perverts the law that allows bankrupts nothing more than a mere
livelihood, and that makes no provision for “honorable maintenance.” It
is enough to have vindicated Escobar from such an accusation—it is more,
indeed, than what I was in duty bound to do. But you, fathers, have not
done your duty. It still remains for you to answer the passage of
Escobar, whose decisions, by the way, have this advantage, that being
entirely independent of the context, and condensed in little articles,
they are not liable to your distinctions. I quoted the whole of the
passage, in which “bankrupts are permitted to keep their goods, though
unjustly acquired, to provide an honorable maintenance for their
families”—commenting on which in my letters, I exclaim: “Indeed, father!
by what strange kind of charity would you have the ill-gotten property
of a bankrupt appropriated to his own use, instead of that of his lawful
creditors?”[245] This is the question which must be answered; but it is
one that involves you in a sad dilemma, and from which you in vain seek
to escape by altering the state of the question, and quoting other
passages from Lessius, which have no connection with the subject. I ask
you, then, May this maxim of Escobar be followed by bankrupts with a
safe conscience, or no? And take care what you say. If you answer, No,
what becomes of your doctor, and your doctrine of probability? If you
say, Yes—I delate you to the Parliament.[246]
In this predicament I must now leave you, fathers; for my limits will
not permit me to overtake your next accusation, which respects homicide.
This will serve for my next letter, and the rest will follow.
In the mean while, I shall make no remarks on the advertisements which
you have tagged to the end of each of your charges, filled as they are
with scandalous falsehoods. I mean to answer all these in a separate
letter, in which I hope to show the weight due to your calumnies. I am
sorry fathers, that you should have recourse to such desperate
resources. The abusive terms which you heap on me will not clear up our
disputes, nor will your manifold threats hinder me from defending
myself. You think you have power and impunity on your side; and I think
that I have truth and innocence on mine. It is a strange and tedious
war, when violence attempts to vanquish truth. All the efforts of
violence cannot weaken truth, and only serve to give it fresh vigor. All
the lights of truth cannot arrest violence, and only serve to exasperate
it. When force meets force, the weaker must succumb to the stronger;
when argument is opposed to argument, the solid and the convincing
triumphs over the empty and the false; but violence and verity can make
no impression on each other. Let none suppose, however, that the two
are, therefore, equal to each other; for there is this vast difference
between them, that violence has only a certain course to run, limited by
the appointment of Heaven, which overrules its effects to the glory of
the truth which it assails; whereas verity endures forever, and
eventually triumphs over its enemies, being eternal and almighty as God
himself.[247]
-----
Footnote 241:
Pierre du Moulin is termed by Bayle “one of the most celebrated
ministers which the Reformed Church in France ever had to boast of.”
He was born in 1568, and was for some time settled in Paris; but
having incurred the resentment of Louis XIII., he retired to Sedan in
1623, where he became a professor in the Protestant University, and
died, in the ninetieth year of his age, in 1658, two years after the
time when Pascal wrote. Of his numerous writings, few are known in
this country, excepting his “Buckler of the Faith,” and his “Anatomy
of the Mass,” which were translated into English. (Quick’s Synodicon,
ii., 105.)
Footnote 242:
De Eleemosyna, c. 6.
Footnote 243:
See before, page 73.
Footnote 244:
See before, page 140.
Footnote 245:
See before, p. 177.
Footnote 246:
“The Parliament of Paris was originally the court of the kings of
France, to which they committed the supreme administration of
justice.” (Robertson’s Charles V., vol. i. 171.)
Footnote 247:
In most of the French editions, another letter is inserted after this,
being a refutation of a reply which appeared at the time to Letter
xii. But as this letter, though well written, was not written by
Pascal, and as it does not contain anything that would now be
interesting to the reader, we omit it. Suffice it to say, that the
reply of the Jesuits consisted, as usual, of the most barefaced
attempts to fix the charge of misrepresentation on their opponent,
accusing him of omitting to quote passages from his authors which they
never wrote, of not answering objections which were never brought
against him, of not adverting to cases which neither he nor his
authors dreamt of—in short, like all Jesuitical answers, it is
anything and everything but a refutation of the charges which have
been substantiated against them.
LETTER XIII.
TO THE REVEREND FATHERS OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS.
THE DOCTRINE OF LESSIUS ON HOMICIDE THE SAME WITH THAT OF VALENTIA—HOW
EASY IT IS TO PASS FROM SPECULATION TO PRACTICE—WHY THE JESUITS HAVE
RECOURSE TO THIS DISTINCTION, AND HOW LITTLE IT SERVES FOR THEIR
VINDICATION.
_September 30, 1656._
REVEREND FATHERS,—I have just seen your last production, in which you
have continued your list of Impostures up to the twentieth, and intimate
that you mean to conclude with this the first part of your accusations
against me, and to proceed to the second, in which you are to adopt a
new mode of defence, by showing that there are other casuists besides
those of your Society who are as lax as yourselves. I now see the
precise number of charges to which I have to reply; and as the fourth,
to which we have now come, relates to homicide, it may be proper, in
answering it, to include the 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and
18th, which refer to the same subject.
In the present letter, therefore, my object shall be to vindicate the
correctness of my quotations from the charges of falsity which you bring
against me. But as you have ventured, in your pamphlets, to assert that
“the sentiments of your authors on murder are agreeable to the decisions
of popes and ecclesiastical laws,” you will compel me, in my next
letter, to confute a statement at once so unfounded and so injurious to
the Church. It is of some importance to show that she is innocent of
your corruptions, in order that heretics may be prevented from taking
advantage of your aberrations, to draw conclusions tending to her
dishonor.[248] And thus, viewing on the one hand your pernicious maxims,
and on the other the canons of the Church which have uniformly condemned
them, people will see, at one glance, what they should shun and what
they should follow.
Your fourth charge turns on a maxim relating to murder, which you say I
have falsely ascribed to Lessius. It is as follows: “That if a man has
received a buffet, he may immediately pursue his enemy, and even return
the blow with the sword, not to avenge himself, but to retrieve his
honor.” This, you say, is the opinion of the casuist Victoria. But this
is nothing to the point. There is no inconsistency in saying, that it is
at once the opinion of Victoria and of Lessius; for Lessius himself says
that it is also held by Navarre and Henriquez, who teach identically the
same doctrine. The only question, then, is, if Lessius holds this view
as well as his brother casuists. You maintain “that Lessius quotes this
opinion solely for the purpose of refuting it, and that I therefore
attribute to him a sentiment which he produces only to overthrow—the
basest and most disgraceful act of which a writer can be guilty.” Now I
maintain, fathers, that he quotes the opinion solely for the purpose of
supporting it. Here is a question of fact, which it will be very easy to
settle. Let us see, then, how you prove your allegation, and you will
see afterwards how I prove mine.
To show that Lessius is not of that opinion, you tell us that he
condemns the practice of it; and in proof of this, you quote one passage
of his (l. 2, c. 9, n. 92), in which he says, in so many words, “I
condemn the practice of it.” I grant that, on looking for these words,
at number 92, to which you refer, they will be found there. But what
will people say, fathers, when they discover, at the same time, that he
is treating in that place of a question totally different from that of
which we are speaking, and that the opinion of which he there says that
he condemns the practice, has no connection with that now in dispute,
but is quite distinct? And yet to be convinced that this is the fact, we
have only to open the book to which you refer, and there we find the
whole subject in its connection as follows: At number 79 he treats the
question, “If it is lawful to kill for a buffet?” and at number 80 he
finishes this matter without a single word of condemnation. Having
disposed of _this_ question, he opens a new one at art. 81, namely, “If
it is lawful to kill for slanders?” and it is when speaking of this
question that he employs the words you have quoted—“I condemn the
practice of it.”
Is it not shameful, fathers, that you should venture to produce these
words to make it be believed that Lessius condemns the opinion that it
is lawful to kill for a buffet? and that, on the ground of this single
proof, you should chuckle over it, as you have done, by saying: “Many
persons of honor in Paris have already discovered this notorious
falsehood by consulting Lessius, and have thus ascertained the degree of
credit due to that slanderer?” Indeed! and is it thus that you abuse the
confidence which those persons of honor repose in you? To show them that
Lessius does not hold a certain opinion, you open the book to them at a
place where he is condemning another opinion; and these persons not
having begun to mistrust your good faith, and never thinking of
examining whether the author speaks in that place of the subject in
dispute, you impose on their credulity. I make no doubt, fathers, that
to shelter yourselves from the guilt of such a scandalous lie, you had
recourse to your doctrine of equivocations; and that, having read the
passage _in a loud voice_, you would say, _in a lower key_, that the
author was speaking there of something else. But I am not so sure
whether this saving clause, which is quite enough to satisfy your
consciences, will be a very satisfactory answer to the just complaint of
those “honorable persons,” when they shall discover that you have
hoodwinked them in this style.
Take care, then, fathers, to prevent them by all means from seeing my
letters; for this is the only method now left you to preserve your
credit for a short time longer. This is not the way in which I deal with
your writings: I send them to all my friends: I wish everybody to see
them. And I verily believe that both of us are in the right for our own
interests; for after having published with such parade this fourth
Imposture, were it once discovered that you have made it up by foisting
in one passage for another, you would be instantly denounced. It will be
easily seen, that if you could have found what you wanted in the passage
where Lessius treated of this matter, you would not have searched for it
elsewhere, and that you had recourse to such a trick only because you
could find nothing in that passage favorable to your purpose.
You would have us believe that we may find in Lessius what you assert,
“that he does _not_ allow that this opinion (that a man may be lawfully
killed for a buffet) is probable in theory;” whereas Lessius distinctly
declares, at number 80: “This opinion, that a man may kill for a buffet,
_is_ probable in theory.” Is not this, word for word, the reverse of
your assertion? And can we sufficiently admire the hardihood with which
you have advanced, in set phrase, the very reverse of a matter of fact!
To your conclusion, from a fabricated passage, that Lessius was _not_ of
that opinion, we have only to place Lessius himself, who, in the genuine
passage, declares that he is of that opinion.
Again, you would have Lessius to say “that he condemns the practice of
it;” and, as I have just observed, there is not in the original a single
word of condemnation; all that he says is: “It appears that it ought not
to be EASILY permitted in practice—_In praxi non videtur FACILE
permittenda_.” Is that, fathers, the language of a man who _condemns_ a
maxim? Would you say that adultery and incest ought not to be _easily
permitted_ in practice? Must we not, on the contrary, conclude, that as
Lessius says no more than that the practice ought not to be easily
permitted, his opinion is, that it may be permitted sometimes, though
rarely? And, as if he had been anxious to apprize everybody when it
might be permitted, and to relieve those who have received affronts from
being troubled with unreasonable scruples, from not knowing on what
occasions they might lawfully kill in practice, he has been at pains to
inform them what they ought to avoid in order to practise the doctrine
with a safe conscience. Mark his words: “It seems,” says he, “that it
ought not to be easily permitted, _because_ of the danger that persons
may act in this matter out of hatred or revenge, or with excess, or that
this may occasion too many murders.” From this it appears that murder is
freely permitted by Lessius, if one avoids the inconveniences referred
to—in other words, if one can act without hatred or revenge, and in
circumstances that may not open the door to a great many murders. To
illustrate the matter, I may give you an example of recent
occurrence—the case of the buffet of Compiègne.[249] You will grant that
the person who received the blow on that occasion has shown by the way
in which he has acted, that he was sufficiently master of the passions
of hatred and revenge. It only remained for him, therefore, to see that
he did not give occasion to too many murders; and you need hardly be
told, fathers, it is such a rare spectacle to find Jesuits bestowing
buffets on the officers of the royal household, that he had no great
reason to fear that a murder committed on this occasion would be likely
to draw many others in its train. You cannot, accordingly, deny that the
Jesuit who figured on that occasion was _killable_ with a safe
conscience, and that the offended party might have converted him into a
practical illustration of the doctrine of Lessius. And very likely,
fathers, this might have been the result had he been educated in your
school, and learnt from Escobar that the man who has received a buffet
is held to be disgraced until he has taken the life of him who insulted
him. But there is ground to believe, that the very different
instructions which he received from a curate, who is no great favorite
of yours, have contributed not a little in this case to save the life of
a Jesuit.
Tell us no more, then, of inconveniences which may, in many instances,
be so easily got over, and in the absence of which, according to
Lessius, murder is permissible even in practice. This is frankly avowed
by your authors, as quoted by Escobar, in his “Practice of Homicide,
according to your Society.” “Is it allowable,” asks this casuist, “to
kill him who has given me a buffet? Lessius says it is permissible in
speculation, though not to be followed in practice—_non consulendum in
praxi_—on account of the risk of hatred, or of murders prejudicial to
the State. Others, however, have judged that, BY AVOIDING THESE
INCONVENIENCES, THIS IS PERMISSIBLE AND SAFE IN PRACTICE—_in praxi
probabilem et tutam judicarunt Henriquez_,” &c. See how your opinions
mount up, by little and little, to the climax of probabilism! The
present one you have at last elevated to this position, by permitting
murder without any distinction between speculation and practice, in the
following terms: “It is lawful, when one has received a buffet, to
return the blow immediately with the sword, not to avenge one’s self,
but to preserve one’s honor.” Such is the decision of your fathers of
Caen in 1644, embodied in their publications produced by the university
before parliament, when they presented their third remonstrance against
your doctrine of homicide, as shown in the book then emitted by them, at
page 339.
Mark, then, fathers, that your own authors have themselves demolished
this absurd distinction between speculative and practical murder—a
distinction which the university treated with ridicule, and the
invention of which is a secret of your policy, which it may now be worth
while to explain. The knowledge of it, besides being necessary to the
right understanding of your 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th charges, is well
calculated, in general, to open up, by little and little, the principles
of that mysterious policy.
In attempting, as you have done, to decide cases of conscience in the
most agreeable and accommodating manner, while you met with some
questions in which religion alone was concerned—such as those of
contrition, penance, love to God, and others only affecting the inner
court of conscience—you encountered another class of cases in which
civil society was interested as well as religion—such as those relating
to usury, bankruptcy, homicide, and the like. And it is truly
distressing to all that love the Church, to observe that, in a vast
number of instances, in which you had only Religion to contend with, you
have violated her laws without reservation, without distinction, and
without compunction; because you knew that it is not here that God
visibly administers his justice. But in those cases in which the State
is interested as well as Religion, your apprehension of man’s justice
has induced you to divide your decisions into two shares. To the first
of these you give the name of _speculation_; under which category
crimes, considered in themselves, without regard to society, but merely
to the law of God, you have permitted, without the least scruple, and in
the way of trampling on the divine law which condemns them. The second
you rank under the denomination of _practice_; and here, considering the
injury which may be done to society, and the presence of magistrates who
look after the public peace, you take care, in order to keep yourselves
on the safe side of the law, not to approve always in practice the
murders and other crimes which you have sanctioned in speculation. Thus,
for example, on the question, “If it be lawful to kill for slanders?”
your authors, Filiutius, Reginald, and others, reply: “This is permitted
in speculation—_ex probabile opinione licet_; but is not to be approved
in _practice_, on account of the great number of murders which might
ensue, and which might injure the State, if all slanderers were to be
killed, _and also because one might be punished in a court of justice
for having killed another for that matter_.” Such is the style in which
your opinions begin to develop themselves, under the shelter of this
distinction, in virtue of which, without doing any sensible injury to
society, you only ruin religion. In acting thus, you consider yourselves
quite safe. You suppose that, on the one hand, the influence you have in
the Church will effectually shield from punishment your assaults on
truth; and that, on the other, the precautions you have taken against
too easily reducing your permissions to practice will save you on the
part of the civil powers, who, not being judges in cases of conscience,
are properly concerned only with the outward practice. Thus an opinion
which would be condemned under the name of practice, comes out quite
safe under the name of speculation. But this basis once established, it
is not difficult to erect on it the rest of your maxims. There is an
infinite distance between God’s prohibition of murder, and your
speculative permission of the crime; but between that permission and the
practice the distance is very small indeed. It only remains to show,
that what is allowable in speculation is also so in practice; and there
can be no want of reasons for this. You have contrived to find them in
far more difficult cases. Would you like to see, fathers, how this may
be managed? I refer you to the reasoning of Escobar, who has distinctly
decided the point in the first of the six volumes of his grand Moral
Theology, of which I have already spoken—a work in which he shows quite
another spirit from that which appears in his former compilation from
your four-and-twenty elders. At that time he thought that there might be
opinions probable in speculation, which might not be safe in practice;
but he has now come to form an opposite judgment, and has, in this, his
latest work, confirmed it. Such is the wonderful growth attained by the
doctrine of probability in general, as well as by every probable opinion
in particular, in the course of time. Attend, then, to what he says: “I
cannot see how it can be that an action which seems allowable in
speculation should not be so likewise in practice; because what may be
done in practice depends on what is found to be lawful in speculation,
and the things differ from each other only as cause and effect.
Speculation is that which determines to action. WHENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT
OPINIONS PROBABLE IN SPECULATION MAY BE FOLLOWED WITH A SAFE CONSCIENCE
IN PRACTICE, and that even with more safety than those which have not
been so well examined as matters of speculation.”[250]
Verily, fathers, your friend Escobar reasons uncommonly well sometimes;
and, in point of fact, there is such a close connection between
speculation and practice, that when the former has once taken root, you
have no difficulty in permitting the latter, without any disguise. A
good illustration of this we have in the permission “to kill for a
buffet,” which, from being a point of simple speculation, was boldly
raised by Lessius into a practice “which ought not easily to be
allowed;” from that promoted by Escobar to the character of “an easy
practice;” and from thence elevated by your fathers of Caen, as we have
seen, without any distinction between theory and practice, into a full
permission. Thus you bring your opinions to their full growth very
gradually. Were they presented all at once in their finished
extravagance, they would beget horror; but this slow imperceptible
progress gradually habituates men to the sight of them, and hides their
offensiveness. And in this way the permission to murder, in itself so
odious both to Church and State, creeps first into the Church, and then
from the Church into the State.
A similar success has attended the opinion of “killing for slander,”
which has now reached the climax of a permission without any
distinction. I should not have stopped to quote my authorities on this
point from your writings, had it not been necessary in order to put down
the effrontery with which you have asserted, twice over, in your
fifteenth Imposture, “that there never was a Jesuit who permitted
killing for slander.” Before making this statement, fathers, you should
have taken care to prevent it from coming under my notice, seeing that
it is so easy for me to answer it. For, not to mention that your fathers
Reginald, Filiutius, and others, have permitted it in speculation, as I
have already shown, and that the principle laid down by Escobar leads us
safely on to the practice, I have to tell you that you have authors who
have permitted it in so many words, and among others Father Hereau in
his public lectures, on the conclusion of which the king put him under
arrest in your house, for having taught, among other errors, that when a
person who has slandered us in the presence of men of honor, continues
to do so after being warned to desist, it is allowable to kill him, not
publicly, indeed, for fear of scandal, but IN A PRIVATE WAY—_sed clam_.
I have had occasion already to mention Father Lamy, and you do not need
to be informed that his doctrine on this subject was censured in 1649 by
the University of Louvain.[251] And yet two months have not elapsed
since your Father Des Bois maintained this very censured doctrine of
Father Lamy, and taught that “it was allowable for a monk to defend the
honor which he acquired by his virtue, EVEN BY KILLING the person who
assails his reputation—_etiam cum morte invasoris_;” which has raised
such a scandal in that town, that the whole of the curés united to
impose silence on him, and to oblige him, by a canonical process, to
retract his doctrine. The case is now pending in the Episcopal court.