_T. H._ For my first five points; where it is explicated, first, what
spontaneity is; secondly, what deliberation is; thirdly, what will,
propension, and appetite is; fourthly, what a free agent is; fifthly,
what liberty is: there can be no other proof offered but every man’s own
experience, by reflecting on himself, and remembering what he useth to
have in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth, when he saith, an
action is spontaneous, a man deliberates, such is his will, that agent
or that action is free. Now, he that so reflecteth on himself, cannot
but be satisfied, that _deliberation_ is the considering of the good and
evil sequels of the action to come; that by _spontaneity_ is meant
inconsiderate proceeding; for else nothing is meant by it; that _will_
is the last act of our deliberation; that a _free agent_, is he that can
do if he will and forbear if he will; and that _liberty_ is the absence
of external impediments. But to those that out of custom speak not what
they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able or will not take the
pains to consider what they think, when they hear such words, no
argument can be sufficient; because experience and matter of fact is not
verified by other men’s arguments, but by every man’s own sense and
memory. For example, how can it be proved, that to love a thing and to
think it good are all one, to a man that does not mark his own meaning
by those words? Or how can it be proved that eternity is not _nunc
stans_, to a man that says these words by custom, and never considers
how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind? Also the sixth point,
that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a cause, can no
other way be made known but by trying how he can imagine it. But if he
try, he shall find as much reason, if there be no cause of the thing, to
conceive it should begin at one time as another, that is, he hath equal
reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible. And
therefore he must think there was some special cause, why it began then
rather than sooner or later; or else, that it began never, but was
eternal.
[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “Now at length he comes to his main proofs; he that hath so
confidently censured the whole current of Schoolmen and Philosophers of
_nonsense_, had need to produce strong evidence for himself. So he calls
his reasons, No. XXXVI., _demonstrative proofs_. All demonstrations are
either from the cause or the effect, not from private notions and
conceptions which we have in our minds. That which he calls a
demonstration, deserves not the name of an intimation. He argues thus:
‘that which a man conceives in his mind by these words, spontaneity,
deliberation, &c.; that they are’. This is his proposition, which I
deny. (_a_) The true natures of things are not to be judged by the
private _ideas_, or conceptions of men, but by their causes and formal
reasons. Ask an ordinary person what _upwards_ signifies, and whether
our antipodes have their heads upwards or downwards; and he will not
stick to tell you, that if his head be upwards, theirs must needs be
downwards. And this is because he knows not the formal reason thereof;
that the heavens encircle the earth, and what is towards heaven is
upwards. This same erroneous notion of _upwards_ and _downwards_, before
the true reason was fully discovered, abused more than ordinary
capacities; as appears by their arguments of _penduli homines_, and
_pendulæ arbores_. Again, what do men conceive ordinarily by this word
_empty_, as when they say an empty vessel, or by this word _body_, as
when they say, there is no body in that room? They intend not to exclude
the air, either out of the vessel or out of the room: yet reason tells
us, that the vessel is not truly empty, and that the air is a true body.
I might give a hundred such like instances. He who leaves the conduct of
his understanding to follow vulgar notions, shall plunge himself into a
thousand errors; like him who leaves a certain guide to follow an _ignus
fatuus_, or a will-with-the-wisp. So his proposition is false. (_b_) His
reason, ‘that matter of fact is not verified by other men’s arguments,
but by every man’s own sense and memory’, is likewise maimed on both
sides. Whether we hear such words or not, is matter of fact; and sense
is the proper judge of it: but what these words do, or ought truly to
signify, is not to be judged by sense but by reason. Secondly, reason
may, and doth oftentimes correct sense, even about its proper object.
Sense tells us that the sun is no bigger than a good ball; but reason
demonstrates, that it is many times greater than the whole globe of the
earth. As to his instance: ‘how can it be proved, that to love a thing
and to think it good is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own
meaning by these words’, I confess it cannot be proved; for it is not
true. Beauty, and likeness, and love, do conciliate love as much as
goodness, _cos amoris amor_. Love is a passion of the will; but to judge
of goodness is an act of the understanding. A father may love an
ungracious child, and yet not esteem him good. A man loves his own house
better than another man’s; yet he cannot but esteem many others better
than his own. His other instance, ‘how can it be proved that eternity is
not _nunc stans_, to a man that says these words by custom, and never
considers how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind’, is just
like the former, not to be proved by reason, but by fancy, which is the
way he takes. And it is not unlike the counsel which one gave to a
novice about the choice of his wife, to advise with the bells: as he
fancied so they sounded, either take her or leave her.
(_c_) “Then for his assumption, it is as defective as his proposition,
that by those words spontaneity, &c, men do understand as he conceives.
No rational man doth conceive a _spontaneous_ action and an
_indeliberate_ action to be all one. Every _indeliberate_ action is not
_spontaneous_; the fire considers not whether it should burn, yet the
burning of it is not _spontaneous_. Neither is every _spontaneous_
action _indeliberate_; a man may deliberate what he will eat, and yet
eat it _spontaneously_. (_d_) Neither doth _deliberation_ properly
signify, the considering of the good and evil sequels of an action to
come, but the considering whether this be a good and fit means, or the
best and fittest means for obtaining such an end. The physician doth not
deliberate whether he should cure his patient, but by what means he
should cure him. Deliberation is of the means, not of the end. (_e_)
Much less doth any man conceive with T. H. that deliberation is an
_imagination_, or an act of fancy not of reason, common to men of
discretion with madmen, and natural fools, and children, and brute
beasts. (_f_) Thirdly, neither doth any understanding man conceive, or
can conceive, that ‘the will is an act of our deliberation’; (the
understanding and the will are two distinct faculties); or that ‘only
the last appetite is to be called our will’. So no man should be able to
say, this is my will, because he knows not whether he shall persevere in
it or not. (_g_) Concerning the fourth point we agree, that ‘he is a
free agent that can do if he will, and forbear if he will’. But I wonder
how this dropped from his pen. What is now become of his absolute
necessity of all things, if a man be free to do and to forbear anything?
Will he make himself guilty of the _nonsense_ of the Schoolmen, and run
with them into contradictions for company? It may be he will say, he can
do if he will, and forbear if he will, but he cannot will if he will.
This will not serve his turn; for if the cause of a free action, that
is, the will to do it be determined, then the effect, or the action
itself is likewise determined; a determined cause cannot produce an
undetermined effect; either the agent can will and forbear to will, or
else he cannot do and forbear to do. (_h_) But we differ wholly about
the fifth point. He who conceives _liberty_ aright, conceives both a
_liberty in the subject_ to will or not to will, and a _liberty to the
object_ to will this or that, and a _liberty from impediments_. T. H. by
a new way of his own cuts off the _liberty of the subject_; as if a
stone was free to ascend or descend, because it hath no outward
impediment: and the _liberty towards the object_; as if the needle
touched with the loadstone were free to point either towards the north
or towards the south, because there is not a barricado in its way to
hinder it. Yea, he cuts off the _liberty from inward impediments_ also;
as if a hawk were at liberty to fly when her wings are plucked, but not
when they are tied. And so he makes _liberty from extrinsical
impediments_ to be complete liberty; so he ascribes _liberty_ to brute
beasts, and _liberty_ to rivers, and by consequence makes beasts and
rivers to be capable of sin and punishment. Assuredly Xerxes, who caused
the Hellespont to be beaten with so many stripes, was of this opinion.
Lastly, T. H.’s reason, that ‘it is custom, or want of ability, or
negligence, which makes a man conceive otherwise’, is but a begging of
that which he should prove. Other men consider as seriously as himself,
with as much judgment as himself, with less prejudice than himself, and
yet they can apprehend no such sense of these words. Would he have other
men feign they see fiery dragons in the air, because he affirms
confidently that he sees them, and wonders why others are so blind as
not to see them?
(_i_) “The reason for the sixth point is like the former, a fantastical
or imaginative reason. ‘How can a man imagine anything to begin without
a cause, or if it should begin without a cause, why it should begin at
this time rather than at that time?’ He saith truly, nothing can _begin_
without a cause, that is, _to be_; but it may _begin to act_ of itself
without any other cause. Nothing can begin without a cause; but many
things may begin, and do begin without necessary causes. A free cause
may as well choose his time when he will begin, as a necessary cause be
determined extrinsically when it must begin. And although free effects
cannot be foretold, because they are not certainly predetermined in
their causes; yet when the free causes do determine themselves, they are
of as great certainty as the other. As when I see a bell ringing, I can
conceive the cause of it as well why it rings now, as I know the
interposition of the earth to be the cause of the eclipse of the moon,
or the most certain occurrent in the nature of things.
(_k_) “And now that I have answered T. H.’s arguments drawn from the
private conceptions of men concerning the sense of words, I desire him
seriously without prejudice to examine himself, and those natural
notions which he finds in himself, (not of words, but of things; these
are from nature, those are by imposition), whether he doth not find by
experience, that he doth many things which he might have left undone if
he would, and omits many things which he might have done if he would;
whether he doth not some things out of mere animosity and will, without
either regard to the direction of right reason or serious respect of
what is honest or profitable, only to show that he will have a dominion
over his own actions; as we see ordinarily in children, and wise men
find at some times in themselves by experience; (and I apprehend this
very defence of necessity against liberty to be partly of that kind);
whether he is not angry with those who draw him from his study, or cross
him in his desires; (if they be necessitated to do it, why should he be
angry with them, any more than he is angry with a sharp winter, or a
rainy day that keeps him at home against his antecedent will?); whether
he doth not sometimes blame himself, and say, ‘O what a fool was I to do
thus and thus’, or wish to himself, ‘O that I had been wise’, or, ‘O
that I had not done such an act’. If he have no dominion over his
actions, if he be irresistibly necessitated to all things that he doth,
he might as well wish, ‘O that I had not breathed,’ or blame himself for
growing old, ‘O what a fool was I to grow old’.”