VEREENIGING.
On the morning of Thursday, May 15th, 1902, the members of both the
Governments and all the delegates had arrived at Vereeniging, and
business was at once proceeded with.
Tents, &c., had been pitched there by Lord Kitchener for their
accommodation during the deliberations. In the middle of this camp
stood a large tent, which could easily accommodate the sixty
representatives, and the members of the Republican Governments. On the
one side were the tents for the Government and delegates of the Orange
Free State, and on the other side for the Government and delegates of
the South African Republic.
[Illustration: _Facsimile of the Oath subscribed to at Vereeniging by
the Delegates of the South African Republic._]
[Illustration: _Facsimile of the Oath subscribed to at Vereeniging by
the delegates of the Orange Free State._]
The following delegates represented the South African Republic:--
NAME. COMMANDO REPRESENTED.
1--General H. A. Alberts Heidelberg.
2--Commandant J. J. Alberts Standerton and Wakkerstroom,
south-west of the Natal
Railway.
3--Commandant J. F. de Beer Bloemhof.
4--General C. J. Brits Standerton.
5--Acting Landrost H. J. Bosman Wakkerstroom.
6--General Chris. Botha Swazieland, and portion of
State Artillery under Captain
von Wichman.
7--C. Birkenstock Vryheid.
8--Assistant-Commandant General
C. F. Beyers Waterberg.
9--Field-Cornet B. H. Breytenbach Utrecht.
10--J. de Clercq Middelburg (south of railway).
11--General J. G. Cilliers Lichtenburg.
12--Field-Cornet T. A. Doenges Heidelberg (town) and Corps
Capts. Hindon and McKenny.
13--Commandant H. S. Grobler Bethel.
14--J. L. Grobler Carolina.
15--General J. N. H. Grobler Ermelo.
16--Field-Cornet B. J. van Heerden Rustenburg.
17--Captain J. F. Jordaan Vryheid Corps and First
Scouting Corps.
18--General J. Kemp Krugersdorp.
19--General P. J. Liebenberg Potchefstroom.
20--General C. H. Muller Boksburg and Middleburg (north
of railway).
21--J. Naude Pretoria (town) and detached
Commando under General de
la Rey.
22--Commandant D. J. E. Opperman Pretoria (south of railway).
23--Field-Cornet P. D. Roux Marico.
24--Commandant D. J. Schoeman Lydenburg.
25--Landrost Stoffberg Zoutpansberg.
26--General S. P. Du Toit Wolmaransstad.
27--Commandant P. L. Uys Pretoria (north of railway).
28--Commandant W. J. Viljoen Johannesburg.
29--P. R. Viljoen Heidelberg.
30--Field-Cornet B. Roos Piet Retief.
The following delegates represented the Orange Free State:--
1--Assistant-Chief Commandant G. C. F.
Badenhorst Boshof, Hoopstad (west),
Bloemfontein, Winburg,
and Kroonstad.
2--Commandant A. J. Bester Bethlehem.
3--Commandant A. J. Bester Bloemfontein.
4--Commandant L. P. H. Botha Harrismith.
5--Assistant-Chief Commandant G. A.
Brand Bethulie, Caledon River,
Rouxville, Wepener, and
Bloemfontein (east).
6--Commandant H. J. Bruwer Bethlehem.
7--Commandant D. H. van Coller Heilbron.
8--Commandant F. R. Cronje Winburg.
9--Commandant D. F. H. Flemming Hoopstad.
10--Assistant-Chief Commandant C. C.
Froneman Winburg and Ladybrand.
11--Assistant-Chief Commandant F. J.
W. J. Hattingh Kroonstad (east) and
Heilbron.
12--Commandant J. A. M. Hertzog Philippolis.
13--Commandant J. N. Jacobs Boshof.
14--Commandant F. P. Jacobsz Harrismith.
15--Commandant A. J. de Kock Vrede.
16--Commandant J. J. Koen Ladybrand.
17--Field-Cornet H. J. Kritzinger Kroonstad.
18--Commandant F. E. Mentz Heilbron.
19--Commandant J. A. P. van der Merwe Heilbron.
20--Commandant C. A. van Niekerk Kroonstad.
21--Commandant H. van Niekerk President Steyn's Guard.
22--Commandant J. J. van Niekerk Ficksburg.
23--Assistant-Chief Commandant T. K.
Nieuwoudt Philippolis, Fauresmith,
Jacobsdal, and portion
Bloemfontein.
24--Commandant H. P. J. Pretorius Jacobsdal.
25--Assistant-Chief Commandant A. M.
Prinsloo Bethlehem and Ficksburg.
26--Commandant L. J. Rautenbach Bethlehem.
27--Commandant F. J. Rheeder Rouxville.
38--Commandant A. Ross Vrede.
29--Commandant P. W. de Vos Kroonstad.
30--Assistant-Chief Commandant W. J.
Wessels Harrismith and Vrede.
At the request of the Government of the South African Republic, and
with the assistance of Lord Kitchener, General J. C. Smuts, the State
Attorney, had also come from the Cape Colony to assist his Government
as legal adviser.
At eleven o'clock all the delegates met in the large tent and took and
subscribed to the following oath before the Acting State President of
the South African Republic:--
OATH.
"We the undersigned swear solemnly that we, as special representatives
of the people, will be faithful to our people and country and
Government, and serve them faithfully, and that we will diligently
perform our duties with the necessary secrecy, as behoves faithful
burghers and representatives of the people. So help us God Almighty.
"Vereeniging, South African Republic, May 15th, 1902."
After a few matters concerning the conduct of the meeting had been
settled, a discussion arose on the question whether the
representatives had come with definite instructions from their
electors or whether they should decide here for the people according
to circumstances.
President Steyn, Chief Commandant de Wet, and General de la Rey
thought that the delegates had definite instructions.
Commandant-General Botha said that before they separated at Pretoria
the understanding was that the delegates should decide here at
Vereeniging. It could not be expected that the people could give them
definite instructions, because they were not fully acquainted with the
circumstances all over the country. Here the delegates should
ascertain from the Governments and from their fellow-delegates what
the condition was in both the Republics and in the Cape Colony, and
then, taking everything into account, come to a decision.
General Meyer was also of opinion that the delegates could not be
tied. Suppose, for instance, that the Governments could retain the
independence of the Republics by surrendering a portion of their
territory, then those delegates who had a definite instruction to vote
only for independence could not vote for such a surrender, because
that would not be the maintenance of their full independence. And then
at the elections the leaders had also told the people that the
Governments could not communicate everything to them, but that they
would do so to the delegates here.
President Steyn remarked that the meeting stood before an accomplished
fact, from which they could not get away, because as far as he knew
the most of the delegates had definite instructions how to vote.
General de la Rey said that if they still had hopes of retaining their
independence, it was a good thing that the delegates had definite
instructions, because these instructions were in the most cases to
retain independence. This the enemy knew, and therefore the Republican
Governments had so much more power.
Acting State President Burger thought that the matter was fraught with
danger on both sides. If, for instance, the majority of the
representatives had been instructed to vote for terms, this would
hamper the Governments very much if the enemy came to know about it.
On the other hand, if it was decided here to continue the war, it
would be said that the leaders kept the people in the field. Where he
had been, the people had unanimously decided to give up everything,
but not the independence. However, they were now together to get a
general view of their whole position, and each one should then decide
as he thought proper, unto which decision the minority must bow.
General Hertzog said that he had acted as General Botha had done.
Where he had conducted elections the burghers had left everything in
the hands of their representatives. These should know how to justify
to their electors the vote which they would cast.
General Botha asked what the delegates came to do? On the basis of
their independence the British did not wish to negotiate. The
representatives should thus decide whether the people could continue
with the struggle, or whether they should come to terms with the
enemy. The people themselves could not take a proper resolution
because they were not properly informed.
General Hertzog said that this was a legal matter. It was a legal
principle that a delegate could not be considered a mere mouthpiece of
his constituents, but that in matters of a public nature he was
virtually a plenipotentiary. The delegates could thus form their
opinions according to what they learnt here, provided they adhere to
what was the spirit of the people, and provided they are convinced
from the facts laid before them, that if those facts were known to the
people, the people would have instructed them to vote as they did.
General Smuts concurred fully with the opinion of General Hertzog.
As appeared from the disposition of the delegates, they acted in the
spirit of this legal opinion.
The Acting State President acted as temporary Chairman, and caused the
meeting to elect a permanent Chairman.
The following gentlemen were nominated as candidates:--General Beyers,
J. de Clercq, General Brand, General Froneman, and General Wessels.
General Beyers was elected Chairman with 19 votes, while the others
obtained 13, 11, 10, and 6 votes respectively.
After a short address, the Chairman adjourned the meeting till the
afternoon.
In the afternoon the meeting was opened with prayer by the Rev. J. D.
Kestell.
Acting State President S. W. Burger then addressed the meeting as
follows:--We are here under peculiar circumstances. Many who commenced
this struggle with us are no longer with us. The war has claimed its
victims, and many who were highly esteemed by us have fallen or have
been captured, or, alas, have become unfaithful. We have only reached
the foot of the mountain, and everything now depends upon you as
representatives of the people. Here we shall have to decide whether,
under the circumstances, we can or must continue the war. We may not
deny that our position is very critical and gloomy. Let us conduct
ourselves as behoves comrades who have a common cause at heart. We
shall have to say much about the future. Opinions will be widely
divergent, and therefore it is important that we bear with one another
and be not afraid to express our opinions in a manly way. You know
what gave occasion for this meeting. A copy of the correspondence
between the Netherlands and British Governments was sent to us by Lord
Kitchener under instructions from his Government. When the Government
of the South African Republic received this correspondence they
thought it should be considered as an invitation to negotiate. They
also considered that the opportunity should be availed of to discuss
matters with the Orange Free State, and requested Lord Kitchener to
enable them to meet the Government of that Republic to consider the
advisability of making peace proposals to Britain. We met and
discussed the matter at Klerksdorp. Then we negotiated with Lord
Kitchener and Lord Milner, and the outcome of it all was the document
(with the correspondence between the two Governments and the British
Government attached), which was submitted to all the commandos. We
felt that we had no power to decide with reference to the question of
independence, and that it was only in our power to conclude a peace by
which the independence would be maintained. As to the independence,
only the people could decide. And for that purpose you are here. We,
the members of the Governments, are here to give you advice and
explanation. As you know, the enemy will not hear of letting us retain
our independence, but they are willing to negotiate for terms on the
basis of the relinquishment of our independence. If we consider all we
have sacrificed and suffered, and for what we have sacrificed and
suffered, it is very hard for us to think of giving up our
independence, but we are not here to consult our hearts but our heads.
You must now give an account of the condition of our country and of
our women and children. You must determine whether, after all the
sacrifices that we have made, we are prepared to make further
sacrifices. If we have no prospects, we cannot proceed and allow our
people to be further exterminated. It will be hard after all that we
have done to surrender our independence, but we must consult our
heads. The Governments will do nothing without the people, and it is
for you now to consider all the circumstances and decide, and if you,
for instance, arrive at the conclusion that we have resorted to our
last expedient, will it be right to continue? Let each one frankly
express his opinion. As far as I am concerned, I do not flinch yet.
But I wish to know what the people say. A year ago the Governments
decided never to give up the independence, but to continue the
struggle until we could do so no longer, and then to surrender
unconditionally; but if we become convinced that our strength and
resources are exhausted we should consider whether we should not still
try to do something for our people. Or shall we continue until all the
leaders and many burghers are banished or killed? By a frank
expression of opinion we shall be enabled to decide what course to
pursue.
Here I must draw your attention to a difficulty that has arisen. Some
of you have received definite instructions from the people from which
it appears you consider you cannot deviate. Others have received
authority to act according to circumstances. Now I believe that this
need not cause a difference; in any case let it not cause a split
among us. We must be unanimous here, and if we are, then the people
will also be unanimous. If we are divided here, what will the people
be?
At this juncture a letter was read, written five months before by the
Deputation in Europe, and safely brought out by a person whose name
was not mentioned. The letter contained much, and maintained, among
other things, that in Europe the Boer cause was then more favourable
than ever before.
The Chairman now gave the Generals and Delegates an opportunity of
laying before the meeting the general condition in their respective
divisions.
Commandant General Botha said: In the Utrecht district there are not
sufficient mealies to support the commandos long, and then there could
be no question of supplying the horses with mealies. There was still a
considerable number of slaughter cattle. In Swazieland there was no
grain, nor was there any in Wakkerstroom, so that the commandos could
not exist there for another month. In Ermelo and Carolina there was
still sufficient corn to exist on for some little time, say two or
three months, and sufficient slaughter-cattle for the winter, if the
cattle and sheep belonging to the burghers were indiscriminately
taken. Most of the grain belonged to the Kaffirs. What had been sown
was too near the enemy, otherwise they would have provisions for a
considerable time still. In Bethal, Standerton, and Middelburg there
was no corn whatever, and they could still hold out for one month at
the utmost. The Heidelberg and Pretoria commandos have no corn to live
on. In the neighbourhood of Boksburg and Springs there was a
considerable quantity of mealies--the old mealie-cobs of last
year--but the commandos have been squeezed out from those parts by the
blockhouses. They had absolutely no slaughter-cattle. In a great area
there was no living animal except horses, and when he was with the men
a few days ago, three days had passed since they had had meat. All
that Middelburg (south-east of the railway) possessed of
slaughter-cattle was 36 goats. Wakkerstroom also was entirely without
slaughter-cattle. The condition on the High Veld as regards horses was
very bad. The burghers were hard pressed by the enemy, and many were
unmounted. The horses were now so weak that the commandos could not
undertake a long journey. The Kaffir question became daily more
serious. Shortly before his departure for Vereeniging 56 burghers were
murdered in Vryheid by Kaffirs who came from the English lines. All
the Kaffirs in the South-eastern portion of the Republic were more or
less under arms, and this had an unfavourable influence on the spirit
of the burghers. Furthermore they had a considerable number of
families who were in a most lamentable condition. The entire High Veld
was divided up by the lines of blockhouses, and the commandos were so
cornered that they had continually to cross these lines of the
railway, and then a fortnight often passed before the husbands could
return to attend to their families. It had happened that women had to
flee to Kaffirs to be helped by them. Many were attacked and raped by
the Kaffirs. Truly the condition of these women was the saddest thing
with which he had had to do in this war.
Coming to the numerical strength of the burghers, they had in the
field in the South African Republic 10,816 men, of which 3,296 were
unmounted, leaving thus only 7,520 men who were available for use.
Since last June their numbers had been diminished by 6,084 men. The
most of these had been captured, but the number included the
surrenders and killed. They still had about 2,540 families. What their
condition was he had already described, and what the difficulties were
to support them, the delegates could imagine themselves. Summoning up
all in one word the Commandant General concluded by saying that the
greatest difficulties lay in the questions concerning horses and food,
and the maintenance of the families.
Chief Commandant de Wet said that he would leave it to the delegates
who were officers to give an account of the conditions obtaining in
their respective districts. They came from far and near, and knew what
the condition of matters was. He could, however, inform the meeting
that the number of burghers in the Orange Free State was 6,100, of
which about 400 were not serviceable. The Basutos were as well
disposed towards the Boers as ever before.
General de la Rey said that he did not know exactly what was expected
of him, and that it was the duty of the delegates to give an account
of the condition of affairs. He could say this, however, that food was
scarce in his division a year ago, and that was so still, but no one
had suffered hunger yet. If a burgher had no food he had to fetch it
from the enemy. He also thought it would be better to leave it to the
delegates to give an account of the conditions in their respective
divisions.
General Beyers said, I shall be brief. As regards food, we obtain
supplies from the hostile Kaffirs, who are all, with the exception of
one tribe, in rebellion against us. In Waterberg all the Kaffirs are
sitting on the fence, and are in a way still well disposed, so that we
cannot take anything from them, but must purchase what we want. What
we require in Zoutpansberg we take. The Kaffirs fire on us, but then
we shoot back. It is our good fortune that there is no co-operation
between the Kaffirs in Zoutpansberg, otherwise they could make matters
difficult for us. When the British forces are operating against us the
Kaffirs are very troublesome, because the English use the Kaffirs. The
greatest difficulties with which we have to cope are: fever,
horse-sickness, and the Kaffirs. Food we have in abundance. I think
there is sufficient food in the Zoutpansberg district to support the
burghers of the South African Republic and of the Orange Free State
for a year. The British, however, are buying up much grain there now
at 10s. a bag and removing it.
General Muller remarked that everything was scarce with him, but that
the burghers had never suffered hunger yet. He had cattle for two
months still, if he slaughtered everything. His great difficulty was
in connection with the families when the Kaffirs were rebellious. If
provisions became scarce he intended to obtain these from the Kaffirs.
In his opinion he could still hold out to the end of the winter.
General Froneman (Winburg and Ladybrand) had no reason to complain.
They had sufficient food still. There were many women and children in
his division, altogether about 80 families, who had to be supported.
The Kaffirs were particularly peaceable, and always prepared to assist
in supplying them with clothing out of Basutoland. When he ran short
of cattle he took some again from the enemy. He saw his way clear to
continue the struggle for another year.
Commandant Hattingh (Kroonstad) informed the meeting that he still had
much cattle, sheep and grain, sufficient for a year. The district of
Heilbron had been entirely depleted of provisions, but he had supplied
them again from the Bethlehem district.
Commandant Badenhorst (portion Bloemfontein, Boshof and Kroonstad)
stated that in his districts there were still thousands of cattle and
sheep, and therefore he could hold out for another year. The farmers
had cattle on their farms, and then there was always a chance of
capturing from the enemy. On one occasion he captured 1,500 cattle
from the enemy, and he also saw a chance of obtaining cattle by this
means for other parts. Hundreds of cattle and thousands of sheep could
still be spared in his district for other districts. Grain was not so
plentiful as it had been the previous year, but they could still raise
so much that they could even supply others.
General Nieuwoudt (S.W. and S. portions of O.F.S.) said that during
the last seven months the enemy had destroyed everything in his
districts. The Fauresmith district had been totally devastated. No
cattle had been left there. There were only about 70 bags of grain
left, but they still managed to live well. He had found out that even
when they had nothing they managed to get along. His horses were now
in excellent condition. If they could sow he saw a chance of raising
food for another year. In his division there were only about three
women.
General Prinsloo (Ficksburg and Bethlehem) stated that he would not be
speaking the truth if he said that there was no food, in his division.
He had no cause for complaint yet on that score. Latterly many forces
of the enemy had operated against him, and all the cattle had been
removed from the Southern Ward, but in the other Wards there was still
much cattle. They could help other districts from there.
Unfortunately, however, cattle could not be moved from those Wards on
account of the blockhouses. Further, he thought that the Lord would
provide for them. Recently one of his Commandants had discovered what
he might call a gold mine, in which there were 150 bags of mealies.
General Brand (Rouxville, &c.) said that the enemy had overrun his
districts very much, built blockhouses, removed cattle, and destroyed
grain. Portions of his division had been totally ruined. Everything
had been removed, and not even a sheep was left. It frequently
happened that for two or three days they were without food, but then
they fortunately captured some food again. There were only nine women
in his division. He had the means to continue for another year.
General Wessels (Vrede, Harrismith, and Frankfort) informed the
meeting that the Khakis had latterly dealt fearfully with him. They
moved up and down in his division, and he thought that nothing would
be left, but he always found food still. It was a marvel to him that
sheep, cattle and grain were still to be found there. Even if the
enemy removed all the cattle he saw a chance of maintaining the
struggle on the grain that would be left, and he knew for certain that
he would be able to capture much cattle from the enemy. Only recently
he had brought 300 head of cattle from Natal, and they had also
discovered a cave containing 300 bags of mealies. As regards
slaughter-cattle, he thought he had enough to last them for another
three months.
Commandant van Niekerk (Vredefort) had to admit that his district had
been entirely devastated, and that he had been forced out of it, so
that they could neither plough nor sow. However, in Hoopstad and
Kroonstad they had sown 35 bags of grain. The enemy had built
blockhouses right through the middle of his division. There was no
cattle, but he had captured 1,000 sheep and 52 head of cattle, and
thought that in some way or other he would still manage to obtain food
for another year.
Commandant van der Merwe said that matters with him were much the same
as in the districts of Commandant van Niekerk. Everything was scarce,
but they had not yet suffered hunger.
General J. C. Smuts related how his expedition to the Cape Colony had
originated, and how it had been carried out. Last year, he said, it
was the opinion of President Kruger and of their Deputation in Europe
that there was good hope for their cause from the Cape Colony. On that
ground and also on the reports that they received from there, it was
decided to send General de la Rey thither to assume the supreme
command as soon as the Cape was strong enough to be considered a third
party in the struggle. Later, however, they came to the conclusion
that it would be best to act more cautiously, that General de la Rey
could hardly be missed in the Western Transvaal, that he (General
Smuts) should go with a small commando to ascertain what the
possibilities in the Cape Colony were. "I went," he continued, "with
300 men, while 100 men followed me, but 100 men I had to leave behind
with General Kritzinger because their horses were too poor. We had a
very difficult journey, certainly the most difficult that I and my
people ever experienced. I went through the whole of the Cape Colony.
I proceeded to Grahamstown, then to Graaff Reinet, and down to the
coast again. With a few exceptions I met all the commandos in the Cape
Colony. I questioned the leaders and thus came to be well informed on
everything. Commandant Kritzinger did not follow me according to
agreement, and as I saw that there was a danger of disorder arising I
took everything under my command. I found that there were about 1,400
or 1,500 men under arms, and not 3,000 as had been reported. To obtain
the exact numbers, however, was almost impossible. Commandant Lotter
was captured with his whole commando of 100 men. I have now been in
the Cape Colony for about a year, and the number that joined us in
that time was about 1,400. The number of men under arms had thus been
doubled, and but for the losses there would now have been 3,000 men.
There are now about 2,600 men under my command, but then there is
another division sent in by General de la Rey under General de
Villiers in Griqualand West, about 700 strong, and another in
Bechuanaland under Commandant van der Merwe. There are thus about
3,300 men operating in the Cape Colony, and this does not include the
men under Myburgh, Wessels, and van Reenen, of whom I know nothing.
The question now is: What help can be expected from the Cape Colony
for our cause? There will be no general rising in the Cape. We had
very good expectations, and thought that it would not be difficult to
cause a general rising there. The people are very enthusiastic--more
so than with us; but they have peculiar difficulties. The first is
with reference to horses. The British have taken all the horses that
could be used, and shot the useless ones. There is, therefore, a
great scarcity of horses in the Cape Colony. And, further, it is
extraordinarily difficult for the Colonist to rise if he has to fight
on foot with the knowledge that if he is captured he will have to
undergo heavy punishment. Unmounted men cannot fight in the Cape
Colony. You can operate only with mounted commandos, and as we have no
horses we cannot accept a tenth of those who are willing to join us.
On account of this deficiency of horses, we cannot expect a general
rising. Another great difficulty is the absence of grass. The veld
over the entire Cape Colony is overgrown with bushes (scrub). There is
no grass as in the Republics. Where you have no forage, therefore, the
horses cannot exist. Where I have been latterly there is wheat, and I
fed my horses on that, but now the wheat is becoming scarce, and there
is no prospect of obtaining any more on account of the proclamations
of the British, which prohibit all sowing. We have, indeed, issued a
counter proclamation, but that has not helped. The question of horses
and forage is thus a great stumbling-block for our cause in the Cape.
In my opinion, the small commandos in the Cape Colony have done their
best. Three British camps were lately taken by them.
The question now arose whether commandos from the Republics could
proceed to the Cape Colony, and whether there was an opening for them
there.--Yes, there was an opening, but the difficulty was how to get
there. More of our commandos from the Republics would be able to exist
in the Cape Colony if food became too scarce here, but the great
trouble was how to get there. The British have now about 50,000
English and Dutch Africanders under arms.--These conditions have led
me to the conclusion that there will be no general rising in the Cape
Colony, and that the continuance of the war will depend more on the
Republics than upon the Cape Colony."
The meeting was then adjourned till the evening.
On re-assembling, the first speaker was Commandant P. L. Uys
(district Pretoria), who said that in his commando there were only 153
mounted men; the other 128 burghers were unmounted. There were still
about 2,000 head of cattle, and grain enough to last them for a month.
All the Kaffirs in his district were hostile, with the exception of
the captain Matello. In the portion of Middelburg under him there were
26 mounted men and 38 burghers on foot.
Commandant H. S. Grobler (Bethal) stated that during all the summer he
had had no rest. He still had a commando of 150 men, but no food, and
he could trek nowhere, because his horses were too poor. Only recently
he had to break through a cordon (kraal), and managed to get through
with only 153 men, while 63 were captured. The Bethal district had
been devastated from the one end to the other. There was no food left
for his commandos, nor for the 300 women and children, who were in a
pitiable condition. They were not only without the necessaries of
life, but also exposed to danger from the Kaffirs, who had already
raped some of the women, which drove some of them to take refuge in
the blockhouses.
General Chris. Botha remarked that he represented Swazieland. With
regard to provisions, the supply of mealies was almost exhausted. They
lived on what they could get from the Kaffirs as a favour. There were
no more women with them. His commando of 113 men was still in the Piet
Retief district. They had no grain, and had to proceed from one
Kaffir-kraal to another to purchase food, which required money.
However, they still managed to live. In this way he had helped the
Transvaal for two and a half years, and now that he heard that there
was food in the Orange Free State he would proceed thither and help
them for two and a half years. In the Piet Retief district they had
grain for about two months, but no cattle, and they had to live on
what they could capture from the enemy. There were 65 families still
there, and it was hard to provide for them. Their position was very
critical.
Mr. Birkenstock (Vryheid) said that he would go more fully into a few
points relating to his district than the Commandant General had been
able to do in his general review. In Vryheid during the last six or
eight months they had been much harassed by large forces, and the
district had been completely devastated. The presence of the families
caused the greatest difficulties. Latterly the British refused to
receive any more families. They were also continually in danger from
Kaffirs, who were decidedly hostile to them. Horses and corn were
scarce. But yet, as far as grain was concerned, they would manage, if
the enemy did not again make incursions into that district. Recently
in the early morning, before daybreak, a Kaffir commando had attacked
a Boer commando consisting of 70 men, of whom they had killed 56. The
families in that district had said to him: "You must make peace in any
case," and he felt it his duty to inform the meeting of this.
General Alberts (Heidelberg) said that for the last twelve months they
had had no rest in his district. During the past year they had not
been able to plough and sow at all, and a commando could no longer
exist there. Three times had they been enclosed in a cordon (kraal),
but had fortunately always managed to get out. They had no
slaughter-cattle themselves, but had received some from Commandant
Roos, of the Orange Free State. His horses were in a most deplorable
condition.
Landrost Bosman (Wakkerstroom) informed the meeting how matters stood
in the Wakkerstroom district. They were dependent upon the Kaffirs for
grain; in fact, for everything except meat. They bartered meat from
the Kaffirs for mealies. But this year there were scarcely any
mealies, and what there were had been badly spoilt by the enemy. With
the supply they had, they would be able to manage for another two
months, and out of this the families with them would also have to be
supported. The supply of slaughter-cattle was also running short, and
the horses were in such a poor condition that they could not be used
against the enemy for a fortnight. It would perhaps become necessary
for the commando to leave the district, and then the great question
arose: What would become of the families there?
Mr. de Clercq (Middelburg) regretted that he had not the privilege of
several members of the meeting of being able to present a rosy report.
The portion of Middelburg which he represented was entirely exhausted.
They had indeed some grain left, but that would last them for only a
short time. They had no slaughter-cattle whatever. With the horses
they still had, they could not operate. They were in too poor
condition to enable the commando to escape if it became necessary to
get out of the way of the enemy. The condition of the burghers was
disheartening. If they should have to leave their district it was very
doubtful whether they would reach their destination, on account of the
condition their horses were in. There were only about 100 burghers
left out of 500. They also had about 50 families with them, and these
were in a miserable plight. The district would have to be abandoned,
and then came the question: What would become of these families? Even
now they were very badly provided for. Some women wished to proceed on
foot to the British, but he had advised them not to do so until the
result of these negotiations were known.
Commandant D. J. Schoeman (Lydenburg) said that until recently they
had about 800 head of cattle, but these had all been removed now by
the enemy. There was no grain at all. As they had no more food for the
men, what would become of the families if the struggle was to be
continued?
Commandant D. J. Opperman (Pretoria, South of the railway) gave an
account of how matters were situated in that part of the district
represented by him. His remarks were to the same effect as those of
Commandant Alberts (see above).
General Liebenberg (Potchefstroom) spoke about the commandos of
Potchefstroom under his command. During the past eight or nine months
blockhouses had been established in his division, and he had only a
narrow space of about twelve miles wide where he could exist. A
considerable amount of corn had been sown, but their fields had
recently fallen into the hands of the enemy, and now everything had
been destroyed, burnt, and trampled down by the horses. They had still
93 families. Some women from the Orange Free State had been placed on
the boundary between the districts of Lichtenburg and Potchefstroom by
the British. These were in a most deplorable condition, and were
almost dying from misery. These women had informed him that unless
matters improved they would proceed to Klerksdorp on foot. He had
advised them to wait until after the completion of the negotiations.
His commando consisted of 400 mounted men and about 100 dismounted. He
would be able to continue the struggle for some little time yet, and
then he would have to seek salvation elsewhere.
General du Toit (Wolmaransstad) informed the meeting that provisions
were very scarce with him, and that they had 500 families to support.
The horses were in a very poor condition, but by making _detours_ he
could always manage to get out of tight corners. His commando was not
large--it consisted of only about 450 mounted men--and the cattle they
had were in good condition, but grain was scarce.
Commandant de Beer (Bloemhof) stated that he had 444 mounted men and
about 165 unmounted burghers. Grain was not plentiful in his district,
nor cattle, but Bloemhof had never had much cattle. The families with
them were not yet suffering very much from scarcity of provisions, and
he thought he would be able to continue the struggle for another year.
General Kemp said that he had under his command portions of the
commandos of Krugersdorp and Rustenburg, and portions of the commandos
of Pretoria and Johannesburg. In the Krugersdorp district they could
not sow any more, and the majority of the cattle had been taken from
them. And yet they were not suffering from want. Indeed, he thought
they should never be in want if they had such a large commissariat
upon which they could draw, namely, the Zoutpansberg district, where
General Beyers was in command. He took from the Kaffirs what he
required, but what he took was not the property of the natives, but
what they had stolen from the burghers. He could hold out for two
years longer.
Chief Commandant de Wet asked why those commandos in the eastern
portions of the Transvaal could not do the same as those under command
of General Kemp, and re-take their property from the Kaffirs?
General Botha replied that the native tribes with which General Kemp
had to do could not even remotely be compared with the tribes with
which they had to deal in the south-east. There the natives were in
contact with the British. Whatever they looted from the Boers they
handed over to the British, who sold the loot. If cattle were
therefore taken from the Kaffirs in the south-eastern districts, they
would be taking cattle the lawful property of the natives. Besides
this, he had to point out that the Zulu was an entirely different kind
of native from the Kaffir with whom General Kemp had to do. The Zulus
were much stronger, and, further, the Republic had an agreement with
the Swazies that they (the Boers) would not trek into their country
with a commando to fight against them. They had to govern themselves
as long as the war lasted. Most of the cattle of the Swazies also had
been moved to behind the Lebombo mountains and to Zambaansland, and
were therefore beyond the reach of the commandos.
General Chris. Botha also declared that no cattle belonging to the
burghers in the eastern parts of the Transvaal were in possession of
the natives.
Mr. J. L. Grobler (Carolina) next related how matters stood in his
district. They had always had cattle and grain, but the British had
cut off the best part of their fields by means of blockhouses. What
they had now sown would stand them in good stead if nothing happened
to prevent them reaping. The Kaffirs were not well disposed. He
thought they could still hold out for seven or eight months, if
nothing unforeseen occurred. They still had 300 horses for the
burghers, but they were weak, and there were a good many burghers for
whom they had no mounts.
Mr. Naude said that he was delegated by a portion of the Pretoria
commando and by the detached commando under General Kemp. They sowed
and reaped as usual. Fortunately he had no women and children to deal
with. His commandos had no large supply of cattle, but yet there was
no want.
After this the meeting was closed with prayer, and adjourned to the
following morning.
FRIDAY, MAY 16TH, 1902.
The delegates met again shortly after nine o'clock.
The meeting was opened with prayer by the Rev. J. D. Kestell.
General Chris. Botha asked whether it was not desirable to attempt to
get into communication with the Deputation in Europe.
After some discussion on this matter, the following two proposals were
made:--
I. Assistant Chief Commandant Froneman, seconded by Commandant
Flemming:--
"That the Republican Governments be instructed to thank the
Governments of His Majesty the King of England and of Her Majesty the
Queen of the Netherlands, through Lord Kitchener, for interesting
themselves in connection with the opening up of peace negotiations, as
appears from the correspondence between the said Governments, and to
express their regret that His Majesty's Government did not accept the
proposal of Her Majesty's Government to place their representatives in
Europe, who still enjoy their full confidence, in a position to come
to the Republics, and also that Lord Kitchener has refused a similar
request made by our Governments."
II. Acting Landdrost H. J. Bosman, seconded by Commandant J. N.
Grobler:--
"The Representatives of the people here assembled resolve to record
their regret that the request of their Governments to meet one or more
of the members of their Deputation had been refused by Lord Kitchener,
and instruct their Governments to try to send the Deputation a
cablegram informing them that a meeting is now taking place to discuss
the possibility of bringing about peace, and further to instruct their
Governments to thank the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of the
Netherlands for interceding in the interests of peace."
On being put to the vote, the first proposal was carried by 36 votes
to 23.
The Chairman now laid before the meeting for discussion the document
which had been drawn up by the Republican Governments relative to the
negotiations in March and April last, and which had been read to all
the commandos at the election of delegates.
Mr. P. R. Viljoen (Heidelberg) then addressed the meeting. He laid
stress on the great seriousness of the matter before the delegates.
The ground whereon they stood, he said, was holy ground. And, indeed,
it was so when they considered how it had been soaked with the tears
and the blood of their fathers and of so many others in the present
struggle. It was extremely hard for him even to think of relinquishing
the independence after all the blood and tears that had been shed, and
all the hardships that had already been endured, but from the
information given them yesterday it was a matter they had to look in
the face. It had been plainly shown that if they wished to continue
the war they would be obliged to abandon some ten districts. By doing
so they would be more concentrated, and that was exactly what the
enemy wanted, for then they would be able to concentrate all their
forces against the Republican commandos. According to what had been
reported in this meeting, matters appeared to be going comparatively
well in the Orange Free State. Here in the Transvaal, however, they
were differently situated. The outlook was very dark, and it appeared
to him that they should try to end the war. If there was a chance of
retaining the independence then they could still continue, and they
would be willing to undergo the bitterest suffering. But the question
was whether there was any prospect of their retaining their
independence. They knew nothing of how matters stood in Europe. The
report from the Deputation that had been laid before the meeting was
six months old. If there were any events in Europe in their favour it
would have come to their knowledge by this time. It was plain that
they should try to obtain peace in an honourable way. But how? They
should still try to retain their independence, and for that purpose it
would be as well if they instructed the Governments to ascertain once
more what the British Government would give if they (the Boers)
relinquished their independence, and that they should know this before
they took a final decision. He did not see much chance to continue the
war. Though it was bitter for him to have had to speak as he had done,
he had felt that it was his duty to do so.
Mr. de Clercq (Middelburg) said he held the same opinion as the last
speaker. They were confronted with great difficulties. The question
was whether they should or should not continue the war. It was
necessary to look into the future, and if they did so they must ask
themselves what would be the consequences of a continuance of the war,
and what the consequences would be if they terminated the struggle
now. He drew the attention of the meeting to the fact that they had at
present about 15,000 men against 250,000 of the enemy. They should
also consider what had been said about the scarcity of food and horses
and the other difficulties. All these matters made it difficult to
prosecute the struggle, and before he could decide in favour thereof
it would have to be shown him that the continuance of the war would
mean the retention of their independence, and if that could be done,
he was prepared to make still further sacrifices. But if there was no
probability of retaining their independence, and if by the continuance
of the struggle all would ultimately only be killed or captured, could
there be a more lamentable termination? He considered that the most
sensible course was to save what could still be saved. Their national
existence should not be sacrificed. Who knew what was still to fall to
the lot of their people in the future? But if everything was
eradicated, they would cease to exist as a people. Was it a good thing
that they should allow a people that had struggled as the Africander
people had done to share such a fate?
Commandant Rheeder (Rouxville) said that though the circumstances were
dark, yet there were some rays of light. If, however, they gave up
their independence, where then could they look for a ray of light? He
was prepared to give his last drop of blood for his country. It had
been asked whether they should continue until they were eventually
annihilated. But he would ask: Should they not continue until they
were all delivered? There were three things possible: deliverance,
annihilation, or surrender to the enemy. The retention of their
independence must take the first place. They should fight on until
they were dead, captured, or delivered.
General Kemp (Krugersdorp) remarked that the matter was most serious.
It was beyond doubt that to a certain extent their circumstances were
dark. But when they commenced the war the chances were not on their
side. They should continue. If they considered what the war had
already cost them, how much blood had been shed, they could not give
up the struggle. As far as he was concerned he wished to continue
until he was dead or saved. They should not look at the dark side
only. In some districts food was indeed scarce, but they could still
find food everywhere. Those districts where they were threatened with
famine they should give up. So many had been captured or killed, but
that gave him so much the more courage. Because the struggle had cost
them so much it could not be given up. If once they were vanquished,
it was all over with the Africander people, and all chance of a
revival would be gone for ever. Why should they not continue to place
their trust in God? They had no right to distrust the God Who had
helped them hitherto.
Mr. Breytenbach (Utrecht) thought that they should not brag. All this
tall talk did not help them. They should consider each other's
feelings. He also had received an instruction from the burghers whom
he represented, and that instruction was that if he could adduce
proofs after this meeting that they were able to continue the war,
then Utrecht would continue to fight; but if he could not do that,
Utrecht would fight no longer. And he could not. They should take a
note of what had been said here yesterday. There were ten districts in
the Transvaal that could not keep up the struggle any longer. Could
they give up these districts? They should not consult their hearts
only, but also their heads, and what did his head tell him? That they
could not continue the war. If they decided that the struggle must go
on, they should be able to carry out that decision as they had done
from the beginning. But they could not. It had been said that they
should trust the Lord, but they could not enter into the decrees of
Providence. They could to some extent understand what God's answer to
their prayers had been. With the Mauser and with Prayer they had
commenced the war, and what had God's answer to those prayers been? He
had led them on ways on which they had not expected to be led. If they
continued now, they would, in his opinion, be dealing a death blow to
the nation. They had seen that ten districts could not keep up the
struggle any longer; should they now say: "We must continue and leave
those districts to their lot?" Would it be right to let those
districts, with the men, women and children who were still in them be
lost? No; they should try to save what could still be saved.
General P. Liebenberg (Klerksdorp) concurred in the views of Mr.
Viljoen and Mr. de Clercq. If they could secure their independence he
would gladly pay for it with his blood. The future appeared dark to
him. They should keep their eyes on God, but also use their brains,
and consider where their present course was leading them to. The
commission he had received from those whom he represented was: "Secure
our independence if it is in any way possible, but be careful and see
to it that our national existence be not destroyed." If they could not
do otherwise they should save what could still be saved, and obtain
peace on the best terms.
Commandant P. L. Uys (Pretoria) spoke as follows: Comrades, we are
faced with a most serious matter. If we continue the struggle I must
leave my district, and hand over the families there a prey to the
Kaffirs, because the British will not receive them. My mounted men I
can always save, but if I did so what would become of the unmounted
men, and what of the women and children? And under these circumstances
it is a question whether all the mounted men would follow me. It now
rests with the delegates and no longer with the Governments to decide
this matter. Never yet have I experienced a day like this, on which I
am called to such a great task. This is no time to criticise each
other. We cannot blame one another, but must bear with one another.
The Bible has been quoted here, but if we do this we must not omit the
text in which reference is made to the King who ought to consider
whether he was competent to proceed with 10,000 men against him who
was marching on him with 20,000 men. A further consideration is, what
will become of the widows and orphans if we do not come to terms, and
thus no longer remain their natural protectors? Oh, we must open our
eyes and observe that God's hand is stretched forth against us, and
not continue to add to the number of widows and orphans.
General J. N. H. Grobler (Ermelo) spoke in the same strain.
The meeting was then adjourned until the afternoon.
On resuming in the afternoon, a letter was read from General Malan,
who was operating in the Cape Colony, and also one from General
Kritzinger. General Malan reported on his operations, and General
Kritzinger advised that the struggle be given up.
General S. P. du Toit was the next speaker, and said: The matter
before us is so serious that I hardly know how to discuss it. We must
bear with one another and remember that we stand here as responsible
people. I have been delegated to this meeting by a portion of the
people who have suffered heavily, and I have a definite instruction.
The people wish to retain their independence, but if that is
impossible, then I am instructed to do the best I can. The state of
matters in my division is, indeed, not so bad as to oblige us to give
up the struggle, but the question is not only what must I do with a
view to the condition in my district alone, but I must also take into
consideration how other districts are situated. We must be specially
on our guard against disunion. What will the future be if a portion of
this meeting decides to make peace and another portion to continue the
war? What will be the position of those who return to continue the
war? Should we not rather all co-operate to obtain from the enemy what
we can, and try to retain a portion of our independence? The eyes of
the enemy are upon us, and what will be the effect if we are divided?
We must consider whether we should not approach the enemy with
proposals, and in that way enter into negotiations with them. If we
cannot prosecute the war we must see what terms we can get. Let us,
above all, guard against internal disunion. If we as one man can
decide to continue the war I shall support the resolution, but if we
cannot be unanimous I am in favour of conceding more to the British
than what our Governments have already offered. I mean we should do
what we can to restore peace, and I would like to add that I am
greatly disappointed in regard to the course matters have taken in the
Cape Colony. It appears to me that the situation was not properly
represented to us from there, but I am glad that we are now well
informed.
Mr. F. W. Reitz, State Secretary of the South African Republic, said:
The future of our country depends upon this opportunity. It is known
what the Governments have already done, and the question I put myself
now is whether there is still something that can be offered to the
enemy consistent with the retention of our independence, and I think
there is. Should we not offer the British the Witwatersrand and
Swazieland? We can also sacrifice our foreign policy and say "We
desire to have no foreign policy, but only our internal independence."
We can then become a protectorate of England. What have we got in the
Witwatersrand? After the Franco-Prussian war France surrendered Alsace
and Lorraine to Germany to retain her independence. What has the
wealth from Johannesburg done for us? That money has only injured the
noble character of our people. This is common knowledge. And the cause
of this war originated in Johannesburg. I could adduce more arguments,
but let me only say that the money obtained from there was to our
detriment. It would now tend to our advantage to be rid of
Johannesburg. We shall then have heard the last of Liquor-jews and
other matters. I do not grudge England that inheritance. And then what
have we in Swazieland? Our object was to get nearer the sea, but I do
not believe that even from that point of view it has now any more
value for us. We have had more loss than gain from Swazieland. As
regards a protectorate, what does that mean? It means that England
undertakes the obligation to defend the country against foreign
attacks. And with reference to our foreign policy, only difficulties
have originated out of that for us. Washington said that his country
must have no foreign policy, and his country became strong enough to
say that other Powers must not interfere with America.
General Muller (Boksburg) agreed with State Secretary Reitz. If they
made a proposal in the terms suggested by Mr. Reitz they would also
prove to the world that they were not fighting for gold or for honour,
but only to be free. His burghers were prepared to surrender the
Witwatersrand and Swazieland, but nothing of their independence.
Rather than do that they would fight to the finish.
Field Cornet Roux (Marico) said: My instruction is that I can concede
much, but we must retain our independence. I stand or fall by that.
Landrost Stofberg (Zoutpansberg) said: Disunion must not even be
mentioned with us. We must strive to be unanimous. I make this remark
with reference to what General du Toit said. Zoutpansberg has said to
me: "Our independence we will not surrender. We are prepared to
concede much, but not that." If we can satisfy the British in some way
or other and retain our independence, I will support such a course.
Some of the burghers are of opinion that the Gold Fields can be
surrendered for a time, and others point out that gold was the cause
of the war. The gold has indeed injured us all, and I agree that we
can give up the Gold Fields. What has the gold done for us? You may
say: "It has enriched us." Yes, but it has been much more of a
stumbling block. If there had been no Johannesburg, there would also
never have been a war. Is it not better for us to be a poor but
independent people than rich and a subject nation? The gold is only a
temptation, and has a pernicious moral influence on our national
character. Let the Gold Fields be given up. We shall in any case
retain the Johannesburg market.
Commandant Mentz (Heilbron) I must ask the indulgence of the meeting,
as I regret that I am not able to present such a rosy report as my
fellow delegates from the Free State. From ten to fifteen columns are
trekking about in my district, devastating everything. There is but
little grain, but my greatest trouble is the families who are still
with us. We have 200 families, and how and on what must they live?
Some months ago I had 200 burghers. Now I have only 80. If we must
continue the war I with my men can leave my district, but what must I
then do with my 200 families? My instruction was: "Do not surrender
the independence," but more than half the burghers who gave me this
instruction have been captured, and subsequently others have asked me
to try to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement, and to act according
to circumstances. I am at one with the proposal of State Secretary
Reitz. Let us even give up a portion of our country if we can thereby
retain our independence. I recollect when I was still a child the late
President Jan Brand saying: "Give up the Diamond Fields! You will
profit more from them than England; you plough and sow and farm." This
we can do now, too.
Commandant Fleming (Hoopstad) said that Hoopstad had been considerably
devastated, and few cattle had been left, but there were still other
cattle with which they had escaped. Matters in his district were not
in such a state that they could not continue the war. There was also
sufficient game for them to live on. The burghers had said to him: "We
have sacrificed wives and children, fathers and mothers, brothers and
sisters, money and blood, and if we must now surrender our
independence too, we give up everything, and rather than do that we
will fight to the finish." However, he had to admit that the burghers
were not acquainted with the conditions in other parts of the country
and in the Transvaal, and now that he knew what these conditions were
he could support the proposal of State Secretary Reitz to give up a
portion of the country to save the independence. They should, if
possible, make an end to the war out of sympathy with the poor
families who suffered so grievously from the enemy and from the
Kaffirs.
Acting State President Burger spoke as follows: The Governments must
receive an instruction from the delegates after they have heard and
considered everything. We should now make a fresh proposal to the
British and see what will come of it. If our proposals are rejected
then we stand exactly where we were before. If any one of you is
attached to his independence, I am too, and I shall very seriously
consider the matter before I surrender it. If any one of you has
sacrificed everything and is prepared to sacrifice still more I am
prepared to do so too. Some say: "We must retain our independence or
continue to fight. We can continue the struggle for another six months
or nine months or a year." But supposing we did that, what would we
gain thereby? Only this, that the enemy would be stronger and we
weaker. If I take everything into consideration I must say it appears
to me impossible to prosecute the war any longer. We can, indeed,
proceed and say: "Let come what will," but who of us can declare
to-day with an upright and clear conscience that we can continue the
struggle with any chance of success? God works miracles, but who can
assure me that He will do so in our case? It is argued that European
complications may arise, but that is a mere hope without foundation.
We must view the matter from all sides, and there is this other point
to which I wish to draw your attention. In a wonderful way the Lord
has hitherto preserved and spared us, and kept us standing, so that we
are still acknowledged as a party, and can speak and negotiate for our
people. Now we should ask ourselves whether this is not the last
chance we shall have of being able to do so. If this opportunity is
allowed to pass, I fear all chances will for ever be gone for us to
negotiate as a party for the entire people. Commandant Rheeders said
that we must fight till we are dead, captured, or saved. That would be
manly and would redound to the honour of ourselves and of our
descendants; but must we act from lust of glory? Would that be
sensible and right towards our people? Can we let the people be
annihilated for the sake of honour and fame for ourselves? If I
sacrifice my person for my people it would bring me true honour, but
not otherwise. If after discussion and consideration we become
convinced that we can only continue the war for a little while longer,
it is our duty to make an end to it now. What would further
unnecessary torture avail us? Have we not now arrived at that stage
when we should pray: "Thy will be done"? and then when we feel what
His will is, surrender ourselves to it? That is a prayer of faith, and
one must be prepared to abide by His will. We have already effected
supernatural things at which the world stands amazed. Shall we now
allow a people, who have sacrificed even women and children, to be
exterminated? If we do not arrive at a proper peace now, then when the
last shot shall have been fired, and the war terminates in another
way, what will become of our women and children and of our prisoners
of war? We shall have rejected the proposals of the British
Government, and what right will we have to intercede for these
unfortunate people? We must think seriously over this. If we see that
we have no ground for hope upon which we can continue the war, then we
must now try to get for our people the best that can be got. We were
proud and despised the enemy, and is it not perhaps God's will to
humble us and cast down the pride in us by allowing us to be oppressed
by the English people? The time will come when we shall again exist as
a people. If you decide to proceed with the war, I shall stand or fall
with your decision, although I would not approve of it. I think we
should draft a proper peace proposal, in which we concede as much as
possible, in order to retain our independence. If England refuses to
accept our proposals we can consider further what course to pursue.
Reference has been made to the confiscation of farms, but there can be
no confiscation, as long as we are in possession of the whole country.
However, if we have to abandon ten districts of the Transvaal, and
some in the Orange Free State, then, according to legal advice, those
confiscation Proclamations could be carried into effect, and where
would we then stand? I say it would be criminal of us to continue the
struggle till everything is destroyed and everyone dead if we are now
convinced that it is a hopeless struggle. Our people do not deserve to
be annihilated.
After this the following proposal was handed in by General Kemp,
seconded by Mr. Naude, which was unanimously adopted:--
"In order to expedite the business this meeting resolves to appoint
General J. C. Smuts and General Hertzog as a committee to draft a
resolution in consultation with the two State Presidents, and submit
same to the meeting to-morrow."
The meeting was then adjourned until the evening at 7.30 o'clock.
After a short service conducted during the adjournment by the Rev. J.
D. Kestell, the meeting re-assembled at 7.30 p.m.
General Celliers (Lichtenburg) reported as follows: Circumstances in
my district are favourable. We have abundant provisions and our horses
are good. The burghers are also well organised. But I wish to take
into account the circumstances in which the other districts are
situated. My burghers are just at present a little fiery, and say:
"Stand firm for the independence." But when they said that, they were
not acquainted with the circumstances elsewhere, and the question is:
To what extent can the other districts who are worse off than we are,
co-operate with us? Well, the other districts say that, if the war is
continued they cannot join in maintaining the struggle. I wish to act
on the lines that will be best for my people and for the future. Now,
what would be best--to say we shall fight to the finish, or to
approach the enemy with a proposal, the acceptance of which will
preserve us as a people? A further question is: Are we as leaders of
the people justified in making further sacrifices? Personally, I must
reply: "Yes, certainly, because we commenced with our trust in God,
Who has preserved us miraculously hitherto." It was painful to me to
hear a comrade say to-day that God's hand was against us. As far as I
am concerned I say we must proceed, but as it appears that all of us
are not able to keep up the struggle, we must jointly try to pursue a
course by which we can in some measure retain our independence. If we
give that up, what can we offer instead to the women and children who
have suffered so grievously?
General Froneman (Winburg and Ladybrand) spoke as follows: I have not
much to say, but it appears to me that matters in my division are
viewed too favourably. The condition is not so rosy there as might be
deduced from what has been said here. I am, however, tied by an
instruction. In a word, my burghers have said to me: "We wish to hear
of nothing else but the retention of our independence, and that
intact." They do not wish to trample on the blood that has already
been shed, but to persevere until deliverance comes. I sympathise with
the comrades from those divisions where matters are so serious, but
our deliverance is from the Lord. It grieves me to observe a doubt
amongst some of us whether God is indeed with us. I would only ask:
Has there ever been a greater miracle than this, that we have been
able hitherto to maintain the struggle against such overwhelming odds?
What has maintained us to this moment? It is the faith of those who in
privacy prayed God to ward off the war, and who when they saw that
such was not God's will, but that He ordained that there should be
war, trusted in Him, and fought bravely. The Lord has indeed hitherto
helped us. The enemy cut us off entirely from the outside world, and
yet these two small Republics have been enabled to maintain the
struggle. Is that not a marvel? I should like to hear what Generals
Botha, de Wet, and de la Rey have to say, for they can throw much
light on the subject for us.
Commandant General Botha said: I am glad to have this opportunity of
expressing my views. It has been observed that we must not be divided,
but when I consider the information that has been given us here, then
there cannot but be a difference of opinion, because in those
divisions where the circumstances are favourable the delegates cannot
flinch at anything. They must declare that they will maintain the
struggle for our independence. If the delegates from those divisions,
where they cannot hold out any longer, differ from the others with
reference to the possibility of continuing the war, we must not
ascribe that to indifference or cowardice or slackness, but to facts
which have wrought a sincere conviction in them. Where I differ from
one or other of you, I do so simply on facts. If I should maintain
silence as to the true state of affairs, and matters went wrong later
on, I, as Head, could be accused of having suppressed facts.
Difference of opinion, however, need not cause any division. We have
commenced this war together and prosecuted it with unanimity. There
should, therefore, be no mention of discord. It is my duty and the
duty of everyone to bow to the decision of the majority. Even though I
may differ in opinion, the decision of the majority is my decision.
Some of the speakers have said that they, as delegates, are tied by
the instructions received from their burghers, notwithstanding the
legal advice given us here, that such an instruction is not binding.
If we should adhere to an instruction given to us by a portion of the
people, that was not acquainted with the position of affairs over the
whole country, then we should not be acting honestly towards that
people in general. We stand here before the question whether our
people shall die a national death, or whether they shall live, and I
am of opinion that no one can judge as to what course we should pursue
unless the facts as to the true conditions obtaining over the entire
country are laid before him, and only in this meeting will these facts
come before us. Let us therefore not say that we are tied by an
instruction.
On the great question before us, I would first ask: How are we now
situated? For more than two and a half years we have fought for our
just rights, and what do we see if we take a retrospective view? Are
we making progress, or are we gradually going down the precipice? I
have been in correspondence with my officers in all parts of the
country, and have received information from them as to the condition
of affairs, but I must tell you that from all that information there
is nothing to show me that our cause is progressing, not even by the
smallest stride. Instead of the large fighting force we had last year,
we have now only 10,000 men. In the course of the last year we have
lost 6,000 men either through death or capture.
When I consider our decline during the past ten months, I must say
that the enemy has in that time learnt to fight better against us, and
to do our people more damage. Ten months ago there was not a single
blockhouse in my division; now lines of blockhouses intersect the
entire division. You can cross these lines only at night, and then
only with difficulty. The whole division is cut up into large areas.
We are now obliged to split up our forces into small groups, so that
the enemy may not be able to ascertain where the commando really is.
Through being so intersected by these lines of blockhouses, which we
cannot cross by daylight, we run a great risk of being captured, and,
indeed, many burghers are captured.
It has been remarked that we can still obtain provisions here and
there. Meat is almost our only food now, and everyone knows what it
means to cross a blockhouse line with cattle. Latterly the commandos
have been supporting themselves principally on cattle looted from the
enemy, but recently the enemy has sent almost all their loot cattle
down to Natal. The cattle, for instance, that was at Ladysmith has
been removed to Estcourt, so that there is now very little opportunity
for looting. To a large extent also we have lived on cattle purchased
from the Kaffirs, but the enemy has now removed even the Kaffirs with
their cattle. The danger is that these districts, forced thereto by
hunger, will later be obliged to say, that however bitter, they must
conclude peace on any terms. We have tried to obtain cattle from other
districts, but that has been proved to be no longer possible. Our
position has thus in this respect become much worse. The blockhouses
are not the only cause of this, but the decline is also to be
attributed to the weakening of our horses, which are driven about so
by the overwhelming force of the enemy, that they are in a very poor
condition and weak, the more so because we have no more forage for
them.
They are so poor that it is difficult, almost impossible, to travel
any distance with them. Another reason is also, that most of the
burghers have now only one horse which must always do service, so that
there is no chance to let it have a proper rest. It has been suggested
that those commandos that can no longer exist in their own districts
should proceed to other parts of the country, but I may say that the
majority of our horses are not able to cover a long distance. If that
is attempted many burghers will be captured on account of their horses
giving up.
I always heard that the Cape Colony is waiting for a suitable
opportunity to rise in great numbers, but according to information now
obtained by me from General Smuts, I am convinced that the cause is
hopeless there. General Smuts also says, after having seen our horses,
that it is absolutely impossible for us to reach the Cape Colony, as
our idea was. We cannot, therefore, rely on the Cape Colony any more.
Our cause has been a failure there. Colonials are also so harshly
treated that they have not the chance or desire to rise. There are not
many Colonists under arms, and it appears to me that lately there are
more Africanders against us, than fighting for us.
In the beginning of the war I hoped and believed that the other
European Powers would not allow one Power to become master of the
Goldfields. But we cherished a false hope. In the letters received
from our Deputation last year they wrote us, that we should not hope
for intervention, because there was for the time being no prospect of
it. From the correspondence between the British and Netherlands
Governments it appears that our Deputation was accredited only to the
Netherlands Government, and therefore that Government alone was in a
position to take upon itself to procure the termination of the war.
The Deputation was accredited by both Republics to all the European
Powers. It appears, however, that only to the Netherlands Government
did they hand in their credentials. This fact has a particularly great
significance for me. It proves that they were advised not to present
their credentials to other Powers. We know that the Deputation would
have left no stone unturned to help us, but after they have been in
Europe for two years they had had to inform us that they had obtained
no help for us, and further, that they could hold out no prospect of
help. We must therefore cherish no hope whatever of help from Europe.
And it is apparent that if no nation came to our assistance when the
enemy introduced a new principle into warfare, namely, to remove women
and children by force, crowd them in camps, and let them die in
thousands, then we need not ever expect any help from other nations.
Their inaction makes me think that they do not care what becomes of
us, even though we all die. They ought to have known that if the
British were tacitly allowed to introduce such a new principle into
warfare, that principle would establish a precedent. We have only the
sympathy of the European Powers, and that sympathy threatens to
smother us, and there the matter remains.
I now come to another matter which lies very near to the heart of each
one of us, namely, our families. If this meeting should decide to
continue the war, then some provision or other must be made for them.
We shall have to decide what to do with them. When I think over this
matter my mind is at a standstill. Their condition is most pitiable,
and they are exposed to all kinds of danger. I have lately tried to
send them in to the British, but without success, because the British
would not receive them. The position has now become such that I am
beginning to think that the fathers of these families must accompany
them into the British lines, because then the enemy receives them. But
even this suggestion offers a great difficulty, namely this, that we
have with us many wives of prisoners-of-war, and what can we do with
them? Where could we find men to "hands up" with them? These families
are in a terrible condition, and something must be done for them.
It has been said that we must fight "to the bitter end," but no one
tells us where that bitter end is. Is it there where everyone lies in
his grave or is banished? In my opinion we must not consider the time
when everyone lies in his grave as the "bitter end." If we do so, and
act upon that view, we become the cause of the death of our people. Is
the bitter end not there, where the people have struggled till they
can struggle no more? Personally, there is nothing that hinders me to
prosecute the war still further. My family is well provided for. I
have good horses, and when I consider what the enemy has done, then I
say: "Rather die than surrender," and that is also my inclination. But
I must not regard myself, but my people and the other men who must
fight.
I assure you that our position is serious, and when I lay matters bare
to you, I do not do so to discourage you, but to give you a clear
insight into them, as it is my duty to do, because you must take a
very important decision here. I have always thought that when matters
came to such a pass with us, that we were driven by hunger to
surrender we should, before going under, and while we were still a
nation, accept terms. We cannot wait until our numbers are reduced to
a few thousand men and then try to negotiate. It would then be too
late. If we wish to negotiate, now is the time. If the Lord God wills
it, then, however bitter, we must come to terms. We cannot simply go
on blindly and say that we trust in God. Miracles can happen, but it
is not for me or for you to say what God's will is with us, or that
the Lord will allow us to retain our independence. If we proceed, it
will be a bitter cup for us to see that the one commando after the
other is forced to surrender. Our responsibility will only be the
greater if we go on and ultimately yet lose. We hear continually of
the death of this one or that one, and it is asked who will care for
the widows if we make peace now? But does not this question remain if
we prosecute the war?
If we have to give up eleven districts--and that means the half of the
South African Republic--then as far as I can see the war must end
disastrously for our people. If a great victory is gained over us we
shall not be able to stand it. All will immediately be over with us.
There is a military reason why we have been able to carry on such a
great war for such a long time against such overwhelming forces, and
that is, because we have commandos in each district, which compels the
British to divide their forces. But if we abandon eleven districts, as
we shall have to do shortly, that will mean the concentration of our
forces, which will give the enemy an opportunity of concentrating
their troops against us, and the consequences thereof will be fatal
for us.
In only one portion of our country, namely, in Zoutpansberg, is there
still food, but how do we obtain our provisions there? It must be
taken, and thereby we create more enemies. Our safety in Zoutpansberg
lay in this: that hitherto the Kaffirs were divided, but if the enemy
were to pour into that district the Kaffirs will join them against us.
I therefore foresee danger for our commandos if they proceed to
Zoutpansberg.
I feel that our people have defended themselves and have fought better
than any people in the world. Our little nation has already sacrificed
proportionately more in this struggle than any other nation known in
history, and I should regret it bitterly if this people should be
destroyed, or have to fight till all are dead or captured, and the
independence lost. If we become convinced that it is impossible for us
to proceed, that it is impossible for us to retain our independence,
then we must inform the people to that effect, and they can then
decide what they wish to do. By continuing blindly we shall certainly
fall. During the last year more than 20,000 women and children died in
the concentration camps, and their suffering there was terrible. Then
there are also some of our own people, who have taken up arms against
us, and if matters go on as at present there will shortly be more
Africanders fighting against us than for us.
The question now is: What must we do? There are only a few courses
open to us. If we can retain our independence by the surrender of a
portion of our territory, then, however hard it may be, let us do so.
The State Secretary has made a few suggestions in this respect, and
however detrimental it may be to us to have a Government within a
Government in the country, it would nevertheless be better than to
lose everything, for humanly speaking it is impossible for us to
retain our independence by force of arms. Swazieland is a great
country, and yet it is of no value to us, and we can well give it up.
And let us also surrender the Witwatersrand--that cancer in our
country--if we can save ourselves thereby. If by these means we do not
succeed in our object it is for you to say whether the war must still
be continued or not. The conditions show me plainly that we are going
backward. In the Orange Free State we have only 6,000 men under arms,
and in the South African Republic only 10,000. Compare these with the
numbers with which we commenced. Are we not going down the precipice?
Let us not co-operate to that end. Let us rather do what we can to
save our people if we must lose our independence. If we must give up
the struggle, are we then to say to the enemy: "We have fought for our
independence only, and since we cannot get that, here we are, do with
us as you please." That we can do for ourselves as leaders, but we
cannot say that for our people. We must interpose for our people. We
must try to get for them what we can, because they are absolutely
ruined, and if we make no terms we place them unconditionally in the
hands of their bitterest enemies. Would that be desirable? If we
cannot retain our independence, let us try to get responsible
Government. Then we will be governed by leaders from amongst ourselves
who can keep their hands over the heads of the people. Let us also try
to secure the rights of our language, the Dutch language. You know how
long it took before the rights of that language were in a measure
acknowledged in the Cape Colony. Shall we not try to get those rights
acknowledged here now we have the chance? Let us stand firm for these
two points, and for the payment of all direct debts, as is done in the
Cape Colony and Natal. We need not trouble ourselves about smaller
matters for they are of such a nature that a Government must attend to
them in the interests of the people.
Some argue that we must accept no terms, because we would thereby bind
ourselves for the future, but that we should go over into a condition
of passive resistance. But can we do that? It is a fact that when the
war ceases there will be famine in the country, and what will be
easier for the British Government than to supply the people with food
on condition that the men take the oath of allegiance? Therefore I
think that it is much better for us, the leaders, to try and stipulate
certain terms for our people. Should we not now co-operate to that
end, or should we wait until we are entirely overpowered and then have
to wait some thirty years before we can be on our legs again. In my
opinion there can be no question of unconditional surrender. You
cannot say that you will accept no terms. We may not say: "Do with us
what you please." If we do that, then our children will be a standing
protest against us. Let us respect each other's opinions. I cannot,
and may not, on account of your opinions, suspect anyone here
to-night, who hitherto in spite of all hardship and bitterness, has
faithfully stood under arms, of being afraid. Only by standing firmly
together and taking one another by the hand can we extricate ourselves
from the deep abyss in which we now stand. Believe me, it is bitter
for me to have to speak as I do, and if you can remove my difficulties
I shall be sincerely thankful.
General de la Rey said: I shall be brief and only touch upon a few
points. You can understand that after the success that has crowned our
arms lately, I have a definite instruction from the burghers in my
division to stand by our independence. And they have grounds for such
an instruction. The burghers have, indeed, lost over 300 men from
deaths and captures, but they have performed deeds of heroism. I do
not say this to boast, but to make the position of myself and of my
fellow delegates clear to you. These victories have naturally had a
particularly good effect on the burghers and also upon the enemy. I do
not wish to convey that these victories have such an effect upon the
enemy that they will cause the scales in this struggle to turn in our
favour, but I say it to show that no one can take it amiss in the
burghers if they give such instructions as they have done.
However, since my arrival, and since I have learnt how matters are
situated in other districts, I feel the difficulties that are brought
forward against the continuance of the war. Under my command I have
also districts, such as Potchefstroom and Krugersdorp, where the
burghers cannot maintain the struggle, but they have the opportunity
there of withdrawing to other parts where they can exist. I have
always been of opinion that I may not lay down my arms as long as I
have any food, even though that food consists of nothing else but
mealies. But it appears to me that certain districts will be compelled
by hunger to surrender. Therefore I am pleased that leaders speak
openly here, and do not arrogantly say: "We can still continue," and
then, when we return, lay down their arms, and put everything upon the
shoulders of only some of us.
Referring to intervention, I may say that the Commandant General and
other members of the Government know what my views have always been on
that matter. I was certain of it that there would never be any
intervention for us, and said so before the war. If Britain becomes
the owner of the Republics, then South Africa would be owned partly by
Germany and partly by England. If Britain becomes the owner of a
portion, then the German possession was guaranteed. That would not be
the case if the Republics won the struggle. The German possessions
would then also be in danger. Will German statesmen therefore
intervene to check England to their own detriment? We need not,
therefore, give intervention even a thought.
There is another point. It is argued that we must fight to the bitter
end. The Commandant General has asked whether that bitter end has
arrived. I think each one must decide that for himself. It must be
borne in mind that everything--cattle, goods, money, man, woman and
child--has been sacrificed. In my division many people go almost
naked. There are men and women who wear nothing more than plain skins
on the naked body. Is this not the bitter end? Only the fighting
burghers are supplied with the necessary clothing, which they take
from the enemy. Therefore I think that the time for negotiating has
now arrived. If this opportunity is not availed of, the door will be
closed. England will never again allow us to meet in this way, or give
us an opportunity to conclude an agreement.
The question is: How shall we negotiate? I hardly know how to proceed.
It is the duty of this meeting to instruct the two Governments, and I
advise you to be sensible. If we cannot obtain what we desire I am
prepared to fight to the finish, whatever that may be.
The proposals made by the State Secretary and supported by the
Commandant General, namely, to surrender the Gold Fields, I cannot
favour, and for two reasons. The first is because I am convinced that
even though we should offer the Gold Fields, the British will refuse
to accept them, because by doing so they would prove to the whole
world that they only wanted the Gold Fields. The second reason is that
we would be parting with our biggest source of revenue, and how shall
we materially rescue the people from the impoverished circumstances in
which we now find ourselves? How shall we pay our debts? I think we
should try to obtain other and better terms.
Chief Commandant de Wet addressed the meeting as follows: I intended
to say nothing on this great matter, because my opinions on it are no
secret. I still have the same opinion which I had when the war
threatened us. In the Orange Free State you find the same critical
conditions that existed in the South African Republic. There are nine
districts which were entirely abandoned by us for a time, but which
were later on again occupied by the burghers. The only food there was
some corn which had been hidden. Meat had to be taken from the enemy.
I deeply respect the feelings of Commandant General Botha, although I
differ from him and others, who are of opinion that we must stop the
war. I believe what has been said about the general misery in so many
districts of the South African Republic and about the difficulty in
keeping up the struggle there, but you must not take it amiss in me if
I point out that that unfortunate correspondence between our two
Governments which fell into the hands of the British at Reitz, painted
the conditions in more or less the same colours as those in which they
are now represented. That was a year ago. I wish, however, to accept
what has been said as true. Still the Free State does not wish to give
up the war. I wish to speak openly, and let no one consider it as a
reproach when I say that this is really a Transvaal war. I say this in
a friendly and brotherly spirit, because, for me, the waters of the
Vaal River never existed. I always was an advocate of closer union.
There are unfaithful burghers amongst us, too, unfaithful to the
Compact between the two Republics, but I cling to that Compact, and
say that the entire war is our common cause.
What is now the mood prevailing amongst the burghers of the Orange
Free State? The meetings held there were attended by 6,000 burghers. I
myself was present at various meetings at which altogether 5,000
attended, while General Hertzog met the remaining 1,000. At these
meetings a voice as of thunder was given for the independence. The
resolution was: "Continue. We have always been prepared to sacrifice
everything for our independence, and are still prepared to do so." Not
a single man spoke differently. There is thus only one course open to
me. We must see what can be done for those parts of the country which
are helpless. I do not wish to be the man to say what must be done,
but I shall do everything I can to help. It would be very hard for me
if we have to adopt the suggestion of General Botha to send men into
the enemy's lines with their families. But we must continue the war.
Let us consider what our numbers were when we commenced. Let us assume
that there were 60,000 burghers able to bear arms. We knew that
England had an army of about 750,000 men. Of this she has sent about
250,000 here, namely, one-third. And experience teaches that she
cannot send out much more than a third. Have we not also still got
about a third of our fighting force?
I am also prepared to give up something for the sake of retaining our
independence, but with reference to the suggestion of offering the
Gold Fields, I agree with General de la Rey on that point. We can have
no other Government, no English Colony, in the midst of our country.
That will cause friction. It is said that the Gold Fields have been a
curse and a cancer for us. Well, they need not remain a curse. And
then, how shall we materially rescue our people without the Gold
Fields? Swazieland is not of much importance. That we can give up.
The war is a matter of faith. If I had not been able to do so in
faith, I would never have taken up arms. Let us again renew our
covenant with God. If we fix our eyes on the past we have more ground
for our faith than I ever expected, and we have ground to continue in
faith. The entire war has been a miracle, and without faith it would
have been childish to commence the war. We must not think of
intervention. That there has been no intervention is a proof that God
does not will it, because through this war he wishes to form us into a
people. Our help and our deliverance must come from Him alone, and
then we shall not become proud. I cannot see into the future, but this
I know, that behind me it is light. What lies before me I do not know.
There it is dark, but we must go on trusting God, and then, when
victory comes, we shall not be proud.
With reference to the Cape Colony, I may say that I am also
disappointed, not with the reports from there, but because there has
been no general rising. People who sent us information have not kept
their word. We must accept the report of General Smuts, and he says
we must not depend upon the Cape Colony; but he does not say that our
cause is declining there. The Cape Colony has been of great assistance
to us, because it compelled the enemy to withdraw about 50,000 troops
from the Republics.
I feel for the poor families who are suffering so grievously, and also
for our burghers in the camps. I think anxiously of their misery, but
I have nothing to do with facts. The entire war is a matter of faith.
I have to do with a fact only when I have to remove it.
I must still make this one remark, that if we surrender, as
vanquished, we shall be able to depend on small mercy from England. We
shall then in any case have dug the grave of our independence. Well,
then, what is the difference between going into our graves in reality,
and digging the grave for our national existence?
Mr. C. Birkenstock (Vryheid) said: We must be careful how we deal with
the Gold Fields. Our country is dreadfully impoverished, and I fail to
see how we can give up that source of income.
The meeting was then adjourned, after prayer, to the following day.
SATURDAY, MAY 17TH, 1902.
At the request of the Chairman the meeting was opened with prayer by
Chief Commandant de Wet at 9.30 o'clock.
A private report from Mr. Schmorderer, who had brought the despatch
from Europe from the deputation, was read, after which Landdrost
BOSMAN (Wakkerstroom) said: We do not know what the future will bring
us, but we can gauge the future by the past. The commando, of the
district which I represent, namely, Wakkerstroom, had 600 men a year
ago. Now that number has been reduced by more than 300. Then, we had
more than sufficient horses. Everyone could simply catch a horse, and
Vryheid got more than 400 horses from us. Now there are burghers of
Wakkerstroom who have no horses, and it is impossible for them to
obtain one. With regard to food, there were then 3,000 to 4,000 bags
of mealies; now we have barely 300 to 400, and these are scarcely
within our reach. If matters have proceeded thus in the course of a
year, what will be our position twelve months hence? What will then
become of the burghers who have no horses? We must also consider the
condition of our families. They have no clothing. That, however, is
not of great consequence. The principal matter is the want of food.
More than one woman has been obliged to live for weeks on fruit alone.
I myself have lived for days simply on mealie-pap (porridge). We must
obtain mealies from the Kaffirs by using nice words. When the enemy
operates in the district we must leave the families to the mercy of
the British and the armed Kaffirs. If we supply them with provisions,
the enemy simply removes those provisions, and they are left without a
morsel of food. If we decide to continue the war some provision must
be made for these families. Their husbands declare that if peace is
not made now there is no other course open to them than to go over to
the enemy, for they cannot any longer look on to see their families
dying of hunger or being murdered.
Then we must also keep in view the condition of the families in the
hands of the enemy. They have submitted to much anguish and suffering,
but always in the belief that we had good hopes of deliverance. If
they knew how matters were situated with us they would adopt other
views. More than 2,000 women and children die per month in the camps,
and if we prosecute the struggle without hope, we become accessory to
their death.
The Kaffir question is also a serious matter.
Of intervention there is no hope. Some time ago I thought that we
would get help from the British people, but that nation becomes more
and more indifferent under all the occurrences of the war, and it
appears to me that their Government will be able to prosecute the war
to the finish.
What will now be the result if we decide to continue the struggle? We
have seen how England has during the past year weakened us more and
more; we have seen how many burghers have become unfaithful and
strengthened the enemy. If it were not for those unfaithful people out
of our midst we would never have had such a hard time of it. If we go
on we shall ever become weaker and weaker, and ultimately dwindle
away. What shall we then have gained by continuing the struggle?
To-day we are still in a position to obtain something from the enemy,
and to stipulate for assistance for our ruined people, who cannot get
on their legs again without help. The burghers are prepared to proceed
and to suffer still more if there is any ground upon which we can
continue the war. If we have no well-founded grounds then I must warn
this meeting that we shall lose many Wakkerstroom burghers. We have
this opportunity for negotiating, and now is the time that we can
still obtain something from the enemy. We shall never have this
opportunity again. If it is clear to us that our independence is lost
then we have still our people to consider. If we simply dwindle away,
our people will sink and become of no account.
The matter has also been considered from a religious point of view. I
am not ashamed to confess that I also serve God, but God has given us
reason, and if we see that, humanly speaking, there is no prospect of
our deliverance, we cannot expect that God will simply grant us our
desire. If we desire to have our independence for the honour of God,
He will let us retain it, but I fear that we desire it more for
ourselves, more for our own honour, than for the honour of God. Unless
some other light is thrown on the matter, I fear it will be wrong of
us to continue the struggle. Reference is made to the blood that has
been shed and to the sacrifices that have been made; but what about
the women and children who will still have to give up their lives if
we now continue, and yet ultimately have to give the matter up as
hopeless? The persons who are still living are of more importance to
me than those who have already given their lives. I say we may not
proceed unless we can give ourselves and our people good reasons for
doing so.
At this stage the Committee appointed to draft a resolution handed in
their draft. It was read, and after some discussion, adopted.
The draft resolution was as follows:--
"This meeting of representatives of the people from both Republics,
having considered the correspondence and the negotiations that passed
between the Governments of both Republics and His Excellency Lord
Kitchener on behalf of the British Government;
"Having heard the information supplied by the delegates from the
various parts of both Republics;
"Having heard the latest reports from their Representatives in Europe;
"Considering the fact that the British Government has refused to
conclude peace, on the basis of their independence, and has refused to
accept the proposals of their Governments made on that basis; yet, in
spite of the above-mentioned refusal of the British Government, this
meeting nevertheless desires to comply with the ardent wishes of the
people to retain their independence, for which so many material and
personal sacrifices have been made;
"RESOLVES, on behalf of the people of both Republics, to authorise the
Governments to conclude peace on the following basis, to wit: The
retention of a limited independence with the offer, in addition to
what has already been offered by the Governments in their
negotiations, dated April 15th, 1902, of:--
(_a_) Surrender of all foreign relations and embassies;
(_b_) acceptance of the protectorate of Great Britain;
(_c_) surrender of portions of the territory of the South
African Republic;
(_d_) the conclusion of a defensive treaty with Great Britain
with reference to South Africa."
During the discussion of this draft resolution the Governments were
clearly given to understand that the portions of the territory which
they could surrender were those already mentioned, namely, the Gold
Fields and Swazieland.
The question was put whether the South African Republic alone should
have to pay for the retention of independence, as these areas formed a
portion of that territory.
To this Mr. de Clercq (Middelburg) replied "Yes, and if I could secure
the independence of the Orange Free State with all I possess, I would
do so." Other Transvaal delegates spoke in the same sense, indicating
that the sacrifices made by the Free State during the war were most
highly appreciated by them.
General Froneman thanked the Transvaal delegates on behalf of the Free
State, remarking that there could be no further mention of the two
States having divergent interests.
With reference to the resolution, General de la Rey declared that he
was opposed to the surrender of Johannesburg.
Commandant Ross (Vrede) remarked: "I am surprised that the meeting
takes such a resolution. What the people demand is total independence,
and we can do nothing else but comply with that demand. Otherwise we
act in a childish way. My commando is prepared to do everything to
secure peace provided they retain their independence. If we part with
that we cease to be a people."
Commandant J. J. van Niekerk (Ficksburg) declared that the meeting
could not even think of surrendering their independence.
General H. A. Alberts (Heidelberg) said: I have a free hand to act
according to circumstances. We shall be committing suicide if we
continue the war without any hope and without any prospect of
attaining our object, and not only suicide, but a murder also of women
and children. If I could to-day purchase the independence of the Free
State with all that I still possess, even with my life, I would do it
with pleasure, but we cannot do what is impossible.
General P. R. Viljoen (Heidelberg) agreed with what General Alberts
had said, and was of opinion that they had to reckon with facts.
The meeting was now adjourned to two o'clock in the afternoon.
The meeting resumed at two o'clock p.m.
After some discussion, the following proposal, made by General Brand
and seconded by Mr. de Kock, was carried with the dissentient vote of
General Kemp:--
"This meeting of representatives of the people of both the Republics
resolve to instruct the two Governments to appoint a Commission with
instructions to negotiate with His Excellency Lord Kitchener on behalf
of His Britannic Majesty's Government on any subject in order to try
to arrive at a satisfactory peace, and to submit their attempts
through the two Governments to this meeting for approval."
After this the meeting was closed with prayer.
In pursuance of the above-mentioned resolution the two Governments
appointed the following gentlemen as a Commission to negotiate with
Lord Kitchener:--
Commandant General Louis Botha.
Chief Commandant C. R. de Wet.
General J. H. de la Rey.
General J. C. Smuts.
General J. B. M. Hertzog.