CHAPTER VII.

Governments in Greece.

I. The return of the Heraclidae occasioned consequences of which the

most important were the least immediate. Whenever the Dorians forced

a settlement, they dislodged such of the previous inhabitants as

refused to succumb. Driven elsewhere to seek a home, the exiles found

it often in yet fairer climes, and along more fertile soils. The

example of these involuntary migrators became imitated wherever

discontent prevailed or population was redundant: and hence, as I have

already recorded, first arose those numerous colonies, which along the

Asiatic shores, in the Grecian isles, on the plains of Italy, and even

in Libya and in Egypt, were destined to give, as it were, a second

youth to the parent states.

II. The ancient Greek constitution was that of an aristocracy, with a

prince at the head. Suppose a certain number of men, thus governed,

to be expelled their native soil, united by a common danger and common

suffering, to land on a foreign shore, to fix themselves with pain and

labour in a new settlement--it is quite clear that a popular principle

would insensibly have entered the forms of the constitution they

transplanted. In the first place, the power of the prince would be

more circumscribed--in the next place, the free spirit of the

aristocracy would be more diffused: the first, because the authority

of the chief would rarely be derived from royal ancestry, or hallowed

by prescriptive privilege; in most cases he was but a noble, selected

from the ranks, and crippled by the jealousies, of his order: the

second, because all who shared in the enterprise would in one respect

rise at once to an aristocracy--they would be distinguished from the

population of the state they colonized. Misfortune, sympathy, and

change would also contribute to sweep away many demarcations; and

authority was transmuted from a birthright into a trust, the moment it

was withdrawn from the shelter of ancient custom, and made the gift of

the living rather than a heritage from the dead. It was probable,

too, that many of such colonies were founded by men, among whom was

but little disparity of rank: this would be especially the case with

those which were the overflow of a redundant population; the great and

the wealthy are never redundant!--the mass would thus ordinarily be

composed of the discontented and the poor, and even where the

aristocratic leaven was most strong, it was still the aristocracy of

some defeated and humbled faction. So that in the average equality of

the emigrators were the seeds of a new constitution; and if they

transplanted the form of monarchy, it already contained the genius of

republicanism. Hence, colonies in the ancient, as in the modern

world, advanced by giant strides towards popular principles.

Maintaining a constant intercourse with their father-land, their own

constitutions became familiar and tempting to the population of the

countries they had abandoned; and much of whatsoever advantages were

derived from the soil they selected, and the commerce they found

within their reach, was readily attributed only to their more popular

constitutions; as, at this day, we find American prosperity held out

to our example, not as the result of local circumstances, but as the

creature of political institutions.

One principal cause of the republican forms of government that began

(as, after the Dorian migration, the different tribes became settled

in those seats by which they are historically known) to spread

throughout Greece, was, therefore, the establishment of colonies

retaining constant intercourse with the parent states. A second cause

is to be found in the elements of the previous constitutions of the

Grecian states themselves, and the political principles which existed

universally, even in the heroic ages: so that, in fact, the change

from monarchy to republicanism was much less violent than at the first

glance it would seem to our modern notions. The ancient kings, as

described by Homer, possessed but a limited authority, like that of

the Spartan kings--extensive in war, narrow in peace. It was

evidently considered that the source of their authority was in the

people. No notion seems to have been more universal among the Greeks

than that it was for the community that all power was to be exercised.

In Homer’s time popular assemblies existed, and claimed the right of

conferring privileges on rank. The nobles were ever jealous of the

prerogative of the prince, and ever encroaching on his accidental

weakness. In his sickness, his age, or his absence, the power of the

state seems to have been wrested from his hands--the prey of the

chiefs, or the dispute of contending factions. Nor was there in

Greece that chivalric fealty to a person which characterizes the

North. From the earliest times it was not the MONARCH, that called

forth the virtue of devotion, and inspired the enthusiasm of loyalty.

Thus, in the limited prerogative of royalty, in the jealousy of the

chiefs, in the right of popular assemblies, and, above all, in the

silent and unconscious spirit of political theory, we may recognise in

the early monarchies of Greece the germes of their inevitable

dissolution. Another cause was in that singular separation of tribes,

speaking a common language, and belonging to a common race, which

characterized the Greeks. Instead of overrunning a territory in one

vast irruption, each section seized a small district, built a city,

and formed an independent people. Thus, in fact, the Hellenic

governments were not those of a country, but of a town; and the words

“state” and “city” were synonymous [152]. Municipal constitutions, in

their very nature, are ever more or less republican; and, as in the

Italian states, the corporation had only to shake off some power

unconnected with, or hostile to it, to rise into a republic. To this

it may be added, that the true republican spirit is more easily

established among mountain tribes imperfectly civilized, and yet fresh

from the wildness of the natural life, than among old states, where

luxury leaves indeed the desire, but has enervated the power of

liberty, “as the marble from the quarry may be more readily wrought

into the statue, than that on which the hand of the workman has

already been employed.” [153]

III. If the change from monarchy to republicanism was not very

violent in itself, it appears to have been yet more smoothed away by

gradual preparations. Monarchy was not abolished, it declined. The

direct line was broken, or some other excuse occurred for exchanging

an hereditary for an elective monarchy; then the period of power

became shortened, and from monarchy for life it was monarchy only for

a certain number of years: in most cases the name too (and how much is

there in names!) was changed, and the title of ruler or magistrate

substituted for that of king.

Thus, by no sudden leap of mind, by no vehement and short-lived

revolutions, but gradually, insensibly, and permanently, monarchy

ceased--a fashion, as it were, worn out and obsolete--and

republicanism succeeded. But this republicanism at first was probably

in no instance purely democratic. It was the chiefs who were the

visible agents in the encroachments on the monarchic power--it was an

aristocracy that succeeded monarchy. Sometimes this aristocracy was

exceedingly limited in number, or the governing power was usurped by a

particular faction or pre-eminent families; then it was called an

OLIGARCHY. And this form of aristocracy appears generally to have

been the most immediate successor to royalty. “The first polity,”

says Aristotle [154], “that was established in Greece after the lapse

of monarchies, was that of the members of the military class, and

those wholly horsemen,” . . . . . “such republics, though called

democracies, had a strong tendency to oligarchy, and even to royalty.”

[155] But the spirit of change still progressed: whether they were

few or many, the aristocratic governors could not fail to open the

door to further innovations. For, if many, they were subjected to

dissensions among themselves--if few, they created odium in all who

were excluded from power. Thus fell the oligarchies of Marseilles,

Ister, and Heraclea. In the one case they were weakened by their own

jealousies, in the other by the jealousies of their rivals. The

progress of civilization and the growing habits of commerce gradually

introduced a medium between the populace and the chiefs. The MIDDLE

CLASS slowly rose, and with it rose the desire of extended liberties

and equal laws. [156]

IV. Now then appeared the class of DEMAGOGUES. The people had been

accustomed to change. They had been led against monarchy, and found

they had only resigned the one master to obtain the many:--A demagogue

arose, sometimes one of their own order, more often a dissatisfied,

ambitious, or empoverished noble. For they who have wasted their

patrimony, as the Stagirite shrewdly observes, are great promoters of

innovation! Party ran high--the state became divided--passions were

aroused--and the popular leader became the popular idol. His life was

probably often in danger from the resentment of the nobles, and it was

always easy to assert that it was so endangered.--He obtained a guard

to protect him, conciliated the soldiers, seized the citadel, and rose

at once from the head of the populace to the ruler of the state. Such

was the common history of the tyrants of Greece, who never supplanted

the kingly sway (unless in the earlier ages, when, born to a limited

monarchy, they extended their privileges beyond the law, as Pheidon of

Argos), but nearly always aristocracies or oligarchies [157]. I need

scarcely observe that the word “tyrant” was of very different

signification in ancient times from that which it bears at present.

It more nearly corresponded to our word “usurper,” and denoted one

who, by illegitimate means, whether of art or force, had usurped the

supreme authority. A tyrant might be mild or cruel, the father of the

people, or their oppressor; he still preserved the name, and it was

transmitted to his children. The merits of this race of rulers, and

the unconscious benefits they produced, have not been justly

appreciated, either by ancient or modern historians. Without her

tyrants, Greece might never have established her democracies. As may

be readily supposed, the man who, against powerful enemies, often from

a low origin and with empoverished fortunes, had succeeded in

ascending a throne, was usually possessed of no ordinary abilities.

It was almost vitally necessary for him to devote those abilities to

the cause and interests of the people. Their favour had alone raised

him--numerous foes still surrounded him--it was on the people alone

that he could depend.

The wiser and more celebrated tyrants were characterized by an extreme

modesty of deportment--they assumed no extraordinary pomp, no lofty

titles--they left untouched, or rendered yet more popular, the outward

forms and institutions of the government--they were not exacting in

taxation--they affected to link themselves with the lowest orders, and

their ascendency was usually productive of immediate benefit to the

working classes, whom they employed in new fortifications or new

public buildings; dazzling the citizens by a splendour that seemed

less the ostentation of an individual than the prosperity of a state.

But the aristocracy still remained their enemies, and it was against

them, not against the people, that they directed their acute

sagacities and unsparing energies. Every more politic tyrant was a

Louis the Eleventh, weakening the nobles, creating a middle class. He

effected his former object by violent and unscrupulous means. He

swept away by death or banishment all who opposed his authority or

excited his fears. He thus left nothing between the state and a

democracy but himself; himself removed, democracy ensued naturally and

of course. There are times in the history of all nations when liberty

is best promoted--when civilization is most rapidly expedited--when

the arts are most luxuriantly nourished by a strict concentration of

power in the hands of an individual--and when the despot is but the

representative of the popular will [158]. At such times did the

tyrannies in Greece mostly flourish, and they may almost be said to

cease with the necessity which called them forth. The energy of these

masters of a revolution opened the intercourse with other states;

their interests extended commerce; their policy broke up the sullen

barriers of oligarchical prejudice and custom; their fears found

perpetual vent for the industry of a population whom they dreaded to

leave in indolence; their genius appreciated the arts--their vanity

fostered them. Thus they interrupted the course of liberty only to

improve, to concentre, to advance its results. Their dynasty never

lasted long; the oldest tyranny in Greece endured but a hundred years

[159]--so enduring only from its mildness. The son of the tyrant

rarely inherited his father’s sagacity and talents: he sought to

strengthen his power by severity; discontent ensued, and his fall was

sudden and complete. Usually, then, such of the aristocracy as had

been banished were recalled, but not invested with their former

privileges. The constitution became more or less democratic. It is

true that Sparta, who lent her powerful aid in destroying tyrannies,

aimed at replacing them by oligarchies--but the effort seldom produced

a permanent result: the more the aristocracy was narrowed, the more

certain was its fall. If the middle class were powerful--if commerce

thrived in the state--the former aristocracy of birth was soon

succeeded by an aristocracy of property (called a timocracy), and this

was in its nature certain of democratic advances. The moment you

widen the suffrage, you may date the commencement of universal

suffrage. He who enjoys certain advantages from the possession of ten

acres, will excite a party against him in those who have nine; and the

arguments that had been used for the franchise of the one are equally

valid for the franchise of the other. Limitations of power by

property are barriers against a tide which perpetually advances.

Timocracy, therefore, almost invariably paved the way to democracy.

But still the old aristocratic faction, constantly invaded, remained

powerful, stubborn, and resisting, and there was scarcely a state in

Greece that did not contain the two parties which we find to-day in

England, and in all free states--the party of the movement to the

future, and the party of recurrence to the past; I say the past, for

in politics there is no present! Wherever party exists, if the one

desire fresh innovations, so the other secretly wishes not to preserve

what remains, but to restore what has been. This fact it is necessary

always to bear in mind in examining the political contests of the

Athenians. For in most of their domestic convulsions we find the

cause in the efforts of the anti-popular party less to resist new

encroachments than to revive departed institutions. But though in

most of the Grecian states were two distinct orders, and the

Eupatrids, or “Well-born,” were a class distinct from, and superior

to, that of the commonalty, we should err in supposing that the

separate orders made the great political divisions. As in England the

more ancient of the nobles are often found in the popular ranks, so in

the Grecian states many of the Eupatrids headed the democratic party.

And this division among themselves, while it weakened the power of the

well-born, contributed to prevent any deadly or ferocious revolutions:

for it served greatly to soften the excesses of the predominant

faction, and every collision found mediators between the contending

parties in some who were at once friends of the people and members of

the nobility. Nor should it be forgotten that the triumph of the

popular party was always more moderate than that of the antagonist

faction--as the history of Athens will hereafter prove.

V. The legal constitutions of Greece were four--Monarchy, Oligarchy,

Aristocracy, and Democracy; the illegal, was Tyranny in a twofold

shape, viz., whether it consisted in an usurped monarchy or an usurped

oligarchy. Thus the oligarchy of the Thirty in Athens was no less a

tyranny than the single government of Pisistratus. Even democracy had

its illegal or corrupt form--in OCHLOCRACY or mob rule; for democracy

did not signify the rule of the lower orders alone, but of all the

people--the highest as the lowest. If the highest became by law

excluded--if the populace confined the legislative and executive

authorities to their own order--then democracy, or the government of a

whole people, virtually ceased, and became the government of a part of

the people--a form equally unjust and illegitimate--equally an abuse

in itself, whether the dominant and exclusive portion were the nobles

or the mechanics. Thus in modern yet analogous history, when the

middle class of Florence expelled the nobles from any share of the

government, they established a monopoly under the name of liberty; and

the resistance of the nobles was the lawful struggle of patriots and

of freemen for an inalienable privilege and a natural right.

VI. We should remove some very important prejudices from our minds,

if we could once subscribe to a fact plain in itself, but which the

contests of modern party have utterly obscured--that in the mere forms

of their government, the Greek republics cannot fairly be pressed into

the service of those who in existing times would attest the evils, or

proclaim the benefits, of constitutions purely democratic. In the

first place, they were not democracies, even in their most democratic

shape:--the vast majority of the working classes were the enslaved

population. And, therefore, to increase the popular tendencies of the

republic was, in fact, only to increase the liberties of the few. We

may fairly doubt whether the worst evils of the ancient republics, in

the separation of ranks, and the war between rich and poor, were not

the necessary results of slavery. We may doubt, with equal

probability, whether much of the lofty spirit, and the universal

passion for public affairs, whence emanated the enterprise, the

competition, the patriotism, and the glory of the ancient cities,

could have existed without a subordinate race to carry on the

drudgeries of daily life. It is clear, also, that much of the

intellectual greatness of the several states arose from the exceeding

smallness of their territories--the concentration of internal power,

and the perpetual emulation with neighbouring and kindred states

nearly equal in civilization; it is clear, too, that much of the

vicious parts of their character, and yet much of their more

brilliant, arose from the absence of the PRESS. Their intellectual

state was that of men talked to, not written to. Their imagination

was perpetually called forth--their deliberative reason rarely;--they

were the fitting audience for an orator, whose art is effective in

proportion to the impulse and the passion of those he addresses. Nor

must it be forgotten that the representative system, which is the

proper conductor of the democratic action, if not wholly unknown to

the Greeks [160], and if unconsciously practised in the Spartan

ephoralty, was at least never existent in the more democratic states.

And assemblies of the whole people are compatible only with those

small nations of which the city is the country. Thus, it would be

impossible for us to propose the abstract constitution of any ancient

state as a warning or an example to modern countries which possess

territories large in extent--which subsist without a slave population

--which substitute representative councils for popular assemblies--and

which direct the intellectual tastes and political habits of a people,

not by oratory and conversation, but through the more calm and

dispassionate medium of the press. This principle settled, it may

perhaps be generally conceded, that on comparing the democracies of

Greece with all other contemporary forms of government, we find them

the most favourable to mental cultivation--not more exposed than

others to internal revolutions--usually, in fact, more durable,--more

mild and civilized in their laws--and that the worst tyranny of the

Demus, whether at home or abroad, never equalled that of an oligarchy

or a single ruler. That in which the ancient republics are properly

models to us, consists not in the form, but the spirit of their

legislation. They teach us that patriotism is most promoted by

bringing all classes into public and constant intercourse--that

intellect is most luxuriant wherever the competition is widest and

most unfettered--and that legislators can create no rewards and invent

no penalties equal to those which are silently engendered by society

itself--while it maintains, elaborated into a system, the desire of

glory and the dread of shame.

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