THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE GERMAN FLEET
There is a certain parallel between the circumstances which have brought
the commanders-in-chief of the British and German battle fleets into the
positions they respectively hold to-day. Just as Admiral Sir John
Jellicoe was long since “ear-marked” for the supreme command of the Home
Fleets, so was Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl selected for the control
of the German High Seas Fleet years before his appointment was actually
gazetted.
The German commander-in-chief, whose flag now flies in the Dreadnought,
Friedrich der Grosse, is without doubt one of Europe’s most
distinguished naval officers. In a navy where more than elsewhere, a
premium is placed upon scientific leadership, this officer early
attracted the attention of his superiors by reason of the skill and
resourcefulness he displayed during manœuvres. He is said to have
specialised in cruiser tactics, and to have been one of the first
officers to urge upon the Navy Department the wisdom of adopting the
battle-cruiser design when that novel conception materialised in the
British “Invincible.” He is also known as the leading advocate of that
system of tactics which is known in Germany as the “rücksichtslose
Offensive,” and which in homely idiom may be translated as “going for”
the enemy hammer and tongs.
In a word, Admiral von Ingenohl is the embodiment of the strikingly
progressive spirit which pervades the modern German navy. It is by no
means a spirit of mere reckless dash, which reckons on gaining a victory
solely by impetuous onslaught. Under modern conditions, tactics such as
these might well be fatal to those who employed them, owing to the
deadly precision of heavy guns and the development of the torpedo. The
German school of naval thought favours, instead, a preliminary period of
“mosquito warfare,” seeking thus to reduce both the material and the
moral strength of an enemy before the actual clash of armoured squadrons
takes place. That this idea is faithfully to be adhered to is clear from
the opening incidents of the present campaign at sea, which have already
shown that reliance is placed on the torpedo and the mine as a
preliminary means of diminishing our preponderance in big ships. So far,
indeed, the German plan of campaign has been singularly true to the
principles advocated by the leading German authorities who have written
of naval warfare. They lead us to anticipate a good deal of this
“Kleinkrieg” before the High Seas Fleet emerges from cover. On the other
hand, it were unwise to suppose that the German Fleet will continue to
act strictly by the book, especially in view of the character of its
commander-in-chief.
In German naval circles Admiral von Ingenohl is known as one of the
first German flag officers who completely freed themselves from the
military traditions in which the fleet was cradled and has been reared.
The German navy, as is well known, was founded as a branch of the army,
and its early development proceeded on distinctly military lines. Until
the present Emperor came to the Throne the head of the Admiralty was
always an army officer, and it followed that, in so far as the different
conditions permitted, the strategy and tactics of the fleet were brought
into line with those of the land forces. Ships were regarded primarily
as units for coast defence, in the most limited sense of the word. This
held true far into the nineties, and it is actually less than two
decades since Germany first undertook the construction of ships which
were specially designed to meet and defeat the foe in open sea. It seems
probable that Admiral von Ingenohl owes something of his broader views
on naval strategy to the large amount of foreign service he has seen.
Born in 1857 of comparatively humble parents, he entered the navy at the
age of 17. The service in those days enjoyed nothing like its present
prestige. It offered no attractions to the sons of the upper classes,
and was completely overshadowed by the army, then in the zenith of its
brilliance and popularity, after the successful war against France. The
navy drew a large majority of its officers from a class whose social
status was considered scarcely high enough to give its sons the entrée
to the army. Proof of this will be seen in the conspicuous absence of
naval officers who are hereditary nobles. Admiral von Ingenohl, in
common with Grand-Admirals von Tirpitz, von Koester, and several other
flag officers, received his patent of nobility as a mark of Imperial
favour.
While on his maiden cruise in foreign waters the young officer was
privileged to see some fighting. His ship, the old “Vineta,” was one of
a small German squadron which was assembled to teach the Chinese pirates
a lesson. Nineteen years later he was again in action in the same
quarter of the globe, and against the same opponents, when the gunboat
“Iltis,” which he commanded, shelled a battery at Tamsui, which had
fired on a German steamer. In the intervals of command afloat he was
engaged at the Navy Department, where he put in one spell of nearly
three and a half years as divisional chief of the ordnance board, and
subsequently directed a department of the Admiral Staff. His first
important independent command was the battleship “Wörth,” in her day one
of the best ships in the navy. He was next appointed to the cruiser
“Kaiserin Augusta,” and shortly after to the “Hertha,” a more powerful
ship of the same class. After another short interval of shore work he
was appointed to command the Imperial yacht “Hohenzollern,” where, of
course, he came under the direct eye of the Kaiser, who was quick to
recognise his qualities.
[Illustration]
=POSEN CLASS.=
NASSAU, POSEN, RHEINLAND, WESTFALEN.
Displacement: 18,900 tons.
Speed: 20 knots; Guns: 12 11in., 12 6in., 16 24pdrs.; Torpedo tubes:
6.
[Illustration]
Astern fire: Broadside: Ahead fire:
6 11in. 8 11in. 6 11in.
4 6in. 6 6in. 4 6in.
As early as 1889 he had been a lieutenant in the old Imperial yacht in
which the Emperor made his first long cruises. On leaving the
“Hohenzollern” in 1908 he was promoted to Rear-Admiral, and placed in
charge of the second division of the First Squadron. In the following
year he hoisted his flag as admiral of the cruiser squadron in China,
whence he was recalled twelve months later to assume charge of the
Second Battle Squadron in home waters. The commander-in-chief of the
High Sea Fleet was then Admiral von Holtzendorff, who, after
Grand-Admiral von Koester (the president of the Navy League), is
considered to be the finest naval strategist in Germany. Under this
officer the battle fleet is said to have increased remarkably in
efficiency, both in regard to gunnery, seamanship, and general
smartness. This period witnessed the introduction into the fleet of
up-to-date shooting methods, and notably of long-range practice. In the
manœuvres of 1912 the Second Squadron, commanded by Admiral von
Ingenohl, was held to have scored a decisive success against a much
stronger fleet, which included seven Dreadnought battleships, whereas
his own squadron was composed of older and weaker ships. In January,
1913, Admiral von Holtzendorff hauled down his flag, and was succeeded
by Admiral von Ingenohl as commander-in-chief.
The leader of the German battle fleet has, therefore, held his present
appointment for upwards of eighteen months, and it is to be supposed
that he is thoroughly familiar with every unit of his fine force,
especially as the ships in active commission spend more than nine
months of the year at sea. The fleet certainly stands to benefit by this
comparatively long period of single command. It will feel the confidence
born of experience in its distinguished leader, and he in turn, knowing
exactly what his ships can do, need fear no check to his plans by
unsuspected defects in personnel or material. Whatever the near future
may bring, it is certain that the German navy will put forth its utmost
effort to fulfil the hope placed in it by the nation, and those who
anticipate a cheaply purchased naval victory for us are laying up a rude
disappointment for themselves. The material resources of the German
fleet alone can give some idea of its formidability, but its
potentiality will be incalculably increased if the leadership is of the
high order which the reputation of the present commander-in-chief leads
us to expect.