FRENCH, THE MAN
A Typical Englishman--Fighting at School--Napoleon
Worship--"A Great Reporter"--Halting Speeches and Polished
Prose. A South African Coincidence--Mrs. Despard and the
Newsboy--The Happy Warrior.
So far, this book has necessarily been chiefly a record of events.
That was inevitable, for the man of action writes his story in deeds.
Nor was there ever a great soldier who made less clamour in the world
of newspapers than General French. He has never adopted the studied
reticence of Kitchener nor yet the chill aloofness of certain of his
colleagues. War correspondents are not anathema to him; neither does
he shudder at the sight of the reporter's pencil. Yet, somehow, few
anecdotes cluster round his name.
Perhaps that is because his modesty is not a pose, although it has
become almost a tradition. It is simply a natural trait in a modest
and rather retiring disposition. French simply will not be talked
about--and there is an end of the matter.
If one were asked to describe the man, one might best answer that he
is the Englishman to the _n_th. degree. It is usual to find that the
man of extraordinary merit is in some degree a contrast with and a
criticism of the mere average mortal of his set. The dour urbanity of
Kitchener, for instance, is Oriental rather than English, and
contrasts strangely with the choleric tradition of the army officer.
So the infinite alertness and constant good humour of Roberts has a
quality of Latin _esprit_ very foreign to the English temperament. But
there are no such peculiarities about French. He is the very essence
of healthy normality.
Yet, although of Celtic descent, he is essentially English. He has not
hacked his way to fame in the manner of the Scot, nor has he leapt
upon her pedestal with the boisterous humour of the Irishman. He has
got there in the dogged but sporting English way, taking Fortune's
gifts when they came, but never pushing or scrambling for them when
they were out of reach.
One catches the spirit of the man in the schoolboy. When he first went
to school at Harrow, the boys, knowing that sisters had been
responsible for his education, were prepared to take it out of him.
But as French was ready to fight at the slightest provocation, and
equally ready to swear eternal friendship when the fight was done, he
quickly won his way through respect to popularity.
[Page Heading: AN ADMIRER OF NAPOLEON]
Despite this quality, the steadfast object of his admiration has been
one of the most abnormal and theatrical figures in history--Napoleon.
It is, however, Napoleon the soldier and not the personality that has
attracted French, who, by the way, possesses a wonderful collection of
Napoleonic relics. He sees Napoleon as the greatest strategist the
world has known. As such the Corsican claims his unstinted admiration:
but there his admiration stops. For French is altogether humane. There
is nothing of the iron heel about either his methods or his manners.
His extreme parsimony of life we have seen as the cause of the only
criticism which has ever been levelled against him.
By a strange coincidence, however, his worship of Napoleon has proved
itself invaluable in an unexpected way. In following Napoleon's
campaigns out in detail, French had traversed every inch of Waterloo,
and much of the Belgian battle-ground in the European war. There can
be little doubt that the success of some of his work has been due to
his detailed knowledge of the scene of operations.
Inevitably, perhaps, French suggests Napoleon in certain subtle traits
of character rather than in personality. His rapidity of thought, for
instance, has probably rarely been equalled, since Napoleon set Europe
by the ears. An officer under his command in South Africa, has
recorded how, day after day, for weeks on end, French would answer the
most intricate questions on policy and tactics over the telephone with
scarcely a moment's delay. Such inhuman speed and accuracy of decision
link French with the greatest commanders of history.
There is just a suggestion of Napoleon too, in his habitual attitudes.
He usually stands with legs wide apart and arms folded either across
his chest or clasped behind his back. But the perfect cheerfulness of
his smile banishes any fear of Corsican churlishness of manner. It is
very certain that French is not feared by his staff: he is worshipped
by them. The reason for that is not far to seek. Although his temper
is irascible, it is not enduring. Often it will flash out in wrathful
words, but the storm is quickly over. Men of this choleric temper are
always beloved, for good humour inevitably underlies the ebullitions
of so light a rage. They never nurse hatreds nor brood over trifles.
Also they are healthily impervious to the wiles of flattery or the
snare of favouritism. There is nothing of the jealous and erratic
genius about French. To read his dispatches is to find praise lavishly
given to subordinates but no mention of self. For he looks after his
assistants and leaves his own record to fate. He has, indeed, mastered
the art of being great enough to allow others to be great. Hence the
excellence which always marks his General Staff.
[Page Heading: THE SOLDIERS' IDOL]
Such qualities must inevitably endear a General to his officers, to
the men who have to bear the brunt of their Chief's personality. But
do they appeal to the private? Both Napoleon and Wellington
indubitably took immense pains to surround themselves with a shroud of
mystery. Under their dark mantles, the ranks must feel, lay buried the
talisman of success. We know that his officers found "the sight of
Wellington's long nose on a frosty morning worth another ten thousand
men" to them. Sir John French has cultivated neither a nose, nor a
frown, nor even a chin. How does he manage to be the idol of his men?
it may be asked. Simply and solely by being himself. Without any of
the meretricious arts of the personality-monger, he has impressed his
personality on the troops in a most memorable way. This is largely due
to the impression of quiet confidence which he always gives. You feel
you are safe with French. Nothing, you know, will ever upset the cool
sanity of his reasoning, the balanced decision of his judgments. This
impression of certainly is strengthened by the distinctly masterful
carriage of the man. His short, stocky figure, like General Grant's,
suggests that fatigue is unknown to him. This is indeed the case. The
story has often been told of how the General and his staff once
decided, after an exhausting day, to spend the night in a lonely farm
in South Africa. The house only boasted one bed, which was of course,
reserved for the General. But French insisted on a tired member of his
staff occupying the solitary mattress, and wrapping himself up in a
rug, went contentedly to sleep on the floor.
His mind is as tireless as his body. The operations round Colesberg
could only have been undertaken in their complicated entirety by a
General who did not know what mental fatigue meant. This physical and
mental fitness French has most carefully studied to preserve. At one
time, several years ago, he feared a tendency to avoirdupois, and
instantly undertook a stern but successful bulk-reducing regimen.
Apropos the regimen there is a story. Just before the present war, a
bulky package was one day delivered to him at his club. French opened
it negligently, expecting to discover the inevitable knick-knack of
doubtful utility. But this was not the usual gift. It was a package of
weight-reducing preparations.
[Page Heading: AN INDEPENDENT THINKER]
French's mind, however, is original as well as tireless. Just there
lies the unique quality of his gifts. The art of war is necessarily
one of the most highly systematised and therefore the most hide-bound
in the world. No man is more perilously in danger of having his mind
swathed in red tape and numbed by discipline than the soldier. In
modern times the tendency to employ masses has not lessened the
tendency to stereotype habits of thought. The danger of the mechanical
soldier is stressed by no one more forcibly than by General von
Bernhardi. He holds that a self-reliant personality is as essential as
a profound knowledge of generalship to the modern commander. French
possesses both. Although profoundly versed in all the doctrines of the
schoolmen, he is never afraid to jump over the traces where they would
lead to a precipice. He has never been hampered, as so many soldiers
are, by his studies. Knowledge he has always used as a means to an
end, which is its proper vocation. To this independence of mind, as to
nothing else, may be attributed his phenomenal success amid the
abnormal conditions of Boer warfare. Where the books end, French's
active mind begins to construct its own "way out" of the corner.
The Boers were indeed the first to admit his superiority to the other
English officers, if not to themselves. De Wet was once asked in the
early stages of the war how long he expected to avoid capture. He
replied, with a smile, that it all depended on which General was
dispatched to run him down. When a certain name was mentioned, the
reply was "Till eternity." General B---- was next mentioned. "About
two years," was the verdict. "And General French?" "Two weeks,"
admitted De Wet.
French has, of course, never accepted social life in this country on
its face value. The young officer who was studying when his friends
were at polo or tennis, was under no illusions as to the havoc which
an over-accentuation of the sporting and social side of life was
playing with the officers' work. Nowadays, like Kitchener, he is bent
on producing the professional and weeding out the "drawing-room"
soldier. No wonder that his favourite authors are those acutest
critics of English social life and English foibles, Dickens and
Thackeray. The former's "Bleak House" and the latter's "Book of
Snobs" are the two books he places first in his affections.
[Page Heading: A GREAT REPORTER]
He is himself a writer of parts. We are, ourselves, so close to the
event he describes, that we are perhaps unable to appreciate the
literary excellence of the despatches which French has sent us on the
operations in France. A Chicago paper hails him, however, as "a great
reporter." "No one can read his reports," the writer remarks, "without
being struck with his weighty lucidity, his calm mastery of the
important facts, the total absence of any attempt at 'effect,' and the
remarkably suggestive bits of pertinent description."
Undoubtedly, the Americans are right--provided that these dispatches
were actually penned by the General himself.
His speeches may be obvious and even trite; his letters may lack any
flavour of personality; but these dispatches are literature. Like his
hero Napoleon, like Cæsar and Wellington, Sir John French has forged a
literary style for himself. There is nothing amateurish or
journalistic about his communications from the front. The dispatch
from Mons, for instance, is a masterpiece of lucid and incisive
English. It might well be printed in our school-histories, not merely
as a vivid historic document, but as a model of English prose.
Not that Sir John French's style is an accident. Like most of the
other successes of his career, it is the result of design. The man who
laboriously "crammed" tactics laboured equally hard over the art of
writing. The many prefaces which he has written to famous books on
strategy and war bear traces of the most careful preparation.
Apart from his dispatches, however, French has written some virile,
telling English in his prefaces to several books on cavalry and on
military history. The most interesting is that which he wrote for
Captain Frederick von Herbert's _The Defence of Plevna_. He prefaces
it with a dramatic little coincidence of war capitally told. "During
the last year of the South African War, while directing the operations
in Cape Colony, I found myself, late one afternoon in February, 1902,
at the north end of the railway bridge over the Orange River at
Bethulie, strangely attracted by the appearance of a well-constructed
and cleverly hidden covered field work, which formed an important part
of the 'Bridge head.' Being somewhat pressed for time I rode on and
directed my aide-de-camp to go down into the fort, look round it, and
then catch me up. He shortly overtook me with an urgent request to
return and inspect it myself. I did so, and was very much struck, not
only with the construction of the work and its excellent siting, but
also with all the defence arrangements at that point of the river.
Whilst I was in the fort the officer in charge arrived and reported
himself. Expressing my strong approval of all I had seen, I remarked
that it brought back to my mind a book I had read and re-read, and
indeed studied with great care and assiduity--a book called _The
Defence of Plevna_, by a certain Lieutenant von Herbert, whom, to my
regret, I had never met. 'I am von Herbert, and I wrote the book you
speak of,' was the reply of the officer to whom I spoke."[22]
[Page Heading: OSMAN PASHA]
Osman Pasha was a soldier after French's own heart. Indeed, his
tenacity was probably equal to that of his critic. Hence this fine
tribute: "The great soldier who defended Plevna refused to acknowledge
such a word as defeat. When things were at their worst his outward
demeanour was calmest and most confident. There was no hysterical
shrieking for supports or reinforcements. These might have reached
him, but through treacherous jealousy he was betrayed and left to his
own resources. In spite of this no thought of capitulation or retreat
ever entered the mind of Osman Pasha...."[23] What a wonderful little
cameo of courage!
One wonders whether the school-boy who sent French the following
letter on his return from South Africa knew the quality of his
writing.
"MY DEAR FRENCH,--You are a great British General. I want
your autograph, but, whatever you do, don't let your secretary
write it."
I have said that Sir John French is the average Englishman in an
accentuated degree. How then does he regard war? If the plain truth be
told, we are not at heart a martial nation. We have made war when we
have been compelled to it by the threat of an Armada or the menace of
a Napoleon. But we have not cultivated war, at least since our wode
days, as a pastime and a profession. Nor is French that abnormal
being, an Englishman governed by the blood lust. Mrs. Despard has said
that in reality he regards war as a hideous outrage. He has no
delusions as to the glory of war. By no chance could he be ranked
among the romanticist of the battlefield. That, perhaps, is why he
never is, never has been, ruthless or remorseless with the men whom he
commands.
[Page Heading: FRENCH AND THE SUFFOLKS]
If ever French had cause for anger, it was over the unlucky incident
of the Suffolks, the one failure unwarrantably attributed to his ever
victorious arms. Yet he was the one officer who softened the
bitterness of that reverse to the men. He met the regiment in the
Transvaal just eight months after the disaster. His speech to the
troops, as reported in at least one paper, is well worthy of
preservation. After referring to his pleasure in meeting them all
again, he said: "What you did at Colesberg is still fresh in my
recollection ... but what I wish especially to recall is the sad event
of the night of January 5th and 6th, and to express my sympathy with
you on the loss of your gallant leader, Colonel Watson, who on that
night showed splendid qualities as a noble and able officer. Now, it
has come to my knowledge that there has been spread about an idea that
that event cast discredit of some sort upon this gallant regiment. I
want you all to banish any such thought from your minds as utterly
untrue. You took part ... in a night operation of extreme difficulty
on a pitch dark night, and did all in your power to make it a success.
So do not let any false idea get into your minds. Think rather that
what took place brings honour to your regiment, and add this event to
the long list of honours it has won in the past. I want you all to
bear in mind about such night operations, that they can never be a
certain success, and because they sometimes fail it does not,
therefore, bring discredit on those who attempted to carry them out.
You must remember that, if we always waited for an opportunity of
certain success, we should do nothing at all, and that in war,
fighting a brave enemy, it is absolutely impossible to be always sure
of success: all we can do is to try our very best to secure
success--and that you did on the occasion I am speaking of. I thank
you for that and all the good work you have done since, and remember
above all that no slur whatever attaches to your regiment for the
result of that occasion."
With these finely sympathetic words might be placed French's speech to
his troops before the battle of Elandslaagte. "Men," he said, "you are
going to oppose two thousand or three thousand Dutch. We want to keep
up our honour as we did in the olden time--as soldiers and men, we
want to take that position before sunset."
[Page Heading: FRENCH AND HIS MEN]
In that single phrase, "as soldiers and men," one has the key to
French's popularity with the ranks. He treats the men as human beings
and not as machines. In other words, he understands the British
soldier through and through. Mrs. Despard has told a touching little
story of the affection which he inspires in his men. She was returning
home one evening when she was surprised by a question as she stopped
to buy the customary evening paper. "Are you Mrs. Despard, General
French's sister?" asked the ragged wretch. She admitted that claim to
distinction. The man then told her, with much enthusiasm, how when
working with a battery in a very hot corner during the South African
war, he had seen the General ride over to cheer them up. "Now, hi
don't care 'oo that man is, and I don't care 'oo I am, I love that
man," he said rather huskily. Mrs. Despard has told how she forgot her
paper that night in shaking the ex-soldier's hand.
For this tact in dealing with his men, Sir John French has largely to
thank the vein of acute sensibility which runs through his character.
This sensibility can be traced in his mouth, which is remarkably
finely chiselled. We have seen it in his childhood, when he shrank
from some of the usual noisiness of boyhood. And Mrs. Despard has
crystallised it in a phrase. Feeling depressed on one occasion before
addressing a meeting on some reforms which she considered urgent, she
confessed to her brother that she was spiritually afraid. "Why," he
replied, "don't worry, I've never yet done anything worth doing
without having to screw myself up to it." French, very obviously, is a
man for whom spiritual doubt may have its terrors. One cannot figure
him as harbouring the narrow if sincere religion of a Kitchener or a
Gordon.
One might sum him up as the _beau-ideal_, not only of the cavalry
spirit, but of the scientific soldier. He can lead a cavalry charge
with the dash of a Hotspur: and he can plan out a campaign with the
masterly logic of a Marlborough. Unlike some of his contemporaries, he
has attained extraordinary mastery over the science of war without
himself becoming a scientific machine. In many ways he bears, in
character and temperament, a striking resemblance to his colleague in
arms--General Joffre. Although Joffre is three inches taller than
French--he is five foot nine--he is otherwise very similar in
appearance. There is the same short, powerful physique, the narrow
neck surmounted by a massive head and heavy jaw, and the same broad
forehead, with masterful eyes peeping from beneath bushy eyebrows.
Neither of these men on whom hangs Europe's destiny is in the least
degree strident or self-assertive. Indeed, both tend to be listeners
rather than talkers. Both have the same trick of making instantaneous
decisions. Both scorn to be merely "smart" in outward appearance; both
are devoted to efficiency in detail; and, most suggestive of all, each
finds himself eternally compared to General Grant! Probably the
latter's dogged personality forms the best possible common denominator
for these two remarkable men.
[Page Heading: AN OPPORTUNITY]
It is said that when news of the war in South Africa reached French,
momentarily obeying a natural impulse, he waved his hand and cried,
"Hurrah for South Africa." If anyone had any right to thank Heaven for
that particular campaign, it was certainly French. But he would have
"hurrahed" any campaign that gave opportunity for his powers. After
all, the soldier's stage is the battlefield. Without wars he is
without an active rôle, and must spend his years drudging in the
rehearsal theatre of the Colonies. If he be so original and so
thorough a soldier as French, his abilities will be at an even graver
discount. For the rehearsal is not the play; and the best Generals,
like the ablest actors, are notoriously weak at rehearsal, which does
not pluck fully at their energies. Probably French would have hurrahed
for South Africa, however, had he had no special abilities at all.
For nowhere is he happier than on the battlefield. If the grisly game
of war must be played, French plays it with all his heart. It is the
game which destiny put him on the stage to play; the game which he has
devoted his life to mastering; and the only game in which he has ever
seriously interested himself.
Luck invariably follows the man who is utterly absorbed in his
profession, for the simply reason that, being always engrossed in his
work, he is always alive to his opportunities. French's luck consists
solely in the fact that he happens to be a soldier. Men of Kitchener's
organising genius may be many things; in nothing, not even in the
arts, are they likely to seriously fail. But French is a soldier in
the sense quite other than Kitchener. He is a man made for the
endurance of hardship and for the facing of hard practical
difficulties in the field. It is as natural for him to conduct a
campaign as it was for Pope to "lisp in numbers, for the numbers
came." He is the Happy Warrior in being.
FINIS
FOOTNOTES:
[22] From Sir John French's Preface to _The Defence of Plevna_, by
Capt. Frederick von Herbert, by permission of Messrs. Smith, Elder.
[23] From Sir John French's Preface to _The Defence of Plevna_, by
Capt. Frederick von Herbert, by permission of Messrs. Smith, Elder.
APPENDIX
THE MONS DESPATCH
_To the Secretary of State for War_
_September 7, 1914._
MY LORD,
I have the honour to report the proceedings of the Field Force
under my command up to the time of rendering this despatch.
1. The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by
rail was effected in the best order and without a check. Each unit
arrived at its destination in this country well within the
scheduled time.
The concentration was practically complete on the evening of
Friday, the 21st ultimo, and I was able to make dispositions to
move the Force during Saturday, the 22nd, to positions I
considered most favourable from which to commence operations which
the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, requested me to
undertake in pursuance of his plans in prosecution of the
campaign.
The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Conde
on the west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was
taken up as follows:--
From Conde to Mons inclusive was assigned to the 2nd Corps, and to
the right of the 2nd Corps from Mons the 1st Corps was posted. The
5th Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.
In the absence of my 3rd Army Corps I desired to keep the Cavalry
Division as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer
flank, or move in support of any threatened part of the line. The
forward reconnaissance was entrusted to Brigadier-General Sir
Philip Chetwode with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, but I directed
General Allenby to send forward a few squadrons to assist in this
work.
During August 22 and 23 these advanced squadrons did some
excellent work, some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and
several encounters took place in which our troops showed to great
advantage.
2. At 6 a.m. on August 23 I assembled the Commanders of the 1st
and 2nd Corps and Cavalry Division at a point close to the
position, and explained the general situation of the Allies, and
what I understood to be General Joffre's plan. I discussed with
them at some length the immediate situation in front of us.
From information I received from French Headquarters I understood
that little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's Army
Corps, with perhaps one Cavalry Division, were in front of my
position; and I was aware of no attempted outflanking movement by
the enemy. I was confirmed in this opinion by the fact that my
patrols encountered no undue opposition in their reconnoitring
operations. The observation of my aeroplanes seemed also to bear
out this estimate.
About 3 p.m. on Sunday, the 23rd, reports began coming in to the
effect that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line,
apparently in some strength, but that the right of the position
from Mons and Bray was being particularly threatened.
The Commander of the 1st Corps had pushed his flank back to some
high ground south of Bray, and the 5th Cavalry Brigade evacuated
Binche, moving slightly south; the enemy thereupon occupied
Binche.
The right of the 3rd Division, under General Hamilton, was at
Mons, which formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed
the Commander of the 2nd Corps to be careful not to keep the
troops on this salient too long, but, if threatened seriously, to
draw back the centre behind Mons. This was done before dark. In
the meantime, about 5 p.m., I received a most unexpected message
from General Joffre by telegraph, telling me that at least three
German Corps, viz., a reserve corps, the 4th Corps and the 9th
Corps, were moving on my position in front, and that the 2nd Corps
was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of Tournay.
He also informed me that the two reserve French divisions and the
5th French Army on my right were retiring, the Germans having on
the previous day gained possession of the passages of the Sambre
between Charleroi and Namur.
3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons
position, I had previously ordered a position in rear to be
reconnoitred. This position rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on
the right and extended west to Jenlain, south-east of
Valenciennes, on the left. The position was reported difficult to
hold, because standing crops and buildings made the siting of
trenches very difficult and limited the field of fire in many
important localities. It nevertheless afforded a few good
artillery positions.
When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German
threatening on my front reached me, I endeavoured to confirm it by
aeroplane reconnaissance; and as a result of this I determined to
effect a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the
24th.
A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line
throughout the night, and at daybreak on the 24th the 2nd Division
from the neighbourhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration
as if to retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of
both the 1st and 2nd Divisions, whilst the 1st Division took up a
supporting position in the neighbourhood of Peissant. Under cover
of this demonstration the 2nd Corps retired on the line
Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. The 3rd Division on the right of the
Corps suffered considerable loss in this operation from the enemy,
who had retaken Mons.
The 2nd Corps halted on this line, where they partially entrenched
themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the 1st Corps gradually
to withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much
further loss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 p.m.
Towards midday the enemy appeared to be directing his principal
effort against our left.
I had previously ordered General Allenby with the Cavalry to act
vigorously in advance of my left front and endeavour to take the
pressure off.
About 7.30 a.m. General Allenby received a message from Sir
Charles Fergusson, commanding 5th Division, saying that he was
very hard pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of
this message General Allenby drew in the Cavalry and endeavoured
to bring direct support to the 5th Division.
During the course of this operation General De Lisle, of the 2nd
Cavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyse the
further advance of the enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack
on his flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was
held up by wire about 500 yards from his objective, and the 9th
Lancers and 18th Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of
the Brigade.
The 19th Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the Line of
Communications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22nd
and 23rd. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a
position south of Quarouble to support the left flank of the 2nd
Corps.
With the assistance of the Cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was
enabled to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having
two corps of the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank,
he suffered great losses in doing so.
At nightfall the position was occupied by the 2nd Corps to the
west of Bavai, the 1st Corps to the right. The right was protected
by the Fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the 19th Brigade in
position between Jenlain and Bry, and the Cavalry on the outer
flank.
4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except
such as was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the
determined attempts of the enemy to get round my left flank
assured me that it was his intention to hem me against that place
and surround me. I felt that not a moment must be lost in retiring
to another position.
I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces were
somewhat exhausted, and I knew that they had suffered heavy
losses. I hoped, therefore, that his pursuit would not be too
vigorous to prevent me effecting my object.
The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not
only owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the
exhaustion of the troops.
The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to
a position in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau, and rearguards were
ordered to be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth Road by 5.30 a.m.
Two Cavalry Brigades, with the Divisional Cavalry of the 2nd
Corps, covered the movement of the 2nd Corps. The remainder of the
Cavalry Division, with the 19th Brigade, the whole under the
command of General Allenby, covered the west flank.
The 4th Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday,
the 23rd, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a
Brigade of Artillery with Divisional Staff were available for
service.
I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a position with his
right south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau
Road south of La Chaprie. In this position the Division rendered
great help to the effective retirement of the 2nd and 1st Corps to
the new position.
Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le
Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th,
been partially prepared and entrenched, I had grave doubts--owing
to the information I received as to the accumulating strength of
the enemy against me--as to the wisdom of standing there to fight.
Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my
right, my exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy's western
corps (II) to envelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted
condition of the troops, I determined to make a great effort to
continue the retreat till I could put some substantial obstacle,
such as the Somme or the Oise, between my troops and the enemy,
and afford the former some opportunity of rest and reorganisation.
Orders were, therefore, sent to the Corps Commanders to continue
their retreat as soon as they possibly could towards the general
line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont.
The Cavalry, under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the
retirement.
Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the 1st Corps
continued its march on Landrecies, following the road along the
eastern border of the Forêt De Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies
about 10 o'clock. I had intended that the Corps should come
further west so as to fill up the gap between Le Cateau and
Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and could not get further
in without rest.
The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9.30
p.m. a report was received that the 4th Guards Brigade in
Landrecies was heavily attacked by troops of the 9th German Army
Corps who were coming through the forest on the north of the town.
This brigade fought most gallantly and caused the enemy to suffer
tremendous loss in issuing from the forest into the narrow streets
of the town. This loss has been estimated from reliable sources at
from 700 to 1,000. At the same time information reached me from
Sir Douglas Haig that his 1st Division was also heavily engaged
south and east of Maroilles. I sent urgent messages to the
Commander of the two French Reserve Divisions on my right to come
up to the assistance of the 1st Corps, which they eventually did.
Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the skilful manner
in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his Corps from an
exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night,
they were able at dawn to resume their march south towards
Wassigny on Guise.
By about 6 p.m. the 2nd Corps had got into position with their
right on Le Cateau, their left in the neighbourhood of Caudry, and
the line of defence was continued thence by the 4th Division
towards Seranvillers, the left being thrown back.
During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the Cavalry became a good
deal scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th General
Allenby had succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south
of Cambrai.
The 4th Division was placed under the orders of the General
Officer Commanding the 2nd Army Corps.
On the 24th the French Cavalry Corps, consisting of three
divisions, under General Sordêt, had been in billets north of
Avesnes. On my way back from Bavai, which was my "Poste de
Commandement" during the fighting of the 23rd and 24th, I visited
General Sordêt, and earnestly requested his co-operation and
support. He promised to obtain sanction from his Army Commander to
act on my left flank, but said that his horses were too tired to
move before the next day. Although he rendered me valuable
assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was unable
for the reasons given to afford me any support on the most
critical day of all, viz., the 26th.
At daybreak on August 26 it became apparent that the enemy was
throwing the bulk of his strength against the left of the position
occupied by the 2nd Corps and the 4th Division.
At this time the guns of four German Army Corps were in position
against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he
judged it impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as
ordered) in face of such an attack.
I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavours to break off the
action and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was
impossible for me to send him any support, the 1st Corps being at
the moment incapable of movement.
The French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordêt, was coming up on
our left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message
to him to do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of
my left flank; but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found
himself unable to intervene in any way.
There had been no time to entrench the position properly, but the
troops showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which
confronted them.
The Artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made
a splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.
At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to
be avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was
given to commence it about 3.30 p.m. The movement was covered with
the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the Artillery,
which had itself suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the
Cavalry in the further retreat from the position assisted
materially in the final completion of this most difficult and
dangerous operation.
Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage
in an energetic pursuit.
I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the
British troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of
the valuable services rendered by General Sir Horace
Smith-Dorrien.
I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the
Army under my command on the morning of the 26th August could
never have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and
unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present
to personally conduct the operation.
The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and
through the 27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the
line Noyon-Chauny-La Fère, having then thrown off the weight of
the enemy's pursuit.
On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to General Sordêt and the
French Cavalry Division which he commands for materially assisting
my retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on
Cambrai.
General D'Amade also, with the 61st and 62nd French Reserve
Divisions, moved down from the neighbourhood of Arras on the
enemy's right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the
British Forces.
This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced
at Mons on Sunday afternoon, August 23, and which really
constituted a four days' battle.
At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present
despatch.
I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British Forces
have suffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in
view of the fact that the British Army--only two days after a
concentration by rail--was called upon to withstand a vigorous
attack of five German Army Corps.
It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced
by the two General Officers commanding Army Corps; the
self-sacrificing and devoted exertions of their Staffs; the
direction of the troops by Divisional Brigade and Regimental
Leaders; the command of the smaller units by their officers; and
the magnificent fighting spirit displayed by non-commissioned
officers and men.
I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice the
admirable work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David
Henderson. Their skill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond
all praise. They have furnished me with the most complete and
accurate information, which has been of incalculable value in the
conduct of the operations. Fired at constantly both by friend and
foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have
remained undaunted throughout.
Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in
destroying five of the enemy's machines.
I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude the incalculable
assistance I received from the General and Personal Staffs at
Headquarters during this trying period.
Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray, Chief of the General
Staff; Major-General Wilson, Sub-Chief of the General Staff; and
all under them have worked day and night unceasingly with the
utmost skill, self-sacrifice and devotion; and the same
acknowledgment is due by me to Brigadier-General Hon. W. Lambton,
my Military Secretary, and the Personal Staff.
In such operations as I have described the work of the
Quartermaster-General is of an extremely onerous nature.
Major-General Sir William Robertson has met what appeared to be
almost insuperable difficulties with his characteristic energy,
skill and determination; and it is largely owing to his exertions
that the hardships and sufferings of the troops--inseparable from
such operations--were not much greater.
Major-General Sir Nevil Macready, the Adjutant-General, has also
been confronted with most onerous and difficult tasks in
connection with disciplinary arrangements and the preparation of
casualty lists. He has been indefatigable in his exertions to meet
the difficult situations which arose.
I have not yet been able to complete the list of officers whose
names I desire to bring to your Lordship's notice for services
rendered during the period under review; and, as I understand it
is of importance that this despatch should no longer be delayed, I
propose to forward this list, separately, as soon as I can.
I have the honour to be,
Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
(Signed) J.D.P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
Commander-in-Chief,
British Forces in the Field.
INDEX
Abu Klea, battle of, 17.
Asquith, H.H., 103.
Baden-Powell, Lieut.-General Sir Robert, 26.
Barrow, Col. Percy, 12, 18, 19, 23.
Beresford, Lord Charles:
Knocked senseless, 15.
Bernhardi, General von, 33, 127.
Bewicke Copley, General--Admiration of French, 24.
Bloemfontein, 75, 85, 86.
Botha, General, 56.
Buller, Sir Redvers:
Relief for the Expedition, 18.
Desperate measure, A, 19.
Checking the enemy's advance, 20.
Tribute to French, 21.
His knowledge of French's value, 34.
Oppressed by misgivings, 53.
Preparing to relieve Ladysmith, 54.
Disaster at Colenso, 56.
Butcher Major E.E.A.: Ingenious solution of a difficulty, 62, 63.
Carleton, Colonel, 46, 47, 48, 49.
Cavalry:
Test against camels, 12.
Distinguishing themselves, 14.
Buller's belief in, 21.
Enemy's respect for, 22.
Cavalry regiments in India, 25.
French's, Sir, J., idea of the function of, 26.
Opinion of the late Sir Robert Russell, 27.
British cavalry reform, 28.
Worrying the enemy at Colesberg, 55.
Race for De Kiel's Drift, The, 70.
Popular idea of cavalry, 106.
Use and abuse of, 108.
Lesson of the Boer War, 109.
French's, Sir J., confidence in, 114.
Mounted arm in modern warfare, The, 115.
Chisholme, Colonel Scott, 36, 38.
Colenso, 50, 56.
Colesberg, 33, 55, 59, 62, 64, 84, 127, 134.
Cromer, Lord, 11.
Cronje, General, 56, 68, 69, 73, 73, 79, 80, 81, 82.
Curragh, The, 7, 104.
Delarey, General, 65, 83, 84.
Despard, Mrs., 2, 136.
De Wet, General, 65, 83, 84, 129.
Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan, 99.
"Dumpies," The, 5.
Eccles, Miss, 2.
Elandslaagte, 40, 41, 52, 135.
Ewart, Sir J.S., 101, 103.
Fisher, Colonel, 59.
French, General Sir John:
Boyhood, 3.
War game, The, 3.
8th Hussars, Gazetted to the, 5.
Naval career, Early, 4.
Sportsman, As a, 6, 7.
Nickname, His, 6.
Strategy, Interest in, 8.
Marriage, 8.
Egypt, Ordered to, 9.
Scouting in the desert, 14, 15.
Wood, Sir E., First meeting with, 20.
Mentioned in Dispatches, 21.
Promotion, 23.
Reorganisation of cavalry regiments in India, 25.
An enforced retirement, 25.
Function of cavalry, His idea of the, 26.
Effect of his cavalry theory, 27.
Appointment at the War Office, 28.
Temperament, His, 29.
Notable success, A, 30.
Promotion to Major-General, 31.
Public ignorance of his work, 33.
Sketch by Major Arthur Griffiths, 34.
Arrival at Ladysmith, 35.
Result of a cavalry charge, 36.
Difficult enterprise, A, 37.
His opportunity, 38.
His first victory, 39.
Impression of him on the battlefield, An, 40.
Secret of his ability, 41.
Won a reputation among the Boers, 43.
An American journalist's description, 44.
Out-manoeuvring the Boers, 49.
Leaving Ladysmith, 50.
Confounding the critics, 53.
Object at Colesberg, 54.
Cavalry attack, A, 55.
Cheering Christmas greeting, A, 57.
Cavalry tactics, His, 58.
Brilliant venture, A, 59.
Disaster to the Suffolks, The, 60.
His remarkable caution, 64.
Problem--modern warfare, mastered, A, 65.
Ability for doing the right thing, 66.
Promise to relieve Kimberley, 67.
Greatness of the undertaking, 68, 69.
Congratulated by Lords Roberts and Kitchener, 71.
Boers routed, 73.
French _v._ The Impossible, 76.
Kimberley relieved, 78.
Cutting off Cronje's retreat, 80.
Escape of De Wet, 84.
Narrow escape from death, 82.
Sitting for his portrait, 86.
Command of the forces in Eastern Transvaal, 89.
Imitating the Boers, 91.
Releasing Schoeman from jail, 92.
Command of the operations in Cape Colony, 93.
His modesty, 94.
"Shirt-sleeved General, The," 95.
Artilleryman's tribute, An, 96.
Return from South Africa, 97.
Appointed Inspector-General of the forces, 98.
His love of efficiency, 99.
Appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 99.
Gough incident, The, 100, 101.
His resignation, 103.
Student and an innovator, 107.
Objection to extremist views, 110.
His value in the present crisis, 118.
Man as he is, The, 123.
Worship of Napoleon, His, 124, 125.
Secret of his popularity, 126.
Literary ability, 130.
How he regards war, 133.
French, Lady, 8.
French, Commander J.T.W., 2.
Freyne, Lord de, 2.
Gatacre, General:
Boer invasion of Cape Colony, 54.
Reverse at Stormberg, 56.
Gordon, General, 11.
Griffiths, Major Arthur, 34.
Grimwood, Colonel, 47.
Gough, Brigadier-General, 101, 102.
Haig, Lieut.-General Sir Douglas, 26, 83, 119.
Hamilton, Sir Ian, 37.
Hussars, 19th, 1, 5, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22.
Joffre, General, 2, 119, 137.
Joubert, General, 49.
Khartoum:
Besieged, 11.
Effort to relieve, 12.
Fall of, 18.
Release of the Madhi's followers, 19.
Kitchener, Lord, 5, 9, 29, 66, 71, 74. 79, 93, 97, 122, 139.
Kimberley, 53, 54, 68, 75, 77, 78, 100, 101.
Kruger, President, 84.
Ladysmith, 35, 38, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 69.
Lambton, Captain Hedworth, 48.
Laycock, Capt. J., 74.
Lombard's Cop, 49.
Luck, Sir George:
Opinion of cavalry regiments in India, 25.
Instituting cavalry reforms at home, 27.
Mahdi, The, 10, 11, 12, 15.
Mafeking, 53.
Magersfontein, 56, 75, 79.
Methuen, Lord, 53, 67, 75.
Milbanke, Sir John, 50.
Modder River, 69.
"Modern Marlborough, The," 120.
Moltke, Count von, 21.
_Morning Post, The_, 27.
Nile Expedition, 9.
Paget, General, 101.
Porter, Colonel, 56.
Pretoria, 88, 92.
Relieving Expedition, 18.
Rhodes, Cecil, 67, 68.
Roberts, Earl, 66, 67, 71, 83, 86, 87, 88, 93.
Seely, Colonel, 101, 102.
Selby-Lowndes, Richard William, 8.
Schoeman, General, 56, 58, 92.
Smith-Dorrien, General Sir Horace, 119.
Stead, W.T., 11.
Stewart, General Sir Herbert:
Testing the camels, 12.
Compelling the guides, 13.
Outnumbered by Dervishes, 15.
Hasty protection, 17.
Last words, His, 18.
Steyn, President, 84.
Stormberg, 56.
Talbot, General, 29, 30.
Warde, Colonel Charles E., 7.
Watson, Lieut.-Colonel A.J., 60, 61, 134.
Wauchope, Major-General, 54.
White, Sir George:
French's, Sir. J. colleague in South Africa, 25.
Peril at Ladysmith, His, 35.
Orders to French, His, 36.
Chivalrous reply, A, 38.
Attempt to distract the enemy, 41.
Difficult retreat, A, 42.
Two successful engagements, 45.
An optimistic plan, 46.
Seriousness of British position, 49.
Surrounded in Ladysmith, 53.
Wilford, Colonel, 42.
Wolseley, Lord:
Khartoum, Orders to relieve, 11.
Flying column, Dispatch of, 12.
Wood, Sir Evelyn, 4.
First meeting with French, 20.
Discovery of French's value, 24.
Yule, General:
Retreat from Dundee, 41.
His force saved, 42, 45.
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