THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN--GALLANT SERVICE OF PERRIN'S AND KERSHAW'S
BRIGADES--HAMPTON'S CAVALRY AT BRANDY STATION.
The spring had gone and summer had opened in Virginia, when, seeing
no indications of aggressive movement on the part of the Federal army
lying opposite him on the Rappahannock, General Lee determined to draw
it from his Fredericksburg base and compel it to follow his movements
or attack him in position. General Lee's plan involved the movement of
his army by its left to Orange and Culpeper, the crossing of the Blue
ridge into the Shenandoah valley, the crossing of the Potomac, and
the march of his whole force directly on Harrisburg, the capital of
Pennsylvania.
The army of Northern Virginia was now organized in three corps,
commanded by Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Ewell and A. P. Hill.
Longstreet's division commanders were McLaws, Pickett and Hood;
Ewell's, Early, Rodes and Johnson; A. P. Hill's, Anderson, Heth and
Pender. Still in the division of the gallant McLaws, under Longstreet,
associated with Barksdale's Mississippians and Semmes' and Wofford's
Georgians, was the South Carolina brigade of Gen. J. B. Kershaw.
Also in the First corps were the batteries of Capt. Hugh R. Garden
(Palmetto) and Captain Bachman's German artillery, with Hood's
division, and the Brooks (Rhett's) battery, Lieut. S. C. Gilbert,
in Alexander's battalion of Walton's reserve artillery. Gen. Micah
Jenkins' South Carolina brigade, of Pickett's division, Longstreet's
corps, was detached for special duty on the Blackwater, in southeast
Virginia, under Maj.-Gen. D. H. Hill. In the Third army corps (A. P.
Hill's), South Carolina was represented by McGowan's brigade, Hill's
light division--North Carolinians, South Carolinians and Georgians--now
being commanded by Pender, and the South Carolina brigade by Col. Abner
Perrin. Maj. C. W. McCreary commanded the First regiment, Capt. W. M.
Hadden the First rifles, Capt. J. L. Miller the Twelfth, Lieut.-Col.
B. T. Brockman the Thirteenth, and Lieut.-Col. J. N. Brown the
Fourteenth. With the Third corps also was the Pee Dee artillery, Lieut.
W. E. Zimmerman. In the cavalry corps of Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart,
Brig.-Gen. Wade Hampton commanded his brigade, including the First and
Second South Carolina cavalry, and Capt. J. F. Hart's South Carolina
battery was part of the horse artillery under Major Beckham.
Thus it will be seen that there were two infantry brigades, five
batteries, and two cavalry regiments of South Carolina troops in the
army of General Lee on this march into Pennsylvania. Evans' and Gist's
brigades were in Mississippi with General Johnston, and Manigault's
brigade was with General Bragg's army at Chattanooga. Attached to
those commands or serving in the West, were the batteries of Captains
Ferguson, Culpeper, Waties and Macbeth. Most of the South Carolina
troops of all arms were engaged in the defense of Charleston and the
coast of the State, then being attacked by a powerful fleet and a
Federal army.
On June 7th the corps of Longstreet and Ewell, with the main body
of the cavalry under Stuart, were encamped around Culpeper Court
House; Hill's corps being in position at Fredericksburg in front of
General Hooker. The latter, vaguely aware of a campaign at hand, sent
his cavalry, under General Pleasanton, up the Rappahannock to gain
information. Pleasanton crossed his cavalry, supported by infantry
and artillery, at Kelly's and Beverly fords, and advanced upon Brandy
Station, one column approaching that railroad station from the
northeast (Beverly ford), the other from the southeast (Kelly's ford).
The road from Beverly ford, before reaching the station, passes over a
high ridge on which is the hamlet of Fleetwood. On the morning of June
9th, Jones' cavalry brigade was covering Beverly ford, and Robertson's,
Kelly's ford. The Federal columns drove off the pickets at the two
fords and marched directly to the attack. Before Robertson's brigade
had assembled, General Stuart sent the First South Carolina, Col.
John L. Black, down the Kelly's Ford road to check the advance until
Robertson could take position. This duty was well done by the First,
until relieved by Robertson, when the regiment went into battle on the
Beverly road with Hampton. As soon as the firing in front was heard,
General Hampton mounted his brigade and moved from his camp rapidly
through the station and over the Fleetwood ridge to support Jones on
the Beverly Ford road, leaving the Second South Carolina, Col. M. C.
Butler, to guard the station. Throwing his brigade immediately into
action on the right of General Jones, and in support, the division,
after severe fighting, drove the column of attack back. At this
juncture the Federal force which moved up the Kelly's Ford road had
reached the railroad and was taking possession of the Fleetwood ridge
in rear of the engagement on the Beverly Ford road. General Stuart
promptly ordered his brigades to concentrate upon this, the main
attacking force, and the battle followed for the possession of the
ridge. The brigades of Hampton, Jones and W. H. F. Lee by repeated
charges, front and flank, swept the hill, captured the artillery which
had been placed on its summit, and drove the enemy in full retreat
for the river. His strong infantry and artillery support checked the
pursuit and covered his crossing. The First South Carolina lost 3
killed and 9 wounded, among the latter the gallant Captains Robin Ap C.
Jones and J. R. P. Fox.
Meanwhile the Second South Carolina had been fighting, single-handed,
an unequal battle on the road running from the station to Stevensburg,
5 or 6 miles south, and beyond that place on the road leading to
Kelly's ford. A column of cavalry, with artillery, had advanced from
Kelly's toward Stevensburg with the evident intention of moving up from
that place to the support of the attack at Fleetwood, and if it had
reached the field of battle in the rear of Stuart, might have turned
the day in Pleasanton's favor. But, being advised of this menacing
movement, General Stuart sent Colonel Butler's regiment, 220 strong,
down the Stevensburg road to meet and check it. Leading the advance of
Butler's regiment, Lieut.-Col. Frank Hampton met and drove back the
Federal advance beyond Stevensburg. Then Butler formed his command
across and to the left of the road at Doggett's house, about 1½ miles
beyond Stevensburg, and stood ready to dispute the advance of the main
body of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Hampton was charged with the
defense of the road, with a few sharpshooters and one company, Capt. T.
H. Clark's. Here he held the right for a half hour, while Butler and
Major Lipscomb resisted the attack in the center and on the left, the
line of defense being nearly a mile in length.
Massing his squadrons, the enemy charged the right, and to break the
force of the onset, Lieutenant-Colonel Hampton, with 36 men, dashed
forward at the head of his column. He fell mortally wounded, and the
onrushing squadrons scattered his little band. Butler retired his
center and left up the Brandy Station road and took post on an eminence
at Beckham's house, where his command was reinforced by a squadron from
the Fourth Virginia, sent by General Stuart and led by Capt. W. D.
Farley of his staff. While holding this position a shell from one of
the enemy's batteries passed through Colonel Butler's horse, shattered
his leg below the knee, and mortally wounded the gallant Farley. The
artillery fire was sweeping the road and the hill, and the Federal
squadrons were forming to charge, when the men offered to bear Farley
off. Smiling, with grateful thanks, he told them to stand to their
rifles, and to carry Butler out of the fire. Then, with expressions of
resignation to his fate and devotion to his country, he expired on the
field. Major Lipscomb took command and drew off slowly toward Brandy
Station. But the battle had been won for the Confederates at Fleetwood,
and Lipscomb soon had opportunity to advance and drive the Federals
before him in the general retreat, until he posted his pickets at the
river. In this famous cavalry battle Stuart captured 375 prisoners, 3
pieces of artillery and several colors.
A few days later, being satisfied that General Lee was beyond his
right flank in force, Hooker began moving his army to keep between
Lee and Washington. Meanwhile Ewell marched upon Milroy at Winchester
in the Valley, attacked and captured 4,000 prisoners and 28 pieces of
artillery, and cleared the Valley for Lee's advance.
General Lee now ordered up A. P. Hill's corps to join in the march for
the Potomac. Kershaw's brigade, with McLaws, marched to Sperryville on
the 16th, thence to Ashby's gap, where Rice's battalion rejoined the
command, crossed the Shenandoah at Berry's ford on the 20th, recrossed
and formed line of battle to meet a threatened attack on the 21st, and
then continuing, crossed the Potomac on the 26th and encamped near
Williamsport. Reaching Chambersburg, Pa., on the 28th of June, they
remained there until the 30th, then marching to Fayetteville. McGowan's
brigade, with A. P. Hill, also occupied a position near Fayetteville on
the 29th. Stuart's cavalry, moving on Longstreet's right flank, left
General Hampton on the Rappahannock to watch the enemy. On the 17th,
Fitzhugh Lee's brigade made a splendid fight at Aldie, but Pleasanton
occupied that place with a large force, and Stuart called Hampton
and his other scattered commands together at Middleburg. Here he was
attacked by cavalry, infantry and artillery on the 21st. Hampton and
Jones received the attack gallantly, but were compelled to retire.
Here, said General Stuart in his report, "one of the pieces of Captain
Hart's battery of horse artillery had the axle broken by one of the
enemy's shot, and the piece had to be abandoned, which is the first
piece of my horse artillery that has ever fallen into the enemy's
hands. Its full value was paid in the slaughter it made in the enemy's
ranks, and it was well sold." The fight was renewed at Upperville,
before Ashby's gap, and there, said Stuart, "General Hampton's brigade
participated largely and in a brilliant manner." On the night of the
24th, Stuart's brigades rendezvoused secretly near Salem Depot, and
started toward Washington, encountering Hancock's corps marching
north, at Gum Spring. When Hancock had passed they moved to Fairfax
Station, where Hampton's advance had a brisk fight on the 27th. Stuart
was now between the Federal army and Washington, and Hampton, in
advance, crossed the Potomac near Dranesville, and on the 28th started
northward. At Rockville a Federal army train, about 8 miles long, was
captured, and the subsequent movements of the cavalry were embarrassed
by the attempt to convoy the train to Lee's army.
Ewell, meanwhile, taking a more easterly route than Longstreet and
Hill, on the 27th camped at Carlisle, Early's division of his corps
marching to York, and menacing the Pennsylvania capital. General Hooker
did not cross the Potomac until the 25th and 26th, and on the 28th
General Meade was placed in command of the Federal army.
On the 28th, General Lee learned from a scout that the Federal army
was marching to Frederick and was in part located at the base of
South mountain, and he changed his design of marching up the valley
to Harrisburg and ordered Hill eastward toward Gettysburg. Heth took
the lead, and the South Carolinians, with Pender, reached Cashtown, 8
miles from Gettysburg, on the last day of June.
On that day both Meade and Lee were marching unconsciously to the point
at which they were to fight the great and decisive battle of the year,
if not of the war. It is interesting to note that the Southern general
was concentrating from the north and the Northern general from the
south. Ewell's corps was approaching the battlefield from Carlisle and
York, and Hill's from Chambersburg. Before the close of the day Hill
learned that Pettigrew's North Carolinians, of Heth's division, in
advance near Gettysburg, had met a strong cavalry force, before which
they withdrew without battle.
Early on the morning of July 1st, General Hill pushed Heth's division
forward, followed closely by Pender's. With Heth was the Pee Dee
artillery, in Pegram's battalion; with Pender, the battalion of
McIntosh. About 10 a. m. Heth met Buford's Federal cavalry and drove it
back across Willoughby run, where the cavalry was promptly supported
by the First corps of Meade's army, three divisions, under General
Reynolds. General Hill deployed Heth's division on the right and left
of the road, Pender's in support, and the battle became severe.
Pushing his battle forward, Hill was checked at the wooded ridge known
as Seminary hill, where the First corps with artillery was strongly
posted. Putting his artillery in position Heth gallantly charged the
heights with his four brigades, and made so strong a battle that
General Howard, with part of the Eleventh corps, reinforced the line
of the First. At this juncture Ewell's two divisions came in on
Hill's left, and the latter ordered Pender forward to relieve Heth.
Ewell's line was at right angles to that of Hill's, and both lines
now swept onward with irresistible force. Pender's advance was with
Thomas' Georgians on the left of the road, and Lane, Scales and Perrin
(McGowan's brigade) on the right. The combined assault of Pender and
Ewell's divisions swept the hill and routed the two Federal corps,
driving them through the streets, capturing 5,000 prisoners, exclusive
of the wounded, several colors and 3 pieces of artillery.
Reporting the advance of Pender, General Hill said: "The rout of the
enemy was complete, Perrin's brigade taking position after position of
the enemy and driving him through the town of Gettysburg." This special
mention by the corps commander of McGowan's veterans, under Perrin,
was well deserved. Never was a brigade better handled in battle, and
never did regiments respond more steadily to every order for advance
in direct charge, or change of front under fire. The Fourteenth, under
Lieut.-Col. J. N. Brown and Maj. Edward Croft, and the First, under
Maj. C. W. McCreary, on the right of the brigade; and the Twelfth,
under Col. J. L. Miller, and the Thirteenth, under Lieut.-Col. B. T.
Brockman, on the left, stormed the stone fences on either side of
the Lutheran college on Seminary hill and routed their foe from this
strong position, capturing hundreds of prisoners, 2 field pieces and
a number of caissons, and following the routed columns through the
town of Gettysburg. The colors of the First South Carolina were the
first Confederate standard raised in the town as Hill's troops were
entering it. Late in the afternoon, when Perrin drew up his brigade for
rest on the south of the town, a battery which had been driven before
Perrin took position on Cemetery hill and fired the first shot from
that memorable eminence at the South Carolina brigade. Colonel Perrin
reported this fact, and stated that he had watched the battery on its
retreat as it was pursued through the town, and saw it take position on
the hill. But the loss of the brigade did not fall short of 500. Every
one of the color sergeants taken into the fight was killed in front of
his regiment.
Perrin was in position in front of Cemetery hill on the 2d, the Federal
sharpshooters in his front on the Emmitsburg road. In the afternoon
he was ordered by General Pender to push his skirmishers to the
road. Capt. William T. Haskell, of the First regiment, commanding a
select battalion of sharpshooters, was intrusted with this duty, and
Major McCreary led the First regiment, now only about 100 strong, in
Haskell's support. The gallant Haskell threw his sharpshooters against
the Federal skirmishers, captured the road and drove his opponents up
the slope and under their guns. While putting his men in favorable
positions on the road, Haskell received a mortal wound and expired on
the field. His fall was felt to be a serious loss to the whole brigade.
South Carolina gave no better, purer, nobler man as a sacrifice to the
cause of Southern independence at Gettysburg.
Perrin held the skirmish line Haskell had won, and on the 3d threw
forward the Fourteenth to maintain it against a strong attack. His
sharpshooters from the road commanded the cannoneers on the hill,
and a desperate effort was made to drive them off the road. In the
fight of the Fourteenth regiment to sustain the sharpshooters,
Lieutenant-Colonel Brown and Major Croft were severely wounded. The
skirmish line was held until the massing of artillery and infantry on
the crest made it no longer tenable.
The total loss in McGowan's brigade at Gettysburg was 100 killed and
477 wounded. Including the loss on the retreat, the total was 654.
Orr's Rifles, left to guard the trains, did not participate in the
battle of the 1st, or the affairs of the 2d and 3d, and lost but few
men. The heaviest casualties fell on the Fourteenth, two-thirds of its
men being killed or wounded in the three days' engagements. Colonel
Perrin mentioned particularly the conduct of the following officers:
Major Croft, of the Fourteenth; Maj. I. F. Hunt, of the Thirteenth;
Maj. E. F. Bookter, of the Twelfth; Capts. W. P. Shooter, T. P. Alston
and A. P. Butler, of the First; Capts. James Boatwright and E. Cowan,
of the Fourteenth, and Capt. Frank Clyburn, of the Twelfth.
Among the gallant dead were Lieut. A. W. Poag, of the Twelfth; Capt.
W. P. Conner and Lieuts. W. C. McNinch and D. M. Leitzsey, of the
Thirteenth; and Lieutenant Crooker, of the Fourteenth. Lieut. J. F. J.
Caldwell, of the First, whose graphic and instructive history of the
brigade has aided the writer materially, was among a host of wounded
line officers.
The break of day on the 2d revealed the army of General Meade in line
of battle on the heights south of Gettysburg, running north and south
with the Emmitsburg road in his front. General Lee thus described
his position: "The enemy occupied a strong position, with his right
upon two commanding elevations adjacent to each other, one southeast
(Culp's hill), and the other (Cemetery hill) immediately south of the
town which lay at its base. His line extended thence upon the high
ground along the Emmitsburg road, with a steep ridge in rear, which
was also occupied. This ridge was difficult of ascent, particularly
the two hills above mentioned as forming its northern extremity, and
a third at the other end (Little Round Top) on which the enemy's left
rested. Numerous stone and rail fences along the slope served to afford
protection to his troops and impede our advance. In his front the
ground was undulating and generally open for about three-quarters of a
mile."
Immediately south of the Federal left, as described by General Lee, was
a still higher hill, known as Round Top, which commanded the whole left
of the Federal position, and was not occupied early on the morning of
the 2d. To attack a superior force in a position so strong presented
a difficult problem for solution, and gave the Confederate general
serious pause. He had Ewell's corps on his left, confronting Culp's and
Cemetery hills, and facing southwest and south; and Hill's corps on
the right facing east. McLaws' and Hood's divisions of Longstreet's
corps camped within 4 miles of the battlefield on the night of the 1st,
left camp at sunrise on the 2d, and marched to the right of Hill's
corps. The Third division of Longstreet's corps (Pickett's) was left
to guard the trains at Chambersburg, and did not reach the vicinity of
Gettysburg until the afternoon of the 2d. General Longstreet received
his definite orders for position and attack about 11 o'clock, and
by 3:30 p. m. McLaws was in position opposite the enemy's advanced
position at the peach orchard, with Hood on his right facing the Round
Tops. General Lee's order of attack directed that his right (Hood and
McLaws), strongly supported by artillery, should envelop and drive in
the Federal left; that simultaneously with this attack against the
Federal left, the Confederate left should storm Culp's and Cemetery
hills; and the Confederate center at the same time should so threaten
the Federal center as to prevent reinforcements to either Federal wing.
General Lee's plan of battle contemplated prompt movement, and concert
of action along his entire line. If these conditions, essential to
the success of the plan, had been given in its execution, the writer
believes that the battle of Gettysburg would have been won by General
Lee on July 2d by a victory as complete as Chancellorsville. They were
not given and the plan failed.
The actual fighting of the separate assaults was gallant and heroic,
and the resistance both steady and aggressive; the Federal position
along his main line being unmoved by the assaults. On the Confederate
right two divisions of Longstreet's corps made the advance at 4 p.
m. (Hood's and McLaws'), supported by four of the five brigades of
Anderson's division from the center. Hood on the extreme right, next
McLaws, and then Anderson, were fighting forward and struggling to
storm the last position of the Federal army on the heights, but these
divisions were fighting it out without the simultaneous battle which
Lee had ordered on the left.
They had carried the stone walls and numerous hills and woods, the
peach orchard, the great wheat-field and rocky bluffs in their front,
and were on the slopes of the Round Tops and the heights north of them,
but still the battle had not opened on the left. There was not a man to
reinforce Longstreet's line, and the enemy in his front was reinforced
by both infantry and artillery. Hours passed (General Lee said two,
General Longstreet four and Gen. Edward Johnson said it was dark)
before General Ewell's left division moved to the attack on Culp's
hill, which, after some time, perhaps another hour, was followed by the
attack on the north face of Cemetery hill. Edward Johnson's division
made the attack on Culp's hill and Early's division on Cemetery hill.
The Third division of Ewell's corps (Rodes') did not attack at all.
Anderson's (of Hill's corps) was the only one of the three center
divisions that attacked from the center.
It is evident from these statements, which are made from a careful
study of the official reports, that the prime conditions of success,
concert of action and simultaneous movement, were not given the plan
of the commanding general. Edward Johnson's three brigades did not
begin the actual attack on Culp's hill until dusk, according to his
own and General Ewell's statements. General Early, with two of his
four brigades, Hays' and Hoke's, attacked Cemetery hill still later.
These two brigades carried the height and actually took the enemy's
batteries, but were unable without support to hold what they had
gained. It is in the report of Rodes, who did not advance at all, on
account of darkness, that particular mention is made of his having
observed the enemy on Cemetery hill, during the afternoon, withdrawing
artillery and infantry to reinforce against the attack then in progress
on the Confederate right. The troops of the Federal army in position
at Culp's and Cemetery hills were those beaten and routed on the 1st,
and considering the success gained by the brigades of Hays and Avery,
there can be no reasonable doubt that with the immediate support of
Rodes, the attack being made at the earlier hour ordered, Cemetery hill
would have fallen, and with its fall the Confederate left and center
would have driven the Federal right in confusion and Gettysburg would
have been added to the long list of General Lee's great victories. The
Comte de Paris, in his review of Gettysburg, has truly said, that "the
way in which the fights of the 2d of July were directed does not show
the same co-ordination which insured the success of the Southern arms
at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville."
But it is time that our attention was directed to the South Carolina
brigade, under Kershaw, operating with McLaws, in Longstreet's attack,
and the batteries of Bachman and Garden, operating with Hood, on the
extreme right of Longstreet's battle.
Kershaw formed the right of McLaws' division and Barksdale his left,
Semmes behind Kershaw and Wofford behind Barksdale. In front of
Barksdale was the peach orchard, 500 yards distant and in front of
Kershaw and on a line with the orchard a stone house, stone barn and
stone fence. The peach orchard was on an eminence, and was held by
infantry and a battery. Beyond the stone house was another eminence,
defended by a battery, and beyond this battery a stony hill, wooded and
rough. This stony hill was in front of Kershaw's center, and beyond the
hill opened the great wheat-field which spread forward to the slopes
of the Federal main position. Barksdale moved against the orchard and
Kershaw against the stony hill and the battery in front of it. Before
moving General Kershaw had detached the Fifteenth South Carolina,
Colonel De Saussure, to support a battery between his right and Hood's
left.
Marching forward under the fire of canister from the battery in his
front, and the infantry fire from the south side of the peach orchard,
the Carolina brigade swept past the battery and reached the hill,
Barksdale clearing the orchard and its battery on Kershaw's left.
Taking possession of the rocky hill, the enemy at once advanced upon it
over the wheat-field in two lines of battle.
As the brigade stood on the rocky hill to receive the advance, the
regiments were ranged, from right to left: The Seventh, Colonel Aiken;
Third, Maj. R. C. Maffett; Second, Colonel Kennedy; Third battalion,
Lieut.-Col. W. G. Rice; Eighth, Colonel Henagan. The Fifteenth, Colonel
DeSaussure, was still in battle in support of artillery between
Kershaw and Hood. Here, at the rocky hill, was the battle ground of
the brigade. The Eighth, Third battalion and Second held their ground
and beat back the attacks coming again and again against them. Moving
around Kershaw's right, before Semmes could come to his support, a
large force assaulted the Seventh and pushed back its right. The Third
held its ground until the Seventh was crowded back at right angles,
and then changed its front to support the Seventh. A part of Semmes'
brigade came up, but the enemy were so far in rear of Kershaw's right
as to cut off the support. Surrounding his right, the attacking force
drove back the Seventh, and the battle on Kershaw's right was with the
Third and Seventh and one of Semmes' regiments at close quarters among
the rocks and trees of the hill-crest and sides.
Meanwhile the left was holding fast. On came Wofford toward the
conflict, and on the right Semmes' other regiments and the Fifteenth
South Carolina. Sweeping up to the battle everything gave way before
the charge, and joining Wofford and Semmes, Kershaw's line moved
forward, the advance sweeping the whole wheat-field and beyond to the
foot of the mountain. Night came on, and the brigades of McLaws were
put on the hill along the positions gained by the battle.
General Kershaw's losses were severe and grievous. The brave and able
Colonel De Saussure, of the Fifteenth, and Major McLeod, of the Eighth,
gallant in fight and estimable in life, had both fallen; Colonel De
Saussure killed on the field and Major McLeod mortally wounded. Among
the wounded were Colonel Kennedy of the Second, Lieut.-Col. Elbert
Bland of the Seventh, and Maj. D. B. Miller of the Third battalion. The
writer regrets that he can find no list of the line officers killed and
wounded in the brigade at Gettysburg. The brigade lost 115 killed, 483
wounded and 32 missing, making a total of 630. Bachman's and Garden's
batteries with Hood's right, and Rhett's battery, under Lieutenant
Gilbert, were in action during the day, but there are no reports at
hand of their casualties.
If the problem presented to the mind of General Lee on the morning
of the 2d, as he saw his army, inferior in numbers and equipment,
confronted by the army of General Meade on the heights of Gettysburg,
was one which gave him the deepest concern, how much more serious was
the situation on the morning of the 3d! General Longstreet's battle
on the right had driven the Federal left to the crests, and the
Confederate infantry and artillery of that wing were occupying the
positions which the Federal forces had held on the morning of the 2d.
But now the Federal army was intrenched on those heights, with the
Round Tops bristling with artillery and Cemetery hill and Culp's hill
crowned by batteries, seven corps behind breastworks of stone or earth,
and the slopes in front guarded by advanced lines lying behind fences
or covered in the woods.
There is no record of a council of war. Longstreet, second in command,
continued to favor a movement around the Federal left; but General Lee
disapproved, and resolutely determined to attack the Federal citadel,
confident that the men who had swept Hooker's army from the heights of
Chancellorsville, if properly supported, could carry victory to the
heights of Gettysburg.
He selected the Federal left center as the point of attack; ordered,
as on the 2d, concert of action from both wings of his army, and
organized his assaulting column of 15,000 men. Stuart's cavalry
had come up on his left and confronted the main body of Meade's
cavalry. The situation on his extreme right was more serious than the
Confederate general realized. This is evident from the reports. The
Round Tops were unassailable by the force at Longstreet's command, and
a division of cavalry, Farnsworth's and Merritt's brigades, was in
position on the right rear, confronted by a single regiment, the First
South Carolina cavalry, Bachman's South Carolina battery, and three
regiments of Anderson's Georgia brigade. Anderson's regiments were at
right angles to Longstreet's line, and Colonel Black's cavalry was on
Anderson's right flank. Black had only about 100 men in his regiment.
In Longstreet's immediate front the situation was such that there was
nothing to do but stand on the defensive. He was weaker in numbers on
the 3d than he was on the morning of the 2d, and his enemy was stronger
by reinforcements and the occupation of the greater of the two Round
Tops. If, however, the assaulting column of 15,000 could break the
center, the wings of General Meade's army would be so shaken that both
Longstreet and Ewell could attack with good hope of success, and Lee
was fixed in his purpose.
The column of attack was made up of the divisions of Pickett and
Pettigrew (Heth's), to be supported by Wilcox and the brigades of Lane
and Scales under Trimble.
All the available artillery of Hill's and Longstreet's corps was put in
position by Col. E. P. Alexander, and at 1 o'clock General Longstreet
ordered the batteries to open. For two hours more than 200 cannon were
in action across the plain against Federal and Confederate. At 3 the
assaulting column moved out from cover and down toward the Emmitsburg
road, which ran between the two armies, and at the point of attack
was held by the Federal pickets. The Confederate batteries had ceased
firing and could give no more support, for their ammunition was nearly
exhausted, no supply near at hand, and it was essential to reserve the
supply in the chests.
All the reports of the advance concur in the statement that the troops
moved over the field and into the fire of the enemy's batteries in
beautiful order. Coming under the canister fire of the batteries on the
crest, the ranks began rapidly to thin and officers to fall, but the
advance was steady. General Trimble, riding with his line, then 100
yards in rear of Pettigrew, said: "Notwithstanding the losses as we
advanced, the men marched with the deliberation and accuracy of men on
drill. I observed the same in Pettigrew's line."
The enemy's batteries were on the crest. Below them 30 or 40 yards on
the slope, and running almost parallel with the crest, was a stone
wall, breast high. Behind this wall lay the Federal first line. Below
this line, some hundred yards, concealed in the undergrowth, lay his
advance line. Beyond it, at the road, ran his picket line. Meeting
the pickets, they were immediately driven in, and Garnett and Kemper
marched against the advance line in the undergrowth. The resistance was
slight, prisoners were made, and the attack so vigorous and dashing
that the Federal line was driven in rout. But the enemy's batteries
opened with redoubled activity, and the fire from the stone wall
was galling. A battery on Little Round Top, enfilading the front of
the stone wall, and another from Cemetery hill, plunged their shell
into the ranks of Kemper and Garnett and raked the advancing line of
Armistead as it moved up in support.
Garnett led his brigade forward against the stone wall and got in
advance, and arrived within 50 yards, where the fire was so severe that
it checked his onset and he sent back to hurry up Kemper and Armistead.
Both these brigades were struggling through the withering fire, and
in a few moments were abreast with Garnett. At 25 yards from the wall
Garnett was shot from his horse. Kemper had fallen and Armistead had
been killed, but officers and men rushed for the wall and planted
their standards. The fighting at this line was desperate, and hand to
hand. But the conflict was too unequal to avail the gallant survivors
of Garnett and Kemper and Armistead. Of the three brigades scarcely a
picket line was left to grapple with the battle array of their foe.
The remnant gave up the fight and left the field. If Wilcox could have
reached the wall with his gallant Alabamians, the fight might have been
prolonged--it might have been successful. But to reach that stone wall
Wilcox must march through the fire that shot to pieces the brigades
of Kemper, Garnett and Armistead. General Wilcox says that he reached
the foot of the hill; that he could not see a man whom he was sent to
support; that he was subjected to such an artillery fire from front and
both flanks that he went back in search of a battery; that he could
find none; that returning to his brigade he regarded further advance
useless and ordered a retreat.
On the left, Pettigrew and Trimble carried their battle to the
Emmitsburg road and to the advanced line. Archer's brigade, on
Garnett's immediate left, had 13 color-bearers shot one after another
in gallant efforts to plant the colors of his five regiments on the
stone wall. The direction of the Federal line was oblique to the
general line of advance. Pettigrew's line was exposed longest to the
front and flank fire, and at the Emmitsburg road he had suffered more
severely than Pickett's brigades. When Pettigrew was yet 150 yards from
the Emmitsburg road, says General Trimble, who was about that distance
in his rear, "They seemed to sink into the earth from the tempest of
fire poured into them." Although wounded, Pettigrew led his line across
the road and against the first line, but his brigades were shattered
too badly to make organized assault further. Archer's brigade on his
right fought at the stone wall, as did Garnett's and Kemper's and
Armistead's, and suffered a like repulse. Officers and men from the
other brigades reached the wall and fought with desperate courage, and
died beside it, but the division in its organization was torn asunder
and shot to pieces by the time they reached and attacked the first
line. Trimble's brigades were as helpless for successful assault as
Pettigrew; and yet they moved on until within pistol shot of the main
line. As General Trimble followed his line back to Seminary ridge,
on horseback, under the increased fire of shell, grape and musketry,
he reported his wonder that any one could escape wounds or death.
And, indeed, but few did. The loss is reported for Garnett, Kemper,
Armistead and Wilcox, but there is no report given of the particular
loss of July 3d in Pettigrew's command, or Trimble's. The three
brigades of Pickett lost their brigadiers, nearly every field officer,
and nearly or quite 3,000 men.
With the failure of this attack, the great contest at Gettysburg was
decided. While it was in progress General Stuart, on the rear of
General Lee's left, was fighting a great cavalry battle with the main
body of General Meade's cavalry. Stuart had the brigades of Hampton,
Fitz Lee, Chambliss, W. H. F. Lee and Jenkins. In the battle much
of the fighting was at close quarters and with pistol and saber as
the charging lines came together. In one of these contacts General
Hampton was twice severely wounded. On the day previous, his having
been the first of General Stuart's brigades to reach the vicinity of
Gettysburg, he was just in time to meet a cavalry force moving from
Hunterstown directly against General Lee's unprotected left. After
a sharp engagement General Hampton defeated this force, and drove
it beyond reach. The arrival of Stuart on the 2d was a source of
infinite satisfaction to the Confederate commander; indeed, if he had
not come, the three divisions of General Pleasanton would have taken
complete possession of General Lee's communications, and the battle of
Gettysburg would have been a still greater disaster to the Southern
army.
After the defeat of the assaulting column, Meade was too cautious
to risk his lines against the army that had held the heights of
Fredericksburg. He stood resolutely on the defensive throughout the
4th of July. On that night General Lee began his masterly retreat to
the Potomac, which he crossed in the face of his enemy on the morning
of the 14th. Ewell's corps forded the river at Williamsport, Generals
Longstreet and Hill crossed by pontoon at Falling Waters, and by 1 p.
m. of the 14th the Gettysburg campaign was over.