_T. H._ And thus you see how the inconveniences, which he objecteth must
follow upon the holding of necessity, are avoided, and the necessity
itself demonstratively proved. To which I could add, if I thought it
good logic, the inconvenience of denying necessity; as that it destroys
both the decrees and prescience of God Almighty. For whatsoever God hath
purposed to bring to pass by man as an instrument, or foreseeth shall
come to pass, a man, if he have liberty, such as he affirmeth from
necessitation, might frustrate and make not to come to pass: and God
should either not foreknow it and not decree it, or he should foreknow
such things shall be as shall never be, and decree that which shall
never come to pass.
[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “Thus he hath laboured in vain to satisfy my reasons, and to
prove his own assertion. But for demonstration, there is nothing like it
among his arguments. Now he saith, (_a_) he could add other arguments,
if he thought it good logic. There is no impediment in logic, why a man
may not press his adversary with those absurdities which flow from his
opinion; _argumentum ducens ad impossibile_ or _ad absurdum_, is a good
form of reasoning. But there is another reason of his forbearance,
though he be loath to express it. _Hæret lateri læthalis arundo._ The
arguments drawn from the attributes of God do stick so close in the
sides of his cause, that he hath no mind to treat of that subject. By
the way, take notice of his own confession, that ‘he could add other
reasons, if he thought it good logic’. If it were predetermined in the
outward causes, that he must make this very defence and no other, how
could it be in his power to add or subtract any thing: just as if a
blind man should say in earnest, _I could see if I had mine eyes_? Truth
often breaks out whilst men seek to smother it. (_b_) But let us view
his argument: ‘if a man have liberty from necessitation, he may
frustrate the decrees of God, and make his prescience false’. First, for
the decrees of God, this is his decree that man should be a free agent;
if he did consider God as a most simple act, without priority or
posteriority of time, or any composition; he would not conceive of his
decrees, as of the laws of the Medes and Persians, long since enacted
and passed before we were born, but as coexistent with ourselves, and
with the acts which we do by virtue of those decrees. Decrees and
attributes are but notions to help the weakness of our understanding to
conceive of God. The decrees of God are God himself, and therefore
justly said to be before the foundation of the world was laid: and yet
coexistent with ourselves, because of the infinite and eternal being of
God. The sum is this, the decree of God, or God himself eternally,
constitutes or ordains all effects which come to pass in time, according
to the distinct natures or capacities of his creatures. An eternal
ordination is neither past nor to come, but always present. So free
actions do proceed as well from the eternal decree of God, as necessary;
and from that order which he hath set in the world.
“As the decree of God is eternal, so is his knowledge. And therefore to
speak truly and properly, there is neither fore-knowledge nor
after-knowledge in him. The knowledge of God comprehends all times in a
point, by reason of the eminence and virtue of its infinite perfection.
And yet I confess, that this is called fore-knowledge in respect of us.
But this fore-knowledge doth produce no absolute necessity. Things are
not therefore, because they are foreknown; but therefore they are
foreknown, because they shall come to pass. If any thing should come to
pass otherwise than it doth, yet God’s knowledge could not be irritated
by it; for then he did not know that it should come to pass, as now it
doth. Because every knowledge of vision necessarily presupposeth its
object, God did know that Judas should betray Christ; but Judas was not
necessitated to be a traitor by God’s knowledge. If Judas had not
betrayed Christ, then God had not fore-known that Judas should betray
him. The case is this: a watchman standing on the steeple’s-top, as it
is the use in Germany, gives notice to them below, who see no such
things, that company are coming, and how many; his prediction is most
certain, for he sees them. What a vain correction were it for one below
to say, what if they did not come, then a certain prediction may fail.
It may be urged, that there is a difference between these two cases. In
this case, the coming is present to the watchman; but that which God
fore-knows, is future. God knows what shall be; the watchman only knows
what is. I answer, that this makes no difference at all in the case, by
reason of that disparity which is between God’s knowledge and ours. As
that coming is present to the watchman, which is future to them who are
below: so all those things which are future to us, are present to God,
because his infinite and eternal knowledge doth reach to the future
being of all agents and events. Thus much is plainly acknowledged by T.
H. No. XI: that ‘fore-knowledge is knowledge, and knowledge depends on
the existence of the things known, and not they on it’. To conclude, the
prescience of God doth not make things more necessary than the
production of the things themselves; but if the agents were free agents,
the production of the things doth not make the events to be absolutely
necessary, but only upon supposition that the causes were so determined.
God’s prescience proveth a necessity of infallibility, but not of
antecedent extrinsical determination to one. If any event should not
come to pass, God did never foreknow that it would come to pass. For
every knowledge necessarily presupposeth its object.