CHAPTER XXIII.

CLOUDS IN THE EAST AND ELSEWHERE.

Political Wreckage--Force triumphs over Opinion--The State of

France--Election of Prince Charles Louis Bonaparte as

Prince-President--The Sad Plight of Italy--Palmerston’s

Anti-Austrian Policy--Defeat of Piedmont--The Fall of Venice--Fall

of the Roman Republic--A Cromwellian Struggle in Prussia--The

Queen’s Partisanship--Her Prussian Sympathies--The Hungarian

Refugees in Turkey--A Diplomatic Conflict with Russia--Opening of

Parliament--Mr. Disraeli and Local Taxation--Parliamentary

Reform--The Jonahs of the Cabinet--The Dispute with Greece--Don

Pacifico’s case--Coercion of Greece--Lord Palmerston meekly accepts

an Insult from Russia--French Intervention--A Diplomatic Conflict

in France--Recall of the French Ambassador--False Statements in

Parliament--The Queen’s Indignation--The Don Pacifico Debate--The

_Civis Romanus sum_ Doctrine--Palmerston’s Victory--The West

African Slave Trade.

When the year 1850 opened the counter-revolution had been accomplished.

Much political and social wreckage disfigured the Continent, but the

tempest which had produced it was over. What remained was an uneasy

after-swell agitating the restless ocean of discontent. Force had, in

fact, triumphed over opinion, and Europe was at last tranquil.

In France, after Louis Philippe fell, the country was left a prey to

four factions or parties. One demanded an absolute monarchy; another

demanded a parliamentary monarchy; a third demanded a military empire,

based on universal suffrage; a fourth demanded a republic. The partisans

of the republic triumphed in the first instance. But it fell, a victim

to the voracity of its own children. The Government of Lamartine was

poetic and Utopian,

[Illustration: LOUIS KOSSUTH (1850).]

and its experiment of creating national workshops in which the workers

were to be paid by the State, was not only fantastic but fatal. The

State found it had no work to give. It found it had no money to spend in

wages; and the artisans of the national establishments were accordingly

advised to join the army. This disastrous adventure in Socialism was

followed by another insurrection in Paris--in which, by the way, the

Archbishop of Paris and thousands of less eminent persons were slain.

What Prince Bismarck would call the “psychological moment” for the

interposition of a clever adventurer with a suggestion of compromise had

manifestly arrived. Accordingly, the advent of Prince Charles Louis

Bonaparte was hailed with a sense of relief by all parties--wearied to

despair by the futile conflicts of factions. Although M. Grévy vainly

endeavoured by a motion in the Chamber to procure the proscription of

the Prince, his Highness was elected President of the Republic on the

10th of December, 1848, by five and a half million out of seven and a

half million votes. He took the oath to preserve the Republic, without

compunction. But when the year 1850 opened, he was busily plotting for

its destruction, and manufacturing failure for its institutions.

The plight of Italy was a sad one. Austria had successfully met the

attempt to seize her Italian provinces. She had crushed Piedmont so

completely that, in 1849, there was danger lest she might be tempted to

invade that State, and thus provoke the interference of Republican

France. Lord Palmerston accordingly endeavoured to mediate between

Austria and Piedmont. The idea of mediation was chimerical, for Austria,

having made heavy sacrifices to hold her Cisalpine territories, and

having succeeded in doing so by force, could hardly be expected to

accept with equanimity Lord Palmerston’s favourite dogma, that the

Italian provinces of Austria were to her not a source of strength, but

of weakness. Austria repudiated all proposals for a conference of

mediation, unless they were limited to discuss what Piedmont owed her as

an indemnity, and the guarantees which could be given against

Piedmontese turbulence. Diplomacy had well-nigh exhausted its resources

in endeavouring to bring Austria to submit the points at issue to a

Congress at Brussels, when the whole situation was suddenly changed.

Joseph Mazzini and his school, convinced that Austria was checked by

France and England, overthrew the Governments of Florence and Rome,

which were under Austrian tutelage. Revolution headed by a monarch had

failed. Its victory, argued Mazzini, under Republican leadership, would

be a signal triumph for the Republican idea. The success of Mazzini and

his followers led to the formation of a violent anti-Austrian Ministry

in Piedmont.

But again Austria triumphed. Piedmont was crushed at Novara on the 23rd

of March, 1849. Venice was on the eve of surrender, and when the Pope,

who had fled to Gaeta, appealed to the Catholic Powers for aid, Austria

was thus quite free to help him. The prospect of Austria bringing

Central as well as North Italy under her sway alarmed France, and

accordingly the Republican Government in Paris sent an army under

Oudinot, which suppressed the Republican Government at Rome. The Grand

Duke of Tuscany was restored, the revolution in the Sicilies quenched in

blood, and the dream of Italian independence dissipated. Nor was this

the only triumph of Absolutism under Austria. The revolution in Hungary

was suppressed, but not till Russia came to the assistance of Austria.

In Prussia, too, the monarchy, after a Cromwellian struggle with a

factious Parliament, had completely restored its authority, and to

Prussia the smaller German States now began to turn for leadership in

consolidating themselves into a German Empire. Unhappily the King of

Prussia failed to respond to this feeling when Austria was struggling

with the revolution in Italy. At the beginning of 1850 he accordingly

found the feeling in favour of unifying Germany opposed by three great

Powers--France, Russia, and Austria, the last, indeed, claiming, on

behalf of the Archduke John, to be the executive head and heir of the

defunct German Confederation of 1815. By the Constitution of Kremsir,

Austria had consolidated her possessions--German, Magyar, Sclavonic, and

Italian--into one federal State, and, in a sense, she had thereby

withdrawn from the German Confederation. Her policy of obstructing

consolidation in disintegrated Germany was therefore alike ungenerous

and unjust.

Through this maze of difficulty the Queen and Prince Albert steered a

clear course. They were both partisans--one might say strong and zealous

partisans--of Teutonic consolidation under Prussia. Austria, they held,

had played for her own hand, and, by adopting Schwarzenberg’s policy of

consolidating her dominions in purely Austrian interests, she had

abandoned her claim to guide the destinies of the smaller German States,

in purely German interests. But, however strongly the Queen felt on this

point, her influence was used to moderate the extravagant anti-Austrian

antipathies of Lord Palmerston, and it largely contributed to keep the

country out of war. At last, however, a cloud rose in the East which

threatened us with calamity.

When Austria, by summoning to her aid the armed hordes of Russia,

stamped out the movement for Hungarian independence, several Hungarian

and Polish patriots--Kossuth, Ban, and others--fled to Turkey. Austria

and Russia demanded their extradition. The Sultan refused to surrender

the refugees, and De Titoff and Stürmer, Russian and Austrian

ambassadors, suspended diplomatic relations with the Porte. The Sultan

appealed to Britain and France against this outrageous violation of the

unity of nations. Britain remonstrated in firm but courteous language,

and Austria and Russia both withdrew their demands, but not before the

British fleet had moved within the forbidden limits of the Dardanelles,

in anticipation of a refusal. Lord Palmerston’s apology for thus

violating the treaty of 1841 was that the fleet had been driven into

forbidden waters by “stress of weather.” As there was notoriously no

“stress of weather,” this explanation merely irritated the Czar, and

planted in his heart the germ of that fierce hatred of England, which

culminated in the Crimean War.

Parliament was opened on the 31st of January, 1850, by Commission, and,

as had been anticipated, the Protectionists made, not an attack, but

rather a reconnoissance in force against the Government. During the

recess they had gone through the country painting the darkest pictures

of the condition of England. According to their speeches, one would have

imagined that another famine had smitten the nation; and for all this

pessimism there was but one justification. No doubt everybody who

depended on the soil for a livelihood was suffering from distress.

Prices had fallen, and farmers had not taken kindly to the new order of

things. But the masses of the people, especially in industrial centres,

were enjoying greater comfort than ever. The revenue was showing signs

of buoyancy; the foreign trade of the

[Illustration: THE WHITE DRAWING-ROOM, WINDSOR CASTLE.]

country had increased, and pauperism had diminished. All these cheering

facts were concealed from the public by the Conservative agitators, who

concentrated attention on one point--the admitted and deplorable

distress of the landed interest. The real desire of the Tory party at

this time was to turn out the Government and restore Protection. The

Duke of Richmond’s indiscreet speech on the Address in the House of

Lords proves that. But, conscious of the difficulty of suddenly

upsetting the fiscal system which was based on Free Trade, they

concealed their real purpose. Mr. Disraeli therefore supported a

Protectionist amendment to the Address in reply to the Queen’s Speech,

on the ground that the landed interests were entitled to a certain

amount of relief from public burdens, in compensation for the loss of

Protection. On the 19th of February, Mr. Disraeli had to show his hand.

He then moved for a committee to revise the Poor Law so as to mitigate

distress among the agricultural class. This debate is worth noticing,

because it may be said to have definitely originated the perennial

movement for local taxation reform, which is always an object of

enthusiasm to what may be called the country party, when out of office.

Mr. Disraeli’s idea was to transfer from local rates to the Imperial

Treasury (1), Poor Law establishment charges; (2), rates which had

nothing to do with the relief of the poor, and were only raised by

[Illustration: THE PIRÆUS, ATHENS.]

Poor Law machinery as a matter of convenience--such as rates for

registration of births, deaths, and marriages, for getting up jury

lists, and the like; and (3), the rate for supporting the casual poor.

His case was not decided on its merits. Members did not look to what was

in the motion, but to what was behind it, namely, the restoration of

Protection, or an increase in Income Tax to provide funds for the relief

of local burdens. Sir James Graham’s frank admission, as a landlord,

that relief in the rate would be swallowed by an increase in the rents,

and that it was the landlord and not the tenant who would profit,

determined many, who did not deny the abstract justice of Mr. Disraeli’s

contention, to vote against him. The sensational incident in the debate

was the speech of Mr. Gladstone, who supported Mr. Disraeli against his

own leaders. In fact, he replied to Sir James Graham. Despite the

support of Peel, the Government, instead of having a majority of forty,

as they expected, were saved from defeat only by a majority of twenty.

From that day till now a clever debater, by a skilful motion in favour

of relief of local taxation, has always been able to weaken the majority

of the strongest of Ministries. Local taxation is the vulnerable point

of Governments, and it is the one subject with which they all seem

afraid to deal in a bold and comprehensive spirit. All they do is to

denounce the evil in Opposition, and palliate its existence when in

Power.

The agitation for Parliamentary Reform had increased. Some of the

Peelites, notably Sir J. Graham, had warned Lord John Russell that they

were in favour of an extension of the franchise, and Lord John himself

had abandoned the doctrine of finality. Mr. Hume, therefore, brought

forward his annual motion on the 28th of February, hinting plainly that

he would have no objection to extend its scope so as to include female

franchise, and the substitution of an elective for a hereditary House of

Lords. It was quite certain that Lord John Russell was by this time of

opinion that some safe concessions might be made to the Radicals.

Several of his colleagues, however--_e.g._, Mr. Labouchere--were of a

different opinion, and it is accordingly right to say that those who

denounced Lord John’s “apostasy,” when he opposed Mr. Hume, were

somewhat unfair. Had the Prime Minister produced a Reform Bill this

Session, every question which it might be possible to deal with would

have been put aside. But as he was not likely to carry his own

colleagues with him in advocating reform, not only would this sacrifice

have been made in vain, but a Government which, in the existing state of

parties, was indispensable to the nation, would have fallen. Mr. Hume

was beaten by a vote of 242 against 96, though the Prime Minister’s

argument against him was rather a plea for delay, than a defiant “_Non

possumus_.”

Writing on the 10th of February, Mr. Greville says in his Journal, “The

brightness of the Ministerial prospect was very soon clouded over, and

last week their disasters began. There was first of all the Greek

affair, and then the case of the Ceylon witnesses--matters affecting

Lord Palmerston and Lord Grey”--the Jonahs of the Cabinet. “The Greek

case,” continues Mr. Greville, “will probably be settled, thanks to

French mediation, but it was a bad and discreditable affair, and has

done more harm to Palmerston than any of his greater enormities. The

other Ministers are extremely annoyed at it, and at the sensation it has

produced.” The Greek case was briefly this: Mr. Finlay, a British

subject in Athens, alleged that King Otho had enclosed a bit of his land

in the Royal Garden, and demanded compensation. The King offered him the

same compensation that had been accepted as fair by other owners of

enclosed land in Mr. Finlay’s position. This Mr. Finlay refused, and he

demanded £1,500 for the land which, it was admitted, he had bought for

£10. Don Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew from Gibraltar, sought damages for

the pillage of his house by the Athenian mob. He claimed £31,534. The

value of his furniture was shown to be £2,181. The balance was supposed

to represent the value of documents proving that he had a claim on the

Portuguese Government for £27,000. Mr. Finlay and Don Pacifico had not

raised their claims in the ordinary law courts, and to the amazement of

everybody, Lord Palmerston proposed to employ the mailed might of

England to collect their bad debts. He peremptorily ordered the Greek

Government to pay these exaggerated claims, on pain of inflicting on

Greece a blockade and reprisals within twenty-four hours. On the 18th of

January, Admiral Parker, with the Mediterranean Fleet, blockaded the

Piræus--for, contrary to Lord Palmerston’s expectations, Greece refused

to comply with his demands. The Greek Government appealed for protection

to France and Russia--whose Governments being with that of Britain joint

guarantors for the independence of Greece, were justly annoyed that

their good offices had not been invoked by Lord Palmerston. Count

Nesselrode, burning to avenge the defeat of the Czar over the question

of the Hungarian refugees in Turkey, sent a remonstrance to Lord

Palmerston, which was couched in the language of bitter contempt and

studied insolence. The French Government, on the other hand, pretending

that our agent in Athens had blundered, courteously offered to extricate

Lord Palmerston from his difficulties by using the influence of France,

to compose the dispute with Greece. On the 12th of February Lord

Palmerston ordered the British Envoy to inform Admiral Parker that he

must suspend coercive operations. It was not till the 2nd of March that

these instructions arrived, and in the interval the Admiral had been

vigorously coercing the Greeks. France was naturally irritated at this

untoward incident, all the more that Lord Palmerston’s explanation of

the delay was deemed unsatisfactory. Ultimately, the matter was settled

on Greece agreeing to pay Mr. Wyse, the British Minister, £8,500 to be

distributed by him as he thought just among the claimants--the value of

Don Pacifico’s lost vouchers against the Portuguese Government to be

determined by arbitration.

This compromise, however, was made by negotiation in London. A French

steamer conveyed the purport of it to Mr. Wyse, the British Envoy at

Athens, on the 24th of April. He, however, said that he had no

instructions from his Government to countermand his original orders,

which were to renew coercion if the French Envoy at Athens could not

induce the Greeks to submit. Coercion was therefore again applied, and

the Greek Government on the 27th submitted to Mr. Wyse’s demands. These

were more onerous in some respects than the terms agreed on by the

London Convention, and Lord Palmerston persisted in adhering to the

Athenian arrangement. M. Gros at Athens, finding he could not persuade

Mr. Wyse to act on the London Convention, had on the 21st of April

officially intimated that his action as mediator was ended. This, argued

Lord Palmerston coolly, left the British Envoy--in the absence of

instructions from England--free to renew coercion, and to enter into the

Athenian arrangement. Palmerston, in other words, claimed the right to

take advantage of his own delay, in notifying to Mr. Wyse the result of

the London Convention, to refuse to act on the finding of that

Convention. It is but fair to say that the Queen was quite as indignant

as the Government of France, at Lord Palmerston’s rude and provocative

conduct. Lord John Russell intimated to her the fact that the French

Government had met the affront with which Lord Palmerston had rewarded

their efforts to extricate him from the effect of his own blunder, by

recalling M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Her Majesty promptly directed her husband,

who acted as her confidential secretary, to send the Prime Minister one

of those curt, cutting notes, which invariably indicate her displeasure.

“MY DEAR LORD JOHN,--Both the Queen and myself are exceedingly

sorry at the news your letter contained. We are not surprised,

however, that Lord Palmerston’s mode of doing business should not

be borne by the susceptible French Government with the same good

humour and forbearance as by his colleagues.

“Ever yours truly,

“ALBERT.

“Buckingham Palace, 15th May, 1850.”[12]

The view which the Queen took was the fair and common-sense one, namely,

that we should act on the London Convention. The Convention of London

which we made with France gave us certain terms. By an accident, for

which Palmerston was responsible, Mr. Wyse at Athens had extorted better

ones for us at Athens. It was not high policy, but sharp practice; it

was not in the spirit of enlightened diplomacy, but in the spirit of the

meanest attorneydom, that any claim to benefit by the “accident” which

had given better terms to us at Athens than at London, was pressed by

Lord Palmerston.

But the Queen’s troubles did not end here. Her birthday was celebrated

on the 15th of May, and the absence of the French and Russian

Ambassadors from the usual Foreign Office dinner on that occasion,

naturally roused suspicion. It was not known that the French

representative had been recalled, and that France and England were in

open diplomatic conflict. What was the meaning of the absence of these

ambassadors? asked Society at the great rout at Devonshire House on the

night of the 19th. Questions to this effect were put to Ministers in

both Houses. Lord Lansdowne said that the departure of M. Drouyn de

Lhuys was purely accidental; and Lord Palmerston had the effrontery to

declare, in reply to Mr. Milner Gibson, that M. de Lhuys had merely gone

to Paris as a medium of communication between the two Governments. But

the _Times_ reported in due course that General de la Hitte, Minister of

War, had intimated from the tribune of the French Assembly that, because

Lord Palmerston’s explanations in regard to points at issue between the

two Governments were not such as France had a right to expect, “the

President had ordered General de la Hitte to recall their Ambassador

from London.” Nothing could exceed the mortification of the Queen when

she was informed of the almost simultaneous publication of these

contradictory official statements. Her detestation of equivocal and

shuffling Ministerial explanations has long passed into a proverb. Her

Majesty’s theory, in fact, is that the Minister is for the time the

trustee of the honour of the Crown, and that, especially in foreign

countries, where the relation between the British Sovereign and her

Ministers is ill understood, the Crown is held personally responsible

for what the Minister says, in all matters affecting

[Illustration: GRAND ENTRANCE, WESTMINSTER PALACE.]

the external relations of the kingdom. In plain English, the Queen has

always held that if a Minister tells a lie in Parliament, nine people

out of ten on the Continent will suspect that she has ordered or induced

him to tell it. Hence her indignation on reading Lord Palmerston’s reply

to Mr. Milner Gibson’s question was tinged with a feeling of personal

humiliation and shame. Public opinion was similarly excited when the

newspapers were studied, and fuller questions were immediately put to

Lord Lansdowne and Lord John Russell. They gave evasive and

prevaricating answers, attempting to explain away the French

Ambassador’s letter of recall, much to the disgust of all parties in

Parliament. The tide of anger rose higher every day that the scandal was

discussed. Lord John Russell told his brother, the Duke of Bedford, that

Ministers must defend Palmerston on this occasion, but, after the

dispute came to an end, he would have Palmerston dismissed from the

Foreign Office. “He is,” writes Mr. Greville on the 19th of May, “to see

the Queen on Tuesday, who will of course be boiling over with

indignation;” for by this time Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador,

had warned Lord John that he, too, must ask to be relieved from his

post, as “it was impossible for him to stay here to be on bad terms with

Palmerston.”

The question has often been asked, Why did English statesmen get up in

both Houses of Parliament and tell a series of falsehoods which they

knew must be discovered in forty-eight hours by official refutation from

France? The fact is, Lord Palmerston had deceived his colleagues. He

assured them that M. de Lhuys had taken back to Paris explanations so

conciliatory, that his letter of recall would be quietly cancelled.

Assured by Palmerston that he had made the cancelling of the recall a

certainty, Lord Lansdowne and Lord John Russell assumed that the letter

of recall was suppressed, and they both answered as if it never had

existed. On the 25th of May, Mr. Greville writes:--“The morning before

yesterday the Duke of Bedford came here again. He had seen Lord John

since, and heard what passed with the Queen. She was full of this

affair, and again urged all her objections to Lord Palmerston. This time

she found Lord John better disposed than heretofore, and he is certainly

revolving in his mind how the thing can be done. He does not by any

means contemplate going out himself, or breaking up the Government. What

he looks to is this, that the Queen should take the initiative, and urge

Palmerston’s removal from the Foreign Office. She is quite ready to do

this as soon as she is assured of her wishes being attended to.”[13]

Lord John Russell screwed up his courage to the point of contemplating

the removal of Lord Palmerston from the Foreign Office to some other

department of State, he himself undertaking the duties of Foreign

Secretary along with those of the Premiership. Such a combination is

never a wise one. Even in recent times, when Lord Salisbury attempted to

unite in his own person the two offices, the strain was found to be

greater than his strength could bear; and in the case of Lord John,

whose health was at this time capricious and precarious, it was perhaps

as well that at the eleventh hour he shrank from proposing the change to

Lord Palmerston. Lord John has been accused of lack of courage in

connection with this affair. The truth is, that a perverted chivalry

prompted him to stand by Lord Palmerston. The Greek affair was hardly

defensible. But it was bruited about that the Opposition, under cover of

condemning Lord Palmerston in that special case, meant to direct a

severe attack on the foreign policy of the Government as a whole. Lord

Palmerston’s colleagues had, however, permitted themselves not only to

be identified with that policy, but had thought fit to defend every

blunder he had made in carrying it out. Lord John Russell, then, cannot

be blamed for considering that to desert the Foreign Secretary on the

Greek Question, would have been tantamount to making him the scapegoat

of the Cabinet. Hence, in spite of the Queen’s strong feeling in the

matter, it was agreed that Palmerston should not be “thrown over.”

After much fencing between the leaders of the two parties, the first of

the attacks, which led to a series of debates almost unparalleled in our

history as displays of sustained Parliamentary eloquence, was made in

the House of Lords on the 17th of June. Lord Stanley moved a vote of

censure on the Ministry for their coercive measures in Greece,

affirming, however, the general proposition that it was the right and

duty of the Government to secure to British subjects in foreign States,

the full protection of the laws of those States. The scene was a

memorable one. The House was crowded in every part, and the conflict

began with an amusing farce. The Peeress’s Gallery was crammed to

overflowing, and when Lady Melbourne and Lady Newport, under Lord

Brougham’s escort, went to their places, they found them filled, and

were ignominiously turned away. Brougham, however, espied Bunsen, the

Prussian Minister, in the gallery, and requested him to retire to his

proper seat in the Ambassadors’ quarter, but he refused. Then Brougham

went down to his own place, and avenged himself on Bunsen by calling the

attention of their lordships to the fact that there was “a stranger in

the Peeress’s Gallery,” adding, “if he does not come down, I shall move

your lordships to enforce the order of the House. It is the more

intolerable as he has a place assigned to him in another part, and he is

now keeping the room of _two Peeresses_.” As Bunsen was notoriously a

fat, overgrown man, Brougham’s malicious personality was received with

shouts of laughter. But it had no effect on the stolid Prussian, who

kept his seat till Sir Augustus Clifford, Usher of the Black Rod, made

him retire.[14]

The issue before the House was simple enough. (1), Lord Palmerston had

agreed with M. Drouyn de Lhuys that if the terms which M. Gros, the

French Envoy at Athens, proposed on behalf of Greece were rejected by

Mr. Wyse, the British Envoy, coercion should not be again applied

without special orders from Britain. But if M. Gros threw up his office

of mediator because the Greeks declined to let him offer fair terms,

then of course Mr. Wyse was to

[Illustration: MR. (AFTERWARDS SIR ALEXANDER) COCKBURN.]

resort to coercion without further instructions. (2), M. Drouyn de Lhuys

and Lord Palmerston in London agreed on a settlement, the terms of which

were less onerous than those demanded by Mr. Wyse. (3), Though this was

informally communicated by the French to Mr. Wyse, he rejected the terms

which M. Gros offered on behalf of Greece, contending that he had no

instructions from Lord Palmerston as to the adoption of any other

course. (4), M. Gros then dropped the negotiations. Mr. Wyse, again

arguing that he was without instructions, ordered coercion to be

applied, upon which the Greek Government yielded. The pith of the

dispute centred in one point. Did Palmerston or did he not send Mr. Wyse

instructions as to the arrangement made in London with M. Drouyn de

Lhuys? The French said that their Envoy abandoned negotiations because

Mr. Wyse was unreasonable. Lord Palmerston contended that Mr. Wyse was

of opinion that M. Gros had dropped mediation because the

[Illustration: CAPE TOWN.]

Greeks were unreasonable, and that therefore, in terms of the

arrangement made in London, Mr. Wyse was justified in resorting to

coercion without further instructions. Mr. Wyse may have been mistaken

in supposing that M. Gros retired from the negotiations in the

circumstances which, according to the London Convention, would have

justified a resort to coercion without further reference to Lord

Palmerston. If that were the case, the Government had a good defence;

for it would have been unfair to censure them for Mr. Wyse’s blunder.

But was it the case? How could Mr. Wyse have blundered in interpreting

the conditions of the London Convention, if no instructions in

accordance with that Convention had been sent to him? The complaint was

that the Foreign Secretary had neglected to send these instructions, and

a close and careful examination of Palmerston’s own Blue-book, fails to

bring to light the slightest proof that they ever were sent. Therefore

it was clear (1), that England had broken a binding diplomatic compact

with France, and (2), that this breach of faith had enabled Mr. Wyse at

Athens to extort by force from a small, weak Power more onerous terms

than the English Government had agreed with France to accept in London.

The House of Lords took this view of the matter, and when the debate

ended, in the grey dawn of a summer’s morning, it was found on division

that there was a majority of 37 against the Government.

Some members of the Cabinet were for resignation. Many friends of the

Government thought that Palmerston should personally offer the Queen his

resignation, begging her not to accept that of his colleagues if they

tendered theirs. But the Foreign Secretary made no offer to resign, and

at first the Cabinet resolved to take no more notice of the vote of

censure in the Upper House. Ultimately, they found that they must notice

it, and as their Foreign Policy as a whole was impugned, they decided

not to abandon the Foreign Secretary. On the 20th of June, Lord John

Russell explained why he would not resign. He gave two reasons--one good

and the other bad,--the first being one of which the Queen approved. It

was that a change of Government, in consequence of a resolution of the

House of Lords, would be unconstitutional, because, in his opinion, it

might be dangerous even to the House of Lords to lay upon it the

responsibility of controlling her Majesty’s Executive. Two precedents,

one a hundred years old, and one taken from 1833, when the Peers, on the

motion of the Duke of Wellington, censured Lord Grey’s Foreign Policy in

Portugal, were ingeniously cited by Lord John Russell in support of this

constitutional doctrine. But his second reason was characteristically

Palmerstonian. He said that the House of Lords had laid it down, that it

was the duty of the British Government to see that British subjects in

Foreign States got full protection from the laws of those States. That

was a _limitation_ of duty which Lord John Russell refused to recognise,

because, said he, a Foreign State might make bad laws, and it would be

the duty of England to prevent her subjects from being injured by those

laws. No principle is more clearly established in international law than

this--that a Sovereign State has an absolute right to dictate the terms

on which any alien shall abide on its soil.[15] If the alien does not

like the law of the Foreign State, he has no business to call on his own

countrymen to defend him by force of arms in refusing to obey it, seeing

that it was not at their request or in their interest, but of his own

free will, and in pursuit of his own fortune, he went to live or traffic

abroad. In fact, to lay it down that England might levy war on any

country, whose laws Englishmen residing in that country considered

inequitable, was tantamount to proclaiming her _hostis humani generis_.

Yet such was the doctrine which the House of Commons, in spite of the

protests of the Tories, of Radicals like Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright, and

Peelites like Sir Robert Peel and Mr. Gladstone, cheerfully accepted

from the Whigs at this period. The only thing that can be said in its

defence is that it is a doctrine which the House has never dared to

apply to a stronger Power than Greece--never to a Power like Russia,

which deports English Jews, nor like Germany, which deports English

residents, personally obnoxious to Prince Bismarck, in the most

arbitrary manner. It is doubtful if it would even dare to apply it to an

autonomous colony like Victoria, had her Government refused, as was

threatened, to permit the Irish informer, James Carey, to reside within

her frontier.

Having decided to defy the House of Lords, the Government hit on an

ingenious plan for neutralising the vote of censure. They put up Mr.

Roebuck on the 21st of June to move a vote of confidence in them not

touching the Greek dispute, but approving generally of their Foreign

Policy as one likely “to preserve untarnished the honour and dignity of

this country.” The debate, which lasted five days, was a veritable

tournament of Titans. On both sides speeches were made that touch the

highest point to which Parliamentary eloquence can reach. Mr. Cockburn,

afterwards Lord Chief Justice, delivered an oration by which, at one

bound, he leapt into the first rank of British orators. Peel delivered

the last speech he was fated to make in the great assembly, on which for

years he had played with the easy mastery of a musician on his favourite

instrument. Palmerston himself spoke for four hours and a quarter with

more than his usual dash and intrepidity, and with surprising moderation

and good taste--basing his case virtually on the application of the

_civis Romanus sum_ doctrine to British Foreign Policy. This was the

point in it which Mr. Gladstone demolished in a passionate protest, that

may be said to have become classical. But in the end the Government

triumphed by a majority of 46! Yet, on the face of the facts, they had

absolutely no case. Why, then, were they victorious? For many reasons.

In the then divided state of parties, the Government was felt to be the

only possible Government. Palmerston, by adroitly spreading the report

that the attack on

[Illustration: MR. GLADSTONE (1855).]

him was really fomented by the agents of the despotic Powers, whose

policy he had persistently opposed, won strong support from the

Radicals. The Whigs felt that as the Foreign Policy of the Government as

a whole was attacked, they were bound to defend the Ministry, quite

irrespective of Palmerston’s possibly objectionable method of carrying

out that policy. Moreover, it was undoubtedly a weak point in the

tactics of the Opposition, that they did not venture to submit in the

House of Commons, the motion of censure which they had carried in the

House of Lords. But though Lord Palmerston’s triumph was complete, the

Queen continued to be dissatisfied

[Illustration: WINDSOR CASTLE: VIEW FROM THE QUADRANGLE.]

with his reckless manner of managing the Foreign Office. Pressure was

put on him by the concurrence of Lord John Russell, the Duke of Bedford,

Lord Lansdowne, and Lord Clarendon to take another department, which,

however, he refused to do. For the time--confident in his popularity--he

was able to hold his position, but ere a year had elapsed her Majesty’s

warnings were fulfilled, and Lord John was simply compelled to force him

to retire.[16] It must be here told how this whole controversy ended.

Before the debate closed, it was announced that we had accepted, with

some trifling modifications in detail, the French proposals made on

behalf of Greece. The demands of the claimants in support of whom we had

been brought to the brink of war with France, were finally assessed at

£10,000--about one-thirtieth part of the sum they originally asked!

No other question of Foreign Policy agitated the House of Commons in

1850, save Mr. Hutt’s proposal to withdraw the British war-ships engaged

in suppressing the West African slave trade. The cost of the squadron

had made its maintenance unpopular even with Liberals, and when Lord

John Russell threatened to stake the existence of his Ministry on it,

the Queen was distressed to learn that there was every prospect of his

being defeated, at a time when a change of Government would have

produced the utmost confusion. A meeting of the Liberal Party was

convened by the Prime Minister at Downing Street, and pressure, which

they hardly dared to resist, induced the malcontents to support the

Government. Mr. Hutt’s motion was lost, many Ministerialists, however,

complaining bitterly that the Prime Minister had concussed them into

voting against their convictions.

The Life and Times of Queen Victoria; vol. 2 of 4 · 第 3 / 18 章