THE BELLE VUE SPUR.
(_a_) October 4th–8th.
The Third Battle of Ypres opened on July 31st, 1917, with an attack by
two British Armies--the Second Army on the right and the Fifth Army on
the left--supported by a French Army Corps to the north. At first a
considerable advance was made, but the unusually wet weather of August
greatly hampered operations. During September the weather improved and
progress continued, but the fighting was exceptionally severe, the
enemy stubbornly defending every inch of the ground. Notwithstanding
all difficulties, by the beginning of October the Second Army was in
touch with the Passchendaele Ridge, which was the last natural barrier
between the British and the fertile, low-lying plains of Belgium.
Though this ridge proved so serious an obstacle to the British advance,
it is by no means conspicuous. At no point is it as much as sixty
metres above sea level, and its average height is little more than
fifty metres.
Some description of the battlefield, which the Battalion entered
early in October, is necessary. For nearly three years the enemy had
been fortifying the area east of Ypres, making use of every method
and device known to modern warfare--and throughout the war the
Germans were unsurpassed as field engineers. The result was a mighty
fortress, covering many square miles of ground, second to none on
the Western Front, or, for that matter, in the world. The ground was
covered with trenches, constructed according to the latest ideas of
fortification, and crammed with every device for offence and defence.
Thousands of miles of barbed wire had been used in the construction of
obstacles. Hundreds of “pill-boxes”--massive but low-lying structures
of reinforced concrete, invulnerable unless they received direct hits
from at least an 8-inch shell--covered the country-side and sheltered
thousands of machine guns. The German artillery was extremely powerful
and magnificently handled; and as every ridge, up to the battle of
Messines, was in enemy hands, his gunners had all the advantages of
superior observation. Such was the country that the British had been
attacking, and slowly penetrating, during the last two months.
This country the British and German artillery had turned into a
desolation unparalleled even on the Somme battlefield in the previous
year. Literally, every inch of ground had been torn up by shell fire.
The whole appearance of the country-side had changed--most of the roads
had almost disappeared, thick woods had become nothing but collections
of broken and distorted tree-stumps, of some villages there was
scarcely a trace. Everywhere the ground was littered with the awful
debris of war--dead bodies of men and animals, derelict tanks and guns,
shattered wagons and every conceivable form of what was known to the
men as “salvage.” To crown all, the heavy rains of the late summer
and early autumn had converted the whole area into a quagmire, the
drainage system having been completely destroyed by artillery fire.
Cross-country travelling was extremely difficult for a man on foot,
for even when he picked his way carefully he was often bogged well
above the knees; transport and animals could not move at all except by
the newly-made roads and tracks. Every effort had been made to deal
with the situation by the construction of plank roads, gridded tracks
and light railways, but transport difficulties and the activity of
the enemy artillery seriously interfered. Could the prophetic eye of
Dante have looked so far forward into the future, he might readily have
introduced this desolation as the setting to one of the lowest circles
of Hell.
* * * * *
The Battalion was about to settle down for the night in Red Rose
Camp when an urgent order from 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q. altered
everything. In spite of the rain that day, a particularly successful
attack had been made on a wide front; all objectives had been
reached, and, in some cases, passed. Luck had been on the side of the
British for once, for that same morning the enemy had planned a big
counter-attack. Unfortunately for him his zero hour had been fixed
a few minutes later than the British, whose barrage, 1,000 yards in
depth, had passed slowly over three enemy divisions, assembled in close
order in the open, and had almost annihilated them. So promising had
been the situation at one time that the 147th Infantry Brigade was
within an ace of being thrown into the battle that very day, to exploit
it. This, however, had not been done, but the Battalion now received
orders to move up and relieve the 1st Battalion Canterbury Regt., in
reserve to the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Brigade. At once all was bustle
and excitement, and, soon after 11-0 p.m. the Battalion, in battle
order and at battle strength, marched out of camp to play its part in
the battle for the Passchendaele Ridge.
The night was very dark and wet, and great difficulty was found in
carrying out the relief. The route to Pommern Castle, where Battalion
H.Q. was located and round which the whole Battalion was posted,
lay along No. 5 Track--a single line of grids, in particularly evil
condition, with fearsome mud on both sides. Relief was not complete
until after dawn. Some anxiety was felt as to what should be done in
case the enemy attacked, for not a man of the Battalion had any clear
idea where he was, or where the front line lay. Accommodation was
very bad. One or two low-lying, very wet, and extremely uncomfortable
pill-boxes were occupied by Battalion H.Q.; but nearly everyone had to
be content with a shell-hole over which he could spread his waterproof
sheet. October 5th was spent mainly in trying to build habitable
shelters.
On the night of October 5/6th the Battalion moved up to the line, where
it relieved two New Zealand battalions. D and C Companies held the
front line--D Company to the south of, and C Company along, the eastern
edge of Berlin Wood; A Company was in support on Abraham Heights, and B
Company in reserve near Otto Farm, where Battalion H.Q. was situated.
Abraham Heights were rather heavily shelled at intervals, but, apart
from this, nothing of importance happened during the twenty-four
hours that were spent in the sector. The enemy was undoubtedly very
disorganised after the attack of two days before, and was in no
condition to be aggressive.
The night of October 5/6th was a particularly bad one for the Battalion
transport men. Owing to the appalling condition of the ground, supplies
could only be taken up on pack animals, and that night, for the first
and last time, Texas packs were used. These proved most unsatisfactory,
the loads could not be properly secured, and constant halts were
necessary to readjust them. The amount of traffic on the roads was
amazing. From Vlamertinghe to Ypres, and up beyond Wieltje, the whole
road was packed with every conceivable form of vehicle and pack animal.
Blocks were constantly occurring and causing wearisome halts. Soon
after the convoy started it became split up, owing to vehicles pushing
in between the animals. Beyond Ypres the conditions became even worse,
and eventually the convoy returned to Red Rose Camp without having
reached the Battalion. But soon after dawn a fresh convoy set out and
succeeded in delivering the rations.
The next night the Battalion was relieved by the 2/5th Battalion
Manchester Regt. (66th Division) and returned to Pommern Castle. The
next two days were spent in active preparation for the attack which was
to take place on October 9th. Large carrying parties were found for
establishing forward dumps, and all officers reconnoitred routes up to
the line and assembly positions for the attack.
This operation was on a very big scale. The 49th Division was to attack
on the extreme left of the Second Army, with the Fifth Army attacking
on its left and the 66th Division on its right. The main details of the
attack were as follows:--
1. The 49th Division was to advance straight towards the point
of the Belle Vue Spur, an offshoot of the main Passchendaele
Ridge, on a frontage of about 1,500 yards.
2. Two objectives were to be captured and consolidated, the
second objective being about 1,250 yards from the British Front
Line.
3. The attack was to be made by the 148th Infantry Brigade on
the right and the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left, each
having two battalions in the front line. The 147th Infantry
Brigade was to be in Divisional Reserve.
It was thus very uncertain what the role of the Battalion would be.
Its orders were to be assembled at Pommern Castle by zero hour (5-20
a.m.) ready to move at a moment’s notice. There it was to remain until
further orders were received from Brigade H.Q., and, as it was the
reserve battalion of the Brigade, these orders were not expected very
early.
The morning of October 8th was bright and sunny, and the ground was
drying up splendidly. But about the middle of the afternoon very heavy
rain began to fall which continued, almost without a break, right
through the night. The ground, already in very bad condition, was thus
rendered almost impassable in many places, and the assembly of the
attacking Brigades was seriously hampered.
(_b_) October 9th.
By 5-0 a.m. on October 9th the Battalion,[11] with the exception
of most of B Company, who had not yet returned from a carrying
party, was assembled at Pommern Castle ready to move. At 5-20 a.m.
the barrage opened, several batteries near where the Battalion was
assembled being in action, and all knew that the attack had begun.
For about two hours nothing happened; save for the noise of the
guns, everything was quiet, and no news of the attack came through.
About 7-30 a.m., orders were received for the Battalion to advance
to the vicinity of Aisne Farm, some six or seven hundred yards west
of Kansas Cross. B Company’s carrying party had not yet returned, so
guides were left behind for them, and the rest of the Battalion moved
off in artillery formation, with platoons at fifty yards’ interval.
The ground was very wet after the heavy rain of the night before, and
movement was slow and laborious. The Battalion had scarcely reached
its destination when fresh orders arrived, directing it to proceed
forthwith to the neighbourhood of Korek, where it would come under the
orders of the 146th Infantry Brigade, whose advanced H.Q. was there.
The route followed was along No. 6 Track, a single line of grids in
none too good condition. Platoons had to move in single file, and, as
they drew near to Korek, came under heavy artillery fire which caused
several casualties--the first suffered that day. On arrival there
the Battalion halted and began to dig in as the artillery fire was
still heavy. While it was thus engaged, the remainder of B Company
came up, so that the Battalion was again concentrated. The Commanding
Officer went personally to the 146th Infantry Brigade H.Q. for orders
and information as to the situation. The latter, he found, was very
obscure. It was not definitely known where any of the Battalion H.Q.
were situated; the 1/5th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. was believed
to be at or near Peter Pan, the 1/7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt.
somewhere between Kronprinz Farm and Yetta Houses. The only definite
information was that both were in need of reinforcements, and the
Commanding Officer was accordingly ordered to send up two companies
in support of each. He returned to his Battalion H.Q. and orders, as
definite as the situation would admit, were issued at 10-50 a.m. A and
B Companies were placed under the command of Capt. A. E. Mander, whose
instructions were to report to the 1/7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt.
and place himself under its orders. C and D Companies the Commanding
Officer decided to lead in person to the assistance of the 1/5th
Battalion West Yorkshire Regt.
[Illustration: R.S.M. F. P. STIRZAKER, M.C.
(Killed).]
[Illustration: R.S.M. W. LEE, M.C.]
[Illustration: C.S.M. W. MEDLEY, M.C., M.M.]
[Illustration: Sergt. A. LOOSEMORE, V.C., D.C.M.]
At 10-55 a.m. Battalion H.Q. moved off, followed by C Company, with D
Company bringing up the rear--all in artillery formation. Near Calgary
Grange they came across Capt. Ablitt, of the 1/5th Battalion West
Yorkshire Regt., who stated that his Commanding Officer was wounded
and he was now in command. Most of his H.Q. personnel were casualties,
he had no proper Headquarters and knew very little of the situation.
The Commanding Officer informed Capt. Ablitt that he was moving up to
Peter Pan with two companies, and then continued on his way. There was
no protective barrage to cover the advance of the Battalion, and, as it
came down the slope past Calgary Grange, very heavy machine gun fire
was encountered from the pill-boxes on the Belle Vue Spur. The enemy
artillery was also active, and, though the companies extended, many
casualties were suffered before the old British front line was reached.
Here a halt was made for about fifteen minutes to give companies an
opportunity to reorganise, and to allow time for the reconnaissance of
the crossings over the Ravebeke. In normal times this stream would have
been a very slight obstacle, but the devastating fire of the British
artillery and the recent heavy rains had converted its course into a
formidable morass. Sec.-Lieut. A. M. Luty went forward to reconnoitre
for practicable crossings. Under a heavy artillery and machine gun fire
he carried out this duty, marked the possible places with sticks, and
then returned to his own lines.
Lieut. H. S. Wilkinson, the Battalion Intelligence Officer, was also
sent forward, not only to reconnoitre the crossings of the stream,
but to try to get into touch with men of the 146th Infantry Brigade.
Running from one shell-hole to another, he soon lost touch with the two
men who had started out with him, and went on alone. Near the Ravebeke,
a bullet lodged in his steel helmet, fortunately without wounding him.
As he could find no other means of crossing, he waded through the
stream, the water coming above his waist. He then advanced straight
towards Peter Pan, across awful mud, and with machine gun bullets
whistling all round. Soon he met a party of the 1/6th Battalion West
Yorkshire Regiment, but they could tell him nothing of the situation.
So he determined to reconnoitre as far as Peter Pan itself before
returning to report. Not a dozen yards from the ruined building he
was severely wounded. One bullet shattered his jaw; another went right
through his left shoulder and fractured the arm. That was the end of
his reconnaissance. He had established the very important fact that
the enemy did not hold Peter Pan, but he was unable to return to give
the information. In great pain and half covered with water, he lay in
a shell-hole until the advance of the Battalion swept past him, and he
was found and carried back.
Meanwhile, the Battalion was again advancing. C Company led the way,
with D Company in close support. Under a hail of machine gun bullets,
in the face of accurate sniping, and with shells bursting all round,
they steadily advanced by section rushes, in extended order. The rear
company gave covering fire to the leading one, and machine guns also
assisted in keeping down the hostile fire. But many men went down,
killed or wounded, in the mud, before the stream was reached. Then
followed the crossing of the Ravebeke. Some of C Company had carried
saplings with them which they threw across, others crossed on the
fallen trees which were already lying there, yet others literally
forced their way through the mud and water. On the far side of the
Ravebeke the fire was, if anything, heavier; but the men pressed on to
Peter Pan where many of them gained some temporary protection among
the ruined buildings. It was in this crossing of the Ravebeke, and
the advance to Peter Pan, that the Battalion suffered its heaviest
casualties that day. Among others, Capt. N. Geldard, O.C. D Company,
went down with a bullet wound in the ankle--his second wound in less
than three months. Lieut. W. L. Hirst assumed command of D Company.
Had the Battalion carried out its advance under a proper barrage the
casualties would not have been nearly so heavy. But the Ravebeke had
been crossed, which was, at the moment, the really important thing.
Battalion H.Q. was established in a newly-made shell hole, just in rear
of the ruins of Peter Pan. C Company was pushed forward at once to
get in touch with the West Yorks, and to gain contact with the enemy.
Following a line slightly to the right of the direction of Wolf Copse,
they came upon a number of West Yorks, who had dug themselves in,
from two to three hundred yards in front of Peter Pan. Reconnoitring
to their flanks, they also gained touch with a platoon of the 1/6th
Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. So they set to work to consolidate on
that line. There were rumours of other troops of the 146th Infantry
Brigade still further out in front, but, apart from a few advanced men
in shell holes, none were seen, and it is unlikely that any existed. D
Company was also sent forward to prolong C Company’s line to the left.
Lieut. W. L. Hirst, with his C.S.M., first reconnoitred the ground,
and, finding a company of the 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt.
already in position there, brought up his company to prolong the line
on its left. With the exception of the platoons found by C Company,
no formed body of the 146th Infantry Brigade was ever found by the
Battalion, though various isolated groups and stragglers were taken
charge of by different companies. Meanwhile, machine gun fire from the
Belle Vue Spur and from Wolf Copse was still sweeping the Battalion
front, and extremely accurate sniping from the latter direction made
individual movement very hazardous. Companies were doing what they
could to keep this down with Lewis gun and rifle fire, but casualties
were frequent. Two signallers, attached to C Company, were shot through
the head as they were moving along a shallow trench. The Adjutant,
Capt. W. C. Fenton, M.C., while reconnoitring the positions, was
also wounded in the head. As Lieut. H. S. Wilkinson had already been
wounded, only the Commanding Officer and Lieut. W. T Scholes were left
at Battalion H.Q. Such was the situation on the right about 3-0 p.m.
Meanwhile, A and B Companies had not moved with the rest of the
Battalion. On receiving his orders to reinforce the 1/7th Battalion
West Yorkshire Regt., Capt. A. E. Mander had sent out scouts to try
to find out the location of the Battalion H.Q.; but, after some
time, these had returned without any information. The companies were
therefore kept in shell holes in the vicinity of Calgary Grange until
something definite could be discovered. It was not until 12-20 p.m.
that they got into touch with the Commanding Officer of the 1/7th
Battalion West Yorkshire Regt., who was found moving his H.Q. back to
Calgary Grange. He simply told them to stand fast for the present. They
remained where they were until about 3-0 p.m., when they received
orders to move up to Yetta Houses, and fill a gap in the line there.
With A Company leading and B Company in support, they moved off in
artillery formation, until they reached the swamps of the Ravebeke.
Here heavy machine gun fire, and the same accurate sniping which had
harassed the rest of the Battalion, forced them to extend. Capt. A. E.
Mander was hit in the head by a sniper during the advance, and killed
instantly. His death was a great loss to the Battalion, for he was not
only a most conscientious officer, but a general favourite with all
ranks; nothing was ever too much trouble for him if he thought it would
benefit his men, and his only ambitions in life seemed to be to work
hard and make others happy. On his fall, Lieut. A. Kirk assumed command
of A Company.
A and B Companies reached their objective about 5-30 p.m. Like the rest
of the Battalion, they found only stragglers of the 146th Infantry
Brigade. A Company began to dig in to the right front of Yetta Houses,
with B Company in support in an old trench in rear. Patrols sent out to
the left failed to gain touch with any troops, save a few stragglers
in shell holes, so Lieut. Kirk ordered the flank of his trench to be
thrown back to protect his left. About dusk, patrols sent out by all
companies succeeded in gaining touch with one another, and the line
which was held for the night was as follows:--
Right:--C Company, facing N.E., and about 200 yards from Wolf
Copse. It was in touch on the right with a platoon of the 1/6th
Battalion West Yorkshire Regt., and had scattered men of the
same battalion in shell holes in front of its position.
Right Centre:--A Company of the 6th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt., under Capt. Buxton.
Left Centre:--D Company, N. of Peter Pan, and facing Wolf Farm.
Left:--A Company, just to the right front of Yetta Houses, with
its left flank thrown back as no touch had been obtained there.
B Company was behind Yetta Houses, in support to A Company.
Battalion H.Q. was behind Peter Pan, still occupying its shell hole,
“and very uncomfortable at that,” according to the situation report
sent in by the Commanding Officer. This line remained unchanged until
the Battalion was relieved the following night.
Darkness brought a welcome relief from the harassing machine gun fire
and the accurate sniping which had caused so many casualties during
the day. Though heavy, casualties had not been sufficiently high to
interfere seriously with the efficiency of the Battalion. C and D
Companies combined had lost nearly 30 per cent. of their men, and A and
B Companies about 20 per cent. These losses were, to a certain extent,
made good by the temporary incorporation of numbers of stragglers.
The men settled down for the night as best they could, tired out with
their efforts of the day. Every officer and man was covered with mud
from head to foot, and his clothes were thoroughly soaked with water.
In these circumstances little comfort could be hoped for, especially
as the Battalion failed to get in touch with the ration convoy. The
night was very cold. Patrols were pushed out to maintain contact with
the enemy, and these found the pill-boxes on Belle Vue Spur and the
neighbourhood of Wolf Copse still held. One H.Q. scout unfortunately
was captured by the enemy while out on patrol; he had become separated
from the man he was working with, owing to the darkness and the very
broken nature of the country. Suddenly he found himself right on the
top of an enemy post; a bullet shattered one of his arms and paralysed
his power of resistance, and, though he tried to run for it, he was
easily taken.[12]
Throughout the day the enemy made no attempt to counter-attack,
contenting himself by harassing the exposed British troops with his
fire. About 7-0 p.m., a report that the Germans were massing for the
attack caused some excitement, but it turned out to be incorrect.
Towards midnight the Battalion was surprised by the opening of a heavy
shrapnel barrage on its front. As everything was quiet at the time,
no call for help had been sent back, and no operation was known to be
in progress, the cause of this remained a mystery for some time. It
was cleared up about 1-45 a.m. by the arrival of an order, from the
146th Infantry Brigade, to mop up a considerable area of ground on the
front. The barrage had been intended to cover this operation, but so
late did the order arrive, that it had long been over and nothing could
be done.
The dawn of October 10th was ushered in by the customary German “hate,”
but after that things became fairly quiet for a time. A change was
made in the Battalion dispositions at dawn. B Company was moved back
to the vicinity of 146th Infantry Brigade H.Q. where it became Brigade
Reserve. A Company thereupon withdrew one platoon from the line to form
a company reserve.
Little of importance happened during October 10th. Very accurate
sniping from Wolf Copse, as on the previous day, caused much
inconvenience and several casualties. At various times during the day
numbers of the enemy were seen on the Belle Vue Spur, and artillery
fire was directed on them. About 4-0 p.m., Battalion H.Q. was subjected
to a heavy and very accurate shelling. This was believed to be a result
of the laying out of the Battalion ground sign, which had been called
for by a contact aeroplane; it was thought that this had been seen by
enemy planes which were also up at the time.
Word had been received during the day that the Battalion was to be
relieved that night by a New Zealand Battalion. About 10-0 p.m., these
troops began to arrive. They did not take over in the ordinary way, but
preferred to select their own position and dig an entirely new line
for themselves. So, as the New Zealanders marched in and took up their
position, the Battalion marched out. Relief was complete about midnight.
The orders issued to companies were that they should make for the
Wieltje Road and follow it until they met the guides who were being
sent up from the transport lines. All that night these guides were out
on the road, directing men to X Camp, St. Jean, where they were to rest
and where hot tea and rum awaited them. From about midnight until long
after dawn, the troops of the 49th Division streamed down the road,
some singly, some in groups of two or three, others in formed bodies.
It is doubtful whether, before or since, the Battalion has been more
thoroughly done up. After living in that waste of mud and water, with
practically no shelter, for nearly a week, it had carried out an attack
over the same appalling ground, and then consolidated and held its
position in the face of violent artillery and machine gun fire.
The attack of October 9th had not been a complete success, but a very
important advance had been made. The first objective had been carried
practically in its entirety, and, in front of Peter Pan, a new line had
been established some distance beyond it. But the second objective had
not been reached. The most important success was the establishment of a
line, well beyond the Ravebeke, along the whole front. This stream was
a most serious obstacle, and the consolidation of a line to the east of
it provided a good jumping-off ground for the troops who were to attack
later on the same front. The difficulty of the operation may be judged
from the fact that an attack launched from the new line a few days
later by the New Zealanders failed to gain an inch of ground, and that
the second objective of the 49th Division on October 9th was only just
reached three weeks later by the Canadians, who had come up quite fresh
to make the attack. The operation of October 9th was one of the first
of that awful series of attacks on the Passchendaele Ridge which failed
to obtain a full measure of success owing, not to the opposition of the
enemy, but to the appalling condition of the ground.
That the work done by the 49th Division was appreciated by the higher
commands is shown by the following message from the G.O.C., 2nd Anzac
Corps, under whom the Division had fought:--
“Following message has been received by me from Army Commander,
begins:--
‘Please accept and convey to all your troops engaged to-day my
heartiest congratulations on success achieved.
General Plumer.’
The Commander-in-Chief also called here to-day and wished
specially to congratulate you and your Division.
I wish also to add my high appreciation and thanks to you
personally and to all ranks of your Division on having done so
much under such arduous and trying conditions.
General Godley.”
The G.O.C., 49th Division, in a Special Order of the Day, wrote
“Nothing could be finer than what the Division accomplished.” The
G.O.C., 146th Infantry Brigade, in a personal letter to the Commanding
Officer, said “I cannot thank you enough for the cheerful and thorough
way in which all my orders were carried out.” While the Battalion’s
own Brigadier, referring to the response of his troops when ordered up
to support the other Brigades of the Division, said “Officers and men,
though thoroughly exhausted, at once forgot their fatigue and advanced
through the enemy barrage in the most gallant style worthy of the best
traditions of the Army.”
[Illustration: _Belle Vue Spur 9.10.17._]
(_c_) Rest and Reorganisation.
Though a welcome change after the hardships of the Belle Vue Spur, X
Camp, St. Jean, was far from a paradise. There were very few tents,
and most of the men had to be content with small bivouacs or covered
holes in the ground. The camp had been pitched hurriedly by a New
Zealand battalion only a day or two before, and there had not been time
to perfect it. It was not shelled, though the enemy paid attention to
some neighbouring areas, and on several occasions his bombing planes
were not far off at night. But the camp was made something like a home,
and great regret was felt, and expressed, when a neighbouring Corps
found that the Battalion was on the wrong side of the road and orders
to move were issued. There was no other suitable camping site in the
district. The best that could be found was a small field, pitted with
shell holes, and covered with very long grass and rank weeds, all
absolutely sodden by the rain. Into this field the tents and bivouacs
were moved and repitched in the pouring rain, the men freely expressing
their opinions, in language more forcible than polite, and the officers
thoroughly sympathising.
On October 12th the New Zealand Division made its attack on the Belle
Vue Spur, with the result already mentioned. One of the worst features
of October 9th had been the difficulty of getting the wounded away;
there had been far too few stretcher-bearers, and many of the wounded
had suffered greatly by their long exposure. For the New Zealand attack
each battalion of the 147th Infantry Brigade was asked to provide
200 men to assist in evacuating the wounded, and volunteers were
readily forthcoming from among the men who had themselves learned the
awful conditions. For two days these men worked in the battle area,
fortunately with practically no casualties, and the gratitude of the
New Zealand Division is shown by the following letter, written by its
Divisional Commander to the G.O.C., 147th Infantry Brigade:--
“My Dear General,
Please express to the officers and men of your Brigade who came
forward to assist in getting in the wounded, the very hearty
thanks of myself and Staff, and the whole Division.
I have heard the warmest expressions of praise for the way in
which your men volunteered to come forward and undertake what
was certainly a very exhausting and maybe dangerous task.
I hope they did not suffer casualties, or if so, that they were
light. The New Zealand Division will not forget the debt they
owe to the officers and men of the 147th Brigade.
A. W. Russell, Major-General.”
On October 16th the Battalion moved back to a hutment camp south-east
of Vlamertinghe and here there was more comfort, though the huts were
very crowded. In fact, at this time, there was not nearly enough
accommodation, around and behind Ypres, for the enormous number
of troops which had been brought up to take part in the battle of
Passchendaele. Some training was done during the week the Battalion
was there, particularly of specialists, the loss of whom had been very
heavy in the recent battle. There, too, Major-General E. M. Perceval,
C.B., D.S.O., said farewell to the 147th Infantry Brigade. He had
commanded the 49th Division for more than two years, but was now
returning to England to take up a home command. The Brigade paraded in
hollow square and was inspected by the General, who afterwards thanked
the men for all they had done and wished them farewell. The Brigade
then marched past. Major-General N. J. G. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., who
had formerly commanded an infantry brigade of the 50th Division,
succeeded to the command of the 49th Division.
The Battalion was now sent well back for a period of rest and
reorganisation. On October 24th it moved by motor bus to tents near
Winnizeele, a village famous for a restaurant which catered specially
for officers. The camp site was not a good one, but three days later
the Battalion moved to billets near Steenvoorde, where it remained for
about a fortnight. Time was spent in reorganisation and training. Some
interesting tactical schemes were worked out, one of which was attended
by the new Divisional Commander. This was the first time the men had
met him, though they were to see much of him in the future. He turned
out to be a man of exceptional energy, who spent much of his time in
the line, and seemed to have a peculiar preference for visiting the
hottest places he could find. Here some drafts, both of officers and
other ranks, joined the Battalion; but the heavy casualties sustained
at Nieuport and the Belle Vue Spur were not made good until the
reorganisation of the British Expeditionary Force at the beginning
of the next year. The arrangement of billets did not allow of much
social relaxation being organised. B Company, who occupied a large and
comfortable barn, held a very successful concert, chiefly noteworthy
for the dancing of a certain “Miss” Hey, who there made her début in
that role. Another feature was the lecturing of the Area Commandant
of Steenvoorde, whose comments on the strategy of the war were most
interesting, even though his prophecies were sometimes rather wide of
the mark.
On November 9th the Battalion moved by motor bus to the neighbourhood
of Ypres where it was to remain, save for one period of rest, until the
last great enemy offensive was launched in the following spring.