during the eventful summer months of 1808, we have not yet chronicled.
The rugged and warlike province of Catalonia had already begun that
heroic struggle against its French garrison which was to endure
throughout the whole of the war. Far more than any other section of
the Spanish nation do the Catalans deserve credit for their unswerving
patriotism. Nowhere else was the war maintained with such resolution.
When the struggle commenced the French were already masters by
treachery of the chief fortresses of the land: the force of Spanish
regular troops which lay within its borders was insignificant: there
was no recognized leader, no general of repute, to head the rising
of the province. Yet the attack on the invaders was delivered with a
fierceness and a persistent energy that was paralleled in no other
quarter of the Peninsula. For six years marshal after marshal ravaged
the Catalan valleys, sacked the towns, scattered the provincial levies.
But not for one moment did the resistance slacken; the invaders
could never control a foot of ground beyond the narrow space that
was swept by the cannon of their strongholds. The spirit of the race
was as unbroken in 1813 as in 1808, and their untiring bands still
held out in the hills, ready to strike at the enemy when the least
chance was offered. Other provinces had equal or greater advantages
than Catalonia for protracted resistance: Biscay, the Asturias, and
Galicia were as rugged, Andalusia far more populous, Valencia more
fertile and wealthy. But in none of these was the struggle carried on
with such a combination of energy and persistence as in the Catalan
hills. Perhaps the greatest testimony that can be quoted in behalf
of the people of that devoted province is that Napier, bitter critic
as he was of all things Spanish, is forced to say a good word for
it. ‘The Catalans,’ he writes, ‘were vain and superstitious; but
their courage was higher, their patriotism purer, and their efforts
more sustained than those of the rest. The _somatenes_ were bold and
active in battle, the population of the towns firm, and the juntas
apparently disinterested[290].’ No one but a careful student of Napier
will realize what a handsome testimonial is contained in the somewhat
grudging language of this paragraph. What the real credit due to the
Catalans was, it will now be our duty to display.
[290] Napier, _History of the Peninsular War_, i. 90.
It will be remembered that in the month of February the French general
Duhesme had obtained possession of the citadel and forts of Barcelona
by a particularly impudent and shameless stratagem[291]. Since that
time he had been lying in the city that he had seized, with his whole
force concentrated under his hand. Of the 7,000 French and 5,000
Italian troops which composed his corps, all were with him save a
single battalion of detachments which had been left behind to garrison
Figueras, the fortress close to the French frontier, which commands
the most important of the three roads by which the principality of
Catalonia can be entered.
[291] See pp. 36, 37 of this book.
Duhesme believed himself to be entirely secure, for of Spanish
regular troops there were barely 6,000 in all scattered through the
province[292], and a third of these were Swiss mercenaries, who,
according to the orders of Bonaparte, were to be taken at once into
the French service. That there was any serious danger to be feared
from the _miqueletes_ of the mountains never entered into the heads
of the Emperor or his lieutenant. Nor does it seem to have occurred
to them that any insurrection which broke out in Catalonia might be
immediately supported from the Balearic Isles, where a heavy garrison
was always kept, in order to guard against any descent of the British
to recover their old stronghold of Port Mahon[293]. If Napoleon had
realized in May that the Spanish rising was about to sweep over the
whole Peninsula, he would not have dared to leave Duhesme with such a
small force. But persisting in his original blunder of believing that
the troubles which had broken out were merely local and sporadic, he
was about to order Duhesme to make large detachments from a corps that
was already dangerously weak.
[292] They were the following:--
Regiment of Estremadura 840 strong at Tarrega
(near Lerida).
Regiment of Ultonia 421 ” Gerona.
Two battalions of Wimpfen’s Swiss Regiment 2,149 ” Tarragona.
Two battalions of Spanish and Walloon Guards 1,700 ” Barcelona.
Cavalry Regiment of Borbon 658 ” ”
Artillery 300 ” in various
forts on
coast.
------
6,068
[293] The Spanish garrisons in the Balearic Isles consisted of
the following troops:--
Regiment of Granada (three batts.) 1,183 at Port Mahon.
Regiment of Soria (three batts.) 1,381 ”
Regiment of Borbon (three batts.) 1,570 at Palma.
Swiss Regiment of Beschard (two batts.) 2,121 ”
Light Infantry of Barcelona, No. 2 1,341 at Port Mahon.
” ” Aragon, No. 2. 1,267 at Palma.
Militia Battalion of Majorca 604 ”
6th Hussars (_Husares Españoles_) 680 ”
Artillery 500 ” and Port Mahon.
------
10,647
The geography of Catalonia, as we have had occasion to relate in an
earlier chapter, is rather complicated. Not only is the principality
cut off by its mountains from the rest of Spain--it faces towards the
sea, while its neighbour Aragon faces towards the Ebro--but it is
divided by its numerous cross-ranges into a number of isolated valleys,
between which communication is very difficult. Its coast-plain along
the Mediterranean is generally narrow, and often cut across by spurs
which run down from the mountains of the inland till they strike the
sea. Except on the eastern side of the principality, where it touches
Aragon in the direction of Lerida, there is no broad expanse of level
ground within its borders: much the greater part of its surface is
upland and mountain.
Catalonia may be divided into four regions: the first is the district
at the foot of the Eastern Pyrenees, drained by the Fluvia and the
Ter. This narrow corner is called the Ampurdam; it contains all the
frontier-fortresses which protect the province on the side of France.
Rosas commands the pass along the sea-shore, Figueras the main road
from Perpignan, which runs some twenty miles further inland. A little
further south both these roads meet, and are blocked by the strong
city of Gerona, the capital of all this region and its most important
strategical point. South of Gerona a cross-range divides the Ampurdam
from the coast-plain of Central Catalonia; the defile through this
range is covered by the small fortified town of Hostalrich, but there
is an alternative route from Gerona to Barcelona along the coast by
Blanes and Arens de Mar.
The river-basin of Central Catalonia is that of the Llobregat, near
whose estuary Barcelona stands. Its lower course lies through the
level ground along the coast, but its upper waters and those of its
tributaries drain a series of highland valleys, difficult of access
and divided from each other by considerable chains of hills. All these
valleys unite at the foot of the crag of Montserrat, which, crowned
by its monastery, overlooks the plain, and stands sentinel over the
approach to the upland. In the mountains behind Montserrat was the
main stronghold of the Catalan insurrection, whose rallying-places
were the high-lying towns of Manresa, Cardona, Berga, and Solsona.
Only three practicable roads enter the valleys of the Upper Llobregat,
one communicates by the line of Manresa and Vich with the Ampurdam;
a second goes from Manresa via Cervera to Lerida, and ultimately to
the plains of Aragon; the third is the high-road from Barcelona to
Manresa, the main line of approach from the shore to the upland. But
there is another route of high importance in this section of Catalonia,
that which, starting from Barcelona, avoids the upper valleys, strikes
inland by Igualada, crosses the main watershed between the coast and
the Ebro valley below Cervera, and at that place joins the other road
from Manresa and the Upper Llobregat, and continues on its way to
Lerida and the plains of Aragon. This, passing the mountains at the
point of least resistance, forms the great trunk-road from Barcelona to
Madrid.
[Illustration: Catalonia.]
The third region of the principality is the coastland of Tarragona,
a district cut off from the coastland of Barcelona by a well-marked
cross-ridge, which runs down from the mountains to the sea, and reaches
the latter near the mouth of the Llobregat. The communication between
the two maritime districts is by two roads, one passing the cross-ridge
by the defile of Ordal, the other hugging the beach and finding its way
between the hills and the water’s edge by Villanueva de Sitjas. The
coastland of Tarragona is not drained by a single river of considerable
volume, like the Llobregat, but by a number of small streams such as
the Francoli and the Gaya, running parallel to each other and at right
angles to the coast. Each is separated from the next by a line of hills
of moderate height. The southern limit of this region is the Ebro,
whose lower course is protected by the strong fortress of Tortosa.
Its main line of internal communication is the great coast-route from
Barcelona to Tarragona, and from Tarragona to the mouth of the Ebro.
Its touch with Aragon and Central Spain is maintained by a good road
from Tarragona by Montblanch to Lerida.
The fourth and last region of Catalonia is the inland, which looks not
towards the Mediterranean but to the Ebro and Aragon. It is drained
by the Segre, an important stream, which after being joined by its
tributaries, the Noguera and the Pallaresa, falls into the Ebro not
far to the south of Lerida. The tracts around that town are flat and
fertile, part of the main valley of the Ebro. But the head-waters of
the Segre and its affluents flow through narrow and difficult mountain
valleys, starting in the highest and wildest region of the Pyrenees.
They are very inaccessible, and served by no roads suitable for the use
of an army. Hence, like the upper valley of the Llobregat, they served
as places of refuge for the Catalan insurgents when Lerida and the flat
country had been lost. The only place of importance in these highlands
is the remote town of Seu d’ Urgel[294], a mediaeval fortress near the
sources of the Segre, approached by mule-paths only, and quite lost in
the hills.
[294] Urgel is more accessible from France than from Spain. The
easiest path to it is that which, starting from Mont-Louis,
crosses the Spanish frontier at Puycerda, and follows the
head-water of the Segre to the foot of the hill on which the Seu
stands.
Catalonia, then, is pre-eminently a mountain land, and one presenting
special difficulties to an invader, because it has no central system
of roads or valleys, but is divided into so many heterogeneous parts.
Though not fertile, it was yet rich, and fairly well peopled when
compared with other regions of Spain[295]. Its wealth came not from
agriculture but from commerce and manufactures. Barcelona, a city of
180,000 souls, was the greatest Mediterranean port of Spain: on each
side of it, along the coast, are dozens of large fishing-villages and
small harbour-towns, drawing their living from the sea. Of the places
which lay farther back from the water there were many which made an
ample profit from their manufactures, for Catalonia was, and still
remains, the workshop of Spain. It is the only province of the kingdom
where the inhabitants have developed industries on a large scale: its
textile products were especially successful, and supplied the whole
Peninsula.
[295] The population of the Principality in 1803 was 858,000
souls.
More than any other part of Spain, Catalonia had suffered from the
war with England and the Continental System. The closure of its ports
had told cruelly upon its merchants and manufacturers, who were
fully aware that their sufferings were the logical consequence of
the French alliance. They had, moreover, a historic grudge against
France: after encouraging them to revolt in the seventeenth century,
the Bourbons had then abandoned them to the mercies of the King of the
Castilians. In the great war of the Spanish Succession, Catalonia had
taken sides against France and Don Philip, and had proclaimed Charles
of Austria its king--not because it loved him, but because it hated
the French claimant. Even after the Peace of Utrecht the Catalans
had refused to lay down their arms, and had made a last desperate
struggle for provincial independence. It was in these wars that their
_miqueletes_[296] had first made their name famous by their stubborn
fighting. These bands were a levy _en masse_ of the population of
military age, armed and paid by their parishes, not by the central
government, which could be called out whenever the principality was
threatened with invasion. From their liability to turn out whenever the
alarm-bell (_somaten_) was rung, they were also known as _somatenes_.
The system of the _Quinta_ and the militia ballot, which prevailed in
the provinces under the crown of Castile, had never been applied to
the Catalans, who gloried in the survival of their ancient military
customs. The _somatenes_ had been called out in the French war of
1793-5, and had done good service in it, distinguishing themselves
far more than the troops of the line which fought on the frontier
of the Eastern Pyrenees. The memories of that struggle were still
fresh among them, and many of the leaders who had won a name in it
were still fit for service. In Catalonia then, more than in any other
corner of Spain, there were all the materials at hand for a vigorous
popular insurrection, even though the body of regular troops in the
principality was insignificant. The Catalans rose to defend their
provincial independence, and to recover their capital, which had been
seized so shamelessly by the trickery of Duhesme. They did not concern
themselves much with what was going on in Aragon and Valencia, or even
in Madrid. Their fight with the invader forms an episode complete
in itself, a sort of underplot in the great drama of the Peninsular
War, which only touches the main struggle at infrequent intervals. It
was not affected by the campaigns of Castile, still less had it any
noticeable influence on them. It would be equally possible to write the
history of the war in Catalonia as a separate treatise, or to compile a
general history of the war in which Catalonia was barely mentioned.
[296] So called from Miquelot de Prats, the Catalan _condottiere_
who served under Caesar Borgia. From him the light infantry, once
called _almogavares_, got the name of _miqueletes_.
When the echoes of the cannon of the second of May went rolling round
Spain, they stirred up Catalonia no less than the other provinces which
lie at a distance from the capital. The phenomena which appeared in the
South and the West were repeated here, in much the same sequence, and
at much the same dates, as elsewhere. But the rising of the Catalans
was greatly handicapped by the fact that their populous and wealthy
capital was occupied by 12,000 French troops. Barcelona could not set
the example to the smaller places, and for some time the outburst was
spasmodic and local. The chief focus of rebellion was Lerida, where an
insurrectionary Junta was formed on May 29. At Tortosa the populace
rose a few days later, and murdered the military governor, Santiago
de Guzman, because he had been slow and reluctant to place himself at
their head. On June 2 Manresa, in the upper valley of the Llobregat,
followed their example, and from it the flame of insurrection spread
all over the central upland. In Barcelona itself there were secret
meetings, and suspicious gatherings in the streets, on which Duhesme
had to keep a watchful eye. But the main preoccupation of the French
general was that there were still several thousand Spanish troops
in the town, who might easily lead the populace in an _émeute_. He
had got rid of one regiment, that of Estremadura, in May: he gave it
orders to march to Lerida, where the magistrates and people refused to
receive it within their walls, dreading that it might not be ready to
join in their projected rising. This was a vain fear, for the corps
readily took its part in the insurrection, and marched to join Palafox
at Saragossa. But there still remained in Barcelona a battalion each
of the Spanish and the Walloon Guards, and the cavalry regiment of
Borbon, some 2,500 men in all. To Duhesme’s intense satisfaction,
these troops, instead of keeping together and attacking the French
garrison when the news of the revolt reached them, began to desert in
small parties. Far from attempting to compel them to stay by their
colours, Duhesme winked at their evasion, and took no notice of their
proceedings, even when a whole squadron of the Borbon Regiment rode off
with trumpets sounding and its officers at its head. Within a few days
the greater part of the Spanish troops had vanished, and when Duhesme
was directed by his master to disarm them, there were very few left
for him to deal with. These scattered remnants of the Guard Regiments
drifted in small bands all over Catalonia, some were found at Gerona,
others at Tarragona, others at Rosas. Nearly 400 went to Aragon and
fought under Palafox at Epila: another considerable body joined the
Valencian insurgents[297]. But these two strong veteran battalions
never were united again, or made to serve as a nucleus for the Catalan
levies[298].
[297] There were 400 Spanish Guards at the fight on the
Cabrillas, who must have come from the battalion at Barcelona.
[298] I cannot make out the movements of the cavalry regiment of
Borbon; it was certainly at Barcelona, 600 strong, in May. But
in July it had got down to Andalusia, and was marching with a
strength of 401 in the army of Castaños.
Saved from the peril of a rising of the Spanish regiments in Barcelona,
Duhesme had still the insurrection of the province on his hands. But he
was not left free to deal with it according to his own inspirations.
By the last dispatch from Napoleon which reached him before the
communications with Madrid and Bayonne were cut, a plan of campaign was
dictated to him. The Emperor ordered him to chastise the insurgents of
Lerida and Manresa, without ceasing to keep a strong grip on Barcelona,
and on the line of touch with France through Figueras. But, as if this
was not enough to occupy his small army of 12,000 or 13,000 men, he
was to provide two strong detachments, one of which was to co-operate
with Moncey in Valencia, and the other with Lefebvre-Desnouettes in
Aragon. A glance at the Emperor’s instructions is enough to show how
entirely he had misconceived the situation, and how thoroughly he had
failed to realize that all Spain was up in arms. The first detachment,
4,000 strong, was to march on Lerida, and to enter Aragon along the
line of the Ebro. It was then to move on Saragossa to join Lefebvre.
The second detachment, also 4,000 strong, was to move on Valencia
via Tortosa, join Marshal Moncey, and finally occupy the great naval
arsenal of Cartagena. With the 5,000 men that remained Duhesme was to
hold down Barcelona and Central Catalonia, while keeping open the line
of communications with Figueras and Perpignan.
Either Duhesme was as blind to the real state of affairs as his
master, or he considered that unquestioning obedience was his first
duty. He told off the two columns as directed, only cutting down
their strength a little, so as not wholly to ungarnish Barcelona. For
the Valencian expedition he told off General Chabran, with the best
brigade in his army, three veteran French battalions of the 7th and
16th of the line[299]. With this force he sent his single brigade of
French cavalry, two regiments under General Bessières (the brother of
the Duke of Istria). The whole amounted to 2,500 foot and 600 horse.
For the attack on Lerida, he had to send out troops of more doubtful
value--all foreigners, for there were no more French to be spared.
General Schwartz was given one Swiss, two Neapolitan, and one Italian
battalion[300], with no more than a single squadron of cavalry, for
his march was to lie over a very mountainous country. His whole force
was 3,200 strong. To the general directions given by Napoleon, Duhesme
added some supplementary orders of his own. Chabran was to pass by
Tarragona, leave a battalion in its citadel, and take as a compensation
the two battalions of Wimpfen’s Swiss Regiment, which was to be
incorporated in the French army. It was expected that he would get into
touch with Marshal Moncey when he should reach Castellon de la Plana.
Schwartz, on the other hand, was told to march by the mountain road
leading to Manresa, in order to punish the inhabitants of that town for
their rebellion. He was to fine them 750,000 francs, and to destroy a
powder-mill which they possessed. He was then to march on Lerida, from
which he was to evict the insurrectionary Junta: the city was to pay
a heavy war-contribution, and to receive a garrison of 500 men. With
the rest of his brigade Schwartz was to join the French forces before
Saragossa, not later than June 19.
[299] This force was Goulas’s Brigade of Chabran’s Division,
viz.:--
7th of the Line (1st and 2nd batts.) 1,785
16th ” (3rd batt.) 789
----- 2,574
and Bessières’ Cavalry:
3rd Provisional Cuirassiers (minus one
squadron) 205
3rd Provisional Chasseurs 416
---- 621
----- 3,195
with eight guns.
[300] Schwartz’s force was:--
2nd Swiss (3rd batt.) 580
1st Neapolitans (1st and 2nd batts.) 1,944
1st Italian _Velites_ (1st batt.) 519
----- 3,043
One squadron of the 3rd Provisional Cuirassiers 204
----- 3,247
with four guns.
[That the detached squadron were cuirassiers is proved by
Arteche, ii. 86. The French authorities do not give the regiment.]
Foy makes the odd mistake of saying ‘trois bataillons du
deuxième Suisse,’ instead of ‘le troisième bataillon du
deuxième Suisse.’ There was only one battalion of this regiment
with Duhesme.
Schwartz started from Barcelona on June 4: a tempest forced him to wait
for a day at Martorel, in the coast-plain, but on the sixth he reached
the pass of Bruch, at whose foot the roads from Igualada and from
Manresa join. Here he met with opposition: the news of his approach
had spread all up the valley of the Llobregat, and the _somatenes_ of
the upland towns were hurrying forward to hold the defile by which the
high-road from Barcelona climbs into the upper country. At the moment
when the invaders, marching in the most careless fashion, were making
their way up the hill, only the levy of Manresa was in position. They
were a mere handful, 300 or 400 at most, and many were destitute of
muskets. But from the cover of a pine-wood they boldly opened fire upon
the head of Schwartz’s column. Surprised to find himself attacked,
the French general deployed a battalion and drove the _somatenes_ out
of their position: they retired in great disorder up the hill towards
Manresa. Schwartz followed them with caution, under the idea that they
must be the vanguard of a larger force, and that there were probably
regular troops in support, further along the defile. In this he was
wrong, but the retreating Manresans received reinforcements a few
miles behind the place of the first skirmish. They were joined by the
levies of San Pedor and other villages of the Upper Llobregat, marching
forward to the sound of the single drum that was to be found in the
upland. The peasants ensconced themselves in the rocks and bushes on
either side of the road, and again offered battle. Schwartz took their
opposition much too seriously, extended a long front of tirailleurs
against them, but did not push his attack home. Soon other bands of
_somatenes_ from the direction of Igualada began to gather round his
left flank, and it seemed to him that he would soon be surrounded and
cut off from his line of communications with Barcelona. His regiments
were raw and not of the best quality: the Neapolitans who composed more
than half his force passed, and with reason, as the worst troops in
Europe. He himself was a cavalry officer who had never held independent
command before, and was wholly unversed in mountain warfare. Reflecting
that the afternoon was far spent, that he was still twelve miles from
Manresa, and that the whole country-side was on the move against him,
he resolved to abandon his expedition. Instead of hurling his four
battalions upon the _somatenes_, who must have been scattered to the
winds if attacked by such superior numbers, he drew back, formed his
men in a great square, with the cavalry and guns in the middle, and
began a retreat across the more open parts of the defile. The Spaniards
followed, pressing in the screen of tirailleurs by which the square
was covered, and taking easy shots into the solid mass behind them.
After six miles of marching under fire, Schwartz’s Swiss and Italians
were growing somewhat demoralized, for nothing could be more harassing
to raw and unwilling troops than such a retreat. At last they found
their way blocked by the village of Esparraguera, where the inhabitants
barricaded the streets and opened a hot fire upon the front face of
the square. Seeing his men hesitate and break their ranks, Schwartz
hastily bade them scatter right and left and pass round the village
without attempting to storm it. This device succeeded, but when the two
halves of the column reunited beyond Esparraguera, they were in such
disorder that there was no means of stopping them. The whole streamed
into Martorel in a confused mass at nightfall, after a retreat whose
incidents remind the military reader, in every detail, of the rout of
the British troops in the march to Lexington, on the first day of the
old American War of 1775.
When he reached the plains Schwartz was able to retire unharmed to
Barcelona, having saved three of his four guns[301] and lost no very
large proportion of his men. But he had suffered the disgrace of being
worsted by inferior numbers of undisciplined peasantry, and brought his
troops back in a state of demoralization, which was very discouraging
to the rest of the garrison of the Catalonian capital. Duhesme, instead
of taking him to task, fully approved of his retreat, on the ground
that if he had pushed on for Manresa and Lerida he would probably have
lost his whole brigade. Realizing at last the true strength of the
insurrection, and learning that the _somaten_ was sounding in every
village, and that the peasantry were flocking together in thousands,
Duhesme determined to concentrate his whole force, and sent orders
to Chabran to abandon his Valencian expedition and return at once to
Barcelona. He was probably quite right in his resolve, though Chabran’s
retreat was the determining fact that ruined Moncey’s campaign in the
province south of the Ebro. The Emperor had sketched out the whole plan
of operations on false premises, and when the new military situation
had developed itself, it would have been absurd for his lieutenants to
carry out his original orders in blind and servile obedience.
[301] One gun was lost after leaving Esparraguera by the fall of
a rickety bridge over the Abrera (Arteche, ii. 93, 94). Foy and
other French narrators do not mention this loss.
Chabran’s column had reached Tarragona when it received Duhesme’s
letters of recall. It had started on June 4, and found the coastland
still quiet, the insurrection not having yet spread downwards from the
hills. On arriving at Tarragona Chabran took possession of the citadel,
and issued orders to the two battalions of Wimpfen’s Swiss Regiment,
which formed the garrison of the place, to prepare to march with him
against Valencia. The Swiss officers showed no alacrity in falling in
with this plan. They were not animated by the patriotic fury which had
carried away the rest of the Spanish regular troops into the insurgent
camp. On the other hand they felt no enthusiasm at the idea of joining
the French in an attack on their late employers. They were deferring
obedience to the orders of the French general on various futile pleas,
when the news of Schwartz’s defeat at Bruch reached Tarragona. Directed
to return in haste and to rejoin Duhesme, General Chabran marched off
on June 9, leaving Wimpfen’s mercenaries behind: they would not follow
him, and declared in favour of the insurgent Junta at Lerida the moment
that his back was turned. The retreating French column had to brush
aside several considerable bands of _somatenes_, which tried to arrest
its progress, for the coastland had taken arms after the combat of
Bruch, and its levies hoped to treat Chabran as their compatriots
of the upland had treated Schwartz. But the three veteran French
battalions were of tougher material than the Neapolitans and Italians
who had been routed on the sixth, and successfully cut their way back
to Barcelona. They were aided by the unwisdom of the insurgents, who,
instead of trying to defend the difficult defile of Ordal, came down
into the plain. When they attacked Chabran at Vendrell and Arbos, they
were charged by his cavalry and scattered to the winds with heavy loss.
The French, when the actions were over, sacked with every circumstance
of brutality all the villages which lay along their path[302]. On June
11 they got into touch with Duhesme’s outposts, and on the twelfth
re-entered Barcelona.
[302] For details see Arteche, ii. 98, 99, and Foy, iv. 150, who
adds that Arbos ‘fut pillé et réduit en cendres, _conformément
aux usages de la guerre_’(!)
The whole of the ‘Army of the Eastern Pyrenees’ was now reunited
under its commander’s hand, and Duhesme thought himself strong enough
to punish the peasantry of the Upper Llobregat for their victory at
Bruch. On the fourteenth Chabran, with his own brigade and the Swiss
and Italians of Schwartz, marched from Martorel to assault once more
the pass which the uplanders had defended so well eight days before.
But the woods and rocks of Bruch were now manned by many thousands of
_somatenes_: all Central Catalonia had sent its levies thither, and
they were supported by 400 regulars from Lerida and four pieces of
artillery. After feeling the position, and directing against it at
least one serious attack, Chabran drew back and refused to press on the
action--apparently influenced by the manifest reluctance of Schwartz’s
troops to advance, no less than by the strength of the ground. After
losing nearly 400 men he retired to the plain and marched back to
Barcelona [June 15].
Duhesme had a more pressing business in hand than the chastisement of
the mountaineers of the Upper Llobregat. He had now learnt, by the fact
that couriers from France had ceased to arrive, that his communications
with Figueras and Upper Catalonia had been cut, and it was absolutely
necessary that they should be reopened. This was to prove a harder task
than he imagined: the _somatenes_ were now up in every valley as far
as the French frontier; they had driven into the citadel of Figueras
the weak battalion of detachments that had been left to hold that
town, and some of the bolder spirits were feeling their way through
the Pyrenean recesses to commence raids on Roussillon. Such alarm was
felt at Perpignan that the general commanding the district had begun to
call out the national guards, for he had no regulars at his disposal
save a few hundred men of details and detachments, who were waiting to
go forward to join their regiments in Duhesme’s corps. But all this
was unknown at Barcelona, and it was with very little conception of
the difficulties before him that Duhesme resolved to march on Gerona
and reopen the main road to France. He told off for this service one
half of the infantry battalions which composed his army--the Italian
division of Lecchi, consisting of the brigades of Schwartz and of
Milosewitz, the latter of which had hitherto remained in garrison at
Barcelona, and had not taken part in the futile attacks on the defile
of Bruch. He also took with him nearly the whole of his cavalry, four
French and three Italian squadrons of cuirassiers and chasseurs, and
a battery of eight guns. This gave him a formidable force of 5,900
men[303], about half of the total strength of his corps when the losses
suffered at Bruch and elsewhere are deducted.
[303] Brigade of Milosewitz:
2nd Italian Line (2nd batt.) 740
4th ” (3rd batt.) 587
5th ” (2nd batt.) 806
---- 2,133
Brigade of Schwartz:
1st Neapolitans (1st and 2nd batts.) 1,944
1st Italian _Velites_ (1st batt.) 519
(Minus 300 men lost in the actions at
Bruch on June 6 and 14)
----- 2,163
Cavalry:
3rd Provisional Cuirassiers 409
3rd ” Chasseurs 416
Italian _Chasseurs à Cheval_ 504
2nd Neapolitan ” 388
(Minus one squadron left at
Barcelona, say 200)
----- 1,517
Artillerymen for eight guns 150
----- 5,963
Duhesme had resolved to march on Gerona by the comparatively easy road
along the sea-coast, rather than by the alternative route which passes
further inland by the valley of the Besos and the town of Hostalrich.
Even in the lowland, however, he found the _somatenes_ prepared to
oppose him. At the castle of Mongat, only six miles outside Barcelona,
he met the first swarm 8,000 or 9,000 strong. They had procured a
few guns, which they had mounted so as to sweep the road, and lay in
disorderly masses along the crest of a rising ground. Duhesme, amusing
them in front by a false attack, sent a strong column to turn their
right flank: seeing themselves likely to be enveloped, the peasants
fled after a short skirmish, in which they suffered considerable loss.
Pushing onward, Duhesme arrived that same afternoon at the large open
town of Mataro, a place of 20,000 souls given over to the manufacture
of glass and cotton goods. The populace had hastily barricaded
the outlets of the streets with carts and piles of furniture, and
discharged two or three cannon against the approaching enemy. But
Milosewitz’s Italian brigade easily burst through the feeble defences
and took Mataro by storm. Its attempt at resistance was considered by
Duhesme to justify its sack, and he granted the plunder of the town to
his men, who only moved on the next day after having thoroughly robbed
every dwelling of its portable goods and murdered a considerable number
of the inhabitants. The French army of Catalonia was the most motley
and undisciplined force of all the imperial hosts in Spain, and for
that reason it was by far the most cruel and brutal in its behaviour to
the natives, who had not as yet justified any such treatment by their
manner of conducting the war. Any ferocity which they showed from this
time onward was a well-deserved revenge for what they had suffered.
Leaving Mataro on the eighteenth, Duhesme arrived before Gerona on the
twentieth, after burning most of the villages on the road, in revenge
for the constant molestation which he suffered from the _somatenes_.
He found the city placed in a state of defence, so far as was possible
in the case of an old-fashioned fortress called upon to stand a siege
at ten days’ notice. There was a small regular garrison, the Irish
regiment of Ultonia, under its two lieutenant-colonels, O’Donovan and
O’Daly: but this corps only counted 350 bayonets. In addition there
were a few trained artillerymen, and the armed citizens of the town,
not more than 2,000 in all, for Gerona had but 14,000 inhabitants. The
place lies on either side of the small stream of the Oña, just above
its confluence with the river Ter. On the south bank is the main part
of the town, straggling up the side of a steep hill, which is crowned
at its eastern end by an ancient citadel, known (like those of several
other Catalonian towns) by the name of Monjuich. Further westward,
along the crest of this hill, lie three other forts, those of the
Constable, Queen Anne, and the Capuchins. These, like the citadel, are
detached works, not connected by any line of wall but only by a ditch.
The town, which is completely commanded by the four forts, has no
protection on the south side of the Oña but a mediaeval wall, destitute
of a ditch and not more than twenty feet high. But on the other side
of the river, the northern suburb, known as the Mercadal, having no
line of outlying heights to protect it, had been fortified in the style
of Vauban with a regular front of five bastions, though, like the
fortifications of the city, it was without a ditch.
Duhesme had no battering-train, and his force of 5,900 men was
insufficient to invest the whole circumference of the city of Gerona
and its forts. But, like Moncey before Valencia, he was resolved to
make an attempt to storm the city by escalade, or by battering in its
gates. He left alone the citadel and the line of works on the hill,
only sending a single battalion to demonstrate against the fort of the
Capuchins. His real attack was directed against the sole point where
the old _enceinte_ of the city is not fully protected by the forts,
the gate of the Carmen, on the very brink of the Oña. In no very
honourable spirit, he sent in one of his aides-de-camp, with a white
flag, to demand the surrender of Gerona, and while that officer was
conferring with the governor and the local Junta, suddenly launched his
column of assault against the gate, hoping to catch the Spaniards off
their guard. The attack was a failure: the heavy guns from the forts
above silenced the French field-artillery which tried to batter in the
gate. Then Duhesme sent forward a storming party, with artillerymen
at its head bearing petards with which to blow open the entrance:
but the heavy musketry-fire from the walls laid low the head of the
column, and the rest swerved, and fell back to get under cover. A
feeble demonstration beyond the Oña against the bastions of Santa Clara
and San Francisco had not even the desired effect of distracting the
attention of the defenders of the Carmen Gate.
Seeing his attack foiled, Duhesme sent in at dusk a second flag of
truce, inviting the Junta of Gerona to send out deputies to confer with
him on certain points which he was desirous of submitting to them.
The Catalans were simple enough to comply with his offer: they would
have been wiser to avoid all negotiations with such an enemy. For this
parley was only intended to cover a second assault. Seeing that he
could not hope to batter his way into the place by means of his light
field-artillery, Duhesme was preparing a great escalade under cover of
the night. The point which he chose for it was the bastion of Santa
Clara, on the centre of the low front of the Mercadal, beyond the Oña.
He collected a quantity of ladders from the neighbouring villages,
and told off for the assault the three battalions of the brigade of
Schwartz.
At ten o’clock[304] the Italians crept up beneath the ramparts, where
the citizens on guard do not seem to have kept a good look out, and
delivered their attack. But these raw troops, moving in the darkness,
made many mistakes: the chief one was that many of the ladder-party
went astray among the water-courses and field-walls, so that the
provision of ladders proved insufficient. The garrison of the bastion,
however, had been taken completely by surprise, and allowed the head
of the column to escalade the twenty-foot wall with no more hindrance
than a few musket-shots. The Neapolitan Colonel Ambrosio and the
leading files had actually mounted, and driven back the citizens to
the gorge of the bastion, when there arrived reinforcements, a company
of the Regiment of Ultonia, which charged with the bayonet, drove the
Italians back, and hurled them over the rampart. An Irish lieutenant,
Thomas Magrath, and a Carmelite friar seized and overturned the
ladders, at the cost of the life of the former. When the garrison began
firing down into the mass of assailants crowded at the foot of the
wall, and the neighbouring bastion commenced to discharge a flanking
fire of artillery, the Italians broke and fled. A second attempt at
an escalade, made two hours later at another bastion, failed even
more lamentably, for the garrison were on the alert and detected the
assailants before they drew near the walls.
[304] Napier says that the assault was delivered at seven in
the evening, before dark (i. 79); but all the Spanish accounts
speak of it as having taken place long after dark, though before
midnight (cf. Arteche, Toreño, and Minali, quoted by the former);
so does Foy (iv. 158), who fixes the hour as ‘between nine and
ten.’
Convinced that he was too weak to take Gerona without siege-artillery,
Duhesme broke up his camp and fled under cover of the night, marking
his retreat by a third insincere attempt to open negotiations with the
garrison. He hastily made off by the same road by which he had come,
and returned to Barcelona by forced marches, dropping on the way one of
his Italian brigades at Mataro [June 24]. In the whole expedition he
had lost 700 men[305].
[305] Yet he had the hardihood to write to the Emperor that
‘after some slight skirmishing, he did not think it worth while
to make a serious attack on Gerona’ (_Nap. Corresp._, xvii. 347).
So ended the first attempt on Gerona, to the great credit of its
gallant defenders, and more especially to that of the weak Irish
regiment which had borne the brunt of the fighting. Duhesme’s whole
campaign bore a singular resemblance to that which Moncey was making at
the same moment in Valencia, and, like it, was wrecked on the initial
blunder of supposing that Spanish towns, defended by a population in
a high state of patriotic enthusiasm, could be carried by escalade
without any proper preparation by artillery. French generals soon got
to know their adversaries better: the same levies that could be easily
scattered in the open field were formidable under cover of stone walls.
On returning to Barcelona, Duhesme found that the insurgents of Central
Catalonia had drawn close to the capital in his absence. Eight or ten
thousand _somatenes_ had come down to the line of the Llobregat, had
broken its bridges, had entrenched themselves opposite its fords,
and were preparing to blockade Barcelona. They had brought up a
considerable number of guns taken from the batteries on the coast,
which had so long kept watch upon the English. But of regular troops
there were only a few present--a mixed body of 400 men from Lerida,
and some small remnants of the old Spanish garrison of Barcelona. The
command seems to have been held by Juan Baget, a lawyer of Lerida,
who had been named colonel of _miqueletes_ by the Junta of his native
town. Duhesme was determined not to be deprived of his hold on the
coast-plain by this tumultuary army. On the thirtieth he sallied out
from Barcelona with Goulas’s French brigade and three of Lecchi’s
Italian battalions, accompanied by the cuirassiers of Bessières.
Though the line of the Llobregat is marked by steep banks, and though
a considerable number of guns were mounted behind it, the position was
too long and too much exposed to be capable of defence by undisciplined
bands of mountaineers. While the Italians menaced its front, Goulas and
Bessières forded the river and turned the flank of the Catalans. Chased
out from the villages of San Boy and Molins de Rey by a sweeping
charge, they were pursued across the plain, stripped of all their
artillery, and forced to take refuge in their old positions along the
edge of the mountains of Montserrat, after losing a considerable number
of men.
Less successful was another stroke against the insurgents which Duhesme
endeavoured to deal five days later. General Chabran, with the Italian
brigade that had been left at Mataro, a regiment of French cavalry and
a field-battery, moved out to clear the hills above the coast, and to
sweep the valley of the Besos. He had before him the _somatenes_ of
the regions about Vich, Hostalrich, and Santa Coloma, under Francisco
Milans, a half-pay lieutenant-colonel, who had been placed at their
head by the local Junta. Chabran forced his way for some distance
inland till he reached Granollers, always harassed but never seriously
attacked by the insurgents. Milans, who showed all through his career
a real genius for guerilla warfare, had ordered his levies never to
stand when pressed, but to hang about the enemy’s line of march, cut
off his pickets and scouting parties, and fall upon the baggage-train
which trailed at the rear of his column. These tactics were perfectly
successful: having reached Granollers after a most toilsome march,
Chabran refused to push further among the mountains, turned back, and
retreated to Mataro, accompanied home by the _somatenes_, who pursued
him to the very outskirts of the town, and cut off his stragglers and
many of his baggage animals [July 4].
The moment that the Catalan insurrection grew serious, Duhesme had sent
repeated appeals for help to the Emperor: the land route to Perpignan
being cut, he had to use small vessels which put out to sea at night,
risked capture by the English ships lying off the coast, and when
fortunate reached the harbours of Collioure or Port-Vendres, just
beyond the Pyrenees. Napoleon looked upon the Catalonian war as a very
small matter, but he was fully resolved that Duhesme must be succoured.
Accordingly he determined to concentrate a division at Perpignan, but
he refused to allot to it any of his veteran French troops. He swept
together from the Southern Alps and Piedmont a most heterogeneous body
of 7,000 or 8,000 men, even worse in quality than the motley army which
he had entrusted to Duhesme. The command was entrusted to a capable
officer, General Reille, one of the Emperor’s aides-de-camp, who was
told to advance and relieve Figueras, after which he was to stretch
out his hand to Duhesme, who would push northward to meet him. His
improvised army consisted of two battalions of recruits just levied
in the lately annexed duchy of Tuscany, and constituting the nucleus
of a new regiment with the number 113, of a battalion of national
guards, some mobilized gendarmerie, a battalion of the ‘Legion of
Reserve of the Alps’ from Grenoble, five ‘battalions of detachments,’
and the single battalion which formed the contingent of the little
republic of the Valais[306]. The cavalry comprised two squadrons of
Tuscan dragoons, and two _escadrons de marche_ of French cuirassiers
and chasseurs. There seem to have been no more than two batteries of
artillery allotted to the force[307]. Reille was informed that other
troops from Italy would ultimately arrive at Perpignan, but that they
were not to be expected till the end of July or the beginning of
August. For the relief of Figueras and the opening up of communications
with Duhesme he must depend on his own forces.
[306] The Valais was a republic from 1802 till 1810, when it was
annexed to the Empire, as the ‘department of the Simplon.’
[307] From _Nap. Corresp._, 14,092, 14,150, 14,151, and 14,168,
we get the composition of this force. They account for the
following:
Two batts. of the 113th (Tuscans) 1,300
National Guards of the Pyrénées Orientales 560
1st Provisional Battalion of Perpignan (companies from the
dépôts of the 1st, 5th, 24th, 62nd of the Line, and 16th
and 22nd Léger) 840
2nd Provisional Battalion, similarly formed from the 23rd,
60th, 79th, 81st of the Line, and the 8th and 18th
Léger 840
A mixed battalion of the 16th and 32nd French and 2nd Swiss 1,100
Another from the 7th and 93rd of the Line 840
Another from the 2nd, 56th, and 37th of the Line 840
One battalion of the ‘5th Legion of Reserve’ from Grenoble 500
Battalion of the Valais 800
Two squadrons of Tuscan Dragoons 250
Two _escadrons de marche_ (French) 300
Two batteries of artillery 200
-----
8,370
There were also nine companies of gendarmerie and ‘departmental
reserves.’
Travelling with commendable rapidity, Reille arrived at Perpignan on
July 3. Of all the detachments that were marching to join him he found
that nothing had yet reached the frontier but the local national guards
and gendarmerie, the two Tuscan battalions, a company of the 2nd Swiss
Regiment, and artillerymen enough to serve a couple of guns. With no
more than the Tuscans and the Swiss, less than 1,600 men in all, he
marched on Figueras on July 5, dispersing on the way some bands of
_somatenes_, who tried to oppose him at the passage of the Muga. He
threw a convoy into the place and strengthened its garrison, but could
do no more, for all the country beyond Figueras was up in arms, and his
raw Italian recruits could hardly be kept to their colours. Indeed he
was forced to make them march in solid columns whenever he moved them,
for when ordered to deploy they always fell into disorder, and tried to
make off to the rear[308].
[308] Foy, iv. 165, 166.
But by July 11 Reille had begun to receive many of the drafts and
detachments which the Emperor was pouring into Perpignan, and having
now three or four thousand men disposable, he resolved to strike a
blow at Rosas, the small seaport town which blocks the coast-road from
Perpignan to Barcelona. Marching through the plains of the Ampurdam
he reached his objective, an insignificant place with a dilapidated
outer entrenchment and a citadel of some small strength. It was
defended by no more than 400 _miqueletes_, and had but five guns on
its land-front. But the little garrison showed a bold face, and when
Reille proceeded to invest Rosas he found himself attacked from the
rear by four or five thousand _somatenes_ levied by Don Juan Claros, a
retired infantry captain who had called to arms the peasantry of the
coast. They beset the besiegers so fiercely that Reille resolved to
abandon the investment, a determination which was assisted by the sight
of a British line-of-battle ship[309] landing marines to strengthen the
garrison. Accordingly he cut his way back to Figueras on the twelfth,
harassed all the way by the bands of Claros, who killed or took no
less than 200 of his men[310]. Rosas was to defy capture for some
months more, for Reille’s next effort was, by his master’s direction,
devoted to a more important object--the clearing of the great road
from Perpignan to Barcelona, and the opening up of communications with
Duhesme.
[309] The _Montague_, of 74 guns, Captain R. W. Otway.
[310] Foy, iv. 169.
SECTION V: CHAPTER II
THE STRUGGLE IN CATALONIA (JULY-AUGUST, 1808): THE SECOND SIEGE OF
GERONA
For the first six weeks of the war in Catalonia Duhesme and Reille had
been opposed only by the gallant _somatenes_. Of the handful of regular
troops who had been stationed in the principality when the insurrection
broke out, the greater part had drifted off to the siege of Saragossa,
or to the struggle in the south. Only the Irish regiment at Gerona,
and certain fragments of the disbanded battalions of the Guards from
Barcelona had aided the peasantry in resisting the invader. The success
of the Catalans, in hemming in Duhesme and checking Reille’s advance,
is all the more notable when we reflect that their levies had not been
guided by any central organization, nor placed under the command of any
single general. The Junta at Lerida had done little more than issue
proclamations and serve out to the _somatenes_ the moderate amount
of munitions of war that was at its disposition. It had indeed drawn
out a scheme for the raising of a provincial army--forty _tercios_ of
_miqueletes_, each 1,000 strong, were to be levied and kept permanently
in the field. But this scheme existed only on paper, and there were
no means of officering or arming such a mass of men. Even as late as
August 1, there were only 6,000 of them embodied in organized corps:
the mass of the men of military age were still at their own firesides,
prepared to turn out at the sound of the _somaten_, whenever a French
column appeared in their neighbourhood, but not ready to keep the field
for more than a few days, or to transfer their service to the more
distant regions of the principality. The direction of these irregular
bands was still in the hands of local leaders like Claros, Milans, and
Baget, who aided each other in a sufficiently loyal fashion when they
had the chance, but did not obey any single commander-in-chief, or act
on any settled military plan. Their successes had been due to their
own untutored intelligence and courage, not to the carrying out of any
regular policy.
This period of patriotic anarchy was now drawing to an end; regular
troops were beginning to appear on the scene in considerable numbers,
and the direction of the military resources of Catalonia was about to
be confided to their generals. The change was not all for the better:
during the whole struggle the Spaniards showed themselves admirable
insurgents but indifferent soldiers. After one more short but brilliant
period of success, the balance of fortune was about to turn against
the Catalans, and a long series of disasters was to try, but never to
subdue, their indomitable and persevering courage.
We have already shown that the only body of regular troops available
for the succour of Catalonia was the corps of 10,000 men which lay
in the Balearic Islands. That these thirteen battalions of veterans
had not yet been thrown ashore in the principality was mainly due to
the over-caution of the aged General Vives, the Captain-General at
Palma, to whom the charge of the garrisons of Majorca and Minorca was
committed[311]. He had a deeply rooted idea that if he left Port Mahon
unguarded, the English would find some excuse for once more making
themselves masters of that ancient stronghold, where the Union Jack
had waved for the greater part of the eighteenth century. Even the
transparent honesty of Lord Collingwood, the veteran admiral of the
Mediterranean fleet, could not reassure him. It was only when strong
pressure was applied to him by his second in command, the Marquis
del Palacio, governor of Minorca, and when he had received the most
explicit pledges from Collingwood concerning the disinterested views
of Great Britain, that he consented to disgarnish Port Mahon. His mind
was only finally made up, when the Aragonese and Catalan battalions
of his army burst out into open mutiny, threatening to seize shipping
and transport themselves to the mainland without his leave, if any
further delay was made [June 30]. A fortnight later Vives permitted Del
Palacio, with the greater part of the Balearic garrisons, to set sail
for the seat of war. The Aragonese regiment landed near Tortosa, and
marched for Saragossa: but the bulk of the expeditionary force, nearly
5,000 strong, was put ashore in Catalonia between July 19 and 23.
[311] Neither Toreño nor Arteche mentions the trouble caused by
this tiresome old man, to whom the delay in succouring Catalonia
was due. For the negotiations with him see Lord Collingwood’s
correspondence (_Life_, ii. 291, 292), and Foy (iv. 181).
Meanwhile affairs in the principality had taken a new turn. Duhesme
had remained quiet for six days after Chabran’s check at Granollers,
though his position at Barcelona grew daily more uncomfortable, owing
to the constant activity of the _somatenes_. But when he learnt that
Reille’s vanguard had reached Figueras, and that he might expect ere
long to be aided by a whole division of fresh troops from the north,
he resolved to renew his attack on Gerona, the fortress which so
completely blocked his communications with France. Sending messages
by sea to bid his colleague meet him under the walls of that place,
he sallied out from Barcelona, on July 10, with the larger half of
his army. This time he took with him the French brigades of Goulas
and Nicolas only, leaving Barcelona to the care of Lecchi and the
foreign troops. He felt that the situation was too grave for him to
trust the fate of Catalonia to the steadiness of Lombard or Neapolitan
regiments. So leaving four Italian and one Swiss battalion, 3,500 men
in all, in the Barcelona forts, he marched for Gerona with seven French
battalions, a regiment of Italian cavalry, and twenty-two guns, of
which ten were heavy siege-artillery. At Mataro he picked up Chabran,
who had been resting there since his check at Granollers on July 4,
and incorporated with his expedition the Italian battalions which
that officer had with him, as well as a regiment of French cavalry.
This gave him a total force of some 7,000 men[312]; yet his march was
slow and difficult. Milans with the _somatenes_ of the upland was
always hanging upon his left flank, and Lord Cochrane with two British
frigates followed him along the coast, bombarding his columns whenever
the road came within cannon-shot of the sea. At Arens de Mar Duhesme
halted for no less than five days, either from sheer indecision as to
the advisability of proceeding with his project, or because he was
waiting for definite news of Reille. At last he made up his mind: two
routes meet at Arens, the main _chaussée_ from Barcelona to Gerona
via Tordera, and a cross-road which seeks the same end by a detour
through the small hill-fortress of Hostalrich. The three battalions
of Goulas’s brigade were sent by this latter path, with orders to
endeavour to seize the place if they could. The main column, with the
battering-train, followed the high-road. Goulas found Hostalrich too
strong for him: it was garrisoned by 500 _miqueletes_ under Manuel
O’Sullivan, a captain of the Regiment of Ultonia, who gallantly
held their own against an attempt at escalade. The French brigadier
thereupon abandoned the attack, crossed the mountains, and joined his
chief before Gerona on July 22. Duhesme meanwhile had been harassed for
three days by the _somatenes_ of Milans, and, though he always drove
them off in the end, had lost much of his baggage, and an appreciable
number of men, before he reached the banks of the Ter. On the day after
he was rejoined by Goulas he forced the passage of that river and took
post before Gerona. On the next morning [July 24] he was rejoiced
to meet with the vanguard of Reille’s division descending from the
north. That general had started from Figueras two days before, with
all the fractions of his motley force that had reached the front, two
Tuscan battalions, the Swiss from the Valais, three French _bataillons
de marche_, the two ‘Provisional Battalions of Perpignan,’ and some
other improvised units, with a total strength of some 6,500 men. He
established his head quarters at Puente Mayor to the north of the city,
on the right bank of the Ter, while Duhesme placed his at Santa Eugenia
on the left bank. There were good and easy communications between them
by means of two fords, and the bridge of Salt, a little further from
Gerona, was also available.
[312] The numbers of these corps before the fighting commenced in
June had been:
Goulas’s Brigade (three batts.) 2,574
Nicolas’s Brigade (four batts.) 2,891
Two Italian battalions 1,300
3rd Provisional Cuirassiers 409
2nd Neapolitan Chasseurs 388
Artillery 250
-----
7,812
But as the Italians, Goulas, and the cuirassiers had all been
engaged several times, and had suffered serious losses, we must
deduct 800 men at least, in order to get the figures of July 17.
Foy gives only 6,000.
Thirteen thousand men seemed enough to make an end of an old-fashioned
fortress like Gerona, held by a garrison which down to the first day
of the siege counted no more than 400 regular troops--that same Irish
regiment of Ultonia which had stood out against Duhesme’s first attack
in June. It was fortunate for the defenders that at the very moment of
the arrival of the French they received a powerful reinforcement. The
light infantry regiment named the 2nd Volunteers of Barcelona, 1,300
strong, entered the city on the night of July 22[313], slipping between
the heads of Duhesme’s and Reille’s columns. This corps had formed
part of the garrison of Minorca: instead of being landed at Tarragona
with the rest of Del Palacio’s troops, it was dropped at San Feliu, the
nearest port on the coast to Gerona, and had just time to reach that
place before its investment was completed.
[313] Not on the twenty-fifth, as Napier says (i. 83), following
apparently the dates given by Cabanes. I have followed Arteche
here, as his search into times and seasons seems more careful
than that of any other authority.
Duhesme had resolved to avoid for the future the fruitless attempts
at escalade, which had cost him so many men during his first siege of
Gerona, and to proceed by the regular rules of poliorcetics. He had
with him a battering-train more than sufficient to wreck the ancient
walls of the city: accordingly he opened a secondary attack on the
lower town on the left of the Oña, but turned the greater part of his
attention to the citadel of Monjuich. If this work, which from its
lofty hill commands the whole city, were once mastered, the place could
not hold out for a day longer. By this arrangement the charge of the
main attack fell to Reille, and Duhesme himself undertook only the
demonstration against the Mercadal. The French began by establishing
themselves on the lower slopes of the tableland of which Monjuich
occupies the culminating point. They found shelter in three ruined
towers which the garrison was too weak to occupy, and raised near them
three batteries with six heavy guns and two howitzers, which battered
the citadel, and also played upon certain parts of the town wall near
the gate of San Pedro. The batteries in Duhesme’s section of the
siege-lines consisted only of mortars and howitzers, which shelled and
several times set fire to the Mercadal, but could make no attempt to
open breaches in its walls.
The siege-approaches of the French before Gerona were conducted with
an astonishing slowness: it was not till sixteen days after they had
established themselves on the slopes round Monjuich, that they began to
batter it in a serious fashion [Aug. 12]. This delay was partly due to
the steepness of the ground up which the guns had to be dragged, partly
to the necessity for sending to Figueras for extra artillery material,
which could only be brought slowly and under heavy escort to the banks
of the Ter. But Duhesme’s slackness, and the want of skill displayed by
his engineer officers, were responsible for the greater portion of the
delay. Moreover the investment of Gerona was so badly managed, that not
only did the garrison keep up a regular communication at night with
the chiefs of the _somatenes_ who lay out on the hills to the west,
but convoys repeatedly left and entered the town in the dark, without
meeting a single French picket or patrol.
This delay of a fortnight in pressing the attack on Gerona led to two
important results. The first was that the news of the capitulation of
Baylen reached both camps, producing grave discouragement in the one,
and a disposition for bold action in the other. The second was that Del
Palacio and the troops from Minorca had time granted to them to prepare
for interference in the siege. The marquis had landed at Tarragona on
July 23, with all his division, save the regiment sent to St. Feliu and
the Aragonese battalion which had been directed on Tortosa. Immediately
on his arrival the insurrectionary Junta of Catalonia transferred
itself from Lerida to Tarragona and elected Del Palacio Captain-General
of the principality. Thus a real central authority was established in
the province, and a single military direction could at last be given
to its armies. The new Captain-General was well-intentioned and full
of patriotism, but no great strategist[314]. His plan was to press
Barcelona with the bulk of his regular forces, so that Lecchi might
be compelled to call for instant help from Duhesme, while a small
column under the Conde de Caldagues was to march on Gerona, not so much
with the hope of raising the siege, as to aid the _somatenes_ of the
Ampurdam in harassing the investing force and throwing succours into
the city[315].
[314] Collingwood (_Correspondence_, ii. 271) calls him ‘a fat
unwieldy marquess, who, if his principles are good, has a very
limited ability.’
[315] For Del Palacio’s intentions see his orders to Caldagues,
quoted by Arteche (ii. 622).
Accordingly the main body of Del Palacio’s army, the regiments of
Soria, Granada, and Borbon, with Wimpfen’s two Swiss battalions from
Tarragona, marched on the Llobregat, drove in Lecchi’s outposts, and
confined him to the immediate environs of Barcelona. The _somatenes_
came to give help in thousands, and a cordon of investment was
established at a very short distance from the great city. On the
seaside Lord Cochrane, with the _Impérieuse_ and _Cambrian_ frigates,
kept up a strict blockade, so that Lecchi, with his insufficient and
not too trustworthy garrison of 3,500 Swiss and Italian troops, was in
a most uncomfortable position. If it had not been that Barcelona was
completely commanded by the impregnable citadel of Monjuich, he could
not have maintained his hold on the large and turbulent city. His last
outpost was destroyed on July 31: this was the strong castle of Mongat,
six miles out on the coast-road from Barcelona to Mataro. It was held
by a company of Neapolitans, 150 men with seven guns. Attacked on the
land-side by 800 _miqueletes_ under Francisco Barcelo, and from the sea
by the broadside of the _Impérieuse_, the Italian officer in command
surrendered to Lord Cochrane, in order to save his men from massacre
by the Catalans. Cochrane then blew up the castle, and destroyed the
narrow coast-road on each side of it by cuttings and explosions[316],
so that there was no longer any practicable route for guns, horses,
or wagons along the shore. Thus hemmed in, Lecchi began to send to
Duhesme, by various secret channels, appeals for instant aid, and
reports painting his situation in gloomy but not much exaggerated
colours. He asserted that the _somatenes_ were pushing their incursions
to within 600 yards of his advanced posts, and that there were now
30,000 Catalans in arms around him. If he had said 10,000 he would have
been within the limits of fact.
[316] For a good narrative of these operations see Lord
Cochrane’s autobiography, i. 262-5.
On August 6 the Captain-General, after carefully arranging his troops
in the positions round Barcelona, sent off Caldagues to harass Duhesme
in the north. This enterprising brigadier-general was given no more
than four companies of regulars, three guns, and 2,000 _miqueletes_
from the Lerida district under their colonel, Juan Baget. Marching by
the mountain road that goes by Hostalrich, and picking up many recruits
on the way, he established himself on the fourteenth at Castella, in
the hills that lie between Gerona and the sea. Here he was met by all
the _somatenes_ of Northern Catalonia, under their daring leaders,
Milans and Claros.
The investment of Gerona was so badly managed, that when the news
of Caldagues’ approach was received, two colonels (O’Donovan of the
Ultonia Regiment and La Valeta of the Barcelona Volunteers) were able
to penetrate the French lines and to confer with the commander of the
army of succour. These two officers were really conducting the defence,
for the titular governor, Bolivar, seems to have been a nonentity[317],
who exercised no influence on the course of events. At a council of
war which they attended, it was resolved to try a stroke which was far
bolder than anything that the Captain-General had contemplated when
he sent Caldagues northward. The relieving force was to attack from
the rear Reille’s troops on the heights before Monjuich, while at the
same time every man that could be spared from the garrison was to be
flung on the breaching batteries from the front. Duhesme’s army in the
plain beyond the Oña was to be left alone: it was hoped that the whole
business would be over before he could arrive at the spot where the
fate of battle was to be decided. There were somewhat over 8,000 men
disposable for the attack: 1,000 regulars and four hundred _miqueletes_
were to sally out of Gerona: Caldagues could bring up 7,000 more, all
raw levies except the four companies of old troops that he had brought
from Tarragona. He had also five field-guns. As Duhesme and Reille had
13,000 men, of whom 1,200 were cavalry, it was a daring experiment
to attack them, even though their forces were distributed along an
extensive line of investment.
[317] It is very odd, as Arteche remarks (ii. 611), that none of
the contemporary Spanish narratives mention the name of Bolivar.
They only speak of La Valeta and O’Donovan as heading the defence.
A bold and confident general, placed in Duhesme’s position, would not
have waited to be attacked in his trenches. The moment that he heard of
the approach of Caldagues, he would have drawn off half his battalions
from the siege, and have gone out to meet the relieving army, before
it could get within striking distance of Gerona. But Duhesme was not
in the mood for adventurous strokes: he was chilled in his ardour by
the news of the disaster of Baylen: he was worried by Lecchi’s gloomy
reports; and he had been pondering for some days whether it would not
be well to raise the siege and march off to save Barcelona. But the
ravages which his bombardment was producing in the beleaguered city,
and the fact that a breach was beginning to be visible in the walls of
Monjuich, induced him to remain before the place, hoping that it might
fall within the next few days. If this was his determination, he should
at least have made preparations to receive Caldagues: but no attempt
whatever appears to have been made to resist an attack from without.
On the morning of August 16, the Spaniards struck their blow. Between
nine and ten o’clock in the morning, the 1,400 men of the garrison
deployed from behind the cover of the citadel, and charged down upon
the trenches and batteries of the besiegers[318]. They completely
swept away the battalion of the 5th Legion of Reserve, which was
furnishing the guard of the trenches, captured the siege-guns, and set
fire to the fascines of the batteries. Then pushing on, they drove off
the Swiss battalion of the Valais, and the two Tuscan battalions of the
113th Regiment, pressing them down hill towards Reille’s head quarters
at Puente Mayor. The French general rallied them upon the 1st _Régiment
de Marche_, which formed his reserve at this point of the line, and
mounting the slope retook some of the works which had been lost. But at
this moment Caldagues’ whole army appeared upon the heights, pressing
forward in four columns with great confidence. The sight of these
multitudes checked Reille, who hastily drew back, evacuated Puente
Mayor and withdrew to the other bank of the Ter. Duhesme, on his side,
abandoned all his outlying positions and concentrated his whole force
in front of the village of Santa Eugenia.
[318] The Barcelona Volunteers under La Valeta led; the Ultonia,
under Major Henry O’Donnell, supported.
The Catalans were wise enough not to descend into the plain, where
Duhesme’s cavalry and guns would have had a free hand. Caldagues
refrained from passing the Ter, and merely drew up his army on the
slopes above Puente Mayor, ready to receive battle. But the expected
attack never came; Duhesme held back all the afternoon, and then fled
away under cover of the darkness. His losses in the fighting on the
hills had not been heavy--seventy-five killed and 196 wounded--but
his spirit was broken. He would not risk an assault on such a strong
position with his motley and somewhat demoralized army. For a moment
he thought of leading his whole force back to Reille’s base at
Figueras: but the reflection that in this case Lecchi would probably be
destroyed, and he himself be made responsible for the loss of Barcelona
by the Emperor, deterred him from such a cowardly move. Bidding Reille
take the northern road and keep open the communications with France,
he drew off the rest of his army to the south to rejoin his Italian
comrades. The move was made with some panic and precipitation: the
remaining siege-guns were buried in a perfunctory fashion, and some
stores destroyed. Then Duhesme marched away over the mountains, pursued
by the _somatenes_ of Milans; while Reille retired across the plains of
the Ampurdam, and had a fairly easy journey to Figueras. Claros, who
tried to harass his retreat, never dared to close in upon him in the
open country, fearing his cavalry and guns. Far more toilsome was the
lot of Duhesme’s column, which had to march for twenty miles through
very broken ground, chased by the levies of Milans, to whom the whole
district was familiar. When he reached the sea at Malgrat he found that
his troubles were only growing worse. The _somatenes_ hung on his right
flank, while Lord Cochrane’s frigate the _Impérieuse_ followed him on
the left hand, giving him a broadside whenever his march lay within
cannon-shot of the beach. Moreover, the peasants had been cutting
and blasting away the road under Cochrane’s direction; and at each
point where one of these obstructions had been made, it was necessary
to drag the guns and wagons of the column across almost impassable
hillsides[319]. Finding that he was making no appreciable progress, and
that his men were growing utterly demoralized, Duhesme at last took a
desperate step. He blew up his ammunition, burnt his baggage, cast his
field-guns into the sea, and fled away by hill-tracks parallel with the
shore. After long skirmishing with the _somatenes_ he reached Mongat,
where Lecchi came out to his aid with 1000 men and a battery--all
that could be spared from the depleted garrison of Barcelona. There
the Catalans stayed their pursuit, and Duhesme’s harassed battalions
poured back into the city, sick of mountain warfare, half-starved, and
carrying with them nothing but what they brought in on their backs
[August 20]. As a fighting force for offensive operations they were
useless for some weeks, and all that their general could do was to hold
for foraging purposes as much of the open ground about Barcelona as he
could manage to retain. Nothing more could be essayed till Napoleon
should vouchsafe to send heavy reinforcements to Catalonia, for the
purpose of reopening the severed communications with France.
[319] See Cochrane’s autobiography, i. 266.
Two obvious criticisms on these operations in the month of August must
be made. The first is that Del Palacio might probably have destroyed
Duhesme’s whole army, if, instead of sending out his lieutenant
Caldagues with a handful of regulars and 2,000 _miqueletes_, he had
marched on Gerona with his entire force, the 5,000 old troops from
Port Mahon and the whole of the local levies of Central Catalonia.
Lecchi was so weak in Barcelona that a few thousand _somatenes_ could
have kept him in check, for he dared not ungarnish the city. If the
Captain-General had thrown every man into the struggle at Gerona,
it seems certain that Duhesme must either have been annihilated or
have fled away with Reille to Figueras, abandoning Barcelona to its
inevitable fate.
The second comment is equally obvious: Duhesme’s generalship was even
worse than that of Del Palacio. Since the Spaniards came against him
not with the whole army of Catalonia, but with a mere detachment of
7,000 _somatenes_, he should have formed a covering force of 5,000
men, and have fallen upon them while they were still at some distance
from Gerona. Instead of doing this, he allowed them to encamp for
three days unmolested at Castella, a village no more than five miles
distant from Reille’s outposts. There they concerted their operations
with the garrison, and fell upon the investing force at the moment that
suited them best. It is the extraordinary apathy or neglect displayed
by Duhesme that justifies Caldagues’ bold stroke at the French lines.
Finding the enemy so torpid, he might well venture an assault upon
them, without incurring the charge of rashness of which Napier finds
him guilty[320]. In other circumstances it would have been mad for the
Spaniard, who had no more than 7,000 _somatenes_, to attack a French
army 13,000 strong. But seeing Duhesme so utterly negligent--and his
army strung out on a long front of investment, without any covering
force--Caldagues was quite justified in making the experiment which
turned out so successfully. Duhesme tried to extenuate his fault, by
giving out that he had been about to abandon the siege even before he
was attacked, and that he had orders from Bayonne authorizing such a
step. But we may be permitted to join his successor St. Cyr in doubting
both the original intention and the imperial authorization[321]. There
is at least no trace of it in the correspondence of Napoleon, who as
late as August 23, seven days after the fight outside Gerona, was under
the impression that Reille’s division alone might suffice to capture
the city, though he was prepared if necessary to support him with
other troops. On the seventeenth of the same month, the day on which
Duhesme began his disastrous retreat on Barcelona, Napoleon had already
made up his mind to supersede him, and had directed St. Cyr, with two
fresh divisions, to take post at Perpignan. But in the orders given to
the new commander in Catalonia there is no sign that the Emperor had
acquiesced in the raising of the siege of Gerona, though it may perhaps
be deduced from a later dispatch that he had not disapproved of the
strengthening of Lecchi’s garrison at Barcelona by the withdrawal of
Chabran’s division from the leaguer[322].
[320] Napier, i. 89.
[321] St. Cyr, _Journal de l’Armée de Catalogne_, 1808-9, p. 15.
[322] The notices of the army of Catalonia and its intended
operations are not very numerous in Napoleon’s dispatches. Foy
accepts Duhesme’s story that he had intended all along to raise
the siege after receiving from Bayonne an order to suspend active
operations (iv. 177). But it seems difficult to read this into
the Emperor’s dispatches; Napoleon received the news of Baylen
on Aug. 3, but did not begin pushing large reinforcements on to
Catalonia till Aug. 10 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,249), nor supersede
Duhesme by St. Cyr till Aug. 17 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,256).
On Aug. 23 he concludes that Duhesme would be best placed at
Barcelona, but that Reille must take Gerona with his division,
which may be reinforced by that of Chabot, newly arrived at
Perpignan, or even by more troops due from Italy in a few weeks.
The expectation which he expresses, that Reille alone might very
possibly be strong enough to capture the place, is enough to
show that he did not intend to raise the siege, but (at most)
to order Duhesme to strengthen Lecchi with men drawn off from
the leaguer--which is a very different thing from that general’s
statement of the case.
Meanwhile Napoleon had recognized that even with Reille’s
reinforcements, Catalonia was not adequately garrisoned, and on August
10 had directed 18,000 fresh troops upon the principality. These,
moreover, were not the mere sweepings of his dépôts, like Reille’s
men, but consisted of two strong divisions of old troops; Souham’s was
composed of ten French battalions from Lombardy, Pino’s of 10,000 men
of the best corps of the army of the kingdom of Italy[323]. A little
later the Emperor resolved to send one division more, Germans this
time, to Catalonia. Instead of the 13,000 men whom he had originally
thought sufficient for the subjugation of the province, he had now
set aside more than 40,000 for the task, and this did not prove to be
one man too many. No better testimonial could be given to the gallant
_somatenes_, than that they had forced the enemy to detach so large
a force against them. Nor could any better proof be given of the
Emperor’s fundamental misconception of the Spanish problem in May and
June, than the fact that he had so long been under the impression that
Duhesme’s original divisions would be enough to subdue the rugged and
warlike Catalan principality.
[323] The Emperor writes to Eugène Beauharnais that the 10,000
Italians, horse, foot, and artillery, must be ‘un extrait de
l’armée italienne dans le cas de se faire honneur,’ the best that
could be got (_Dispatch_ 14,249, Aug. 10).
Before Souham, Pino, and the rest could arrive on the scene, many
weeks must elapse, and meanwhile we must turn back to the main course
of the war in Central Spain, where the condition of affairs had been
profoundly modified by the results of the Capitulation of Baylen.
SECTION VI
THE CONSEQUENCES OF BAYLEN
CHAPTER I
THE FRENCH RETREAT TO THE EBRO
While dealing with the operations of the French armies in the various
provinces of Spain, we have observed that at every point the arrival
of the news of Dupont’s disaster at Baylen produced notable results.
It was this unexpected intelligence that drove the intrusive king out
of Madrid within a week of his arrival, and ere the ceremonial of his
proclamation had been completed. It brought back Bessières from the
Esla to the Arlanzon, and raised the siege of Saragossa. Knowing of
it Junot summoned his council of war at Torres Vedras with a sinking
heart, and Duhesme lacked the confidence to try the ordeal of battle
before Gerona. Beyond the Pyrenees its influence was no less marked.
Napoleon had imagined that the victory of Rio Seco had practically
decided the fate of the Peninsula, and at the moment of Baylen was
turning his attention to Austria rather than to Spain. On July 25,
five days after Dupont had laid down his arms, he was meditating the
reinforcement of his army in Germany, and drafting orders that directed
the garrisons of northern France on Mainz and Strasburg[324]. To a
mind thus preoccupied the news of the disaster in Andalusia came like
a thunderclap. So far was the Spanish trouble from an end, that it
was assuming an aspect of primary importance. If Austria was really
intending mischief, it was clear that the Emperor would have two great
continental wars on his hands at the same moment--a misfortune that
had never yet befallen him. It was already beginning to be borne in
upon him that the treachery at Bayonne had been a blunder as well as a
crime. Hence came the wild rage that bursts out in the letters written
upon the days following that on which the news of Baylen reached him
at Bordeaux. ‘Has there ever, since the world began,’ wrote Bonaparte
to Clarke, his minister of war, ‘been such a stupid, cowardly, idiotic
business as this? Behold Mack and Hohenlohe justified! Dupont’s own
dispatch shows that all that has occurred is the result of his own
inconceivable folly.... The loss of 20,000 picked men, who have
disappeared without even inflicting any considerable loss on the
enemy, will necessarily have the worst moral influence on the Spanish
nation.... Its effect on European politics will prevent me from going
to Spain myself.... I wish to know at once what tribunal ought to try
these generals, and what penalty the law can inflict on them for such
a crime[325].’ A similar strain runs through his first letter to his
brother Joseph after the receipt of the news--‘Dupont has soiled our
banners. What folly and what baseness! The English will lay hands on
his army[326]. Such events make it necessary for me to go to Paris,
for Germany, Poland, Italy, and all, are tied up in the same knot.
It pains me grievously that I cannot be with you, in the midst of
my soldiers[327].’ In other letters the capitulation is ‘a terrible
catastrophe,’ ‘a horrible affair, for the cowards capitulated to save
their baggage,’ and (of course) ‘a machination paid for with English
gold[328]. These imbeciles are to suffer on the scaffold the penalty
of this great national crime[329].’ The Emperor did well to be angry,
for the shock of Baylen was indeed felt to every end of Europe. But he
should have blamed his own Macchiavellian brain, that conceived the
plot of Bayonne, and his own overweening confidence, that launched
Dupont with 20,000 half-trained conscripts (not, as he wrote to
Clarke, with _vingt mille hommes d’élite et choisis_) on the hazardous
Andalusian enterprise.
[324] Napoleon to Jerome, King of Westphalia, July 25 (_Nap.
Corresp._, 14,230): ‘L’Autriche arme: elle nie ses armements,
elle arme donc contre nous.... Puisque l’Autriche arme, il faut
donc armer. Aussi j’ordonne que la Grande Armée soit renforcée.
Mes troupes se réunissent à Strasbourg, Mayence, Wesel,’ &c.
Compare this with the great harangue made to Metternich on August
15 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,254) and with _Nap. Corresp._, 14,248,
which discusses the co-operation of Russia in a war with Austria.
[325] Napoleon to Clarke, Aug. 3 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,242).
[326] i.e. Napoleon is aware that they will never allow the army
to be taken home by sea, as the capitulation provided.
[327] Napoleon to Joseph, Aug. 3 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,243):
‘L’Allemagne, l’Italie, la Pologne etc., tout se lie,’ is the
Emperor’s phrase.
[328] _Nap. Corresp._, 14,244, 14,272, 14,283.
[329] A few words as to Dupont’s fate may be added. His
experiences during the next four years throw a curious light
on the administration of military justice under the Empire.
He, together with Vedel, Chabert, Marescot, Legendre, and the
aide-de-camp Villoutreys, were arrested on returning to France,
and thrown into prison. They were told to prepare for a trial
before the Supreme High Court (_Haute Cour Impériale_), and
a long series of interrogatories was administered to them. A
military commission drew up a preliminary report on the case:
on reading it the Emperor saw that Dupont had a fair defence to
make on all the charges brought against him, with the exception
of that of military incapacity. He countermanded the order for
a trial, and the prisoners (after nine months of confinement)
were released, but left under police surveillance. After Dupont
had spent two years and a half of peace in the country-house of
a relative, he was suddenly arrested at midnight on Feb. 12,
1812, and given a secret trial, not before a court of justice or
a court-martial, but before a special military commission. He
was allowed neither counsel nor documents, and forced to defend
himself at forty-eight hours’ notice. The judges declared him
guilty of having signed a capitulation containing ‘des conditions
honteuses et avilissantes,’ but not of having surrendered without
necessity, or of having shown cowardice or treason. Since the
capitulation had been ‘contrary to the political interests of
the Empire, and had compromised the safety of the State,’ while
yet ‘there would be grave inconvenience in giving the accused a
public trial,’ the court advised the Emperor to deprive Dupont of
rank, title, and pension, and to relegate him to the country. The
other accused officers might suffer the same penalties. Refusing
to consider this a sufficient punishment, Napoleon shut up Dupont
in the lonely fort of Joux, in the Jura, where he remained a
prisoner till the fall of the Empire. Vedel and Legendre were
pardoned, and afterwards served in Italy. Chabert and Villoutreys
were put on half-pay.
Meanwhile he had to face the situation: within a few hours of the
moment when Villoutreys placed Dupont’s dispatch in his hands, he had
so far got over the first spasms of his wrath that he was able to
dictate a general plan for the reconcentration of his armies[330]. We
have compared the French forces in Spain to a broad wedge, of which
the point, directed against the heart of the insurrection, was formed
by the three divisions of Dupont’s corps. This point had now been
broken off; but the Emperor, still clinging to the idea of the wedge,
wished to preserve Madrid and to form in and about it a new army fit
for offensive operations. With this force he would strike at the
insurgents of Andalusia and Valencia when they marched on the capital,
while Bessières in the valley of the Douro, and Verdier in the valley
of the Ebro were still to preserve a forward position, and shield the
army of the centre from the flank attacks of the Galicians and the
Aragonese. The troops left around Madrid at the moment of the disaster
of Baylen were parts of the three divisions of Moncey’s corps[331],
one of Dupont’s, and the brigade which had escorted Joseph Napoleon
from Burgos, together with 3,000 horse--a total of about 23,000 men.
Bonaparte judged that this was not enough to resist the combined attack
of Castaños and of the Valencians and Murcians of Saint March and
Llamas. Accordingly he intended that Bessières should lend the King two
brigades of infantry--a deduction from his force which would compel him
to fall back from Leon into Old Castile[332]--and that Verdier should
spare a brigade from the army in front of Saragossa[333], though it was
none too strong for the task before it. Six battalions from the reserve
at Bayonne were to make a forced march to Madrid to join the King. Thus
reinforced up to 35,000 men, the corps at Madrid would be able, as
the Emperor supposed, to make head against any combination of Spanish
troops that could possibly be brought against it.
[330] The ‘Note sur la situation actuelle de l’Espagne,’ which
forms No. 14,241 of the _Correspondance_. It is dated at
Bordeaux, Aug. 2, the very day on which Villoutreys brought the
news of the capitulation.
[331] Viz. Musnier’s division of Moncey’s corps 6,500 men
Frere’s division of Dupont’s corps 4,400 ”
Bujet’s brigade of Morlot’s division of Moncey’s corps 3,700 ”
Remains (5 batts.) of Gobert’s division of Moncey’s corps 2,500 ”
Rey’s brigade of infantry (Joseph’s escort) 2,000 ”
Infantry and Cavalry of the Imperial Guard 2,500 ”
Cavalry of the Line 1,700 ”
------
23,300 ”
[332] Lefebvre’s brigade, which belonged to Morlot’s division of
Moncey’s corps--it had been lent to Bessières for the moment--and
Reynaud’s brigade, i.e. 5,300 foot, also two cavalry regiments,
making 6,000 in all.
[333] Bazancourt’s brigade of two veteran regiments (14th and
44th of the line), the last that had arrived at Saragossa.
But all these arrangements were futile. Bonaparte at Bordeaux was
separated from his brother at the Retiro by so many miles that his
orders were grown stale before they reached their destination. His
scheme was made out on August 2, but on the preceding day King Joseph
and his whole army had evacuated Madrid. The terror of Baylen was
upon them, and they were expecting every moment to find themselves
attacked by Castaños, who was as a matter of fact celebrating triumphal
feasts at Seville. With a haste that turned out to be altogether
unnecessary, Moncey’s corps, escorting the King, his court, and his
long train of Spanish refugees, crossed the Somosierra and did not
halt till they reached Aranda de Duero, in the plains of Old Castile.
Napoleon was forced to make other plans in view of this retreat, whose
moral consequences were hardly inferior in importance to those of
Dupont’s capitulation. For both the Spanish nation and the courts of
Europe looked upon the evacuation of Madrid as marking the complete
downfall of Napoleon’s policy, and portending a speedy retirement of
the invaders behind the Pyrenees. It is certain that if the spirit of
Joseph and his advisers had been unbroken, they might have clung to the
capital till the reinforcements which the Emperor was hurrying to their
aid had arrived. It is probable that the 35,000 men, of whom Savary
and Moncey could then have disposed, might have held Castaños in check
till the army from the Rhine had time to come up. Yet there is every
excuse for the behaviour of the French commanders, for they could not
possibly have known that the Spaniards would move with such astonishing
slowness, or that they would refrain from hurling every available man
on Madrid. And as a matter of fact the evacuation of the capital turned
out in the end to be advantageous to Napoleon, for it inspired his
adversaries with a foolish self-confidence which proved their ruin. If
they had been forced to fight hard in New Castile, they would have been
obliged to throw much more energy into the struggle, and could not have
slackened their efforts under the false impression that the French were
absconding in dismay to Bayonne.
When Bonaparte learnt that his brother had fled from Madrid and crossed
the passes into Old Castile, he was forced to draw out a wholly
different scheme from that which he had sketched on August 2. The
King, he wrote, with Moncey’s corps, must take post at Aranda, where
the Douro is crossed by the high-road from France to Madrid. His army
should be strengthened to a force of 30,000 men: meanwhile Bessières
and Verdier must protect his flanks. The former with 15,000 men should
take Valladolid as his head quarters and guard against any attempt
of Blake to resume the offensive. As to Verdier, since he had been
instructed to abandon the siege of Saragossa--a grave blunder--he must
be drawn back as far as Tudela on the Middle Ebro. From that point he
would easily be able to ‘contain’ the tumultuary army of Palafox. If
the Spaniards showed signs of pressing in on any part of the front,
the King, Verdier, or Bessières--as the case might demand--must not
hang back, but endeavour to shatter the vanguard of any advancing
force by a bold stroke. At all costs the war must not be waged in a
timid style--in short, to adopt a well-known military axiom, ‘the
best defensive would be a vigorous local offensive[334].’ Meanwhile
it should be known that enormous reinforcements were in march from
the Rhine and the Elbe. This was indubitably correct, for on August 5
the 1st and 6th Corps of the ‘Grand Army,’ and two divisions of heavy
cavalry, had been sent their orders to break up from their garrisons
and set out for Spain[335]. The Viceroy of Italy and the Princes of
the Confederation of the Rhine had also been directed to send large
contingents to the Peninsula: the troops from Italy were to move on
Perpignan and strengthen the army of Catalonia; those from the German
states were to march on Bayonne and join the main army[336]. Somewhat
later the Emperor directed still further masses of men to be drawn
off from Germany, namely Marshal Mortier with the 5th Corps and two
more divisions of dragoons[337], while the whole of the Imperial Guard
came down from Paris on the same errand[338]. There were still nearly
100,000 of the old army left in Spain[339], and the reinforcements
would amount to 130,000 more, a force which when united would far
surpass both in numbers and in quality any army that the Spaniards
would be able to get together in the course of the next two months.
[334] Note on the situation of Spain, Aug. 5 (_Nap. Corresp._,
14,245).
[335] Napoleon to Clarke, Aug. 5 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,244).
[336] Napoleon to Eugène, Aug. 10 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,249), and
to Clarke (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,256).
[337] Napoleon to Clarke, Aug. 17 (_Nap. Corresp._, 14,256).
[338] Except of course the brigade of fusiliers and the three
cavalry regiments which were already in Spain.
[339] Or 98,000 to be exact, unless Reille’s force in Roussillon
be added.
It was from Rochefort and on August 5 that Napoleon sent off his orders
to his brother to stay his retreat at Aranda de Duero, and to keep
Bessières at Valladolid and Verdier at Tudela. Once more the distances
of space and time were too much for him. Before the dispatch from
Rochefort came to hand, Joseph and Savary had already abandoned Aranda:
they left it on the sixth and by the ninth were at Burgos. At that city
they were met by Bessières, who according to the King’s orders had
fallen back from the Esla to the Arlanzon. Napoleon’s elaborate scheme
for the maintenance of the line of the Douro had thus fallen through,
as completely as his earlier plan for the defence of Madrid. Seeing
that his orders were clearly out of date, Moncey and Bessières[340]
agreed that they might be disregarded. The next line suitable for an
army acting on the defensive was that of the Ebro, and to the banks of
that river the dispirited army of France now withdrew.
[340] Savary had left the army on Aug. 4, and returned to France.
The head quarters were established at Miranda: the troops of Bessières
and Moncey were massed at that place and at Logroño, with a strong
detachment across the Ebro at Pancorbo, and some cavalry lying out
as far as Burgos: Verdier’s army, after finally raising the siege of
Saragossa, fell back on Milagro, the point where the Aragon falls into
the Ebro. Thus some 70,000 men were concentrated on a comparatively
short and compact front, covering the two great roads which lead to
France by Vittoria and by Pampeluna. Against any frontal attack from
the direction of Madrid the position was very strong. But a glance at
the map shows that the flanks were not properly protected: there was
nothing to prevent Blake from turning the extreme right by an advance
into Biscay, or to prevent Palafox from turning the extreme left by
a march on Pampeluna via Tafalla or Sanguesa. If either of these
moves were made by a powerful force, the army on the Ebro would be
compelled either to abandon its positions in order to go in pursuit,
or else to leave them occupied by a detachment insufficient to resist
a serious attack along the line of the high-road from Madrid. Both
those operations were ultimately taken in hand by the Spaniards, but
it was at too late an hour, when the reinforcements from Germany had
begun to arrive, and when ample means were at the disposal of the
French generals for repulsing flank attacks, without drawing off men
from the line of the Ebro. The astounding slowness of the Spaniards,
and the lamentable want of union between the commanders of the various
provincial armies, ruined any chance that there might have been of
success. The troops of King Joseph were safely installed in their
defensive positions by August 15. On that day the leading columns of
the Spanish army had only just arrived at Madrid. It was not till a
month later that the number of troops brought forward to the line of
the Ebro approached the total strength of the host of the intrusive
King. The offensive operations of Blake and Palafox did not commence
till the second half of September, when the columns of the ‘Grand Army’
were already drawing near to the Pyrenees, and all possible chance
of success had long gone by. They were not developed till October,
when the counter-stroke of the French was fully prepared. From August
15 down to the day of the battle of Zornoza (October 31) there are
two months and a half of wasted time, during which the Spaniards
did nothing more than stir up an ineffectual rising in Biscay and
gradually push to the front scattered corps whose total did not amount
to much more than 100,000 men. The troops of Bonaparte on the other
hand--now under the orders of Jourdan, who arrived at Miranda on August
25[341]--had little to do but to ward off the feeble attempts to cut
their communications in Biscay, and to incorporate, brigade by brigade,
the numerous reinforcements which kept marching in from Bayonne. For
even ere the three veteran corps from Germany came to hand, there
was a continuous stream of troops pouring across the Pyrenees. Most
important, perhaps, of all the arrivals was that of Marshal Ney, the
toughest and most resolute of all the Emperor’s fighting-men, who
brought with him a spirit of enterprise and confidence which had long
been wanting in the army of Spain[342].
[341] See his _Mémoires_ (pp. 66, 67) for the situation at this
date.
[342] He arrived at Irun on Aug. 30 (_Madrid Gazette_, Sept.
17th, 1808).
SECTION VI: CHAPTER II
CREATION OF THE ‘JUNTA GENERAL’
On August 1, Madrid had seen the last of the French: yet it was not
till the thirteenth that the Spanish troops appeared before the gates
of the capital. Even then it was not the victorious army of Andalusia
which presented itself, but only the Valencian corps of Llamas, a mere
division of 8,000 men, which would not have dared to push forward,
had it not known that Joseph Bonaparte and all his train were now far
on their way towards the Ebro. During the thirteen days which elapsed
between his departure and the arrival of the Valencians there was
a curious interregnum in Madrid. It took some time to convince the
populace and the local authorities that the hated invaders were really
gone, and that they were once more their own masters. Nothing reflects
the state of public opinion better than the _Madrid Gazette_: down to
August 1, it shows the hand of a French editor; ‘His Majesty’ means
King Joseph, and all the foreign intelligence is coloured with French
views. On August 2 the foreign influence begins to disappear, and we
note a very cautious and tentative proclamation by the old ‘Council
of Castile.’ That effete body, shorn by the French of most of its
prominent members, had repeatedly yielded to the orders of Murat and
Savary: it had carried out many decrees of the new executive, yet it
had never actually recognized the legality of King Joseph’s accession.
Indeed at the last moment it had striven, by feeble methods of evasion
and delay, to avoid committing itself to this final step. But we may
guess that, had there been no Baylen, the Council would finally have
made up its mind to ‘swallow the pill’--if we may use once more Murat’s
characteristic phrase. However, the flight of Joseph had saved it
from being forced to range itself on the side of the traitors, and
its members were able to stay behind in Madrid without fearing for
their necks. In their first manifesto there is not a word that could
have offended Savary, if he had returned the next day. It preaches
the necessity of calm, order, and quiet: no one must stir up mobs,
compromise the public safety, or vex his respectable neighbours[343].
The rest of the paper on this and the two following days is filled
up with essays on geography and political economy, lists of servants
seeking places, and colourless foreign news many weeks old. Such
piteous stuff was not likely to keep the people quiet: on August 4 a
mob assembled, broke open the house of Don Luis Viguri (one of Godoy’s
old confidants), murdered him, and dragged his body through the
streets. Fearing that they too might be considered _Afrancesados_ the
Council published a second proclamation of the most abject kind. The
‘melancholy instance of insubordination’ of the previous day causes
them ‘intolerable sorrow’ and is ‘unlikely to tend to public felicity.’
The loyal and generous citizens ought to wait for the working of the
law and its ministers, and not to take the execution of justice into
their own hands. The clergy, the local officials, every employer of
labour, every father of a family, are begged to help to maintain peace
and order. Then comes a page of notices of new books, and a short paper
on the ethics of emigration! Of Ferdinand VII or Joseph I, of politics
domestic or foreign, there is not a word. Two days later the Council at
last makes up its mind, and, after a week of most uncomfortable sitting
on the fence, suddenly bursts out into an ‘Address to the honourable
and generous people of the capital of Spain,’ in the highest strain
of patriotism: ‘Our loved King is in chains, but his loyal subjects
have risen in his name. Our gallant armies have achieved triumphs over
“the invincibles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena.” All Europe stands
surprised at their rapid victories. These fellow citizens of ours,
crowned with the laurels of success, will soon be with us. Meanwhile
the Council must beg the patriotic citizens of Madrid to abstain from
riot and murder, and to turn their energies into more useful channels.
Let them prostrate themselves before the altar in grateful thanks
to God, and make preparations to receive and embrace the oncoming
bands of liberators.’ Domestic intelligence becomes for the future a
list of French atrocities, and of (sometimes apocryphal) victories
in the remoter corners of Spain[344]. Foreign intelligence is served
up with an English rather than a French flavour. The arsenal of
‘Volovich[345]’ is shipping scores of cannon and thousands of muskets
for the use of the brave Spaniards, the treasures of Great Britain
are to be poured into the hands of the insurrectionary Juntas, and
so forth. All this comes a little late: the good intentions of the
Council would have been more clear if they had been expressed on August
2 instead of August 7, when the French were still at Buitrago, rather
than when they were far away beyond Aranda de Duero[346].
[343] Proclamation of the Council, dated Aug. 1, published Aug. 2
in the _Gazette_. There is an original copy of the broadsheet in
the _Vaughan Papers_.
[344] On Aug. 9 the reader is invited to believe that Roussillon
has risen against Napoleon, and that the peasantry have stormed
its frontier-fortress of Bellegarde.
[345] i.e. Woolwich.
[346] It is hard to agree with Napier’s verdict that ‘The Council
was not wanting to itself; the individuals comprising it did
not hesitate to seize the reins of power when the French had
departed, and the prudence with which they preserved tranquillity
in the capital, and prevented all reaction, proves that they were
not without merit, and forms a striking contrast to the conduct
of the provincial Juntas, under whose savage sway every kind of
excess was committed and even encouraged’ (Napier, i. 299).
It is really astonishing to find that the Council made a bid for power,
and attempted to assume the pose of a senate of warm-hearted patriots,
after all its base servility to Murat and Savary during the last six
months. Its president, Don Arias Mon y Velarde, actually had the
audacity to write a circular-note to the various provincial Juntas of
Spain, proposing that, as a single central government must obviously
be established, they should send representatives to Madrid to concert
with the Council on means of defence, and lend it the aid of their
influence and authority. That such a discredited body should attempt
to assume a kind of presidential authority over the local Juntas who
had raised and directed the insurrection was absurd. The replies which
were returned were of the most uncompromising kind: the Galician Junta
taunted the Council with having been ‘the most active instrument of
the Usurper.’ Palafox, speaking for Aragon, wrote that it ‘was a
corporation which had not done its duty.’ The active and ambitious
Junta of Seville wished to accuse the Council before the face of the
Spanish people ‘of having subverted the fundamental laws of the realm,
of having given the enemy every facility for seizing the domination of
Spain, of having lost all legal authority and become null and void, and
of being suspected of deliberate treason of the most atrocious sort
possible.’ The Valencians voted that ‘no public body of any kind ought
to enter into correspondence with the Council of Castile, or come
to any understanding with it[347].’ All these rebuffs to the Council
were well deserved, and it is clear that the provincial Juntas were
entirely justified in their action. But it is to be feared that there
lay at the bottom of their hearts not merely honest indignation at the
impudent proposal that had been laid before them, but a not unnatural
desire to cling as long as possible to their existing power and
authority. In many of the provinces there was shown a most unworthy and
unwise reluctance to proceed at once to the construction of a single
governing body for Spain, even when the proposal was put forward not
by a discredited corporation like the Council, but by men of undoubted
patriotism.
[347] All these quotations come from the documents inserted by
Toreño in his fifth book (i. 262).
The credit of starting a serious agitation for the erection of a
‘Supreme Junta’ must be given to the Murcians, whose councils were
guided by the old statesman Florida Blanca, a survivor from the days
of Charles III. As far back as June 22 they had issued a proclamation
setting forth the evils of provincial particularism, and advocating
the establishment of a central government. None of the other Juntas
ventured openly to oppose this laudable design, and some of them did
their best to further it. But there were others who clung to power,
and were determined to surrender it at as late a date as they could
manage. The Junta of Seville was far the worst: that body--as we have
had occasion to mention in another place--was largely in the hands
of intriguers, and had put forth unjustifiable claims to domination
in the whole southern part of the realm, even usurping the title of
‘Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies[348].’ In their desire for
self-aggrandizement they took most unjustifiable steps: they suppressed
Florida Blanca’s Murcian proclamation, lest it might stir up an
agitation in Andalusia in behalf of the establishment of a central
government[349]. But this was a comparatively venial sin: their worst
act was to stay the march of Castaños on Madrid after Baylen. The
pretext used was that they wished to welcome the victorious general
and his army with triumphal entries and feasts of rejoicing--things
entirely out of place, so long as the French were still holding the
capital of the realm. To his own entire dissatisfaction Castaños was
dragged back to Seville, there to display the captured guns and flags
of the French, and to be received with salvos fired by patriotic
ladies who had learnt the drill of the artilleryman[350]. But he
soon found to his disgust that the Junta was really aiming at the
employment of his troops not for national purposes but for their own
aggrandizement. They wished to speak with 40,000 men at their back,
and were most reluctant to let the army pass the Sierra Morena, lest
it should get out of their control. Their most iniquitous design was
to overawe by armed force their neighbours, the Junta of Granada, who
refused to recognize them as a central authority for Andalusia, and had
given their assent to the Murcian proposal for the prompt formation of
a national government. They were actually issuing orders for a division
to march against the Granadans, when Castaños--though a man of mild
and conciliatory manners--burst out in wrath at the council board.
Springing up from his chair and smiting the table a resounding blow,
he exclaimed, ‘Who is the man that dares bid the troops march without
my leave? Away with all provincial differences: I am the general of
the Spanish nation, I am in command of an honourable army, and we are
not going to allow any one to stir up civil war[351].’ Conscious that
the regiments would follow the victor of Baylen, and refuse obedience
to mere civilians, the Junta dropped their suicidal project. But
they turned all their energy into devising pretexts for delaying the
march of the army on Madrid. Their selfishness was undisguised: when
Castaños begged for leave to march on the capital without further
delay[352], the Conde de Tilly (the most intriguing spirit among
all the politicians of Seville) responded with the simple question,
‘And what then will become of _us_?’ He then moved that the Junta of
Andalusia should concern itself with Andalusia and Portugal alone, and
not interfere in what went on beyond the Sierra Morena. This proposal
was a little too strong even for the narrow-minded particularists of
the Junta: but though they let Castaños go, they contrived excuses for
delaying the march of the greater part of his army. He did not get to
Madrid till August 23, more than a month after Baylen, and then brought
with him only the single division of La Peña, about 7,000 strong. The
other three divisions, those of Reding, Jones, and Coupigny, did not
cross the Sierra Morena for many weeks after, and some of the troops
had not even left Andalusia at the moment when the French resumed
offensive operations in October. On various specious pretences the
Junta detained many regiments at Seville and Cadiz, giving out that
they were to form the nucleus of a new ‘army of reserve,’ which was
still a mere skeleton three months after Baylen had been fought. If we
compare the Andalusian army-list of November with that of July, we find
that only seven new battalions[353] had joined the army of Castaños in
time to fight on the Ebro. It is true that a new division had been also
raised in Granada, and sent to Catalonia under General Reding, but this
was due to the energy of the Junta of that small kingdom, which was far
more active than that of Seville. Andalusia had 40,000 men under arms
in July, and no more than 50,000 at the beginning of November, though
the Junta had promised to have at least thirty reserve battalions ready
before the end of the autumn, and had received from England enormous
stores of muskets and clothing for their equipment.
[348] See page 69.
[349] Lord Collingwood’s _Correspondence_, ii. 98.
[350] Arteche, ii. 124.
[351] Toreño, i. 264.
[352] This story is told by Lord Collingwood, in an official
dispatch to Castlereagh, dated July 29. He states that he _knows_
that the colloquy took place, and clearly had the information
from Castaños himself (_Collingwood Correspondence_, ii. 199).
[353] Tiradores de España, Provincial de Cadiz, Carmona, Baylen,
Navas de Tolosa, 3rd and 5th Volunteers of Seville.
In the northern parts of Spain there was almost as much confusion,
particularism, and selfishness as in the south. The main sources of
trouble were the rivalry of the Juntas of Asturias and Galicia, and
the extravagant claims of the aged and imbecile Cuesta, in virtue of
his position as Captain-General of Castile. It will be remembered
that in June insurrectionary Juntas had been established at Leon
and Valladolid, the former purporting to represent the kingdom of
Leon, the latter the kingdom of Old Castile. Each had been under
the thumb of Cuesta, who looked upon them as nothing more than
committees established under his authority for the civil government
of the provinces of the Douro. But the disaster of Medina de Rio Seco
destroyed both the power and the credit of the Captain-General. Flying
before the French, the Juntas took refuge in Galicia, where they
settled down at Ponferrada for a few days, and then moved to Lugo,
whither the Junta of Galicia came out to meet them. The three bodies,
joining in common session, chose as their president Don Antonio Valdes,
the Bailiff of the Knights of Malta, who was one of the representatives
of Castile. They claimed to be recognized as the supreme civil
government of Northern Spain, but their position was weakened by two
mischances. The Asturian Junta refused to have anything to do with
them, and persisted in remaining sovereign within the borders of its
own principality. Even more vexatious was the conduct of Cuesta: though
he was wandering in the mountains with only three or four thousand
raw levies--the wrecks of Rio Seco--he refused to recognize any
authority in the three federated Juntas, and pretended to revoke by his
proclamation any powers vested in those of Castile and Leon. The fact
was that he knew that they would lend support to his military rival
Blake, and not to himself. He feigned to regard the Captains-General
and the old _Audiencias_, or provincial tribunals, as the sole
legitimate powers left in the kingdom, and to consider the Juntas
as irregular assemblies destitute of any valid authority. In what a
scandalous form he translated his theories into action, we shall soon
see. Meanwhile he refused to co-operate with the troops of Galicia, and
made no attempt to follow the retreating French. All his efforts were
directed to increasing the numbers of the mass of raw levies which he
called the ‘Army of Castile.’ But from the whole of the provinces over
which he claimed authority he had only succeeded in scraping together
12,000 men by the middle of September, though as far as population went
they represented nearly a sixth of the people of Spain.
The want of any central executive for directing the armies of the
patriots had the most disastrous results. By September 1 Castaños and
Llamas had not more than 20,000 men at Madrid. Galluzzo’s army of
Estremadura, which ought to have joined them long before, was still
employed in its futile siege of Elvas. Cuesta was hanging back in
Castile, as jealous of Castaños as he had been of Blake. The only
armies which were in touch with the French were Palafox’s troops on
the Ebro and the Valencian division of Saint March, which the Junta of
Valencia (showing more patriotism than most of their colleagues) had
pushed up to Saragossa to aid the Aragonese. Blake, with the powerful
army of Galicia, had descended to Astorga when Bessières retreated to
Burgos. But from Astorga he advanced most cautiously, always clinging
to the southern slope of the Cantabrian hills, in order to avoid the
plains, where the cavalry of the French would have a free hand. It
was not till September 10 that he had concentrated his main body at
Reynosa, near the sources of the Ebro, where he was at last near enough
to the front to be able to commence operations.