_T. H._ Supposing, it seems, I might answer as I have done, that
necessity and election might stand together, and instance in the actions
of children, fools, and brute beasts, whose fancies, I might say, are
necessitated and determined to one: before these his proofs out of
Scripture, he desires to prevent that instance, and therefore says, that
the actions of children, fools, madmen, and beasts, are indeed
determined, but that they proceed not from election, nor from free, but
from spontaneous agents. As for example, that the bee, when it maketh
honey, does it spontaneously; and when the spider makes his web, he does
it spontaneously, and not by election. Though I never meant to ground
any answer upon the experience of what children, fools, madmen, and
beasts do, yet that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by
spontaneous, and how it differs from voluntary, I will answer that
distinction, and show that it fighteth against its fellow arguments.
Your Lordship therefore is to consider, that all voluntary actions,
where the thing that induceth the will is not fear, are called also
spontaneous, and said to be done by a man’s own accord. As when a man
giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, or out of
affection, he is said to do it of his own accord, which in Latin is
_sponte_, and therefore the action is spontaneous; though to give one’s
money willingly to a thief to avoid killing, or throw it into the sea to
avoid drowning, where the motive is fear, be not called spontaneous. But
every spontaneous action is not therefore voluntary; for voluntary
presupposes some precedent deliberation, that is to say, some
consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the
doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of; whereas many
actions are done of our own accord, and are therefore spontaneous; of
which nevertheless, as he thinks, we never consulted nor deliberated in
ourselves, as when making no question nor any the least doubt in the
world but that the thing we are about is good, we eat, or walk, or in
anger strike or revile, which he thinks spontaneous, but not voluntary
nor elective actions. And with such kind of actions he says
necessitation may stand, but not with such as are voluntary, and proceed
upon election and deliberation. Now if I make it appear to you that even
these actions which he says proceed from spontaneity, and which he
ascribes only to fools, children, madmen, and beasts, proceed from
deliberation and election, and that actions inconsiderate, rash and
spontaneous, are ordinarily found in those that are, by themselves and
many more, thought as wise or wiser than ordinary men are; then his
argument concludeth, that necessity and election may stand together,
which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his
arguments to prove. And first, your Lordship’s own experience furnishes
you with proof enough, that horses, dogs, and other brute beasts, do
demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take: the horse, retiring from
some strange figure he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And
what else doth man that deliberateth, but one while proceed toward
action, another while retire from it, as the hope of greater good draws
him, or the fear of greater evil drives him? A child may be so young as
to do all which it does without all deliberation, but that is but till
it chance to be hurt by doing somewhat, or till it be of age to
understand the rod; for the actions wherein he hath once a check, shall
be deliberated on a second time. Fools and madmen manifestly deliberate
no less than the wisest men, though they make not so good a choice, the
images of things being by diseases altered. For bees and spiders, if he
had so little to do as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have
confessed not only election, but also art, prudence, and policy in them,
very near equal to that of mankind. Of bees Aristotle says, their life
is civil. He is deceived, if he think any spontaneous action, after once
being checked in it, differs from an action voluntary and elective, for
even the setting of a man’s foot in the posture of walking, and the
action of ordinary eating, was once deliberated, how and when it should
be done; and though it afterwards became easy and habitual, so as to be
done without fore-thought, yet that does not hinder but that the act is
voluntary and proceeds from election. So also are the rashest actions of
choleric persons voluntary and upon deliberation. For who is there, but
very young children, that has not considered when and how far he ought,
or safely may, strike or revile. Seeing then he agrees with me that such
actions are necessitated, and the fancy of those that do them is
determined to the actions they do, it follows out of his own doctrine,
that the liberty of election does not take away the necessity of
electing this or that individual thing. And thus one of his arguments
fights against another.
[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “We have partly seen before how T. H. hath coined a new kind of
liberty, a new kind of necessity, a new kind of election; and now in
this section a new kind of spontaneity, and a new kind of voluntary
actions. Although he say that here is nothing new to him, yet I begin to
suspect that either here are many things new to him, or otherwise his
election is not the result of a serious mature deliberation. (_a_) The
first thing that I offer, is, how often he mistakes my meaning in this
one section. First, I make voluntary and spontaneous actions to be one
and the same; he saith, I distinguish them, so as spontaneous actions
may be necessary, but voluntary actions cannot. Secondly, (_b_) I
distinguish between free acts and voluntary acts. The former are always
deliberate, the latter may be indeliberate; all free acts are voluntary,
but all voluntary acts are not free. But he saith I confound them and
make them the same. (_c_) Thirdly, he saith, I ascribe spontaneity only
to fools, children, madmen, and beasts; but I acknowledge spontaneity
hath place in rational men, both as it is comprehended in liberty, and
as it is distinguished from liberty.
(_d_) “Yet I have no reason to be offended at it; for he deals no
otherwise with me than he doth with himself. Here he tells us that
‘voluntary presupposeth deliberation.’ But (No. XXV.) he tells us
contrary, ‘that whatsoever followeth the last appetite is voluntary, and
where there is but one appetite, that is the last:’ and that ‘no action
of a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so
sudden.’ So (No. XXXIII.) he tells us, that ‘by spontaneity is meant
inconsiderate proceeding, or else nothing is meant by it:’ yet here he
tells us, that ‘all voluntary actions which proceed not from fear, are
spontaneous,’ whereof many are deliberate, as that wherein he instanceth
himself, ‘to give money for merchandise.’ Thirdly, when I said that
children, before they have the use of reason, act spontaneously, as when
they suck the breast, but do not act freely, because they have not
judgment to deliberate or elect, here T. H. undertakes to prove that
they do deliberate and elect; and yet presently after confesseth again,
that ‘a child may be so young, as to do what it doth without all
deliberation.’
“Besides these mistakes and contradictions, he hath other errors also in
this section. As this, that no actions proceeding from fear are
spontaneous. He who throws his goods into the sea to avoid drowning,
doth it not only _spontaneously_, but even _freely_. He that wills the
end, wills the means conducing to that end. It is true that if the
action be considered nakedly without all circumstances, no man willingly
or spontaneously casts his goods into the sea. But if we take the
action, as in this particular case, invested with all the circumstances,
and in order to the end, that is, the saving of his own life, it is not
only voluntary and spontaneous, but elective and chosen by him, as the
most probable means for his own preservation. As there is an antecedent
and a subsequent will, so there is an antecedent and a subsequent
spontaneity. His grammatical argument, grounded upon the derivation of
spontaneous from _sponte_, weighs nothing; we have learned in the
rudiments of logic, that conjugates are sometimes in name only, and not
in deed. He who casts his goods into the sea, may do it of his own
accord in order to the end. Secondly, he errs in this also, that nothing
is opposed to spontaneity but only fear. Invincible and antecedent
ignorance doth destroy the nature of spontaneity or voluntariness, by
removing that knowledge which should and would have prohibited the
action. As a man thinking to shoot a wild beast in a bush, shoots his
friend, which if he had known, he would not have shot. This man did not
kill his friend of his own accord.
“For the clearer understanding of these things, and to know what
spontaneity is, let us consult awhile with the Schools about the
distinct order of voluntary or involuntary actions. Some acts proceed
wholly from an extrinsical cause; as the throwing of a stone upwards, a
rape, or the drawing of a Christian by plain force to the idol’s temple;
these are called violent acts. Secondly, some proceed from an
intrinsical cause, but without any manner of knowledge of the end, as
the falling of a stone downwards; these are called natural acts.
Thirdly, some proceed from an internal principle, with an imperfect
knowledge of the end, where there is an appetite to the object, but no
deliberation nor election; as the acts of fools, children, beasts, and
the inconsiderate acts of men of judgment. These are called voluntary or
spontaneous acts. Fourthly, some proceed from an intrinsical cause, with
a more perfect knowledge of the end, which are elected upon
deliberation. These are called free acts. So then the formal reason of
liberty is election. The necessary requisite to election is
deliberation. Deliberation implyeth the actual use of reason. But
deliberation and election cannot possibly subsist with an extrinsical
predetermination to one. How should a man deliberate or choose which way
to go, who knows that all ways are shut against him and made impossible
to him, but only one? This is the genuine sense of these words
_voluntary_ and _spontaneous_ in this question. Though they were taken
twenty other ways vulgarly or metaphorically, as we say _spontaneous
ulcers_, where there is no appetite at all, yet it were nothing to this
controversy, which is not about words, but about things; not what the
words voluntary or free do or may signify, but whether all things be
extrinsically predetermined to one.
“These grounds being laid for clearing the true sense of the words, the
next thing to be examined is, that contradiction which he hath espied in
my discourse, or how this argument fights against his fellows. ‘If I,’
saith T. H., ‘make it appear, that the spontaneous actions of fools,
children, madmen, and beasts, do proceed from election and deliberation,
and that inconsiderate and indeliberate actions are found in the wisest
men, then this argument concludes that necessity and election may stand
together, which is contrary to his assertion.’ If this could be made
appear as easily as it is spoken, it would concern himself much, who,
when he should prove that rational men are not free from necessity, goes
about to prove that brute beasts do deliberate and elect, that is as
much as to say, are free from necessity. But it concerns not me at all;
it is neither my assertion nor my opinion, that necessity and election
may not meet together in the same subject; violent, natural,
spontaneous, and deliberate or elective acts may all meet together in
the same subject. But this I say, that necessity and election cannot
consist together in the same act. He who is determined to one, is not
free to choose out of more than one. To begin with his latter
supposition, ‘that wise men may do inconsiderate and indeliberate
actions,’ I do readily admit it. But where did he learn to infer a
general conclusion from particular premises; as thus, because wise men
do some indeliberate acts, therefore no act they do is free or elective?
Secondly, for his former supposition, ‘that fools, children, madmen, and
beasts, do deliberate and elect,’ if he could make it good, it is not I
who contradict myself, nor fight against mine own assertion, but it is
he who endeavours to prove that which I altogether deny. He may well
find a contradiction between him and me; otherwise to what end is this
dispute? But he shall not be able to find a difference between me and
myself. But the truth is, he is not able to prove any such thing; and
that brings me to my sixth consideration, that neither horses, nor bees,
nor spiders, nor children, nor fools, nor madmen do deliberate or elect.
“His first instance is in the horse, or dog, but more especially the
horse. He told me that I divided my argument into squadrons, to apply
myself to your Lordship, being a military man; and I apprehend that for
the same reason he gives his first instance of the horse, with a
submission to your own experience. So far well, but otherwise very
disadvantageously to his cause. Men used to say of a dull fellow, that
he hath no more brains than a horse. And the Prophet David saith, (Psalm
xxxii. 9): _Be not like the horse and mule, which have no
understanding_. How do they deliberate without understanding? And (Psalm
xlix. 20), he saith the same of all brute beasts: _Man being in honour
had no understanding, but became like unto the beasts that perish_. The
horse ‘demurs upon his way.’ Why not? Outward objects, or inward
fancies, may produce a stay in his course, though he have no judgment
either to deliberate or elect. ‘He retires from some strange figure
which he sees, and comes on again to avoid the spur.’ So he may; and yet
be far enough from deliberation. All this proceeds from the sensitive
passion of fear, which is a perturbation arising from the expectation of
some imminent evil. But he urgeth, ‘what else doth a man that
deliberateth?’ Yes, very much. The horse feareth some outward object,
but deliberation is a comparing of several means conducing to the same
end. Fear is commonly of one, deliberation of more than one; fear is of
those things which are not in our power, deliberation of those things
which are in our power; fear ariseth many times out of natural
antipathies, but in these disconveniences of nature deliberation hath no
place at all. In a word, fear is an enemy to deliberation, and betrayeth
the succours of the soul. If the horse did deliberate, he should consult
with reason, whether it were more expedient for him to go that way or
not; he would represent to himself all the dangers both of going and
staying, and compare the one with the other, and elect that which is
less evil; he should consider whether it were not better to endure a
little hazard, than ungratefully and dishonestly to fail in his duty
towards his master, who did breed him and doth feed him. This the horse
doth not; neither is it possible for him to do it. Secondly, for
children, T. H. confesseth that they may be so young that they do not
deliberate at all; afterwards, as they attain to the use of reason by
degrees, so by degrees they become free agents. Then they do deliberate;
before they do not deliberate. The rod may be a means to make them use
their reason, when they have power to exercise it, but the rod cannot
produce the power before they have it. Thirdly, for fools and madmen, it
is not to be understood of such madmen as have their _lucida
intervalla_, who are mad and discreet by fits; when they have the use of
reason, they are no madmen, but may deliberate as well as others; nor
yet of such fools as are only comparative fools, that is, less wise than
others. Such may deliberate, though not so clearly, nor so judiciously
as others; but of mere madmen, and mere natural fools, to say that they,
who have not the use of reason, do deliberate or use reason, implies a
contradiction. But his chiefest confidence is in his bees and spiders,
‘of whose actions,’ he saith, ‘if I had been a spectator, I would have
confessed, not only election, but also art, prudence, policy, very near
equal to that of mankind, whose life, as Aristotle saith, is civil.’
Truly I have contemplated their actions many times, and have been much
taken with their curious works; yet my thoughts did not reflect so much
upon them, as upon their Maker, who is _sic magnus in magnis_, that he
is not _minor in parvis_; so great in great things, that he is not less
in small things. Yes, I have seen those silliest of creatures, and
seeing their rare works I have seen enough to confute all the bold-faced
atheists of this age, and their hellish blasphemies. I saw them, but I
praised the marvellous works of God, and admired that great and first
intellect, who hath both adapted their organs, and determined their
fancies to these particular works. I was not so simple as to ascribe
those rarities to their own invention, which I knew to proceed from a
mere instinct of nature. In all other things they are the dullest of
creatures. Naturalists write of bees, that their fancy is imperfect, not
distinct from their common-sense, spread over their whole body, and only
perceiving things present. When Aristotle calls them political or
sociable creatures, he did not intend it really that they lived a civil
life, but according to an analogy, because they do such things by
instinct as truly political creatures do out of judgment. Nor when I
read in St. Ambrose of their hexagons or sexangular cells, did I
therefore conclude that they were mathematicians. Nor when I read in
Crespet, that they invoke God to their aid when they go out of their
hives, bending their thighs in form of a cross, and bowing themselves;
did I therefore think that this was an act of religious piety, or that
they were capable of theological virtues, whom I see in all other things
in which their fancies are not determined, to be the silliest of
creatures, strangers not only to right reason, but to all resemblances
of it.
“Seventhly, concerning those actions which are done upon precedent and
passed deliberations; they are not only spontaneous, but free acts.
Habits contracted by use and experience, do help the will to act with
more facility and more determinately, as the hand of the artificer is
helped by his tools. And precedent deliberations, if they were sad and
serious, and proved by experience to be profitable, do save the labour
of subsequent consultations; _frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest
per pauciora_. Yet nevertheless the actions which are done by virtue of
these formerly acquired habits, are no less free, than if the
deliberation were coexistent with this particular action. He that hath
gained an habit and skill to play such a lesson, needs not a new
deliberation how to play every time that he plays it over and over. Yet
I am far from giving credit to him in this, that walking or eating
universally considered, are free actions, or proceed from true liberty;
not so much because they want a particular deliberation before every
individual act, as because they are animal motions and need no
deliberation of reason, as we see in brute beasts. And nevertheless the
same actions, as they are considered individually, and invested with
their due circumstances, may be and often are free actions subjected to
the liberty of the agent.
“Lastly, whereas T. H. compareth the first motions or rash attempts of
choleric persons with such acquired habits, it is a great mistake. Those
rash attempts are voluntary actions, and may be facilitated sometimes by
acquired habits. But yet for as much as actions are often altered and
varied by the circumstances of time, place, and person, so as that act
which at one time is morally good, at another time may be morally evil;
and for as much as a general precedent deliberation how to do this kind
of action, is not sufficient to make this or that particular action good
or expedient, which being in itself good, yet particular circumstances
may render inconvenient or unprofitable to some persons, at some times,
in some places: therefore a precedent general deliberation how to do any
act, as for instance, how to write, is not sufficient to make a
particular act, as my writing this individual reply, to be freely done,
without a particular and subsequent deliberation. A man learns French
advisedly; that is a free act. The same man in his choler and passion
reviles his friend in French, without any deliberation; this is a
spontaneous act, but it is not a free act. If he had taken time to
advise, he would not have reviled his friend. Yet as it is not free, so
neither is it so necessary as the bees making honey, whose fancy is not
only inclined, but determined, by nature to that act. So every way he
fails. And his conclusion, that the liberty of election doth not take
away the necessity of electing this or that individual thing, is no
consequent from my doctrine, but from his own. Neither do my arguments
fight one against another, but his private opinions fight both against
me and against an undoubted truth. A free agent endowed with liberty of
election, or with an elective power, may nevertheless be necessitated in
some individual acts, but those acts wherein he is necessitated, do not
flow from his elective power, neither are those acts which flow from his
elective power necessitated.”