[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “Secondly, (_a_) they who might have done, and may do, many
things which they leave undone; and they who leave undone many things
which they might do, are neither compelled nor necessitated to do what
they do, but have true liberty. But we might do many things which we do
not, and we do many things which we might leave undone, as is plain, (1
Kings iii. 11): _Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked
for thyself long life, neither hast asked riches for thyself, nor hast
asked the life of thine enemies_ &c. God gave Solomon his choice. He
might have asked riches, but then he had not asked wisdom, which he did
ask. He did ask wisdom, but he might have asked riches, which yet he did
not ask. And (Acts v. 4): _After it was sold, was it not in thine own
power?_ It was in his own power to give it, and it was in his own power
to retain it. Yet if he did give it, he could not retain it; and if he
did retain it, he could not give it. Therefore we may do, what we do
not. And we do not, what we might do. That is, we have true liberty from
necessity.”
_T. H._ The second argument from Scripture consisteth in histories of
men that did one thing, when, if they would, they might have done
another. The places are two; one is in 1 Kings iii. 11, where the
history says, God was pleased that Solomon, who might, if he would, have
asked riches or revenge, did nevertheless ask wisdom at God’s hands. The
other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, (Acts v. 4): _After it was
sold, was it not in thine own power?_
To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former
places: that they prove that there is election, but do not disprove the
necessity which I maintain of what they so elect.
“We have had the very same answer twice before. It seemeth that he is
well-pleased with it, or else he would not draw it in again so suddenly
by head and shoulders to no purpose, if he did not conceive it to be a
panchreston, a salve for all sores, or _dictamnum_, sovereign dittany,
to make all his adversaries’ weapons to drop out of the wounds of his
cause, only by chewing it, without any application to the sore. I will
not waste the time to show any further, how the members of his
distinction do cross one another, and one take away another. To make
every election to be of one thing imposed by necessity, and of another
thing which is absolutely impossible, is to make election to be no
election at all. But I forbear to press that at present. If I may be
bold to use his own phrase, his answer looks quite another way from mine
argument. My second reason was this: ‘They who may do, and might have
done many things which they leave undone, and who leave undone many
things which they might do, are not necessitated, nor precisely and
antecedently determined to what they do.’
“But we might do many things which we do not, and we do many things
which we might leave undone, as appears evidently by the texts alleged.
Therefore we are not antecedently and precisely determined, nor
necessitated to do all things which we do. What is here of _election_ in
this argument? To what proposition, to what term doth T. H. apply his
answer? He neither affirms, nor denieth, nor distinguisheth of any thing
contained in my argument. Here I must be bold to call upon him for a
more pertinent answer.”