PROCEEDINGS AT KLERKSDORP.
On April 6th the Government of the South African Republic left
Kroonstad by rail, and arrived at Klerksdorp the next day, where they
received the letter from President Steyn, mentioned above, as well as
the following from General de la Rey:--
IN THE VELD,
_April 7, 1902_.
_His Honour The Acting State President, S.A.R., Klerksdorp._
YOUR HONOUR,
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Honour's telegram
forwarded to me by His Excellency Lord Kitchener. I leave to-day with
His Honour President Steyn for Klerksdorp, and hope, D.V., to arrive
there on Wednesday next.
I have the honour to be, &c.,
J. H. DE LA REY,
_Asst. Commandant General_.
On the evening of April 7th Commandant General L. Botha also arrived
at Klerksdorp.
President Steyn, accompanied by his Executive Council and by General
de la Rey, left the farm Weltevreden on April 7th, and arrived at
Klerksdorp at 12 o'clock on April 9th.
The British authorities gave accommodation to the Free State
Government in the Old Town, while the Transvaal Government was
accommodated in the New Town.
The first meeting between the two Governments took place on Wednesday
afternoon, April 9th, at three o'clock, in a large tent which had been
pitched for that purpose some little distance out of the town.
There were present, representing the South African Republic:--
The Acting State President, S. W. Burger.
The State Secretary, F. W. Reitz.
The Commandant General, Louis Botha.
General de la Rey.
Mr. L. J. Meyer.
Mr. J. C. Krogh.
Also Mr. L. J. Jacobsz, Asst. State Attorney; Mr. N. J. de Wet,
Military Secretary of the Commandant General; Mr. I. S. Ferrerra,
Military Secretary of General de la Rey, and Mr. D. van Velden,
Secretary of the Executive Council.
Representing the Orange Free State:--
President M. T. Steyn.
Chief Commandant C. R. de Wet.
General J. B. M. Hertzog.
General C. H. Olivier.
Acting Government Secretary W. J. C. Brebner.
Further: Revd. J. D. Kestell, Acting Secretary of the Executive
Council, and Mr. B. J. du Plessis, Private Secretary to President
Steyn.
The Acting State President of the South African Republic was elected
Chairman.
After the meeting had been opened with prayer, the Chairman spoke as
follows:--
As you are aware, we have for some time been desirous of meeting one
another. The correspondence between the Netherlands Minister and Lord
Lansdowne was sent us by Lord Kitchener, under instructions from his
Government. I consider the transmission by the British Government of
this correspondence as an invitation from England to the two Republics
to discuss the question of peace. Having placed this interpretation
upon England's action, I requested a safe-conduct from Lord
Kitchener, in order to be enabled to meet the President and Government
of the Orange Free State. These circumstances suggested to us that the
opportune time to meet one another had arrived. When we see another
Government trying to do something for us, I think that we ought to
make use thereof. It was impossible for us to meet the Free State
Government in another way, and though it was hard for us to make use
of the enemy, our cause is of too great importance for us to consider
that. I regret that we had to remain at Kroonstad for such a long
time. This was certainly not desirable. Faithful, however, to our
compact, we can do nothing without the Orange Free State. I considered
that it was time for us, the Leaders of the People, to meet each other
and discuss matters fully, with our eyes fixed on God. We must face
our condition as it really is. Our object is to make a proposal for
the restoration of peace. The terms of such a proposal must be
discussed by us. If we had not availed ourselves of this opportunity,
I would not have been able to justify my actions to the People. I
believe all will agree with me that it has become necessary for us to
take such a step.
The Meeting then desired to have a brief review from the three
Generals of the conditions in their respective districts.
The Commandant General of the South African Republic said, that after
the fight at Bakenlaagte the enemy proceeded against him with eighteen
columns. Almost all the cattle in his District was taken. By the
building of block houses the space on the High Veld was limited very
much. The lines of block houses were only about three or four hours'
ride from each other. He had to leave the High Veld to try to lead
the enemy away, and proceeded to the Vryheid district. He explained
how the block house lines on the High Veld ran. In the course of their
last operations the enemy captured about 1,000 men on the High Veld,
of which the half were good men. The speaker then enumerated the
numerical strength of his commandos. He had eight commandos under him,
numbering 5,200 men. Food, he said further, was scarce. There was
hardly a sheep to be seen in his division, and in one district, which
he mentioned, there were only 20 head of cattle. In some other
districts conditions were more favourable, and they could not complain
of want. There were no mealies whatever, except what was standing in
the fields. The question of horses also caused anxiety. Four hundred
of his men went on foot. He concluded by bringing to the notice of the
Governments the fact that Zulus had been armed against him. The
Swazies, with the exception of a small number, were well disposed. On
the whole the spirit of the burghers was good. Only here and there
could dejection be discerned.
Chief Commandant de Wet said that innumerable hostile forces had
continually operated against him during the last eight or ten months.
He, with his Government, were so surrounded by the enemy in the
North-eastern districts of the Free State, that they had to fight
their way out. Seven hundred burghers were then captured, but among
them there were many grey-beards, boys, and other men not capable of
serving, so that the number of serviceable burghers captured was not
more than 250. As regards cattle, if one compared the present
condition with that before the war, you would have to say, "There are
no cattle." However, there were sufficient for the burghers and
families. In the Western and South-western portions of the Free State
almost all the burghers laid down their arms when the great forces of
the enemy marched through there for the first time. The Commandos
there were consequently very weak. They had enough corn in those
districts for a full year. Cattle, however, were so scarce that bulls
and rams were slaughtered. From the division where General Brand
commanded, the enemy at an earlier stage of the war removed all
cattle, but now they had large herds again and sufficient corn to last
for a year. In the South-eastern portion of the Free State matters
were much the same as in the South-western. In the districts of Boshof
and Hoopstad there were many sheep and cattle, and there was no want
of mealies. The numerical strength in the entire State amounted to
5,000 men, and there were many burghers in the Cape Colony. The spirit
of all the burghers was splendid.
General de la Rey informed the meeting that he still had 2,000 men
under arms. By means of a line of block houses the enemy had divided
the Western districts, and thus made matters difficult for him.
Zeerust and Rustenburg were still intact. The approach to his
food-districts was also hampered by block houses, much to his
detriment. There were between 1,800 and 2,000 men who fought. There
were also others who had no horses. These he concealed, and if a
burgher fell or was wounded, one of them was brought out to take his
place. The burghers were also destitute of the necessary clothes.
Mealies were still abundant, and they had a fair number of cattle, but
at the present moment the British had all the mealie and Kaffir-corn
fields in their possession, and if they should cut these fields off by
a block house line, his food would be in their hands. With reference
to the Cape Colony, he had about 1,800 men there, and General de Wet
about 600. He saw a chance of still continuing the war.
The Members of the Transvaal Government then reported that they had
met General Kritzinger at Kroonstad. He had received permission from
the British to see President Steyn, and he had greatly regretted that
the President had not been there. With regard to the Cape Colony he
had not given a hopeful prospect to the Transvaal delegates. He stated
that the entire force there amounted to from 1,800 to 2,000 men. There
was a great want of horses, and the enemy made it impossible for the
commandos to get them, as not only horses and mules, but also donkeys
were taken possession of by the enemy. He also said that many
Colonists had laid down their arms.
To this President Steyn and General de Wet replied that at the time
when General Kritzinger made the above statements he was not competent
to express an opinion on the state of affairs in the Cape Colony from
personal observation, because after his rather protracted visit to the
Free State he had barely returned to the Cape Colony when he was
captured at Hanover, badly wounded.
The Meeting then proceeded to the discussion of the question whether
they would request a personal interview with Lord Kitchener, or make
him a proposal in writing.
President Steyn said that, as far as he was concerned, there was only
one condition upon which he could make peace, and that was:
Independence. His opinion was still the same as a year ago, and he saw
nothing to make him change. It was plain to him that the enemy
continually climbed down from the position they had taken up. If the
enemy did not wish the Republics to remain independent, the struggle
must continue. This was what the burghers also desired. Rather than
make terms with the British he would submit unconditionally to them
for ever.
State Secretary Reitz said that to make terms and to give up the
country were two distinct matters. They should try to grasp the
position in which England stood. If England consented to the existence
of the independence of the Republics, she would be done for. For that
reason it was probable that England would not lend her ear to the two
Republican Governments if independence was immediately insisted upon.
The question therefore was whether terms could not be offered. The
Republics were the weaker party, and therefore they could make the
offer. That would also be proof that they were prepared to make peace.
They should make a proposal of some kind or other. The making of such
a proposal did not signify that thereby their independence was
sacrificed, but that the question of independence was not for the
time being under discussion.
President Steyn was of opinion that the enemy should be compelled to
state what terms they were prepared to give.
Mr. Krogh thought that a conference with the British should first be
requested, but no proposals made for the present.
General de la Rey said that the Republics should make a proposal for
the restoration of peace, especially after what the Netherlands
Government had done. It could not be expected that the British would
now make a peace proposal.
The Acting State President of the South African Republic said the war
had done away with the _Status quo ante bellum_. Other proposals
should therefore be made. The question was: what proposals? If Lord
Kitchener agreed to a conference with them, he would ask: what do you
propose? In his opinion the two Governments should ask and concede as
much as it was in their power to do. To retain their independence,
they should concede something. It was better for them to make a
proposal first. If the enemy made the first proposal it would be much
more difficult for them (the Boers) to get some point or other
conceded, than to obtain the alteration of a proposal made from the
Republican side. The matter should be considered from all sides, and
its seriousness, especially, should not be lost sight of. If no change
came, many of the burghers, forced by sheer necessity, would go over
to the enemy. Amongst the people there were always the courageous and
the disheartened. And the two elements were still amongst them. A
burgher who was with them to-day went to lay down his arms to-morrow.
The cause became weaker day by day. Every man who was lost was gone,
and his place could not be filled up. The question was whether it was
better to continue until the people were exterminated, man, woman and
child, than to try to come to terms. Or, on the other hand, to
continue until they obtained what they wanted, only to find that the
people were extirpated. For whose benefit would the struggle then have
been carried on? It should seriously be considered whether the
decision taken last year should be adhered to, or whether an attempt
should be made to obtain for the people what was possible to obtain.
If they must surrender unconditionally, the time should be fixed for
doing so, and not delayed till all were captured or killed. They
should not be lead away too much by their feelings. If he acted
emotionally he would say, "Continue." But they should use their heads.
After this the meeting adjourned to the following morning.
THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 1902.
The meeting was resumed. General L. J. Meyer was the first speaker. He
said that if anyone intended to continue the struggle he would stand
by him, but they should first consider how great the responsibility
was that rested on the two Republican Governments. The principal
matter that should be taken into consideration was what is to the
advantage of the people. Unless a miracle occurred nothing could save
the people. He knew what their condition was as regarded food and
ammunition. Their cause--whatever might be said--had not improved
since June, 1901, but had gone backward. They should not shut their
eyes to facts. The rebellion in the Cape Colony was, after all,
feeble, and the cause was not progressing there. Would it not be
possible to conclude a federal union with the two Colonies? An
offensive and defensive treaty? Friendship in trade? If all attempts
in these directions came to nothing, could they not be satisfied with
an "encumbered independence"? and if England did not want this, and
refused to concede anything, the time would have arrived for the
matter to be laid before the people.
Chief Commandant de Wet said he did not wish to boast when he said
that the enemy had concentrated their greatest forces against him, and
that he had at his disposal the smallest forces; but as far as he was
concerned there could be no mention of the surrender of their
independence. Their cause had progressed since last June. The places
of the burghers whom they lost in the Republics were filled by
recruits in the Cape Colony. He had sufficient food, clothes, and
ammunition for more than a year. Before he conceded an iota of their
independence he would allow himself to be banished for ever.
State Secretary Reitz asked whether they should not discuss some
questions first. Should they not, for example: (1) Request an
armistice; (2) Try to get into communication with their Deputation;
(3) Make proposals in which the following points were raised: (_a_)
Customs Convention; (_b_) Postal Union; (_c_) The Franchise; (_d_)
Their Foreign Affairs; (_e_) Amnesty for Colonial Burghers; (_f_)
Their relation to other Powers; (_g_) The Paramount Power of England,
and (4) In order that they did not at once repulse the British by
using the word "Independence," would it not be better to use another
word instead, for instance, "Self-government"?
General Hertzog said that the Constitution of the Republics did not
permit the Governments to meddle with the independence. That was most
severely punishable under Roman-Dutch law. The Governments could not
part with the independence of the Republics without authority from the
people. They should request a conference with Lord Kitchener on the
basis of their independence. All they heard was from British sources,
and they therefore did not know what the true condition of affairs
was. What assurance had they that England was not willing to give them
their independence, if she could retain the Cape Colony?
General de la Rey also thought that they should demand their
independence. They should concede only what was forced from them.
General Hertzog, seconded by General Olivier, then submitted a draft
resolution to the meeting, which was referred to a committee
consisting of the two Presidents, the State Secretary, and General
Hertzog.
After an adjournment the committee handed in a draft resolution, which
was accepted and dispatched to Lord Kitchener.
The resolution read as follows:--
Resolution passed at Klerksdorp by the Governments of the South
African Republic and the Orange Free State.
"The Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free
State having met with reference to the transmission to them of the
correspondence which passed in Europe between the Government of His
Majesty the King of England and the Government of Her Majesty the
Queen of the Netherlands concerning the desirability of giving the
Governments of these Republics an opportunity of communicating with
their plenipotentiaries in Europe, who still continue to enjoy the
confidence of both the Republics;
"Considering the spirit of reconciliation (_rapprochement_) which is
apparent on the part of the Government of His Britannic Majesty, as
well as to the desire therein expressed by Lord Lansdowne on behalf of
his Government to cause this struggle to come to an end;
"Are of opinion that this is a suitable time to again show their
willingness to do all in their power to terminate this war; and
"Consequently resolve to make certain proposals to Lord Kitchener as
representing the Government of His Britannic Majesty, which can serve
as a basis for further negotiations with the object of establishing
the desired peace;
"It is further the view of both these Governments that in order to
accelerate the attainment of the desired object, and to prevent
misunderstandings as much as possible, His Excellency Lord Kitchener
be requested to meet the two Republican Governments personally, at a
time and place to be appointed by him, in order to enable them to
submit to him direct peace proposals, which they are prepared to make,
in order thus by means of direct discussion and conference with him
immediately to solve all questions which may arise, and thereby to
ensure that this meeting shall bear the desired fruit."
This resolution was forwarded to Lord Kitchener under covering letter
signed by the two Presidents.
In the afternoon, after a general discussion, the same Committee was
appointed to make a draft of the points which could be conceded to the
British.
The meeting adjourned till the following morning.
APRIL 11, 1902.
On meeting again the following morning, the Committee submitted the
following document:--
"Proceeding from the basis that they do not recognise the annexation,
the two Governments are prepared to conclude peace by conceding the
following matters:--
1. The concluding of a perpetual Treaty of friendship and peace,
including:--
(_a_) Arrangements relative to a Customs Convention.
(_b_) Post, Telegraph and Railway Union,
(_c_) Fixing of the Franchise.
2. Dismantling of all State Forts.
3. Arbitration in all future differences between the contracting
parties, an equal number of arbitrators to be appointed by each
party from their subjects, with an umpire to be chosen by both
parties.
4. Equal educational rights for both the English and Dutch
languages.
5. Mutual amnesty.
Mr. Krogh asked whether the following could not be included in the
proposal:--"The conclusion of an offensive and defensive Treaty with
England."
President Steyn remarked that if they themselves offered to conclude
an offensive and defensive treaty with England, they would thereby
alienate all other nations from them. England would use such proposal
to kill all the sympathy other nations had for them.
The meeting did not consider it advisable to add anything to the
proposal, and accepted it as submitted by the Committee.
Mr. L. J. Jacobsz inquired whether, although it was plain that the
Governments were not competent to decide on questions touching the
independence of the Republics, they could not raise the point. If
England did not accept the proposal of the Republican Governments, and
the matter had to be laid before the people, it would be well if those
Governments knew what England was prepared to give instead of the
independence. The question should be thoroughly taken into serious
consideration by their Governments, because, in his opinion, matters
had not improved, but become worse since June, 1901.
General Hertzog was of opinion that the Republican outlook had
improved during the past year. As proof thereof he pointed to the good
spirit that prevailed amongst the burghers. They were determined to
persevere. He also pointed to the engagements that had taken place
since June, 1901. Then it had also been said that the cause was
hopeless, and that no engagement of any importance could still be
fought. He also showed that they knew nothing of the real condition of
the enemy. The Republics being so shut off made that impossible. They
should bear in mind that the enemy also had a hard time of it. England
could not continue indefinitely to enlist soldiers and to borrow
money. He was not yet prepared to surrender his independence.
Commandant General Botha said that they could not take it amiss in one
another if there was no unanimity of views. They had gathered together
confidentially, and should treat one another open-heartedly. There was
nothing that urged him personally to terminate the struggle. He could
flee about as well as anyone else, but when he considered the
circumstances, he was bound to say, "We are becoming weaker." They
were being forced out of those parts of the country which were the
best for them, and to which they had clung most tenaciously. He wished
to prove from facts that they had become weaker. In the Northern and
South-eastern parts of the Republic they had 9,570 men a year ago. Now
they had there only 5,200 men, a reduction thus of 4,370 men. At their
meeting on June 20th last year he had said that they should throw the
responsibility of the continuance of the war more upon the people.
They should then have said plainly that only faith and perseverance
could save them, and that there was no other means of salvation.
However, the majority of them had taken another view. What he then
specially relied upon was the Cape Colony, on the strength of the
reports that they received from there. Their reports were to the
effect that 2,000 burghers had risen in the Cape Colony. Now,
according to the statements of Generals de Wet and de la Rey, there
were about 600 of his (General Botha's) burghers and of the Free State
burghers together in the Cape Colony; altogether there were about
2,600 burghers under arms there. There has therefore been no further
rising during the past year. He was firmly convinced that they could
expect nothing from the rebellion in the Cape Colony. The time for a
big rising there was past. It appeared that their men were scattered
over that Colony in small groups, and effected nothing. They had to
live on those people who were well disposed towards them (the Boers),
and the result was that those people were treated very harshly by the
enemy, and would be compelled later to assist the latter to drive
those groups of rebels out of the country. Already many Colonists had
been hanged. Their cause was often compared to that of the American
Colonists, but it was not clear to him how that comparison could be
made. The enemy (the British) had about 40,000 men in America, and
America had more than one million inhabitants. She also had the
support of France, and a means of importing supplies. They (the Boers)
had no such means of importing what was necessary, and there was no
proper communication with the outside world. The forces of the enemy
in the country were much greater than the entire male population of
the two Republics. Their population had now been reduced to 15,000 or
16,000 men. Had they grounds for saying that they with 15,000 men
could achieve what 50,000 burghers could not do? They were becoming so
weak that he was afraid that they would afterwards no longer be
considered a party that had to be reckoned with. It was not impossible
that they would afterwards be declared rebels, and then a mutual
murdering would take place. He did not think that it could be expected
of him to co-operate towards that end. They could not speak of
"right," because they knew from sad experience that the stronger party
did just what it wanted to. Their people were too good to allow
matters to proceed so far. Scheepers was already under the sod, and
whom must they shoot for him? Not an ordinary soldier, but an officer,
for only officers were equal to their burghers. If the enemy continued
to capture burghers as they had done during the last year, then they
would within a short time become too weak to effect anything. They had
indeed during the last year had such successful engagements that they
could hardly account for it themselves, but it was also equally true
that the best part of their country was being made uninhabitable for
their commandos. In the High Veld there was no more food for their
people. They could not bring food there either, because if wagons with
provisions were sent thither the enemy captured the greater part of
them. He had already informed his Government and General de la Rey
that he would be obliged to give up certain portions of the country,
and they would have to discuss whither the commandos of those parts
had to go.
How must this war end? Must they wait until everyone had been
captured? or should they, for the sake of their people, adopt another
course? His Government, his officers, and he himself, could say: "Let
the enemy carry out their proclamations concerning us. We have nothing
more to lose. We have fought for nothing else than our country, and
wish to have that back or nothing else. Banish us, banish the
Government." But then, what about the People? The People could not be
banished. Was there now not still a chance to save something for the
People? He considered this point worthy of consideration. For their
Leaders he thought it would be easier to continue till they died a
manly death, or till they were banished to far-off islands, than to
submit to the yoke of the enemy; but they had a duty towards the
People.
The State Secretary thought it would be best for the People themselves
to elect persons to make their views clear to the Government.
At this juncture a telegram was received from Lord Kitchener stating
that he was prepared to have a personal interview with the two
Republican Governments, and requesting them to come to Pretoria that
same evening.