Two years after the conclusion of the Zulu war, when the troops who had
been hurried from England to take part in that campaign had for the most
part returned, and the country was almost deserted of troops, the Boers,
saved by our arms from all danger of a native rising, longed again for
independence, and they determined to have it. They had, in fact, never
acquiesced in the act of annexation. At the time, the residents in the
towns had desired it for the sake of law and order, and in the general
helplessness of the State many of the country Boers acquiesced, and to
many it seemed the only way to save the country from the Zulu. But it
was expected and promised that some form of self-government would be
left to the Dutch community. As time went on, the discontent grew, and
it was fomented by the speeches of party leaders in England, where the
Liberal party were violently attacking the colonial policy of Lord
Beaconsfield; and Mr Gladstone, referring to the Boers' country,
actually said, that if the acquisition was as valuable as it was
valueless, nevertheless he would repudiate it. When Mr Gladstone came
into office, the Boers, who did not understand the ethics of election
campaigns, expected him to reverse an act which he repudiated; and when
they found that though he disapproved the act he did not intend to
revoke it, they saw that they must take up arms, thinking that their
cause would have many supporters among the English, who would put
pressure upon the Government to give way,--a view which subsequent
events proved to be correct.
The burghers have always objected to paying taxes even to their own
republic, and naturally the opposition to our rule presented itself, in
the first place, by a resistance to the payment of taxes. Meetings
assembled, at which rebellious speeches were uttered; and the rising
commenced by an attack upon the English at Potchefstroom, the investment
of the garrisons of Pretoria, Leydenburg, Standerton, and other
positions, and by an attack upon a column of the 94th on their way from
Leydenburg to Pretoria, ending with the slaughter or captivity of the
whole force. The instant the news arrived at Pietermaritzburg, the
capital, Sir George Colley, the governor, commenced preparations for
marching to the frontier, and the ships in harbour were called upon to
furnish a naval contingent. A hundred and fifty bluejackets and marines
were landed and marched rapidly to Newcastle, an English town within a
few miles of the frontier of Natal.
At the attack upon the Dutch lines at Laing's Nek, the Naval Brigade
were in reserve, and took no active part in the engagement. But on the
26th of February a portion of them accompanied General Colley on his
night march to Majuba Hill. This mountain was situate on the flank of
the Boer position. The Dutch were in the habit of occupying it during
the daytime with their videttes, but these at night fell back, leaving
the place open to the British assault.
All through the night the troops, who with the bluejackets numbered
between 500 and 600 men, laboured across an extremely difficult country;
but, after encountering immense fatigue and difficulty, they reached the
top of Majuba Hill before sunrise. It was not until two hours later
that the Boer videttes, advancing to occupy their usual look-out, found
the English in position. The Boers at once perceived the danger, as
their position was made untenable by the possession of Majuba Hill by
the English. Had the force left in camp been sufficiently strong to
threaten a direct attack at this moment, the Boers would doubtless have
fled: but the paucity of numbers there prevented any demonstration being
made in favour of the defenders of Majuba Hill, and the Dutch were able
to use their whole force against these.
Surrounding the hill, and climbing upwards towards the precipitous
summit, they kept up for some hours a heavy fire upon the defenders.
Presently this lulled, and the garrison thought that the attack had
ceased. The Dutch were, however, strongly reinforcing their fighting
line, creeping among the bushes and gathering a strong force on the side
of the hill, unseen by the British. Suddenly these made an attack, and
this in such force that the defenders at the threatened point fell back
in haste before they could be reinforced from the main body, who were
lying in a hollow on the top of the small plateau which formed the
summit of the mountain.
The first to gain the summit were rapidly reinforced by large numbers of
their countrymen, and these, covering their advance with a tremendous
fire of musketry, rushed upon the British position. The defence was
feeble. Taken by surprise, shot down in numbers by the accurate firing
of the Boers, attacked on all sides at once, the garrison failed to
defend their position, and in a moment the Boers were among them. At
this point a bayonet charge would have turned defeat into a victory, but
there were no officers left to command, all had been picked off by the
accurate shooting of the Boers, and the soldiers were panic-stricken.
All cohesion became lost, and in a few minutes the whole of the
defenders of the position were either shot down or taken prisoners, with
the exception of a few who managed to make their escape down the side of
the hill and to lie concealed among the bushes, making their way back to
camp during the night. Sir George Colley stood still, and was shot down
at close range as the men ran down the hill.
This was the only affair in which the Naval Brigade were engaged during
the war, as, shortly afterwards, just as they were hoping to retrieve
the disasters which had befallen the force,--the reinforcements from
England having now come up to the spot,--peace was made, the Transvaal
was surrendered to the Boers, and the sacrifices made and the blood
which had been shed were shown to have been spent in vain. The intense
disappointment of the troops at this summary and unexpected termination
of the campaign was fully shared by the bluejackets and marines.
The defeat at Majuba Hill was a great blow to British prestige, but it
was one that, in the course of the war which all the world expected to
follow, could have been speedily retrieved, but the effect upon the
Dutch must have remained. It seemed, indeed, as if in fighting for
freedom they were truly invincible, and as if they could withstand the
power of Great Britain, and defeat it, just as their fathers, a few
hundred in number, had withstood Dingaan and defeated his thousands of
warriors. This impression was greatly strengthened by the action of the
British Government.
The Liberal party in England had undertaken the war with very little
fervour, to many the cause of the Boer was the cause of freedom, and the
sight of a small peasant nation, armed as it then was only with rifles,
rising against the power of Great Britain, appealed to the sentiment of
many people, to whom the great popular orator had repeatedly declared
that the act of annexation was an act of tyranny.
Still the war was the act of their great leader, and had therefore been
supported; moreover, regarded as a military matter only, the defeat was
of no importance; the various British garrisons in the country were
manfully holding their own; Sir Evelyn Wood was gathering sufficient
force to take action; he held, he said, the Boers in the hollow of his
hand,--so the war must go on, and Sir F (now Lord) Roberts was sent out
to take command.
Mr Gladstone now suddenly changed his mind; further prosecution of the
war, he said, would be "sheer blood-guiltiness."
He gave the Boers their independence, but they and all the world noted
that he did not discover the blood-guiltiness of the war before the
defeat, and they drew their inferences; and to their dislike of British
rule, added a contempt for British courage, which led their leaders into
a course of action which culminated in an ambition to substitute Dutch
for British throughout South Africa, and thus brought down upon the two
republics the ruin and disasters of the great war of 1899-1901.