The march was a most unpleasant one, for the autumn rains surprised

the troops in their passage through the mountains. Moreover some of

the regiments were badly fed, as Sataro, the Portuguese contractor who

had undertaken to supply them with meat, went bankrupt at this moment

and failed to fulfil his obligations. Nevertheless the advance was

carried out with complete success: the men were in good heart, marched

well, and generally maintained their[581] discipline. On November

13 the leading regiments began to file into Salamanca, whither the

Commander-in-chief had already preceded them. The concentration would

have been a little more rapid but for a strange mistake of General

Anstruther, commanding at Almeida, who detained some of the troops for

a few days, contrary to the orders which had been sent him. But by the

twenty-third the three columns had all joined at Salamanca[582], where

Moore now had 15,000 infantry and the solitary battery that had marched

with Fraser’s division. The guns had met with some tiresome obstacles,

but had surmounted them with no great difficulty, and Moore now saw

(as we have already shown) that he might have brought the whole of his

artillery with him, if only he had been given correct information as to

the state of the roads.

[581] Moore names one regiment only as an exception.

[582] Save two stray battalions, which had started last from

Lisbon.

On November 23, then, the British commander-in-chief lay at Salamanca,

with six infantry brigades and one battery. Baird lay at Astorga, with

four brigades and three batteries: a few of his battalions were still

on the march from Galicia. Hope, with Moore’s cavalry and guns, was

near the Escurial. Lord Paget with Baird’s equally belated cavalry,

which had left Corunna on the fifteenth, was between Lugo and Astorga.

The situation was deplorable, for it was clear that the army would

require ten days more to concentrate and get into full fighting order,

and it was by no means certain that those ten days would be granted

to it. Such were the unhappy results of the false direction given to

Hope’s column, and of the enforced delay of Baird at Corunna, owing to

the folly of the Galician Junta.

It may easily be guessed that Moore’s state of mind at this moment

was most unenviable. He had received, much at the same time as did

Baird, the news of Gamonal and Espinosa. He was aware that no screen

of Spanish troops now lay between him and the enemy. He had heard of

the arrival of Milhaud’s dragoons at Valladolid, and of Lefebvre’s

corps at Carrion, and he expected every moment to hear that they were

marching forward against himself. Yet he could not possibly advance

without cavalry or guns, and if attacked he must fly at once towards

Portugal, for it would be mad to attempt to fight in the plains with no

force at his disposition save a mass of foot-soldiery. If the French

moved forward from Valladolid to Zamora on the one side, or to Avila

on the other, he would inevitably be cut off from Baird and Hope.

There was no serious danger that any one of the three columns might be

caught by the enemy, if they halted at once, for each had a clear and

safe line of retreat, on Lisbon, Corunna, and Talavera respectively.

But if they continued their movement of concentration the case was

otherwise. To any one unacquainted with Bonaparte’s actual design of

throwing all his forces on Madrid by the Somosierra road, it looked

not only possible, but probable, that the enemy would advance westward

as well as southward from his present positions, and if he did so the

game was up. The British army, utterly unable to concentrate, must fly

in three separate directions. Moore and Hope might ultimately unite in

front of Lisbon: Baird might be shipped round from Corunna to the same

point. But this movement would take many weeks, and its moral effect

would be deplorable. What would be thought of the general who marched

forward till he was within eighty miles of the French, and then ordered

a precipitate retreat, without even succeeding in concentrating his

army or firing a single shot? The thought filled Moore’s heart with

bitterness: must he, with all his ability and with his well-earned

reputation, swell the list of the failures, and be reckoned with the

Duke of York, Dalrymple, and Hutchinson among the generals who were

too late--who had their chance of fame, and lost it by being an hour,

or a week, or a month behind the decisive moment? But on one point he

was clear: he must run no unnecessary risk with the forces committed

to him: they were, as was once remarked, not _a_ British field-army,

but the only British field-army. Supposing they were destroyed, no

such second host existed: it would take years to make another. There

were still many regiments on home service, but those which now lay at

Salamanca and Astorga were the pick of the whole, the corps chosen for

foreign service because they were the fittest for it.

The question, then, which Moore had to put to himself was whether he

should persist in attempting to complete the concentration of his army,

and in case of success take an active part in the campaign, or whether

he should simply order each fraction of the British forces to retreat

at once towards some safe base. The way in which the question should be

answered depended mainly on two points--what would be the movements of

the French during the next few days, and what Spanish troops existed

to co-operate with the British army, in case it were determined to

commence active operations. For clearly the 30,000 men of Moore and

Baird could not hope to struggle unaided against the whole French army

in Spain.

To explain Moore’s action, it is necessary to remember that he started

with a strong prejudice against trusting the British army to the mercy

of Spanish co-operation. He had been receiving very gloomy reports both

from Mr. Stuart, the temporary representative of the British Government

at Aranjuez, and from Lord William Bentinck, the military agent whom

Dalrymple had sent to Madrid. The latter was one of the few British

officers who (like Wellesley) foresaw from the first a catastrophe

whenever the French reinforcements should cross the Ebro[583]. Moreover

the character of Moore’s correspondence with the Central Junta, before

and during his advance, had conspired with the reports of Stuart

and Bentinck to give him a very unfavourable idea of the energy and

administrative capacity of our allies. He had been vexed that the

Junta refused to put him in direct communication with the Spanish

generals[584]. He complained that he got from them tardy, unfrequent,

and inaccurate news of the enemy’s movements. He was disgusted that

Lopez, the officer sent to aid him in moving his troops, turned out

to know even less about the roads of the Spanish frontier than he

did himself. But above all he professed that he was terrified by the

apathy which he found both among the officials and the people of the

kingdom of Leon and Old Castile. He had been politely received by the

authorities both at Ciudad Rodrigo and at Salamanca, but he complained

that he got little but empty compliments from them.

[583] There is an undertone of gloom in most of Bentinck’s very

capable letters, which contrasts sharply with the very optimistic

views expressed by Doyle and most of the other military agents.

On Oct. 2 he ‘feels the danger forcibly’ of the want of a single

commander for the Spanish armies. On Sept. 30 he remarks that

‘the Spanish troops consider themselves invincible, but that the

Spanish Government ought not to be deluded by the same opinion.’

On Nov. 14 ‘he must not disguise that he thinks very unfavourably

of the affairs of Spain: the Spaniards have not the means to

repel the danger that threatens’: most of his letters are in more

or less the same strain.

[584] Except with Castaños, from whom some sensible but rather

vague advice was procured.

There was some truth in this allegation, though certain facts can be

quoted against it[585], even from Moore’s own correspondence. Leon and

Old Castile had, as we have already had occasion to remark, been far

less energetic than other parts of the Peninsula in raising new troops

and coming forward with contributions to the national exchequer. They

had done no more than furnish the 10,000 men of Cuesta’s disorderly

‘Army of Castile,’ a contingent utterly out of proportion with their

population and resources. Nor did they seem to realize the scandal of

their own sloth and procrastination. Moore had expected to see every

town full of new levies undergoing drill before marching to the Ebro,

to discover magazines accumulated in important places like Ciudad

Rodrigo and Salamanca, to find the military and civil officials working

busily for the armies at the front. Instead he found an unaccountable

apathy. Even after the reports of Espinosa and Gamonal had come to

hand, the people and the authorities alike seemed to be living in a

sort of fools’ paradise, disbelieving the gloomy news that arrived, or

at least refusing to recognize that the war was now at their own doors.

Moore feared that this came from want of patriotism or of courage.

[585] e.g. in his letter of Nov. 19 Moore speaks of the town of

Salamanca as doing its best for him: the clergy were exerting

themselves, and a convent of nuns had promised him £5,000. In his

_Journal_ he has a testimonial to the fidelity with which the

people of Tordesillas protected an English officer from a raiding

party of French cavalry. There are some similar notes in British

memoirs: e.g. ‘T.S.’ of the 71st expresses much gratitude for the

kindness of the people of Peñaranda, who, when Hope’s division

arrived in a drenched and frozen condition, rolled out barrels of

spirits into the streets and gave every man a good dram before

the regiments marched on. Some towns, e.g. Zamora and Alba de

Tormes, behaved well in opposing (though without any hope of

success) the French, when they did appear.

As a matter of fact, the people’s hearts were sound enough[586], but

they had still got ‘Baylen on the brain’: they simply failed to

recognize the full horror of the situation. That their armies were

not merely beaten but dispersed, that the way to Madrid was open to

Bonaparte, escaped them. This attitude of mind enraged Moore. ‘In these

provinces,’ he wrote, ‘no armed force whatever exists, either for

immediate protection or to reinforce the armies. The French cavalry

from Burgos, in small detachments, are overrunning the province of

Leon, and raising contributions to which the inhabitants submit without

the least resistance: the enthusiasm of which we heard so much nowhere

appears. Whatever good-will there is (and among the lower orders I

believe there is a good deal) is taken no advantage of. I am at this

moment in no communication with any of their generals. I am ignorant

of their plans, or those of their government[587].’ And again, he adds

in despair, ‘I hope a better spirit exists in the southern provinces:

here no one stirs--and yet they are well inclined[588].’ While Leon

and Old Castile were in this state of apathy, it was maddening to

Moore to receive constant appeals from the Supreme Junta, begging that

the British army might move forward at once. Their dispatches were

accompanied by representations, which Moore knew to be inaccurate,

concerning the numbers and enthusiasm of the Spanish armies still in

the field, and by misrepresentations of the force of the French. They

were also backed by urgent letters from Mr. Frere, the new ambassador

at Madrid, urging him to give help at all costs.

[586] As to the conduct of the Spaniards I think that the

best commentary on it is that of Leith Hay (i. 80-1), who was

riding all over Castile and Leon in these unhappy weeks. ‘Thus

terminated a journey of about 900 miles, in which a considerable

portion of the country had been traversed, under circumstances

which enabled me to ascertain the sincere feeling of the people.

It is but justice to say that I met with but one sentiment as to

the war: that I was everywhere treated with kindness. I mention

this as a creditable circumstance to the inhabitants of the

Peninsula, and in contradiction to the statements often recorded,

unjustly in my opinion, as to the want of faith, supineness, and

perfidy of the Spanish people.... Their conduct was throughout

distinguished by good faith, if it was at the same time rendered

apparently equivocal from characteristic negligence, want of

energy, and the deficiency of that moral power that can alone be

derived from free institutions and an enlightened aristocracy.’

[587] Moore to Castlereagh from Salamanca, Nov. 24.

[588] Ibid., Dec. 8.

These appeals were intolerable to a man who dared not advance because

his army (partly by his own fault, partly owing to circumstances that

had not been under his control) was not concentrated. From the point

of view of policy, Moore knew that it was all-important that he should

take the field: but, from the point of view of strategy, he saw that

an advance with the 15,000 men that he had at Salamanca might very

probably lead to instant and complete disaster. He refused to move, but

all the time he knew that his refusal was having the worst effect, and

would certainly be represented by his critics as the result of timidity

and selfishness. It was this consciousness that caused him to fill

his dispatches with the bitterest comments on the Spanish government

and people. He had been induced to advance to Salamanca, he said, by

false pretences. He had been told that there was a large army in front

of him, ready to cover his concentration. He had been informed that

the whole country-side was full of enthusiasm, that he might look for

ready help from every official, that when once he had crossed the

frontier transport and food would be readily provided for him. Instead,

he found nothing but apathy and disasters. ‘Had the real strength and

composition of the Spanish armies been known, and the defenceless state

of the country, I conceive that Cadiz, not Corunna, would have been

chosen for the disembarkation of the troops from England: and Seville

or Cordova, not Salamanca, would have been selected as the proper place

for the assembling of this army[589].’ Thus he wrote to Castlereagh:

to Frere, in reponse to constant invitations to strike a blow of some

sort in behalf of Spain, he replied in more vigorous terms[590].

‘Madrid is threatened; the French have destroyed one army (Blake’s),

have passed the Ebro, and are advancing in superior numbers against

another (Castaños’), which from its composition promises no resistance,

but must retire or be overwhelmed. No other armed force exists in

this country: I perceive no enthusiasm or determined spirit among the

people. This is a state of affairs quite different from that conceived

by the British Government, when they determined to send troops to the

assistance of Spain. It was not expected that these were to cope alone

with the whole force of France: as auxiliaries they were to aid a

people who were believed to be enthusiastic, determined, and prepared

for resistance. It becomes therefore a question whether the British

army should remain to be attacked in its turn, or should retire from

a country where the contest, from whatever circumstances, is become

unequal.’

[589] Moore to Castlereagh from Salamanca, Nov. 24.

[590] Moore to Frere from Salamanca, Nov. 27.

All that Moore wrote was true: yet, granting the accuracy of every

premise, his conclusion that he ought to retire to Portugal was

not necessarily correct. The British Government had undoubtedly

over-estimated the power and resources of Spain: the Supreme Junta had

shown no capacity for organization or command: most of the Spanish

generals had committed gross military blunders. But none of these

facts were enough to justify Moore in washing his hands of the whole

business, and marching out of Spain without firing a shot. He had

not been sent to help the patriots only if they were powerful and

victorious, to desert them if they proved weak and unlucky. If these

had been the orders issued to him by Castlereagh, all Bonaparte’s

taunts about the selfishness and timidity of the British Government

would have been justified. It was true that on his arrival at Salamanca

he found the aspect of the war very different from what he had expected

at the moment of his quitting Lisbon. Instead of aiding the victorious

Spanish armies to press up to the Pyrenees, he would have to cover

their retreat and gain time for the reorganization of the scattered

remnants of their first line of defence. To reject this task because

the Supreme Junta had been incapable, or Blake and Palafox rash and

unskilful, would have been unworthy of a man of Moore’s talents and

courage.

Yet in a moment of irritation at the mismanagement that he saw before

him, and of anger at the continual importunities that he was receiving

from the Central Junta and from Mr. Frere, Moore nearly committed this

fault. The last piece of news which broke down his resolution and drove

him to order a retreat was the account of the battle of Tudela. If he

had been forced to wait for the notification of this disaster through

Spanish official sources, he might have remained ignorant of it for

many days. But Charles Vaughan, the secretary of Mr. Stuart, had been

in the camp of Palafox, and had ridden straight from Tudela to Madrid,

and from Madrid to Salamanca--476 miles in six days[591]. He brought

the intelligence of Castaños’ defeat to the English commander-in-chief

on the night of November 28. Moore lost not a moment in dictating

orders of retreat to the whole army. In the few hours that elapsed

before midnight he gave his own troops directions to prepare to

retire on Portugal, sent Hope a dispatch bidding him turn off on to

cross-roads and move by Peñaranda on Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and

wrote to Baird that he must return to Corunna, re-embark his army, and

bring it round by sea to Lisbon.

[591] The notes and diaries of this ancient member of my own

College have been of enormous use to me for side-lights on

Spanish politics during 1808. His summary of his great ride from

Caparrosa in Navarre to Corunna, between November 21 and December

2, is perhaps worth quoting. ‘From Caparrosa to Madrid and from

Madrid to Salamanca, with the dispatches for Sir John Moore,

containing the defeat of the army commanded by General Castaños,

I rode post. I stayed the night at Salamanca, and at two o’clock

on the following day (Nov. 29) I set out for Astorga with

dispatches for Sir D. Baird, and with Sir J. Moore’s dispatches

for England. I was detained only six hours at Astorga, and after

riding two days and two nights on end arrived at Corunna the

evening of Dec. 2. The post-horses at every relay in Spain were

at this time so overworked that the journey was tiresome and

painful. I had ridden 790 miles from Caparrosa to Corunna in

eleven days (Nov. 21 to Dec. 2). I had a night’s rest at Agreda,

Cetina, and Salamanca, and two at Madrid.’ Deducting two days in

Madrid, the ride was really one of 790 miles in nine days.

The spirit in which Moore acted is shown by the wording of his letter

to Hope:--‘I have determined to give the thing up, and to retire. It

was my wish to have run great risks to fulfil what I conceive to be

the wishes of the people of England, and to give every aid to the

Spanish cause. But they have shown themselves equal to do so little for

themselves, that it would only be sacrificing this army, without doing

any good to Spain, to oppose it to such numbers as must now be brought

against us. A junction with Baird is out of the question, and with you,

perhaps, problematical.... This is a cruel determination for me to

make--I mean to retreat: but I hope you will think the circumstances

such as demand it[592].’

[592] Moore to Hope from Salamanca, Nov. 28.

To Moore, weighed down by the burden of responsibility, and worried by

the constant pressure of the Spaniards at Madrid, ‘who expected every

one to fly but themselves,’ this resolve to retreat seemed reasonable,

and even inevitable. But it was clearly wrong: when he gave the order

he was overwrought by irritation and despondency. He was sent to

aid the Spaniards, and till he was sure that he could do absolutely

nothing in their behalf, it was his duty not to abandon them. The

British army was intended to be used freely in their cause, not to be

laid up--like the talent in the napkin--lest anything might happen to

it. Its mere presence at Salamanca was valuable as an encouragement

to the Spaniards, and a check on the free movement of the French.

Above all, it was not yet proved that the concentration with Baird

and Hope was impossible: indeed, the events of the last few days were

rendering it more and more likely that the junction might, after all,

take place. The French cavalry which had appeared at Valladolid had

gone off southward, without any attempt to move in the direction of

Salamanca. Soult and Lefebvre were also moving in a direction which

would not bring them anywhere near the British army. Hope had crossed

the Guadarrama unhindered, and was now near Villacastin, only seventy

miles from Moore’s head quarters. Under these circumstances it was most

impolitic to order an instant retreat. What would have been thought of

Moore if this movement had been carried out, and if after the British

columns had reached Corunna and Almeida the news had come that no

French infantry had ever been nearer than fifty miles to them, that

their concentration had been perfectly feasible, and that Napoleon had

possessed no knowledge of their whereabouts? All these facts chanced

to be true--as we have seen. The Emperor’s advance on Madrid was made

without any reference to the British army, by roads that took him

very far from Salamanca: he was marching past Moore’s front in serene

unconsciousness of his proximity. If, at the same moment, the British

had been hurrying back to Portugal, pursued only by phantoms hatched in

their general’s imagination, it is easy to guess what military critics

would have said, and what historians would have written. Moore would

have been pronounced a selfish and timid officer, who in a moment of

pique and despondency deliberately abandoned his unhappy allies.

Fortunately for his own reputation and for that of England, his

original intentions of the night of November 28 were not fully carried

out. Only Baird’s column actually commenced its retrograde movement.

That general received Moore’s letter from Vaughan on the thirtieth, and

immediately began to retire on Galicia. Leaving his cavalry and his

light brigade at Astorga, to cover his retreat, he fell back with the

rest of his division to Villafranca, fifty miles on the road towards

Corunna. Here (as we shall see) he received on December 6 a complete

new set of orders, countermanding his retreat and bidding him return to

the plains of Leon.

Hope also had heard from Moore on the thirtieth, had been informed

that the army was to retire on Portugal, and was told to make forced

marches by Peñaranda and Ciudad Rodrigo to join his chief--unless

indeed he were forced to go back by the way that he had come, owing to

the appearance of French troops in his path. Fortunately no such danger

occurred: Hope arranged his two cavalry regiments as a screen in front

of his right, in the direction of Arevalo and Madrigal. He hurried his

infantry and guns by Fontiveros and Peñaranda, along the road that

had been pointed out to him. The cavalry obtained news that patrols

of French dragoons coming from the north had pushed as far as Olmedo

and La Nava--some sixteen or eighteen miles from their outposts--but

did not actually see a single hostile vedette. This was lucky, as,

if Napoleon had heard of a British force hovering on the flank of his

advancing columns, he would certainly have turned against it the troops

that were covering the right flank of his advance on Madrid--Lefebvre’s

corps and the dragoons of Milhaud. But, as it chanced, Hope was

entirely unmolested: he moved, as was right, with his troops closed

up and ready for a fight: on the night of the thirtieth his infantry

actually slept in square without piling arms: during the ensuing

thirty-six hours they marched forty-seven miles before they were

allowed to encamp at Peñaranda. There they were practically in safety:

slackening the pace for the exhausted infantry and for the over-driven

oxen of the convoy, Hope drew in to Alba de Tormes, where he was only

fifteen miles from Salamanca[593]. Here he received orders not to push

for Ciudad Rodrigo, but to turn northward and join the main body of the

army, which was still--as it turned out--in its old positions. Thus on

December 3 Moore could at last dispose of his long-lost cavalry and

guns, and possessed an army of 20,000 men complete in all arms. This

very much changed the aspect of affairs for him, and removed one of his

main justifications for the projected retreat on Portugal. Hope also

brought information as to the movements of the French which was of the

highest importance. He reported that their columns were all trending

southward, none of them to the west of Segovia. He had also heard of

the infantry of the 4th Corps, and could report that it had marched

by Valladolid and Olmedo on Segovia, evidently with the intention of

driving Heredia’s Estremaduran troops out of the last-named city, and

of opening the Guadarrama Pass[594]. There was no sign whatever of any

movement of the French in this quarter towards Salamanca. Thus the

Emperor’s plan for a concentration of his whole army on Madrid became

clear to Moore’s discerning eyes.

[593] There is a good, but short, account of this forced march,

in bitter cold, to be found in the memoir of ‘T.S.’ of the 71st,

one of Hope’s four infantry regiments. He speaks of a curious

fact that I have nowhere else seen mentioned, viz. that at

Peñaranda the artillery horses were so done up that Hope buried

six guns, and turned their teams to help the other batteries.

Apparently they were dug up a few days after by troops sent out

from Salamanca, as the tale of batteries is complete when Moore

resumed his march.

[594] I think that Napier (i. 287-8) somewhat exaggerates the

danger which Hope ran in his march from Villacastin to Alba de

Tormes. Of course if Lefebvre had been marching on Salamanca,

the situation would have been dangerous: but as a matter of

fact he was marching on the Guadarrama, which Hope had safely

passed on the twenty-eighth. Every mile that the British moved

took them further from Lefebvre’s route: his infantry was never

within fifty miles of Hope’s convoy: and supposing his brigade

of cavalry had got in touch with the British, it could have done

nothing serious against a force of all arms in the hands of a

very capable general. The ‘4,000 cavalry’ of which Napier speaks

were in reality only 1,500.

SECTION VIII: CHAPTER III

MOORE’S ADVANCE TO SAHAGUN

Moore’s determination to retreat on Portugal lasted just seven days.

It was at midnight on November 28-29 that he wrote his orders to Baird

and Hope, bidding the one to fall back on Corunna and the other on

Ciudad Rodrigo. On the afternoon of December 5 he abandoned his scheme,

and wrote to recall Baird from Galicia: on the tenth he set out on a

very different sort of enterprise, and advanced into the plains of Old

Castile with the object of striking at the communications of the French

army. We have now to investigate the curious mixture of motives which

led him to make such a complete and dramatic change in his plan of

campaign.

Having sent off his dispatches to Hope and Baird, the

Commander-in-chief had announced next morning to the generals who

commanded his divisions and brigades his intention of retreating to

Portugal. The news evoked manifestations of surprise and anger that

could not be concealed. Even Moore’s own staff did not succeed in

disguising their dismay and regret[595]. The army was looking forward

with eagerness to another campaign against the French under a general

of such well-earned reputation as their present chief: a sudden order

to retreat, when the enemy had not even been seen, and when his

nearest cavalry vedettes were still three or four marches away, seemed

astounding. There would have been remonstrances, had not Moore curtly

informed his subordinates that ‘he had not called them together to

request their counsel, or to induce them to commit themselves to giving

any opinion on the subject. He was taking the whole responsibility

entirely upon himself: and he only required that they would immediately

prepare to carry it into effect.’ In face of this speech there could be

no argument or opposition: but there was murmuring in every quarter:

of all the officers of the army of Portugal Hope is said to have been

the only one who approved of the Commander-in-chief’s resolve. The

consciousness of the criticism that he was undergoing from his own

subordinates did not tend to soften Moore’s temper, which was already

sufficiently tried by the existing situation of affairs.

[595] See James Moore’s memoir of his brother, p. 72; compare

Napier, i. 292, and Lord Londonderry’s account of his own

observations at Salamanca, in his _History of the Peninsular

War_, i. 220, 221.

After announcing this determination, it might have been expected that

Moore would fall back at once on Almeida. But while beginning to send

back his stores and his sick[596], he did not move his fighting-men:

the reason (as he wrote to Castlereagh[597]) was that he still hoped

that he might succeed in picking up Hope’s division, if the French did

not press him. Accordingly he lingered on, waiting for that general’s

approach, and much surprised that the enemy was making no advance in

his direction. It was owing to the fact that he delayed his departure

for five days, on the chance that his lost cavalry and guns might after

all come in, that Moore finally gained the opportunity of striking his

great blow and saving his reputation.

[596] The heavy ammunition and all the sick who could be moved

were sent off on Dec. 5, under the escort of the 5/60th. See

Moore’s ‘General Orders’ for that day, and Ormsby, ii. 54.

[597] Moore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Nov. 29.

During this period of waiting and of preparation to depart, appeals

from many quarters came pouring in upon Moore, begging him to advance

at all costs and make his presence felt by the French. The first

dispatches which he received were written before his determination

to retreat was known: after it was divulged, his correspondents only

became the more importunate and clamorous. Simultaneous pressure was

brought to bear upon him by the British ambassador at Aranjuez, by

the Supreme Junta, by the general who now commanded the wrecks of the

Spanish army of Galicia, and by the military authorities at Madrid.

Each one of them had many and serious considerations to set before the

harassed Commander-in-chief.

Moore had been so constantly asserting that Blake’s old ‘Army of the

Left’ had been completely dispersed and ruined, that it must have been

somewhat of a surprise to him when the Marquis of La Romana wrote

from Leon, on November 30, to say that he was now at the head of a

considerable force, and hoped to co-operate in the oncoming campaign.

The Galicians had rallied in much greater numbers than had been

expected: their losses in battle had not been very great, and the

men had dispersed from sheer want of food rather than from a desire

to desert their colours. Their equipment was in the most wretched

condition, and their shoes worn out: but their spirit was not broken,

and if they could get food and clothing, they were quite prepared to

do their duty. La Romana enclosed a dispatch of Soult’s which had been

intercepted, and remarked that the news in it (apparently a statement

of the marshal’s intention to move westward) made it advisable that

the English and Spanish armies should at once concert measures for a

junction[598].

[598] La Romana to Moore, from Leon, Nov. 30.

All that the Marquis stated was perfectly true: his army was growing

rapidly, for his muster-rolls of December 4 showed that he had already

15,600 men with the colours, exclusive of sick and wounded: ten days

later the number had gone up to 22,800[599]. This was a force that

could not be entirely neglected, even though the men were in a dire

state of nakedness, and were only just recovering from the effects of

their dreadful march from Reynosa across the Cantabrian hills. Moore

had always stated, in his dispatches to Castlereagh, that there was no

Spanish army with which he could co-operate. He was now offered the aid

of 15,000 men, under a veteran officer of high reputation and undoubted

patriotism. The proposal to retreat on Portugal seemed even less

honourable than before, when it involved the desertion of the Marquis

and his much-tried host.

[599] See the ‘morning states’ for the army of Galicia on Dec. 4

and Dec. 14, in Arteche (iv. 532, 533).

Not long after the moment at which La Romana’s dispatch came to hand,

there arrived at Salamanca two officers deputed by the Central Junta

to make a final appeal to Moore. These were Don Ventura Escalante,

Captain-General of the kingdom of Granada, and the Brigadier-General

Augustin Bueno. They had started from Aranjuez on November 28, and

seem to have arrived at the British head quarters on December 3 or

4. They brought a letter from Don Martin de Garay, the secretary to

the Junta, stating that they were authorized to treat with Moore for

the drawing up of a plan of campaign, ‘by which the troops of his

Britannic Majesty may act in concert with those of Spain, accelerating

a combined movement, and avoiding the delays that are so prejudicial

to the noble enterprise in which the two nations are engaged[600].’

The proposal that the two generals made would appear to have been

that Moore should march on Madrid by the Guadarrama Pass, picking up

Hope’s division on the way, and ordering Baird to follow as best he

could. They wished to demonstrate to their despondent ally that it was

possible to concentrate for the defence of Madrid a force sufficient

to hold the Emperor at bay. If the British came up, they hoped even

to be able to repulse him with decisive effect. They alleged that

Castaños had escaped from Tudela with the Andalusian divisions almost

intact, and must now be at Guadalajara, quite close to the capital,

with 25,000 good troops. Heredia, with the rallied Estremaduran army,

was at Segovia, and had 10,000 bayonets: San Juan with 12,000 men

was occupying the impregnable Somosierra. Andalusian and Castilian

levies were coming in to Madrid every day--they believed that 10,000

men must already be collected. This would constitute when united a

mass of nearly 60,000 men: if Moore brought up 20,000 British troops

all must go well, for Napoleon had only 80,000 men in the north of

Spain. After deducting the army sent against Saragossa, and the

detachments at Burgos and in Biscay, as also the corps of Soult, he

could not have much more than 20,000 men concentrated for the attack

on Madrid. All this ingenious calculation was based on the fundamental

misconception that the French armies were only one-third of their

actual strength--which far exceeded 200,000 men. But on this point

Moore was as ill informed as the Spaniards themselves, and the causes

which he alleged for refusing to march on Madrid had nothing to do with

statistics. He informed them that his reasons for proposing to retreat

on Portugal were that the Spanish armies were too much demoralized to

offer successful resistance to the Emperor, and that the road to the

capital was now in the possession of the French. He then introduced

Colonel Graham, who had just returned from a meeting with San Juan,

and had heard from him the story of the forcing of the Somosierra on

November 29. Of this disaster Escalante and Bueno were still ignorant:

they had to learn from English lips that the French were actually

before the gates of Madrid, that Heredia and San Juan were in flight,

and that their junction with Castaños (wherever that general might

now be) had become impossible. This appalling news deeply affected

Escalante and Bueno, but they then turned to urging Moore to unite

with La Romana, and march to the relief of Madrid. The British general

replied that he did not believe that the Marquis had 5,000 men fit to

take the field along with the British[601], and that any such scheme

would be chimerical. His whole bearing towards the emissaries of the

Junta seems to have been frigid to the verge of discourtesy. How much

they irritated him may be gathered from the account of the interview

which he sent to Mr. Frere two days later. In language that seems very

inappropriate in an official dispatch--destined ere long to be printed

as a ‘Parliamentary Paper’--he wrote: ‘The two generals seemed to me

to be two weak old men, or rather women, with whom it was impossible

for me to concert any military operations, even had I been so inclined.

Their conferences with me consisted in questions, and in assertions

with regard to the strength of different Spanish corps, all of which I

knew to be erroneous. They neither knew that Segovia or the Somosierra

were in the hands of the enemy. I shall be obliged to you to save me

from such visits, which are very painful[602].’

[600] Martin de Garay to Moore, from Aranjuez, Nov. 28, 1808.

[601] This answer is recorded in the despairing appeal which

Escalante wrote to Moore from Calzada de Baños on Nov. 7, after

having started back to join the Junta. The rest of Moore’s

arguments can be gathered from his own dispatches.

[602] Moore to Frere, from Salamanca, Dec. 6, 1808.

It is clear that the mission of Escalante and Bueno had no great

share in determining Sir John to abandon his projected retreat on

Portugal, though it may possibly have had some cumulative effect when

taken in conjunction with other appeals that were coming in to him

at the same moment. It was quite otherwise with the dispatches which

he received from the authorities at Madrid, and from the British

ambassador at Aranjuez: in them we may find the chief causes of his

changed attitude. The Madrid dispatch was written by Morla and the

Prince of Castelfranco--the two military heads of the Junta of Defence

which had been created on December 1--in behalf of themselves and

their colleagues. It was sent off early on December 2, before Napoleon

had begun to press in upon the suburbs, for it speaks of the city as

menaced, not as actually attacked by the enemy. It amounted to an

appeal to Moore to do something to help Madrid--not necessarily (as has

been often stated) to throw himself into the city, but, if he judged

it best, to manœuvre on the flank and rear of the Emperor’s army, so

as to distract him from his present design. The writers stated, in

much the same terms that Escalante and Bueno had used, that Castaños

with 25,000 men from Tudela and San Juan with 10,000 men from the

Somosierra were converging on the capital, and added that the Junta had

got together 40,000 men for its defence. With this mass of new levies

they thought that they could hold off for the moment the forces that

Napoleon had displayed in front of them; but when his reserves and

reinforcements came up the situation would be more dangerous. Wherefore

they made no doubt that the British general would move with the

rapidity that was required in the interests of the allied nations. They

supposed it probable that Moore had already united with La Romana’s

army, and that the two forces would be able to act together.

There is no reason to think, with Napier and with Moore’s

biographer[603], that this dispatch was written by Morla with the

treacherous intent of involving the British army in the catastrophe

that was impending over the capital. Morla ultimately betrayed his

country and joined King Joseph, but there is no real proof that he

contemplated doing so before the fall of Madrid. The letter was signed

not only by him but by Castelfranco, of whose loyalty there is no

doubt, and who was actually arrested and imprisoned by Bonaparte.

Moreover, if it had been designed to draw Moore into the Emperor’s

clutches, it would not have given him the perfectly sound advice to

fall upon the communications of the French army after uniting with La

Romana--the precise move that the British general made ten days later

with such effect. It would have begged him to enter Madrid, without

suggesting any other alternative.

[603] See James Moore (p. 86-7), where he vilely mistranslates

the letter--even rendering _corte_ by ‘country’; and Napier (i.

291), where the same accusation is formulated.

Moore had always stated that his reluctance to advance into Spain had

been due, in no small degree, to the apathy which he had found there:

but now the capital, as it seemed, was about to imitate Saragossa and

to stand at bay behind its barricades. He had no great confidence

in its power to hold out. ‘I own,’ he wrote to Castlereagh, ‘that I

cannot derive much hope from the resistance of one town against forces

so formidable, unless the spark catches and the flame becomes pretty

general[604].’ But he could realize the dishonour that would rest

upon his own head if, as now seemed possible, Madrid were to make a

desperate resistance, and at the same moment the British army were to

be seen executing unmolested a tame retreat on Portugal. The letter of

Morla and Castelfranco he might perhaps have disregarded, suspecting

the usual Spanish exaggerations, if it had stood alone. But it was

backed up by an appeal from the most important British sources. Mr.

Stuart, whose forecasts Moore had always respected because they were

far from optimistic[605], had written him to the effect that ‘the

retrograde movements of the British divisions were likely to produce

an effect not less serious than the most decisive victory on the part

of the enemy.’ Frere, the newly arrived ambassador to the Central

Junta, launched out into language of the strongest kind. He had already

discovered that his opinions were fundamentally opposed to those of

Moore: this was but natural, as the general looked upon the problem

that lay before him from a military point of view, while the ambassador

could only regard its political aspect. Any impartial observer can now

see that the advance of the British army into Spain was likely to be

a hazardous matter, even if Hope and Baird succeeded in joining the

main body at Salamanca. On the other hand, it is quite clear that the

Spanish government would have every reason to regard itself as having

been abandoned and betrayed, if that advance were not made. Balancing

the one danger against the other, it seems evident that Frere was

right, and that it was Moore’s duty to make a diversion of some sort

against the French. Executed on any day before Madrid fell, such a

movement would have disturbed Bonaparte and distracted him from his

main plan of operations. Nor would the operation have been so hazardous

as Moore supposed, since his junction with Hope had become certain

when that general reached Peñaranda, while Baird had never had any

French troops in his neighbourhood. The retreat on Galicia was always

open: that on Portugal was equally available till the moment when the

capitulation of Madrid set free great masses of Bonaparte’s central

reserve.

[604] Moore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Dec. 5.

[605] Stuart to Moore, from Madrid, Nov. 30.

In his earlier epistles to Moore Frere had deprecated the idea of a

retreat, and had suggested that if for military reasons an advance

should be impracticable, it would at least be possible that the British

army might remain on Spanish ground. He had soon learnt that the

general entertained very different views, and his penultimate letter,

that of November 30, shows signs of pique at the small impression that

his arguments had made upon his correspondent[606]. Now on December

3 he wrote from Talavera, whither he had followed the Supreme Junta

in their flight, to try his last effort. To his previous arguments he

had only one more to add, the fact that on December 1-2 the people of

Madrid were showing that spirit of fanatical patriotism which Moore

had sought in vain hitherto among the Spaniards. The populace, as he

had learnt, was barricading the streets and throwing up batteries:

30,000 citizens and peasants were now under arms. Considering their

spirit, he had no hesitation in taking upon himself the responsibility

of representing the propriety, not to say the necessity, of doing

something in their behalf. The fate of Spain depended absolutely, for

the moment, on some help being given by the British army. Frere had

first-hand evidence of the enthusiasm which was reigning in Madrid

on the first day of December, having spoken to several persons who

had just left the capital, including a French _émigré_ colonel,

one Charmilly, to whose care he entrusted his last letter to the

Commander-in-chief. But so convinced was he that no argument of his

would affect Sir John Moore, that he took a most improper step, and

endeavoured to appeal to the public opinion of the army over the head

of its general. He entrusted Charmilly with a second letter, which he

was only to deliver if Moore refused to countermand his retreat after

reading the first. This document was a request that in case Sir John

remained fixed in his original determination, he would allow the bearer

of these letters to be examined before a Council of War. Frere thought

that Charmilly’s account of what was going on in Madrid would appeal

to the Brigadiers, if it had no effect on the Lieutenant-General--and

probably he was not far wrong. Such a plan struck at the roots of all

military obedience: it could only have occurred to a civilian. If

anything could have made the matter worse, it was that the document

should be entrusted not to a British officer but to a foreign

adventurer, a kind of person to whom the breach between the civil and

military representatives of Great Britain ought never to have been

divulged. Moreover Charmilly (though Frere was not aware of this fact)

chanced to be personally known to Moore, who had a very bad opinion

of him[607]. The _émigré_ was said to have been implicated in the San

Domingo massacres of 1794, and to have been engaged of late in doubtful

financial speculations in London. To send him to Salamanca with such an

errand seemed like a deliberate insult to the Commander-in-chief. Frere

was innocent of this intention, but the whole business, even without

this aggravation, was most unwise and improper.

[606] ‘I do not know that I can in any way express with less

offence the entire difference of our opinions on this subject,

than by forwarding what I had already written, in ignorance of

the determination [to retreat] which you had already taken’

(Aranjuez, Nov. 30).

[607] He had called on Sir John a few days before, while on his

way to Madrid to solicit a military post from the Junta. Moore

wrote on Nov. 27 to Mr. Stuart, to say that he had seen him and

that ‘he never could help having a dislike to people of this

description.’

Charmilly handed in his first document on the evening of December 5, a

few hours after Morla’s messenger had delivered the appeal from Madrid.

Moore received him in the most formal way, dismissed him, and began

to compare Frere’s information with that of the Junta of Defence, of

the emissaries from Aranjuez, and of his other English correspondents.

Putting all together, he felt his determination much shaken: Madrid, as

it seemed, was really about to defend itself: the preparations which

were reported to him bore out the words of Morla and Castelfranco.

His own army was seething with discontent at the projected retreat:

Hope being now only one march away, at Alba de Tormes, he could no

longer plead that he was unable to advance because he was destitute

of cavalry and guns. Moreover, he was now so far informed as to the

position--though not as to the numbers--of the French, that he was

aware that there was no very serious force in front of himself or of

Baird: everything had been turned on to Madrid. Even the 4th Corps, of

which Hope had heard during his march, was evidently moving on Segovia

and the Guadarrama.

Contemplating the situation, Moore’s resolution broke down: he knew

what his army was saying about him at the present moment: he guessed

what his government would say, if it should chance that Madrid made a

heroic defence while he was retreating unpursued on Lisbon and Almeida.

A man of keen ambition and soldierly feeling, he could not bear to

think that he might be sacrificing his life’s work and reputation to

an over-conscientious caution. Somewhere between eight o’clock and

midnight on the night of December 5 he made up his mind to countermand

the retreat. He dashed off a short note to Castlereagh, and a dispatch

to Baird, and the thing was done. To the war-minister he wrote that

‘considerable hopes were entertained from the enthusiastic manner in

which the people of Madrid resist the French.’ This hope he did not

share himself, but ‘in consequence of the general opinion, which is

also Mr. Frere’s, I have ordered Sir David Baird to suspend his march

[to Corunna] and shall myself continue at this place until I see

further, and shall be guided by circumstances.’ To Madrid he would not

go till he was certain that the town was making a firm defence, and

that the spirit of resistance was spreading all over Spain: but the

plan of instant retreat on Portugal was definitely abandoned[608]. The

dispatch to Baird shows even more of the General’s mind, for he and

his subordinate were personal friends, and spoke out freely to each

other. The people of Madrid, Moore wrote, had taken up arms, refused

to capitulate, and were barricading their streets--they said that they

would suffer anything rather than submit. Probably all this came too

late, and Bonaparte was too strong to be resisted. ‘There is, however,

no saying, and I feel myself the more obliged to give it a trial, as

Mr. Frere has made a formal representation, which I received this

evening. All this appears very strange and unsteady--but if the spirit

of enthusiasm _does_ arise in Spain, and the people _will_ be martyrs,

there is no saying what our force may do.’ Baird therefore was to stay

his march on Corunna, to make arrangements to return to Astorga, and to

send off at once to join the main army one of his three regiments of

hussars[609]. All this was written ere midnight: at early dawn Moore’s

mind was still further made up. He sent to Sir David orders to push his

cavalry to Zamora, his infantry, brigade by brigade, to Benavente, in

the plains of Leon. ‘What is passing at Madrid may be decisive of the

fate of Spain, and we must be at hand to take advantage of whatever

happens. The wishes of our country and our duty demand it of us, with

whatever risk it may be attended.... But if the bubble bursts, and

Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it.... Both you and me, though

we may look big, and determine to get everything forward, yet we must

never lose sight of this, that at any moment affairs may take the turn

that will render it necessary to retreat[610].’

[608] Moore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Dec. 5.

[609] Moore to Baird, from Salamanca, Dec. 5.

[610] Moore to Baird, from Salamanca, Dec. 6. The strange grammar

would seem to show that the letter was dashed off in a hurry, and

never revised.

If only Moore had discovered on November 13, instead of on December 5,

that events at Madrid were important, and that his country’s wishes and

his duty required him to take a practical interest in them, the winter

campaign of 1808 would have taken--for good or evil--a very different

shape from that which it actually assumed. Meanwhile his resolve came

too late. Madrid had actually capitulated thirty-six hours before he

received the letters of Morla and of Frere. Moreover the offensive

could not be assumed till Baird should have retraced his steps from

Villafranca, and returned to the position at Astorga from which his

wholly unnecessary retreat had removed him.

A painful and rather grotesque scene had to be gone through on the

morning of December 6. Colonel Charmilly had been received by Moore

on the previous night in such a dry and formal manner, that it never

occurred to him that the letter which he had delivered was likely to

have had any effect. Accordingly he presented himself for the second

time next morning, with Frere’s supplementary epistle, taking it for

granted that retreat was still the order of the day, and making the

demand for the assembly of a Council of War. Moore, fresh from the

severe mental struggle which attended the reversal of all his plans,

was in no mood for politeness. Righteously indignant at what seemed to

him both a deliberate personal insult, and an intrigue to undermine

his authority with his subordinates, he burst out into words of anger

and contempt, and told his provost-marshal to expel Charmilly from the

camp without a moment’s delay[611]. When this had been done, he sat

down to write a dispatch to Frere, in which his conscientious desire

to avoid hard words with a British minister struggled in vain with

his natural resentment. He began by justifying his original resolve

to retreat; and then informed his correspondent that ‘I should never

have thought of asking your opinion or advice, as the determination was

founded on circumstances with which you could not be acquainted, and

was a question purely military, of which I thought myself the best

judge.’ When he made up his mind, the army had been hopelessly divided

into fractions, and there was good reason at that moment to fear that

the French would prevent their concentration. But as the resistance

made by the people of Madrid had deterred Bonaparte from detaching

any corps against him, and the junction of the British divisions now

seemed possible, the situation was changed. ‘Without being able to say

exactly in what manner, everything shall be done for the assistance

of Madrid, and the Spanish cause, that can be expected from an army

such as I command.’ But Moore would not move till Baird came up, and

even then, he said, he would only have 26,000 men fit for duty[612].

Believing that Frere’s conduct had been inspired by a regard for the

public welfare, he should abstain from any comment on the two letters

brought by Colonel Charmilly. But he must confess that he both felt

and expressed much indignation at a person of that sort being made the

channel of communication between them. ‘I have prejudices against all

that class, and it is impossible for me to put any trust in him. I

shall therefore thank you not to employ him in any communication with

me[613].’

[611] Charmilly, greatly indignant, published a narrative of the

whole, in which he justified himself and his character. It does

not alter the main facts of the case.

[612] His muster-rolls show 33,000 troops in all, with 29,000

actually present with the colours, but Leith’s brigade and the

82nd, 2,539 men, were not up.

[613] Moore to Frere, Dec. 6. The version presented to Parliament

has been somewhat expurgated: I quote from that given by James

Moore.

Moore had kept his temper more in hand than might have been expected,

considering the provocation that he had received: the same cannot be

said for Frere, whose next letter, written from Truxillo on December 9,

ended by informing the general that ‘if the British army had been sent

abroad for the express object of doing the utmost possible mischief

to the cause of Spain, short of actually firing upon the Spanish

troops, they would have most completely fulfilled their purpose by

carrying out exactly the measures which they have taken[614].’ This

was unpardonable language from one official writing a state paper

to another, and it is regrettable to find that Frere made no formal

apology for it in his later dispatches. Even when he discovered that

Moore was actually executing a diversion against the communications of

the French army, he only wrote that he was ‘highly gratified’ to find

that they were at last agreed on the advisability of such a move[615].

Frere’s uncontrolled expressions showed that he was entirely unfit for

a diplomatic post, and cannot be too strongly reprobated. At the same

time we are forced to concede that his main thesis was perfectly true:

nothing could have been more unhappy than that the aid of a British

army of 33,000 men should have been promised to Spain: that the army

should have marched late, in isolated divisions and by the wrong roads:

that after its van had reached Salamanca on November 13, it should not

have taken one step in advance up to December 5: that just as Madrid

was attacked it should tamely begin to retreat on Corunna and Lisbon.

Moore was only partly responsible for all this: but it is certain

that the whole series of movements had in truth been calculated to do

the utmost possible mischief to the cause of Spain and of England.

If Moore had died or been superseded on December 4, 1808, he would

have been written down as wellnigh the worst failure in all the long

list of incompetent British commanders since the commencement of the

Revolutionary War.

[614] Frere to Moore, from Truxillo, Dec. 9.

[615] Frere to Moore, from Merida, Dec. 14.

It is, therefore, with all the greater satisfaction that we now pass

on to the second part of the campaign of the British army in Spain,

wherein Moore showed himself as resourceful, rapid, and enterprising as

he had hitherto appeared slow and hesitating. Having once got rid of

the over-caution which had hitherto governed his movements, and having

made up his mind that it was right to run risks, he showed that the

high reputation which he enjoyed in the British army was well deserved.

Moore’s first intention, as is shown by his orders to Baird and his

letters to Castlereagh, was merely to disturb the French communications

by a sudden raid on Valladolid, or even on Burgos. If Madrid was really

holding out, the Emperor would not be able to send any large detachment

against him, unless he made up his mind to raise the siege of the

capital. It was probable that Bonaparte would consider the destruction

of an English army of even more importance than the prosecution of the

siege, and that he would come rushing northward with all his army. In

that case, as Moore wrote to Baird, ‘we shall have a run for it,’ but

Madrid would be saved. In short, Napoleon was to be treated like the

bull in the arena, who is lured away from a fallen adversary by having

a red cloak dangled before his eyes. Supposing that the main force of

the French were turned upon him, Moore was perfectly well aware that

his line of retreat on Portugal would be cut, for troops marching from

the neighbourhood of Madrid, via the Guadarrama Pass, might easily

seize Salamanca. But it is one of the privileges of the possessor of

sea-power that he can change his base whenever he chooses, and Moore

wrote to Castlereagh to request that transports might be massed at

Corunna for the reception of his army. If forced to fall back on that

place he intended to sail round to Lisbon or to Cadiz, as circumstances

might dictate.

In the unlikely event of Bonaparte’s persisting in the siege of Madrid,

and sending only small detachments against the British army, Moore

thought that he would be strong enough to make matters very unpleasant

for the enemy in Old Castile. If he beat the forces immediately

opposed to him, and seized Valladolid and Burgos, the Emperor would be

compelled to come north, whether he wished it or no.

All these plans were perfectly reasonable and well concerted,

considering the information that was at Moore’s disposition on December

6. But that information was based on two false premises: the one was

that Madrid was likely to hold out for some little time--Moore never

supposed that it could be for very long, for he remained fixed in his

distrust of Spanish civic virtues: the second was that the French army

in the north of Spain did not amount to more than 80,000 or 100,000

men, an estimate which had been repeated to him by every Spaniard with

whom he had communicated, and which had been confirmed, not only by

Frere, but by Stuart and other English correspondents in whom he had

some confidence. If he had known that the French had entered Madrid

on December 4, and that they numbered more than 250,000 bayonets and

sabres, his plans would have been profoundly modified[616].

[616] Moore’s plans between Dec. 6 and 10, the day on which he

got news of the fall of Madrid, must be gathered from his rather

meagre dispatches to Castlereagh of midnight, Dec. 5, and of Dec.

8; from his much more explicit letters to Frere on Dec. 6 and 10;

from that to La Romana on Dec. 8; and most of all from the very

interesting and confidential letters to Baird on Dec. 6 and 8.

His doubts as to the permanence of the outburst of enthusiasm

in Madrid are plainly expressed in nearly every one of these

epistles. The terrible under-estimate of Napoleon’s disposable

forces is to be found in that to Castlereagh on Dec. 12, where

he writes that ‘the French force in Spain may fairly be set down

at 80,000 men, besides what is in Catalonia.’ Acting upon this

hypothesis, it is no wonder that he was convinced that Bonaparte

could not both besiege Madrid and hunt the British army.

Moore’s original intention was to move on Valladolid, a great centre

of roads, and a sort of halfway-house between Burgos and Madrid.

Meanwhile, Baird was to come down from Astorga via Benavente, and to

converge on the same point. A cavalry screen in front of the combined

force was formed, by pushing the two regiments which belonged to

Moore’s own corps towards Alaejos and Tordesillas, on the south bank

of the Douro; while Baird’s cavalry brigade, under Lord Paget, made a

forced march from Astorga to Toro, and extended itself north of the

river. Moore’s infantry was not to move till the tenth, but that of

Baird was already returning as fast as it could manage from Villafranca

to Astorga. The unfortunate orders of retreat, issued on November 29,

had cost Sir David six marches, three from Astorga to Villafranca and

three from Villafranca to Astorga--time lost in the most miserable and

unnecessary fashion. One of his brigades, that of General Leith[617],

was now so far off that it never managed to overtake the army, and was

out of the game for something like a fortnight. But the rest, which had

only to return from Villafranca[618], succeeded in joining the main

body in much better time than might have been expected. The fact was

that the news of an advance had restored the high spirits of the whole

army, and the men stepped out splendidly through the cold and rainy

winter days, and easily accomplished their twenty miles between dawn

and dusk.

[617] Consisting of the 51st Regiment, 59th (2nd batt.), and 76th.

[618] Except the ‘Light Brigade’ of Baird’s army which had never

left Astorga, having been intended to act with the cavalry as a

rearguard.

Moore, meanwhile, was occupied at Salamanca in making the last

preparations for his advance. He had already sent back into Portugal

one large convoy on December 5, escorted by the fifth battalion

of the 60th Regiment. He now dispatched another which marched by

Ciudad Rodrigo, where it picked up the 3rd Foot, who guarded it

back to Portugal[619]. The two between them contained all his heavy

baggage, and all the sick from his base hospital who could bear

transport--probably more than 1,500 invalids: for the total number of

the sick of the army was very nearly 4,000, and the larger half of them

must have belonged to Moore’s own corps, which was in worse trim than

that of Baird. The loss of the regiments sent off on escort duty was

partly made up a few days later by the arrival of the 82nd, which came

up by forced marches from Oporto, and reached Benavente on December

26. It was the leading battalion of a brigade which the government

had resolved to add to Moore’s force from the slender division of

Cradock: the other two battalions of the brigade were too far behind,

and never succeeded in joining the field-army[620]. Allowing for these

final changes we find that Moore and Baird started forth with 29,946

effective sabres and bayonets--in which are included 1,687 men on

detachment: they left behind them nearly 4,000 sick[621]. If we deduct

2,539 for Leith’s brigade, which was still far beyond Villafranca, and

for the belated 82nd, the actual force which carried out the great raid

into the plain of Old Castile must have been just over 25,000 strong:

of these 2,450 were cavalry, and there were 1,297 artillery gunners and

drivers with sixty-six guns.

[619] The 3rd had been at Ciudad Rodrigo since Oct. 29 guarding

communications.

[620] They were the 45th (1st batt.) and the 97th.

[621] See the tables in the Appendix. It seems to result that the

gross total who marched from Corunna and Lisbon was 33,884, that

the deduction of 3,938 sick leaves 29,946. Leith’s battalions and

the 82nd were 2,539 strong, the men on detachment 1,687: this

leaves 25,720 for the actual marching force.

Moore had, of course, given notice to La Romana of his change of plan:

in response to his letter of December 6 the Marquis expressed his

pleasure at the prospect of the union of the allied armies, and his

wish to co-operate to the best of his power[622]. He had now collected

20,000 men--a formidable army on paper--and was certain to do his best,

but what that might amount to was very doubtful. It was well known that

a great part of his troops were not fit to move: but it was not till

a few days later that Moore received definite intelligence as to the

exact amount of military aid that might be furnished by the army of the

Left.

[622] As Arteche very truly observes, the letter of La Romana

cannot be safely quoted (after the fashion of James Moore on his

p. 122) as approving of the retreat on Portugal. He is answering

the dispatch of Dec. 6, not that of Nov. 28.

The British troops were fully committed to their new plan of

campaign--Baird was hastening back to Astorga, the sick and the

convoys had started for Portugal, the cavalry had pushed well to the

front--when Moore suddenly received a piece of intelligence which

profoundly modified the situation. Madrid had fallen into the hands of

Bonaparte: the news was brought by Colonel Graham, who had been sent

off with the reply to Morla and Castelfranco. Forced to make a long

detour, because all the direct roads were known to be in the hands of

the French, he had fallen in at Talavera with the fugitive army from

the Escurial, and had almost witnessed the murder of San Juan. From

information given him by various persons, and especially by two belated

members of the Central Junta, he learnt that Napoleon had stormed the

Retiro and the Prado, and that Morla had signed a capitulation. The

populace were said to be still in possession of their arms, and it was

supposed that there would be much trouble in pacifying the city; but

there was no doubt that, from a military point of view, it was in the

Emperor’s power[623].

[623] Graham to Moore, from Talavera, Dec. 7-8.

Considering Moore’s earlier doubts and hesitations, we should almost

have expected that this news would have induced him to throw up his

whole plan for an advance into Old Castile, and once more to order

a retreat on Almeida. But he evidently considered that he was now

committed to the raid on Bonaparte’s lines of communication, and

thought that, even if he could not save Madrid, he could at least

distract the enemy from an attempt to push further south, and give

the Spanish armies time to rally. There was a chance, as he wrote to

Castlereagh[624], that he might effect something, and he should take

it, committing himself to Fortune: ‘If she smiles we may do some good:

if not, we shall still I hope have the merit of having done all that we

could. The army, for its numbers, is excellent, and is (I am confident)

quite determined to do its duty.’

[624] Moore to Castlereagh, from Salamanca, Dec. 10.

On December 11 the infantry at last began to move forward from

Salamanca--a month all but two days had elapsed since its vanguard

reached that city. On that day the reserve division, under General

E. Paget, and Beresford’s brigade of Fraser’s division marched for

Toro, where they found Lord Paget with Baird’s cavalry, ready to

cover their advance. These troops were to form the left-hand column

of the advance on Valladolid. On the next day Hope’s detachment from

Alba de Tormes, and the brigades of Bentinck, Fane, Hill, and Charles

Alten from Salamanca, which formed the right-hand column, marched

for Alaejos and Tordesillas. In front of them was Charles Stewart’s

cavalry brigade, which, on the same evening (December 12), fell upon

a French cavalry patrol at Rueda and captured it whole, only one man

escaping. The prisoners turned out to belong to the 22nd Chasseurs

cf Franceschi’s cavalry division, which, as it was discovered, lay

at Valladolid without any infantry supports[625]. They expressed the

greatest surprise at finding themselves assailed by English cavalry,

as they were under the impression that Moore had retired on Lisbon

some days before. This side-light on the general ignorance prevailing

in the French army as to the position and designs of the British was

very valuable: the first meeting with the enemy, trifling as was the

success, promised well for the future.

[625] There were thirty of these dragoons: with them were fifty

infantry, apparently a belated detail or foraging party from

Lefebvre’s corps.

On the thirteenth Moore himself came up from Salamanca to Alaejos,

where he overtook the infantry. Stewart’s cavalry meanwhile pushed on

to Tordesillas and Medina del Campo, without coming across any traces

of the French. At Tordesillas they found themselves in touch with Lord

Paget’s horsemen on the other side of the Douro, who had also met

with no opposition whatever. On the fifteenth the whole army would

have converged on Valladolid, if Moore’s original intention had been

carried out. But a fortunate accident intervened to prevent this march,

which would have placed the British troops nearer to Madrid and to the

Emperor than did the route which they finally adopted.

There was brought to Moore at Alaejos an intercepted dispatch from

Berthier to Soult, containing the most valuable information. The

officer bearing it had been sent off from Madrid without an escort,

according to the Emperor’s usual habit--a habit that cost the lives

of some scores of unfortunate aides-de-camp during the first year of

the Peninsular War. It was only by experience that Napoleon and his

marshals learnt that isolated officers travelling in this fashion were

devoted in Spain to probable death and possible torture, as Marbot

(after a personal experience of the kind) bitterly observed. The bearer

of this particular dispatch had been murdered by peasants at the

post-house of Valdestillos, near Segovia.

The document was full of invaluable facts and details. It informed

Soult that with his existing force--the two infantry divisions of

Merle and Mouton, and the four cavalry regiments of Franceschi’s

division[626]--he was strong enough to march straight before him from

Saldaña, and to overrun the whole kingdom of Leon. He was to seize the

towns of Leon, Zamora, and Benavente, and to sweep the débris of the

army of Galicia into its native mountains. He would find nothing else

to oppose him; for the English, as all accounts agreed, were in full

retreat on Lisbon. They had last been heard of at Salamanca and the

Escurial. A knowledge of this plan was valuable to Moore, but still

more so was what followed--a sketch of the position of the French army

at the moment when the dispatch was written. The advanced guard of the

‘Grand Army’ (Lefebvre’s corps) was at Talavera, and would shortly be

at Badajoz: Bessières was chasing Castaños beyond the Upper Tagus, on

the road to Valencia. Mortier’s and Junot’s corps had reached Spain:

the former had been ordered off to aid in the siege of Saragossa: the

latter was on the march to Burgos, and its leading division had reached

Vittoria. The chief omission was that Berthier did not mention the

Imperial Guard or the corps of Ney, which were in or about Madrid when

he wrote, and were probably destined to follow Lefebvre’s march on

Badajoz and Lisbon. The dispatch ends with the curious note that ‘His

Majesty is in the best of health. The city of Madrid is quite tranquil:

the shops are open, theatrical amusements have been resumed, and you

would never suppose that our first addresses to the place had been

emphasized by 4,000 cannon-balls[627].’

[626] Berthier speaks as if Mouton were still commanding one of

Soult’s divisions, but he was now gone, and Mermet’s name ought

to appear.

[627] This dispatch, though often published, has been

deliberately omitted (like some others) in the _Correspondance de

Napoléon_, vol. xviii, probably because it shows the Emperor in

one of his least omniscient moods.

Moore was thus placed in possession of the Emperor’s plan of campaign,

and of the dislocation of the greater part of his army. Most important

of all, he discovered that his own position and designs were wholly

unsuspected. His mind was soon made up: Soult, as it seemed, with his

15,000 or 16,000 men at Saldaña and Carrion, was about to move forward

into Leon. He would thus be placed at an enormous distance from the

Emperor, and would have no solid supports save the leading division

of Junot’s corps, which must now be drawing near to Burgos. If he

advanced, the whole British army, aided by whatever troops La Romana

could produce, might be hurled upon him. The results could not be

doubtful, and a severe defeat inflicted on the 2nd Corps would shake

the hold of the French on Northern Spain, and ruin all the Emperor’s

plans. Moreover the region where Soult might be looked for, about

Carrion, Sahagun, and Mayorga, was far more remote from Madrid than the

Valladolid country, where Moore was originally intending to strike his

blow, so that several days would be gained before the Emperor could

interfere.

Accordingly, on December 15, the whole army suddenly changed its

direction from eastward to northward. The left-hand column of the

infantry crossed the Douro at Zamora, the right-hand column at

Toro. The cavalry, screening the march of both, went northward from

Tordesillas to the banks of the Sequillo, pushing its advanced parties

right up to Valladolid, and driving back the dragoons of Franceschi,

several of whose detachments they cut off, capturing a colonel and

more than a hundred men. They intercepted the communications between

Burgos and Madrid to such effect that Bonaparte believed that the whole

British army was moving on Valladolid, and drew up his first plan of

operations under that hypothesis[628].

[628] It is clear from _Nap. Corresp._, 14,614, 14,616-7, that

Franceschi actually evacuated Valladolid and retired northwards.

Napoleon at first believed that Moore had occupied the place:

but 14,620 mentions that no more happened than that 100 hussars

swooped down on it on Dec. 19, and carried off the intendant

of the province and 300,000 reals (£3,000) from the treasury.

This exploit is omitted by nearly every English writer. Only

Vivian mentions it in his diary, and says that the lucky captors

belonged to the 18th Hussars (_Memoirs_, p. 94). What became of

the money?

Meanwhile four good marches [December 16-20] carried Moore’s infantry

from Zamora and Toro by the route Villalpando-Valderas to Mayorga.

The weather was bitterly cold, which in one way favoured the movement,

for the frost hardened the country roads, which would otherwise have

been mere sloughs of mud. A little snow fell from time to time, but

not enough to incommode the troops. They marched well, kept their

discipline, and left few sick or stragglers behind. This was the result

of good spirits, for they had been told that they would meet the French

before the week was out. At Mayorga the junction with Baird’s column

was safely effected.

When the army had thus completed its concentration, Sir John Moore,

for reasons which it is not quite easy to understand, rearranged all

its units. He formed it into four divisions and two independent

light brigades. The 1st Division was given to Sir David Baird, the

2nd to Sir John Hope, the 3rd to General Fraser, the 4th (or Reserve)

to General E. Paget. The two light brigades were under Charles Alten

and Robert Crawfurd (now as always to be carefully distinguished from

Catlin Crawfurd, who commanded a brigade of Hope’s division). All the

old arrangements of the army of Portugal were broken up: Baird was

given three regiments which had come from Lisbon: on the other hand

he had to make over four of his Corunna battalions to Hope and two to

Fraser. Apparently the idea of the Commander-in-chief was to mix the

corps who had already had experience of the French in Portugal with

the comparatively raw troops who had landed in Galicia. Otherwise it

is impossible to understand the gratuitous divorce of regiments which

had been for some time accustomed to act together. The cavalry was

formed as a division of two brigades under Lord Paget: the three hussar

regiments from Corunna formed one, under General Slade; the two corps

from Lisbon the other, under Charles Stewart, the brother of Lord

Castlereagh. Of the whole army only the 82nd and Leith’s brigade were

still missing: the former had not yet reached Benavente. The belated

regiments of the latter were still on the further side of Astorga, and

never took any part in the advance.

During this march Moore at last got full information as to the state

of La Romana’s troops, and the aid that might be expected from them.

The Marquis himself, writing to contradict a false report that he

was retiring on Galicia, confessed that two-thirds of his 20,000 men

wanted reclothing from head to foot, and that there was a terrible

want of haversacks, cartridge-boxes, and shoes. He complained bitterly

that the provinces (i.e. Asturias and Galicia) were slack and tardy

in forwarding him supplies, and laid much of the blame on them[629].

But he would move forward the moment he could be assisted by Baird’s

troops in pressing the French in his front. He reported that Soult had

10,000 infantry at Saldaña, Carrion, and Almanza, with cavalry out in

advance at Sahagun: he dared not move across their front southward, for

to do so would uncover the high-road through Leon to the Asturias. But

the appearance of Baird on the Benavente-Palencia road should be the

signal for him to advance against the French in conjunction with his

allies[630].

[629] Toreño, being an Asturian, is rather indignant at Romana’s

reflection on the Junta of his province, and observes (i. 324)

that the Marquis did not take the trouble to ask for help from

them, only writing them a single letter during his stay at Leon.

But they sent him some tents, and took in some of his sick. From

Galicia there was coming for him an enormous convoy with 100

wagons of English boots and clothes: but it was three weeks too

late, and had only reached Lugo by Jan. 1.

[630] Romana to Moore, from Leon, Dec. 14.

Romana’s description of his army did not sound very promising. But

a confidential report from an English officer who had visited his

cantonments gave an even less favourable account of the Galicians.

Colonel Symes had seen four of the seven divisions which formed the

‘Army of the Left.’ He wrote that the soldiers were ‘in general, stout

young men, without order or discipline, but not at all turbulent

or ferocious. Their clothing was motley, and some were half-naked.

Their manœuvres were very confusedly performed, and the officers were

comparatively inferior to the men. The equipment was miserable: of

sixteen men of General Figueroa’s guard only six had bayonets. The

springs and locks of the muskets often did not correspond. A portion

of them--at least one-third--would not explode, and a French soldier

could load and fire his piece with precision thrice, before a Spaniard

could fire his twice.’ Of the three divisions which he saw reviewed at

Leon, one (the 5th, the old troops from the Baltic) seemed superior to

the rest, and was armed with good English firelocks: there was also

a corps of light troops, 1,000 men in uniform, who might be called

respectable[631].... Without undervaluing the spirit of patriotism of

the Spaniards, which might in the end effect their deliverance, the

writer of the report could only say that they were not, and for a very

long time could not be, sufficiently improved in the art of war to

be coadjutors in a general action with the British: if any reliance

were placed on Spanish aid in the field, terrible disappointment must

result: ‘we must stand or fall through our own means[632].’ Colonel

Symes doubted whether La Romana would even dare to take his troops into

the field at all--wherein he did the Marquis grave injustice: he had

every intention of doing his best--though that best turned out to be

merely the bringing to the front of the 7,000 or 8,000 men out of his

22,000, who were more or less armed and equipped, while the rest were

left behind as wholly unserviceable.

[631] Possibly the two light infantry battalions (Catalonia and

Barcelona) of the Baltic division.

[632] Symes to Baird, from Leon, Dec. 14. Baird, of course,

forwarded the letter to Moore. I have cut down the report to

one-third of its bulk, by omitting the less important parts.

With this document before him, Moore must have found a certain grim

humour in the perusal of a letter from the Supreme Junta, which reached

him at Toro on December 16, informing him that La Romana would join him

with 14,000 ‘picked men,’ and that within a month 30,000 more Asturian

and Galician levies should be at his disposal. This communication was

brought to him by Francisco Xavier Caro, the brother of the Marquis,

who was himself a member of the Junta. With him came Mr. Stuart, as

an emissary from the British minister, bringing the last of those

unhappy epistles which Frere had written before he knew that the plan

of retreating on Portugal had been given up. We have already quoted one

of its insulting phrases on page 524: the rest was in the same strain.

Fortunately, it could be disregarded, as Moore was actually advancing

on the enemy, with a definite promise of help from La Romana. Caro

professed to be much delighted that the Junta’s hopes were at last

obtaining fruition. Stuart expressed surprise and grief at the tone of

Frere’s letters, and ‘seemed not much pleased at his mission[633].’

This was the last of the many troubles with the British and Spanish

civil authorities which were destined to harass the Commander-in-chief.

For the future it was only military cares that were to weigh upon his

mind.

[633] Moore’s diary, quoted in his brother’s memoir of him, pp.

141, 142.

On December 20 the army had concentrated at Mayorga. Somewhat to his

disappointment Moore discovered that Soult had not begun the advance

on Leon which Berthier’s intercepted dispatch had ordered. Either

no duplicate of it had been received by the Marshal, or he had been

disconcerted by the report that the English were on the move for

Valladolid. That they were coming against his own force he can as yet

hardly have guessed. He was still in his old position, one infantry

division at Saldaña, the other at Carrion. Debelle’s light-cavalry

brigade lay in front as a screen, with its head quarters at Sahagun,

only nine miles from the English advanced pickets, which had reached

the abbey of Melgar Abaxo.

The proximity of the enemy led Lord Paget, who showed himself

throughout the campaign a most admirable and enterprising cavalry

commander, to attempt a surprise. Marching long ere dawn with the

10th and 15th Hussars, he reached the vicinity of Sahagun without

being discovered. Debelle had no outlying vedettes, and his main-guard

on the high-road was suddenly surrounded and captured before it was

aware that an enemy was near. Only a single trooper escaped, but he

aroused the town, and Paget, hearing the French trumpets sounding in

the streets, saw that he must lose no time. He sent General Slade with

the 10th Hussars by the straight road into Sahagun, while he himself

galloped around it with the 15th to cut off the enemy’s retreat. As he

reached the suburb he found Debelle forming up his two regiments--the

8th Dragoons and the 1st Provisional Chasseurs--among the snow-covered

stumps of a vineyard. Nothing could be seen of the 10th, which was

scouring the town, but Paget formed up the 15th for a charge. His first

movement was checked by an unexpected ditch; but moving rapidly down

it he crossed at a place where it was practicable, and found Debelle

changing front to meet him. Catching the French before they had begun

to move--their new formation was not yet quite completed--Paget charged

into them without hesitation, though they outnumbered him by nearly two

to one. He completely rode down the front regiment, the provisional

chasseurs, and flung it back on to the dragoons, who broke and fled.

The chasseurs, who were commanded by Colonel Tascher, a cousin of

the Empress Josephine, were half destroyed: two lieutenant-colonels,

eleven other officers, and 157 men were taken prisoners, twenty were

killed, many were wounded[634]. The regiment indeed was so mauled that

Bonaparte dissolved it soon after, and replaced it in Franceschi’s

division by the 1st Hussars, which had just arrived from France.

[634] Compare Lord Londonderry (a participator in the charge),

Vivian, Adam Neale, and on the French side, Colonel St. Chamans,

Soult’s aide-de-camp. The British lost only 14 men (Vivian, p.

97).

This was perhaps the most brilliant exploit of the British cavalry

during the whole six years of the war. When the Peninsular medals were

distributed, nearly forty years after, a special clasp was very rightly

given for it, though many combats in which a much larger number of men

were engaged received no such notice. While reading the records of

later stages of the war the historian must often regret that Wellington

never, till Waterloo, had the services of Paget as commander of his

light cavalry. There were unfortunate personal reasons which rendered

the presence of the victor of Sahagun and Benavente impossible in the

camp of the victor of Vimiero[635].

[635] After his return from Spain in January, 1809, Paget

eloped with the wife of Henry Wellesley, the younger brother of

Wellington. Naturally they could not be placed together for many

years, and Paget lost his chance of seeing any more of the war.

But at Waterloo he gloriously vindicated his reputation as the

best living British cavalry-officer.

The scared survivors of Debelle’s brigade rode back to give Soult

notice that the enemy was upon him, and might close in on the very

next day. Meanwhile Moore’s infantry, following in the wake of Paget’s

horse, reached Sahagun on the evening of the twenty-first. It was to

be almost their last step in advance. The general allowed one day’s

rest to enable the rear divisions to close up to the van, so that all

might advance on Saldaña and Carrion in a compact mass. He intended to

deliver his much-desired blow at Soult upon the twenty-third.

The Duke of Dalmatia, though he had heard nothing as yet of the British

infantry, made the right inference from the vigorous way in which his

cavalry had been driven in, and concluded that Moore was not far off.

He drew down his second infantry division from Saldaña to Carrion,

thus concentrating his corps, and sent aides-de-camp to Burgos and

Palencia to hurry up to his support every regiment that could be found.

The disposable troops turned out to be Lorges’s division of dragoons,

and Delaborde’s division of the 8th Corps, which were both on their

way from Burgos to Madrid. The rest of Junot’s infantry was two days

off, on the road from Vittoria to Burgos. The brigade of Franceschi’s

cavalry which had evacuated Valladolid, was also heard of on the

Palencia road. No news or orders had been received from Madrid, with

which place communication was now only possible by the route of Aranda,

that by Valladolid being closed.

If Moore, allowing his infantry the night of the twenty-first and the

morning of the twenty-second to recruit their strength, had marched

on Carrion on the afternoon of the latter day, he would have caught

Soult at a disadvantage at dawn on the twenty-third, for none of the

supporting forces had yet got into touch with the Marshal. If the

latter had dared to make a stand, he would have been crushed: but it is

more probable that--being a prudent general--he would have fallen back

a march in the direction of Burgos. But, as it chanced, Moore resolved

to give his men forty-eight hours instead of thirty-six at Sahagun--and

twelve hours often suffice to change the whole situation. The army was

told to rest as long as daylight lasted on the twenty-third, and to

march at nightfall, so as to appear in front of the bridge of Carrion

at dawn on the twenty-fourth. Attacked at daybreak, the Marshal would,

as Moore hoped, find no time to organize his retreat and would thus be

forced to fight.

While waiting at Sahagun for the sun to set, Moore received a dispatch

from La Romana to say that, in accordance with his promise, he had

marched from Leon to aid his allies. But he could only put into the

field some 8,000 men and a single battery--with which he had advanced

to Mansilla, with his vanguard at Villarminio, on the road to Saldaña.

He was thus but eighteen miles from Sahagun, and though he had only

brought a third of his army with him, could be utilized in the oncoming

operations.

But this was not the only news which reached Moore on the afternoon

of the twenty-third. Only two short hours before he received the

dispatch from Mansilla, another note from La Romana had come in, with

information of very much greater importance. A confidential agent of

the Marquis, beyond the Douro, had sent him a messenger with news that

all the French forces in the direction of the Escurial were turning

northward and crossing the Guadarrama. Putting this intelligence side

by side with rumours brought in by peasants, to the effect that great

quantities of food and forage had been ordered to be collected in the

villages west of Palencia, Moore drew the right inference. What he

had always expected had come to pass. Napoleon had turned north from

Madrid, and was hastening across the mountains to overwhelm the British

army[636].

[636] From Moore’s dispatch to La Romana, written on the

twenty-third, we gather that the letter with the news about the

French movements came in about six p.m., and the second one with

the report that the Spaniards had reached Mansilla about eight.

The latter is acknowledged in a postscript to Moore’s reply to

the former. The resolve to retreat was made between six and eight

o’clock.

Without losing a moment, Moore countermanded his advance on Carrion.

The orders went out at nine o’clock, when the leading brigades had

already started. As the men were tramping over the frozen snow, in

full expectation of a fight at dawn, they were suddenly told to halt.

A moment later came the command to turn back by the road that they had

come, and to retire to their bivouacs of the previous day. Utterly

puzzled and much disgusted the troops returned to Sahagun.

SECTION VIII: CHAPTER IV

NAPOLEON’S PURSUIT OF MOORE: SAHAGUN TO ASTORGA

We have many times had occasion in this narrative to wonder at the

extreme tardiness with which news reached the Spanish and the English

generals. It is now at the inefficiency of Napoleon’s intelligence

department that we must express our surprise. Considering that Moore

had moved forward from Salamanca as far back as December 12, and had

made his existence manifest to the French on that same day by the

successful skirmish at Rueda, it is astonishing to find that the

Emperor did not grasp the situation for nine days. Under the influence

of his pre-conceived idea that the British must be retiring on Lisbon,

he was looking for them in every other quarter rather than the banks

of the Upper Douro. On the seventeenth he was ordering reconnaissances

to be made in the direction of Plasencia[637] in Estremadura (of all

places in the world) to get news of Moore, and was still pushing

troops towards Talavera on the road to Portugal. The general tendency

of all his movements was in this direction, and there can be no doubt

that in a few days his great central reserve would have followed in

the wake of Lasalle and Lefebvre, and started for Badajoz and Elvas.

On the nineteenth he reviewed outside Madrid the troops that were

available for instant movement--the Imperial Guard, the corps of Ney,

the divisions of Leval and Lapisse--about 40,000 men with 150 guns,

all in excellent order, and with fifteen days’ biscuit stored in

their wagons[638]. Of the direction they were to take we can have no

doubt, when we read in the imperial correspondence orders for naval

officers to be hurried up to reorganize the arsenal of Lisbon[639],

and a private note to Bessières--the commander-in-chief of the

cavalry--bidding him start his spare horses and his personal baggage

for Talavera[640].

[637] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,577 [Dec. 17], orders Lasalle’s cavalry

to push for Plasencia in order to get news of the British army.

[638] Napier (i. 304) says that there were 60,000 men present,

but it is hard to see how such a number could have been collected

on that day at Madrid; and the official account of the review in

the _Madrid Gazette_ for Dec. 23 says that 40,000 men appeared,

‘all in beautiful order, and testifying their enthusiasm by their

shouts as His Majesty rode past the front of each regiment.’

The Emperor never understated his forces on such occasions: the

tendency was the other way.

[639] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,514, to Admiral Decrès. Cf. De Pradt,

p. 211.

[640] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,553, to Bessières, Dec. 12.

The Emperor’s obstinate refusal to look in the right direction is very

curious when we remember that Moore’s cavalry was sweeping the plains

as far as Valladolid from December 12 to 16, and that on the eighteenth

Franceschi had abandoned that important city, while Soult had got news

of Moore’s being on the move two days earlier. Clearly either there

was grave neglect in sending information on the part of the French

cavalry generals in Old Castile, or else the Emperor had so convinced

himself that the British were somewhere on the road to Lisbon, that

he did not read the true meaning of the dispatches from the north. Be

this as it may, it is evident that there was a serious failure in the

imperial intelligence department, and that a week or more was wasted.

Bonaparte ought to have been astir two or three days after Stewart and

Paget drove in Franceschi’s screen of vedettes. As a matter of fact it

was nine days before any move was made at the French head quarters: yet

Rueda is only ninety-five miles from Madrid.

The first definite intelligence as to the English being on the move in

Old Castile reached the Emperor on the evening of December 19. Yet it

was only on the twenty-first that he really awoke to the full meaning

of the reports that reached him from Soult and Franceschi[641]. But

when he did at last realize the situation, he acted with a sudden

and spasmodic energy which was never surpassed in any of his earlier

campaigns. He hurled on to Moore’s track not only the central reserve

at Madrid, but troops gathered in from all directions, till he had

set at least 80,000 men on the march, to encompass the British corps

which had so hardily thrown itself upon his communications. Moore had

been perfectly right when he stated his belief that the sight of the

redcoats within reach would stir the Emperor up to such wrath, that

he would abandon every other enterprise and rush upon them with every

available man.

[641] In _Nap. Corresp._ there is no trace of movement till the

twenty-second.

On the evening of the twenty-first the French troops from every

camp around Madrid were pouring out towards the Escurial and the two

passes over the Guadarrama. The cavalry of Ney’s corps and of the

Imperial Guard was in front, then came the masses of their infantry.

Lapisse’s division fell in behind: an express was sent to Dessolles,

who was guarding the road to Calatayud and Saragossa, to leave only

two battalions and a battery behind, and to make forced marches on the

Escurial with the rest of his men. Another aide-de-camp rode to set

Lahoussaye’s division of dragoons on the move from Avila[642]. Finally

messengers rode north to bid Lorges’s dragoons, and all the fractions

of Junot’s corps, to place themselves under the orders of Soult.

Millet’s belated division of dragoons was to do the same, if it had yet

crossed the Ebro.

[642] All this can be studied in _Nap. Corresp._, 14,609,

14,611, 14,614. The march out towards the Escurial is fixed, by

the _Madrid Gazette_ of Dec. 23, as having begun late on the

twenty-first.

The Emperor, once more committing the error of arguing from

insufficient data, had made up his mind that the English were at

Valladolid[643]. He had no news from that place since Franceschi

had abandoned it, and chose to assume that Moore, or at any rate

some portion of the British army, was there established. Under this

hypothesis it would be easy to cut off the raiders from a retreat on

Portugal, or even on Galicia, by carrying troops with extreme speed

to Tordesillas and Medina de Rio Seco. This comparatively easy task

was all that Napoleon aimed at in his first directions. Villacastin,

Arevalo, Olmedo, and Medina del Campo are the points to which his

orders of December 21 and 22 require that the advancing columns should

be pushed.

[643] This error appears in _Nap. Corresp._, 14,614 [Dec. 22],

‘si les Anglais veulent tenir à Valladolid’; 14,616 [Dec. 23]

says, ‘Les Anglais paraissent être à Valladolid, probablement

avec une avant-garde.’ It is only on Dec. 27 that he writes to

King Joseph that they had never been there at all, save with a

flying party of 100 light cavalry.

For the maintenance of Madrid, and the ‘containing’ of the Spanish

armies at Cuenca and Almaraz, the Emperor left nothing behind but the

corps of Lefebvre, two-thirds of the corps of Victor, and the three

cavalry divisions of Lasalle, Milhaud, and Latour-Maubourg--8,000 horse

and 28,000 foot in all, with ninety guns[644]. King Joseph was left

in nominal command of the whole. Such a force was amply sufficient to

hold back the disorganized troops of Galluzzo and Infantado, but not to

advance on Seville or on Lisbon. It was impossible that any blow should

be dealt to the west or the south, till the Emperor should send back

some of the enormous masses of men that he had hurled upon Moore. Thus

the English general’s intention was fully carried out: his raid into

Old Castile had completely disarranged all Bonaparte’s plans. It gave

the Spaniards at least two months in which to rally and recover their

spirits, and it drew the field-army of the Emperor into a remote and

desolate corner of Spain, so that the main centres of resistance were

left unmolested.

[644] This is Napoleon’s own estimate (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,615).

Marshal Jourdan, who was more or less in charge of the whole,

as chief of the staff to King Joseph, says that there were in

reality only 30,000 men in all (_Mémoires Militaires_, p. 130).

Not only was Victor’s corps short of the division of Lapisse

(which the Emperor had carried off), but Lefebvre’s was also

incomplete, as two Dutch and one German battalions of Leval’s

division were behind in Biscay, garrisoning Bilbao and other

points. King Joseph’s Guards had also left some detachments

behind, and were not up to full strength (_Nap. Corresp._,

14,615).

Napoleon had guessed part, but by no means all, of Moore’s design.

‘The manœuvre of the English is very strange,’ he wrote to his brother

Joseph; ‘it is proved that they have evacuated Salamanca. Probably

they have brought their transports round to Ferrol, because they think

that the retreat on Lisbon is no longer safe, as we could push on

from Talavera by the left bank of the Tagus and shut the mouth of the

river.... Probably they have evacuated Portugal and transferred their

base to Ferrol, because it offers advantages for a safe embarkation.

But while retreating, they might hope to inflict a check on the corps

of Soult, and may not have made up their mind to try it till they

had got upon their new line of retreat, and moved to the right bank

of the Douro. They may have argued as follows: “If the French commit

themselves to a march on Lisbon, we can evacuate on Oporto, and while

doing so are still on our line of communications with Ferrol. Or,

possibly, they may be expecting fresh reinforcements. But whatever

their plan may be, their move will have a great influence on the end of

this whole business.”’

The Emperor thought therefore that Moore’s main object had been to

change an unsafe base at Lisbon for a safe one in Galicia, and that the

demonstration against Soult was incidental and secondary. It does not

seem to have struck him that the real design was to lure the central

field-army of the French from Madrid, and to postpone the invasion

of the south. Many of his apologists and admirers have excused his

blindness, by saying that Moore’s plan was so rash and hazardous that

no sensible man could have guessed it. But this is a complete mistake:

the plan, if properly carried out, was perfectly sound. Sir John knew

precisely what he was doing, and was prepared to turn on his heel and

go back at full speed, the instant that he saw the least movement on

the side of Madrid. It was in no rash spirit that he acted, but rather

the reverse: ‘I mean to proceed bridle in hand,’ he said; ‘and if the

bubble bursts, we shall have a run for it.’[645] And on this principle

he acted: three hours after he got notice that Napoleon was on the

march, he started to ‘make a run for it’ to Astorga, and his promptness

was such that his main body was never in the slightest danger from

the Emperor’s rush on Benavente, fierce and sudden though it was. The

disasters of the second part of the retreat were not in the least

caused by Napoleon’s intercepting movement, which proved an absolute

and complete failure.

[645] Moore to Baird, from Salamanca, Dec. 6.

But to proceed: Ney’s corps, which led the advance against Moore,

crossed the Guadarrama on the night of December 21, and had arrived

safely at Villacastin, on the northern side of the passes, on the

morning of the twenty-second. As if to contradict the Emperor’s

statement--made as he was setting out--that ‘the weather could not

be better,’ a dreadful tempest arose that day. When Bonaparte rode

up from Chamartin, to place himself at the head of his Guard, which

was to cross the mountains on the twenty-second, he found the whole

column stopped by a howling blizzard, which swept down the pass with

irresistible strength and piled the snow in large drifts at every

inconvenient corner of the defile. It is said that several horsemen

were flung over precipices by the mere force of the wind. The whole

train of cannon and caissons stuck halfway up the ascent, and could

neither advance nor retreat. Violently irritated at the long delay,

Napoleon turned on every pioneer that could be found to clear away the

drifts, set masses of men to trample down the snow into a beaten track,

forced the officers and all the cavalry to dismount and lead their

horses, and unharnessed half the artillery so as to give double teams

to the rest. In this way the Guard, with the Emperor walking on foot in

its midst, succeeded at last in crawling through to Villacastin by the

night of December 23. A considerable number of men died of cold and

fatigue, and the passage had occupied some sixteen hours more than had

been calculated by the Emperor. The troops which followed him had less

trouble in their passage, the tempest having abated its fury, and the

path cleared by the Guard being available for their use.

At the very moment at which Moore was countermanding the

advance on Sahagun--about seven o’clock on the evening of the

twenty-third--Napoleon was throwing himself on his couch at

Villacastin, after a day of fatigue which had tried even his iron

frame. For the next week the two armies were contending with their

feet and not their arms, in the competition which the French officers

called the ‘race to Benavente[646].’ Napoleon was at last beginning to

understand that he had not before him the comparatively simple task of

cutting the road between Valladolid and Astorga, but the much harder

one of intercepting that between Sahagun and Astorga. For the first

three days of his march he was still under some hopes of catching the

English before they could cross the Esla--and if any of them had been

at Valladolid this would certainly have been possible. On December 24

he was at Arevalo: on Christmas Day he reached Tordesillas, where he

waited twenty-four hours to allow his infantry to come up with his

cavalry. On the twenty-seventh he at last understood--mainly through a

letter from Soult--that the English were much further north than he had

at first believed. But he was still in high spirits: he did not think

it probable that Moore also might have been making forced marches, and

having seized Medina de Rio Seco with Ney’s corps, he imagined that he

was close on the flank of the retreating enemy. ‘To-day or to-morrow,’

he wrote to his brother Joseph on that morning, ‘it is probable that

great events will take place. If the English have not already retreated

they are lost: even if they have already moved they shall be pursued

to the water’s edge, and not half of them shall re-embark. Put in your

newspapers that 36,000 English are surrounded, that I am at Benavente

in their rear, while Soult is in their front[647].’ The announcement

was duly made in the _Madrid Gazette_, but the Emperor had been

deceived as to the condition of affairs, which never in actual fact

resembled the picture that he had drawn for himself[648].

[646] The phrase will be found in De Pradt, p. 211.

[647] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,620 (Napoleon to King Joseph, Dec. 27).

[648] Oddly enough Joseph had anticipated his brother’s orders,

by putting in the _Madrid Gazette_ of that very day a notice

that a British corps was in the most critical position, that its

retreat was cut off, and that ‘London, so long insensible to the

woes of Spain, will soon grieve over a disaster that is her own

and not that of another.’

Sir John had commenced his retreat from Sahagun on the twenty-fourth,

with the intention of retiring to Astorga, and of taking up a position

on the mountains behind it that might cover Galicia. He did not

intend to retire any further unless he were obliged[649]. If Soult

should follow him closely, while the Emperor was still two or three

marches away, he announced his intention of turning upon the Marshal

and offering him battle. He wrote to La Romana asking him to hold the

bridge of Mansilla (the most northerly passage over the Esla) as long

as might be prudent, and then to retire on the Asturias, leaving the

road to Galicia clear for the English army[650].

[649] Moore to La Romana, from Sahagun, night of Dec. 23-4.

[650] Moore to La Romana, from Sahagun, Dec. 24.

At noon on the twenty-fourth Moore started off in two columns: Baird’s

division marched by the northern road to Valencia de Don Juan, where

the Esla is passable by a ford and a ferry: Hope and Fraser took the

more southern route by Mayorga and the bridge of Castro Gonzalo. The

reserve division under E. Paget, and the two light brigades, remained

behind at Sahagun for twenty-four hours to cover the retreat. The five

cavalry regiments were ordered to press in closely upon Soult, and to

keep him as long as possible in doubt as to whether he was not himself

about to be attacked.

This demonstration seems to have served its purpose, for the Marshal

made no move either on the twenty-fourth or the twenty-fifth. Yet by

the latter day his army was growing very formidable, as all the corps

from Burgos and Palencia were reporting themselves to him: Lorges’s

dragoons had reached Frechilla, and Delaborde with the head of the

infantry of Junot’s corps was at Paredes, only thirteen miles from

Soult’s head quarters at Carrion. Loison and Heudelet were not far

behind. Yet the English columns marched for two days wholly unmolested.

On the twenty-sixth Baird crossed the Esla at Valencia: the ford was

dangerous, for the river was rising: a sudden thaw on the twenty-fourth

had turned the roads into mud, and loosened the snows. But the guns

and baggage crossed without loss, as did also some of the infantry,

the rest using the two ferry-boats[651]. Hope and Fraser, on the

Mayorga road, had nothing but the badness of their route to contend

against. The soil of this part of the kingdom of Leon is a soft rich

loam, and the cross-roads were knee-deep in clay: for the whole of

the twenty-sixth it rained without intermission: the troops plodded

on in very surly mood, but as yet there was no straggling. It was

still believed that Moore would fight at Astorga, and, though the men

grumbled that ‘the General intended to march them to death first and to

fight after[652],’ they still kept together.

[651] There is a good account of this dangerous passage in Adam

Neale’s _Spanish Campaign of 1808_.

[652] Memoir of ‘T.S.’ of the 71st Highlanders, p. 53.

But already signs were beginning to be visible that their discipline

was about to break down. A good deal of wanton damage and a

certain amount of plunder took place at the halting-places for the

night--Mayorga, Valderas, and Benavente. A voice from the ranks

explains the situation. ‘Our sufferings were so great that many of the

men lost their natural activity and spirits, and became savage in their

dispositions. The idea of running away, without even firing a shot,

from the enemy we had beaten so easily at Vimiero, was too galling to

their feelings. Each spoke to his fellow, even in common conversation,

with bitterness: rage flashed out on the most trifling occasion of

disagreement. The poor Spaniards had little to expect from such men as

these, who blamed them for their inactivity. Every man found at home

was looked upon as a traitor to his country. “Why is not every Spaniard

under arms and fighting? The cause is not ours: are we to be the only

sufferers?” Such was the common language, and from these feelings

pillage and outrage naturally arose[653].’ The men began to seize food

in the towns and villages without waiting for the regular distribution,

forced their way into houses, and (the country being singularly

destitute of wood) tore down sheds and doors to build up their bivouac

fires. The most deplorable mischief took place at Benavente, where

the regiment quartered in the picturesque old castle belonging to the

Duchess of Osuna burnt much of the mediaeval furniture, tore down the

sixteenth-century tapestry to make bed-clothes, and lighted fires on

the floors of the rooms, to the destruction of the porcelain friezes

and alcoves[654]. Moore issued a strongly-worded proclamation against

these excesses on December 27, blaming the officers for not keeping

an eye upon the men, and pointing out that ‘not bravery alone, but

patience and constancy under fatigue and hardship were military

virtues[655].’ Unfortunately, such arguments had little effect on the

tired and surly rank and file. Things were ere long to grow much worse.

[653] I am again quoting from the admirable narrative of ‘T.S.’,

the private in the 71st. Compare Ormsby’s _Letters_, ii. 92-3,

for the wanton plundering.

[654] The French did worse, as they burnt the whole castle when

they occupied it during the first days of the new year. But

that is no justification for the conduct of the British. For a

description of the damage done see Ormsby, ii. 102, 103.

[655] General Order, issued at Benavente on Dec. 27.

The infantry, as we have seen, accomplished their march to Benavente

without molestation, and all, including the rearguard, were across the

Esla by the twenty-seventh. Paget’s cavalry, however, had a much more

exciting time on the last two days. Finding that he was not attacked,

Soult began to bestir himself on the twenty-sixth: he sent Lorges’s

dragoons after the British army, in the direction of Mayorga, while

with Franceschi’s cavalry and the whole of his infantry he marched by

the direct road on Astorga, via the bridge of Mansilla.

Lorges’s four regiments were in touch with the rearguard of Paget’s

hussars on the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh, but they were not the

only or the most important enemies who were now striving to drive in

Moore’s cavalry screen. The advanced guard of the Emperor’s army had

just come up, and first Colbert’s brigade of Ney’s corps and then

the cavalry of the Guard began to press in upon Paget: Lahoussaye’s

dragoons arrived on the scene a little later. It is a splendid

testimonial to the way in which the British horsemen were handled, that

they held their own for three days against nearly triple forces on a

front of thirty miles[656]. No better certificate could be given to

them than the fact that the Emperor estimated them, when the fighting

was over, at 4,000 or 5,000 sabres, their real force being only 2,400.

He wrote, too, in a moment of chagrin when Moore’s army had just

escaped from him, so that he was not at all inclined to exaggerate

their numbers, and as a matter of fact rated the infantry too low.

But under the admirable leading of Paget the British cavalry held its

own in every direction. Moore was not exaggerating when he wrote on the

twenty-eighth that ‘they have obtained by their spirit and enterprise

an ascendency over the French which nothing but great superiority of

numbers on their part can get the better of[657].’ The 18th Light

Dragoons turned back to clear their rear six times on December 27, and

on each occasion drove in the leading squadrons of their pursuers with

such effect that they secured themselves an unmolested retreat for the

next few miles. At one charge, near Valencia de Don Juan, a troop of

thirty-eight sabres of this regiment charged a French squadron of 105

men, and broke through them, killing twelve and capturing twenty. The

10th Hussars, while fending off Lorges’s dragoons near Mayorga, found

that a regiment of the light cavalry of Ney had got into their rear and

had drawn itself up on a rising ground flanking the high-road. Charging

up the slope, and over soil deep in the slush of half-melted snow,

they broke through the enemy’s line, and got off in safety with 100

prisoners. Every one of Paget’s five regiments had its full share of

fighting on the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh, yet they closed in on

to Benavente in perfect order, with insignificant losses, and exulting

in a complete consciousness of their superiority to the enemy’s horse.

Since the start from Salamanca they had in twelve days taken no less

than 500 prisoners, besides inflicting considerable losses in killed

and wounded on the French. They had still one more success before them,

ere they found themselves condemned to comparative uselessness among

the mountains of Galicia.

[656] Five regiments (7th, 10th, and 15th Hussars, 18th Light

Dragoons, 3rd K. G. L.) were being pressed by thirteen French

regiments--four each of Lorges’s and Lahoussaye’s, two of

Colbert’s, and three of the Guard.

[657] Moore to Castlereagh, from Benavente, Dec. 28.

On the twenty-eighth Robert Crawfurd’s brigade had waited behind in

the mud and rain, drawn up in front of the bridge of Castro Gonzalo,

‘standing for many hours with arms posted, and staring the French

cavalry in the face, while the water actually ran out of the muzzles

of their muskets[658].’ At last our hussars retired, and Crawfurd blew

up two arches of the bridge when Paget had passed over, and moved back

on Benavente, after some trifling skirmishing with the cavalry of the

Imperial Guard, who had come up in force and tried to interrupt his

work. The indefatigable British horsemen left pickets all along the

river on each side of the broken bridge, ready to report and oppose any

attempt to cross.

[658] _Recollections of Rifleman Harris_, p. 171.

After resting for a day in Benavente Moore had sent on the divisions

of Fraser and Hope to Astorga, by the highway through La Baneza. The

division of Baird, marching from Valencia by villainous cross-roads,

converged on the same point, where the three corps met upon December

29. Their march was wholly unmolested by the French, who were being

successfully held back by Moore’s rearguard under the two Pagets--the

cavalry general and the commander of the reserve division--and by

Crawfurd and Alten’s light brigades. On the same morning that the main

body reached Astorga, the infantry of the rearguard marched out of

Benavente, leaving behind only the horsemen, who were watching all the

fords, with their supports three miles behind in the town of Benavente.

Seeing that all the infantry had disappeared, Lefebvre-Desnouettes,

who commanded the cavalry of the Guard, thought it high time to press

beyond the Esla: it was absurd, he thought, that the mass of French

horsemen, now gathered opposite the broken bridge of Castro Gonzalo,

should allow themselves to be kept in check by a mere chain of vedettes

unsupported by infantry or guns. Accordingly he searched for fords,

and when one was found a few hundred yards from the bridge, crossed

it at the head of the four squadrons of the chasseurs of the Guard,

between 500 and 600 sabres[659]. The rest of his troops, after vainly

seeking for other passages, were about to follow him. The moment that

he had got over the water Lefebvre found himself withstood by the

pickets, mainly belonging to the 18th Light Dragoons, who came riding

in from their posts along the river to mass themselves opposite to

him. When about 130 men were collected, under Colonel Otway, they

ventured to charge the leading squadrons of the chasseurs, of course

with indifferent success. After retiring a few hundred yards more,

they were joined by a troop of the 3rd Dragoons of the King’s German

Legion, under Major Burgwedel, and again turned to fight. At this

second clash the front line of the pursuers was broken for a moment,

and the dragoons who had burst through the gap had a narrow escape of

being surrounded and captured by the second line, but finally fought

their way out of the _mêlée_ with no great loss. Charles Stewart, their

brigadier, now came up and rallied them for the second time: he retired

towards the town in good order, without allowing himself to be cowed

by Lefebvre’s rapid advance, for he knew that supports were at hand.

Lord Paget, warned in good time, had drawn out the 10th Hussars under

cover of the houses of the southern suburb of Benavente. He waited till

the chasseurs drew quite near to him, and were too remote from the

ford they had crossed to be able to retire with ease: then he suddenly

sallied out from his cover and swooped down upon them. The pickets at

the same moment wheeled about, cheered, and charged. The enemy, now

slightly outnumbered--for the 10th were fully 450 sabres strong, and

the pickets at least 200--made a good fight. A British witness observes

that these ‘fine big fellows in fur caps and long green coats’ were

far better than the line regiments with which the hussars had hitherto

been engaged. But in a few minutes they were broken, and chased for

two miles right back to the ford by which they had crossed. Lefebvre

himself was captured by a private of the 10th named Grisdale, his

wounded horse having refused to swim the river[660]. With him there

were taken two captains and seventy unwounded prisoners. The chasseurs

left fifty-five men dead or hurt upon the field, and many of those who

got away were much cut about[661]. The British casualties were fifty,

almost all from the men who had furnished the pickets, for the 10th

suffered little: Burgwedel, who had led the Germans of the 3rd K. G.

L., was the only officer hurt[662].

[659] Napoleon (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,623) says that the regiment

of chasseurs was only 300 strong, and their loss only sixty. But

the splendid regiments of the Guard cavalry had not yet fallen to

this small number of sabres.

[660] He was sent to England, and long lived on parole at

Cheltenham. While he was there Charles Vaughan called on him, and

got from him some valuable information about the first siege of

Saragossa, whose history he was then writing. In 1811 Lefebvre

broke his parole and escaped to France, where Napoleon welcomed

him and restored him to command.

[661] Larrey, the Emperor’s surgeon, commenting on sabre-wounds,

says that no less than seventy wounded of the chasseurs came

under his care on this occasion.

[662] In James Moore’s book this gallant officer appears under

the English disguise of Major Bagwell, under which I did not at

first recognize him (p. 181). Oddly enough Adam Neale makes the

same mistake (p. 179).

The remnant of the chasseurs crossed the river, and were immediately

supported by other regiments, who (after failing to find another ford)

had come down to that which Lefebvre had used. They showed some

signs of attempting a second passage, but Lord Paget turned upon them

the guns of Downman’s horse-battery, which had just galloped up from

Benavente. After two rounds the enemy rode off hastily from the river,

and fell back inland. They had received such a sharp lesson that they

allowed the British cavalry to retreat without molestation in the

afternoon. Napoleon consoled himself with writing that the British were

‘flying in panic’--a statement which the circumstances hardly seemed to

justify[663]--and gave an exaggerated account of the disorders which

they had committed at Valderas and Benavente, to which he added an

imaginary outrage at Leon[664]. But there is no more talk of Moore’s

corps being surrounded--wherefore it suddenly shrinks in the Emperor’s

estimation, being no longer 36,000 strong, but only ‘21,000 infantry,

with 4,000 or 5,000 horse.’ Lefebvre’s affair he frankly owned, when

writing to King Joseph, was disgusting: ‘by evening I had 8,000 horse

on the spot, but the enemy was gone[665].’

[663] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,623 (Napoleon to Josephine, from

Benavente, Dec. 31), ‘Les Anglais fuient épouvantés.’

[664] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,626 (Napoleon to King Joseph). Joseph

is to insert in the Madrid papers letters written from these

three places with descriptions of the brigandage practised by the

English--‘à Leon ils ont chassé les moines.’ No English troops

had ever been within thirty miles of Leon!

[665] ‘Cette affaire m’a coûté une soixantaine de mes chasseurs.

Vous sentez combien cela m’a été désagréable’ (ibid.).