_T. H._ Secondly, I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall do
a thing or not do a thing, that he does nothing else but consider
whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to
consider an action, is to imagine the consequences of it, both good and
evil. From whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing but
alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or
(which is the same thing) alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite
to do or acquit the action of which he deliberateth.
[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ (_a_) “If I did not know what deliberation was, I should be
little relieved in my knowledge by this description. Sometimes he makes
it to be a consideration, or an act of the understanding; sometimes an
imagination, or an act of the fancy; sometimes he makes it to be an
alternation of passions, hope and fear. Sometimes he makes it concern
the end, sometimes to concern the means. So he makes it I know not what.
The truth is this in brief: ‘Deliberation is an inquiry made by reason,
whether this or that, definitely considered, be a good and fit means,
or, indefinitely, what are good and fit means to be chosen for attaining
some wished end.’”