SCIENCE AND RELIGION[8]

_Charles Proteus Steinmetz_

The problem of religion--that is, of the relations of man with the

supernatural, with God and immortality, with the soul, our personality

or the ego, and its existence or nonexistence after death--is the

greatest and deepest which ever confronted mankind. In the present state

of human knowledge, science can give no definite and final conclusions

on these subjects, because of the limitations inherent in science.

We must realize that all our knowledge and information and the entire

structure of science are ultimately derived from the perceptions of our

senses and thereby limited in the same manner and to the same extent as

our sense perceptions and our intellect are limited. The success or

failure of scientific achievement largely depends on the extent to which

we can abstract--that is, make our observations and conclusions

independent of the limitations of the human mind. But there are

limitations inherent in the human mind beyond which our intellect cannot

reach, and therefore science does not and cannot show us the world as it

actually is, with its true facts and laws, but only as it appears to us

within the inherent limitations of the human mind.

The greatest limitation of the human mind is that all its perceptions

are finite, and our intellect cannot grasp the conception of infinity.

The same limitation therefore applies to the world as it appears to our

reasoning intellect, and in the world of science there is no infinity,

and conceptions such as God and the immortality of the ego are beyond

the realm of empirical science. Science deals only with finite events in

finite time and space, and the farther we pass onward in space or time,

the more uncertain becomes the scientific reasoning, until, in trying to

approach the infinite, we are lost in the fog of unreasonable

contradiction, "beyond science"--that is, "transcendental".

Thus, we may never know and understand the infinite, whether in nature,

in the ultimate deductions from the laws of nature in time and in space,

or beyond nature, on such transcendental conceptions as God and

immortality. But we may approach these subjects as far as the

limitations of our mind permit, reach the border line beyond which we

cannot go, and so derive some understanding of how far these subjects

may appear nonexisting or unreasonable, merely because they are beyond

the limitations of our intellect.

There appear to me two promising directions of approach--first, from the

complex of thought and research, which in physics has culminated in the

theory of relativity; and, second, in a study of the gaps found in the

structure of empirical science and what they may teach us.

All events of nature occur in space and in time. Whatever we perceive,

whatever record we receive through our senses, always is attached to,

and contained in, space and time. But are space and time real existing

things? Have they an absolute reality outside of our mind, as a part or

framework of nature, as entities--that is, things that are? Or are they

merely a conception of the human mind, a form given by the character of

our mind to the events of nature--that is, to the hypothetical cause of

our sense perceptions? Kant, the greatest and most critical of all

philosophers, in his _Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der Reinen

Vernunft)_, concludes that space and time have no absolute existence,

but are categories--that is, forms in which the human mind conceives his

relation to nature. The same idea is expressed by the poet-philosopher

Goethe in his dramatic autobiography _Faust_ (in the second part), when

he refers to the "Mütter," to the marriage of Achilles and Helena

"outside of all time." It is found in ancient time. So Revelation speaks

of "there should be time no longer" (hoti chronos ouketi

estai).

The work of the great mathematicians of the nineteenth century--Gauss,

Riemann, Lobatschefsky, Bolyai--offered further evidence that space is

not an empirical deduction from nature, but a conception of the mind, by

showing that various forms of space can be conceived, differing from one

another and from the form in which the mind has cast the events of

nature (the "Euclidean" space). Finally, physical science, in the theory

of relativity, has deduced the same conclusions: space and time do not

exist in nature by themselves, as empty space and empty time, but their

existence is only due to things and events as they occur in nature. They

are relative in the relation between us and the events of nature, so

much so that they are not fixed and invariable in their properties, but

depend upon the observer and the conditions of observation.

We can get an idea of how utterly our perception of nature depends on

the particular form of our time conception by picturing to ourselves how

nature would look if our time perception were 100,000 times faster, or

100,000 times slower.

In the first case, with our sense perceptions 100,000 times faster, all

events in nature would appear to us 100,000 times slower. This would

then be a stationary and immovable world. The only motion which we could

see with our eyes would be that of the cannon ball, which would crawl

slowly along, at less than a snail's pace. The express train going at

sixty miles per hour would appear to stand still, and deliberate

experiment be required to discover its motion. By noting its position on

the track, and noting it again after a period of time as long as five

minutes appears to us now, we should find its position changed by three

inches. It would be a dangerous world, as there would be many

objects--not distinguishable to the senses from other harmless

objects--contact with which would be dangerous, even fatal; and one and

the same object (as the express train) might sometimes be harmless (when

at rest), sometimes dangerous (when in motion), without our senses being

able to see any difference.

On the other hand, with our sense perceptions 100,000 times slower, all

events in nature would appear to us to occur 100,000 times faster. There

would be little rest in nature, and we should see plants, and even

stones, move. We should observe, in a period of time not longer than a

minute or two appear to us now, a plant start from seed, grow up,

flower, bring fruit, and die. Sun and moon would be luminous bands

traversing the sky; day and night alternate seconds of light and

darkness. Much of nature, all moving things, would be invisible to us.

If I moved my arm, it would disappear, to reappear again when I held it

still. It would be a usual occurrence to have somebody suddenly appear

and just as suddenly disappear from our midst, or to see only a part of

a body. The vanishing and the appearance of objects would be common

occurrences in nature; and we should speak of "vanishing" and

"appearing," instead of "moving" and "stopping." Collisions, usually

harmless, with invisible objects would be common occurrences.

As seen, nature and its laws would appear to us very different from what

we find them now, with our present time perception.

Thus philosophy, mathematics, and physical science agree that space and

time cannot be entities, but are conceptions of the human mind in its

relation to nature. But what does this mean, and what conclusions follow

from it?

The space of our conception is three-dimensional--that is, extended in

three directions. For instance, the north-south direction, the east-west

direction, and the up-down direction. Any place or "point" in space thus

is located, relative to some other point, by giving its three distances

from the latter, in three (arbitrarily chosen) directions.

Time has only one dimension--that is, extends in one direction only,

from the past to the future--and a moment or "point" in time thus is

located, with reference to another point in time, by one time distance.

But there is a fundamental difference between our space conception and

our time conception, in that we can pass through time only in one

direction, from the past to the future, while we can pass through space

in any direction, from north to south, as well as from south to

north--that is, time is irreversible, flows uniformly in one direction,

while space is reversible, can be traversed in any direction. This means

that when we enter a thing in space, as a house, we can approach it,

pass through it, leave it, come back to it, and the thing therefore

appears permanent to us, and we know, even when we have left the house

and do not see it any more, that it still exists, and that we can go

back to it again and enter it. Not so with time. On approaching a thing

in time, an event such as a human life, it extends from a point in

time--birth--over a length of time--the life--to an end point in

time--death--just as the house in space extends from a point in

space--say the north wall--over a length of space--its extent--to an end

point in space--say the south wall. But when we pass beyond the end

point of an event in time--the death of a life--we cannot go back to the

event any more; the event has ceased, ended, the life is extinct.

But let us imagine that the same irreversibility applied to the

conception of space--that is, that we could move through space only from

north to south, and not in the opposite direction. Then a thing in

space, as a house, would not exist for us until we approached it. When

we were approaching it, it would first appear indistinctly, and more and

more distinctly the nearer we approached it, just as an event in time

does not exist until we reach the point of its beginning, but may appear

in anticipation, in time perspective, when we approach it, the more

distinctly, the closer we approach it, until we reach the threshold of

the time span covered by the event, and the event begins to exist, the

life is born. So to us, if we could move only from north to south, the

house would begin to exist only when we reached its north door. That

point would be the "birth" of the house. Passing through the span of

space covered by the house--this would for us be its existence, its

"life," and when we stepped out of the south door the house would cease

to exist for us, we could never enter it and turn back to it again--that

is, it would be dead and extinct, just as the life when we pass beyond

its end point in time. Thus birth and death, appearance and extinction

of an event in time, as our life, are the same as the beginning and end

point of a thing in space, like a house. But the house appears to us to

exist permanently, whether we are in it, within the length between

beginning and end point, or not; while the event in time, our life,

appears to us to exist only during the length of time when we are

between its beginning and its end point in time, and before and after it

does not exist for us, because we cannot go back to it or ahead into it.

But assume time were reversible, like space--that is, we could go

through it in any direction. There would then be no such thing as birth

or origin, and death or extinction, but our life would exist

permanently, as a part or span of time, just as the house exists as a

part or section of space, and the question of immortality, of extinction

or nonextinction by death, would then be meaningless. We should not

exist outside of the span of time covered by our life, just as we do not

exist outside of the part of space covered by our body in space, and to

reach an event, as our life, we should have to go to the part of space

and to the part of time where it occurs; but there would be no more

extinction of the life by going beyond its length in time as there is

extinction of a house by going outside of its door, and everything, like

a human being, would have four extensions or dimensions--three

extensions in space and one in time.[9]

If space and time, and therefore the characteristics of space and time,

are not real things or entities, but conceptions of the human mind, then

those transcendental questions, as that of immortality after death and

existence before birth, are not problems of fact in nature or outside of

nature, but are meaningless, just as the question whether a house exists

for an observer outside of the space covered by it. In other words, the

questions of birth and death, of extinction or immortality, are merely

the incidental results of the peculiarity of our conceptions of time,

the peculiarity that the time of our conceptions is irreversible, flows

continuously at a uniform rate in the same direction from the past to

the future.

But if time has no reality, is not an existing entity, then these

transcendental problems resulting from our time conception, of

extinction or immortality, have no real existence, but are really

phenomena of the human mind, and cease to exist if we go beyond the

limitations of our mind, beyond our peculiar time conception.

It is interesting to realize that the modern development of science, in

the relativity theory, has proved not only that time is not real, but a

conception, but also has proved that the time of our conception does not

flow uniformly at constant rate from past to future, but that the rate

of the flow of time varies with the conditions; the rate of time flow of

an event slows down with the motion relative to the event.

But the conception of a reversal of the flow of time is no more

illogical than the conception of a change of the rate of the flow of

time. It is inconceivable, because it is beyond the limitations of our

mind.

Thus we see that the questions of life and death, of extinction and

immortality, are not absolute problems, but merely the result of the

limitations of our mind in its conception of time, and have no existence

outside of us.

After all, to some extent we conceive time as reversible, in the

conception of historical time. In history we go back in time at our

will, and traverse with the mind's eye the times of the past, and we

then find that death and extinction do not exist in history, but the

events of history, the lives of those who made history, exist just as

much outside of the span of time of their physiological life--that is,

are immortal in historical time. They may fade and become more

indistinct with the distance in time, just as things in space become

more indistinct with the distance in space, but they can be brought back

to full clearness and distinction by again approaching the things and

events, the former moving through space, the latter moving through the

historical time--that is, by looking up and studying the history of the

time.

A Book of Exposition · 第 28 / 32 题