirable to make into a dogma.
As time wore on, the excitement became more intense. In France, the
action of the government, as in most things under the Second Empire,
was ambiguous. It seemed to dread the impending innovations, and
every now and then what appeared to the world as a menace was half
uttered. Yet it was plain that the Curia was not disturbed. Nothing
can be more tranquil than the letters in the _Civiltá_ from its French
correspondent. There is an apparent sense of solid support, such as
no gusts of the popular winds will seriously shake. M. de Banneville,
the acceptable representative of France in Rome, continued in his
post. When the question of the presence of princes in the Council was
to be faced, Cardinal Antonelli had the comfort of treating it with
this trusty friend. It was comparatively easy to convey to him the
intimation which, in a few words, represented, as M. Veuillot had
showed, a radical revolution in Church and State. _There were no more
Catholic States._ The term "Catholic arms" continued to be applied,
by official writers, to those of France and the other countries which
had reconquered the lost States of the Pope. But arms are perhaps,
like gold and silver to the Brahmans, substances which never contract
pollution. The monarchs were outside the door. Even France, whose flag
at Civitá Vecchia was the only protection of the temporal power, was
told that she was no longer a Catholic State--she, the eldest daughter
of the Church; she whom the Pope, in parting with General Failly, had
for love of her chassepots--the "prodigious chassepots," as they were
called--blessed as the "most Christian nation!" The Curia knew that
the hold of the Pope on the priests and schools was stronger than that
of the Bonapartes on army and nation; and they were rearing up their
champions, while the Empire was wearing out its own.
The same number of the _Civiltá_ which records the death of Antonelli
states the case in the following terms. The Pontiff could not invite
powers "of which one, like Italy, was in open hostility to the Church;
of which another had, like Austria, of her own motion, torn up the
Concordat; and another had, like France, a turncoat and a perfidious
traitor to the Holy See upon the throne."
The Ultramontane priests enjoyed this disfranchisement of kings; but
they were not yet all prepared to find that the Order of Priests was
also to be disfranchised. Not a man of them was to be allowed to plead
in presence of the Council. The Cardinals, in their close and still
Commissions, were preparing to put, not only laymen, but priests and
bishops too, more on the footing of a marching army than ever before.
On April 9, 1869, Prince Hohenlohe addressed a circular to the
European Cabinets in the name of Bavaria. It was not to be believed,
he said, that the Council would confine itself to purely theological
questions, of which, in fact, none were pressing for solution. The
only dogmatic point that Rome wished the Council to decide was that of
Papal infallibility, for which the Jesuits in Germany and elsewhere
were agitating. "This question," added the Prince, "reaches far beyond
the domain of religion, and is in its nature highly political; for the
power of the Pope in temporal things over all princes and nations, even
such as are in separation from Rome, would be defined, and elevated
into an article of faith."
The smooth reply of the German Jesuit organ was that something of the
kind had been said before in the _Augsburg Gazette_. But the circle
of Church authority would remain the same, whether the organ of that
authority should be the Pope singly, or the Pope in conjunction with
the bishops; just as the powers of a national government would be the
same in extent, whether in the hands of a monarch or of a republican
executive.
This is characteristic. The discussion was not about any proposal to
enlarge or contract the theoretic circle of Church power, but about
a proposal to declare that the Pope alone, without the bishops, was
the depositary of that power. If the theory of Rome was correct, no
extension of the circle of power was possible, but the depositary of
power was now to be changed.
If, among ourselves, it was proposed to give the power of life and
death to the Crown, without judge or jury, we might be told that the
power of life and death was the same whether exercised by royal warrant
or through the traditionary courts. The circle of power would not be
extended.
The Bavarian note did not elicit a practical response from other
Cabinets. The reply of Austria was, perhaps, influenced by the fact
that Count Beust, then Prime Minister, was a Protestant. His despatch
bears marks either of non-appreciation of the import of terms and
acts, proceeding from the Vatican, such as would be natural in one
not trained to watch them, or of a desire to evade the gravity of the
question. He thought it best to wait and to be on his guard.[141] On
behalf of Prussia, Bismarck also took up an attitude of observation,
but with more insight into the reasons for the suggestion of Prince
Hohenlohe. The Italian Government had expressed itself in favour of
common action, but practically let things take their course. England
naturally declined to interfere. As to France, she thought herself
protected by the Concordat against all eventualities--another proof
that her statesmen handled affairs without mastering ideas. Perhaps not
one of them had read what Rome had lately been teaching as the true
doctrine of Concordats.
The _Unitá Cattolica_ (June 23), however, put this tranquil attitude of
France in a different light--
Hohenlohe is sold to Prussia, and torments the Catholics of Bavaria
to push them to throw themselves into the arms of Prussia, where
Catholicism enjoys the utmost liberty, thanks to the fox-like
policy of Bismarck. This is known in Paris, and hence Napoleon
is said to have looked darkly on the perfidious proposals of the
Bavarian Minister.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 140: _Priv. Pet._, Part III. p. 37.]
[Footnote 141: _Friedberg_, pp. 325-28.]