Transcriber’ Notes:
Text printed as blackletter, italics, underlined, or boldface have
been transcribed as ^text^, _text_, ~text~, and =text=, respectively.
Small capitals have been replaced by all capitals; ^{txt} represents
superscript text.
More Transcriber’s Notes and a list of changes made may be found at
the end of this document.
^The Daily Telegraph^
WAR BOOKS
THE FLEETS AT WAR
^The Daily Telegraph^
WAR BOOKS
CLOTH 1/- NET.
~VOL. I. (3rd Enormous Edition.)~
_HOW THE WAR BEGAN_
_By W. L. COURTNEY, LL.D., and J. M. KENNEDY_
Is Britain’s justification before the Bar of History.
~VOL. II.~
_THE FLEETS AT WAR_
_By ARCHIBALD HURD_,
The key book to the understanding of the NAVAL situation
~VOL. III.~
_THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN_
_By GEORGE HOOPER_
The key book to the MILITARY situation.
~VOL. IV.~
_THE CAMPAIGN ROUND
LIEGE_
¶ Describes in wonderful detail the heroic defence of Liege, and shows
how the gallant army of Belgium has upset and altered the whole plan
of advance as devised by the Kaiser and his War Council.
[Illustration: _Photo: Speaight, Ltd._
=ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE.=
Supreme Admiral, British Home Fleet.]
THE FLEETS AT
WAR
BY
ARCHIBALD HURD
Author of “Command of the Sea,” “Naval Efficiency,” “German Sea Power:
Its Rise, Progress, and Economic Basis” (part author), etc.
HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
MCMXIV
PREFACE
It is hoped that this volume will prove of permanent value as presenting
a conspectus of the great navies engaged in war when hostilities opened,
and in particular of the events of singular significance in the naval
contest between Great Britain and Germany which occurred in the years
immediately preceding the war.
Grateful acknowledgment is made to Mr. H. C. Bywater for valuable
assistance in preparing this volume.
A. H.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
INTRODUCTION--THE OPENING PHASE 9
I. THE RELATIVE STANDING OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS 49
II. THE BRITISH NAVY 54
III. THE GERMAN NAVY 101
IV. ADMIRAL JELLICOE 131
V. OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE BRITISH NAVY 137
VI. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE GERMAN FLEET 141
VII. OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE FOREIGN NAVIES 147
VIII. GERMAN NAVAL BASES 151
IX. THE KIEL CANAL 161
X. THE GREAT FLEETS ENGAGED: TABULAR STATEMENT 168
[Illustration: Map of North Sea.]
INTRODUCTION
THE OPENING PHASE
PEACEFUL VICTORIES OF BRITISH SEA POWER
The declaration of war against Germany, followed as it was by similar
action against Austria-Hungary, was preceded by a sequence of events so
remarkable in their character that if any British writer had made any
such forecast in times of peace he would have been written down as a
romantic optimist.
Owing to a series of fortunate circumstances, the British Fleet--our
main line of defence and offence--was fully mobilised for war on the
morning before the day--August 4th at 11 p.m.--when war was declared by
this country, and we were enabled to enter upon the supreme contest in
our history with a sense of confidence which was communicated to all the
peoples of the British Empire. This feeling of assurance and courage
furnished the best possible augury for the future.
Within a fortnight of diplomatic relations being broken off with
Germany, and less than a week after Austria-Hungary by her acts had
declared her community of interest with her ally, the British Navy,
without firing a gun or sending a single torpedo hissing through the
water, had achieved four victories.
(1) Germany’s elaborate scheme to produce a feeling of panic in this
country--hence the army of spies, who took advantage of our open
hospitality, using the telephone and providing themselves with bombs
and arms, had failed.
(2) Germany’s over-sea commerce was strangled.
(3) British trade on the seas began to resume its normal course owing
to the growing confidence of shipowners and shippers.
(4) The British Expeditionary Force, as detailed for foreign service,
had been transported to the Continent under a guarantee of safety
given by the British Fleet.
These successes were due to the influence of sea-power. Confidence in
the Navy, its ships and men, and a belief in the competency of Mr.
Winston Churchill and Prince Louis of Battenberg and the other Sea
Lords, and the War Staff, steadied the nerve of the nation when it
received the first shock. Apparently the crisis developed so swiftly
that there was no time for effective co-operation between the German
spies. All the mischievous stories of British reverses which were
clumsily put in circulation in the early period of hostilities were
tracked down; for once truth was nearly as swift as rumour, though the
latter was the result of an elaborately organised scheme for throwing
the British people off their mental balance. It was conjectured that if
a feeling of panic could be created in this country, a frightened nation
would bring pressure to bear on the naval and military authorities and
our strategic plans ashore and afloat would be interfered with. A
democracy in a state of panic cannot make war. The carefully-laid scheme
miscarried. Never was a nation more self-possessed. It had faith in its
Fleet.
In the history of sea power, there is nothing comparable with the
strangulation of German oversea shipping in all the seas of the world.
It followed almost instantly on the declaration of war. There were over
2,000 German steamers, of nearly 5,000,000 tons gross, afloat when
hostilities opened. The German sailing ships--mostly of small
size--numbered 2,700. These vessels were distributed over the seas far
and wide. Some--scores of them, in fact--were captured, others ran for
neutral ports, the sailings of others were cancelled, and the heart of
the German mercantile navy suddenly stopped beating. What must have been
the feelings of Herr Ballin and the other pioneers as they contemplated
the ruin, at least temporary ruin, of years of splendid enterprise? The
strategical advantages enjoyed by England in a war against Germany,
lying as she does like a bunker across Germany’s approach to the oversea
world, had never been understood by the mass of Germans, nor by their
statesmen. Shipowners had some conception of what would happen, but even
they did not anticipate that in less than a week the great engine of
commercial activity oversea would be brought to a standstill.
By its prompt action on the eve of war in instituting a system of
Government insurance of war risks, Mr. Asquith’s administration checked
any indication of panic among those responsible for our sea affairs. The
maintenance of our oversea commerce on the outbreak of hostilities had
been the subject of enquiry by a sub-committee of the Committee of
Imperial Defence. When war was inevitable, the Government produced this
report, and relying on our sea power, immediately carried into effect
the far-reaching and statesmanlike recommendations which had been made,
for the State itself bearing 80 per cent. of the cost of insurance of
hull and cargoes due to capture by the enemies. Thus at the moment of
severest strain--the outbreak of war--traders recognised that in
carrying on their normal trading operations overseas they had behind
them the wholehearted support of the British Government, the power of a
supreme fleet, and the guarantee of all the accumulated wealth of the
richest country in the world. None of the dismal forebodings which had
been indulged in during peace were realised. Traders were convinced by
the drastic action of the Government and by the ubiquitous pressure of
British sea power on all the trade routes that, though some losses might
be suffered owing to the action of German cruisers and converted
merchantmen, the danger was of so restricted a character and had been so
admirably covered by the Government’s insurance scheme that they could
“carry on” in calm courage and thus contribute to the success of British
arms. Navies and armies must accept defeat if they have not behind them
a civil population freed from fear of starvation.
Even more remarkable, perhaps, than either of these victories of British
sea power was the safe transportation to the Continent of the
Expeditionary Force as detailed for foreign service. Within a fortnight
of the declaration of war, while we had suffered from no threat of
invasion or even of such raids on the coast as had been considered
probable incidents in the early stage of war, the spearhead of the
British Army had been thrust into the Continent of Europe.
It is often the obvious which passes without recognition. The official
intelligence that the Expeditionary Force had reached the Continent
fired the imagination of Englishmen, and they felt no little pride that
at so early a stage in the war the British Army--the only long-service
army in the world--should have been able to take its stand beside the
devoted defenders of France and Belgium.
It is, of course, obvious that the army of an island kingdom cannot
leave its base except it receive a guarantee of safe transport from the
Navy. The British Army, whether it fights in India, in Egypt, or in
South Africa, must always be carried on the back of the British Navy.
If during the years of peaceful dalliance and fearful anticipation it
had been suggested that, in face of an unconquered German fleet, we
could throw an immense body of men on the Continent, and complete the
operation within ten days or so from the declaration of war, the
statement would have been regarded as a gross exaggeration. This was the
amazing achievement. It reflected credit on the military machinery; but
let it not be forgotten that all the labours of the General Staff at the
War Office would have been of no avail unless, on the day before the
declaration of war, the whole mobilised Navy had been able to take the
sea in defence of British interests afloat.
We do well not to ignore these obvious facts, because they are
fundamental. The Navy must always be the lifeline of the Expeditionary
Force, ensuring to it reinforcements, stores, and everything necessary
to enable it to carry out its high purpose. That the Admiralty, with the
approval of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, felt itself justified in giving
the military authorities a certificate of safe transport before the
command of the sea had been secured indicated high confidence that when
the German fleet did come forth to accept battle the issue would be in
no doubt, though victory might have to be purchased at a high price.
Nor was this all. Thanks to the ubiquitous operations of the British
Navy, the Government was able to move two divisions of troops from
India, and to accept all the offers of military aid which were
immediately made by the Dominions. It was realised in a flash by all
the scattered people of the Empire that the Fleet, with its tentacles in
every sea, maintains the Empire in unity: when “the earth was full of
anger,” the seas were full of British ships of war.
[Illustration]
_H.M.S. King George V._
_Photo: Cribb, Southsea._
=KING GEORGE V CLASS.=
KING GEORGE V, CENTURION, AUDACIOUS, AJAX.
Displacement: 23,000 tons.
Speed: 22 knots; Guns: 10 13·5in., 16 4in.; Torpedo tubes: 5.
[Illustration]
Astern fire: Broadside: Ahead fire:
4 13·5in. 10 13·5in. 4 13·5in.
It was in these circumstances that the war opened. Every incident tended
to remind the people of the British Isles and the subjects of the King
who live in the far-flung Dominions and those who reside in the
scattered Crown Colonies and Dependencies of the essential truth
contained in the phrases which had come so trippingly to the lips in
days of peace. Men recognised that the statement of our dependence upon
the sea as set forth in the Articles of War was a declaration of policy
which we had done well not to ignore:
“It is upon the Navy that, under the good Providence of God, the
wealth, prosperity and peace of these islands and of the Empire do
mainly depend.”
How true these words rang when, in defence of our honour, we had to take
up the gage thrown down by the Power which claimed supremacy as a
military Power and aspired to primacy as a naval Power. Those who turned
to Mr. Arnold White’s admirable monograph on “The Navy and Its Story,”
must admit that this writer, in picturesque phrase, had set forth
fundamental facts:
“Since the first mariner risked his life in a canoe and travelled
coastwise for his pleasure or his business, Britain has acquired half
the seaborne traffic of the world. She relies on her Navy to fill the
grocer’s shop, to bring flour and corn to our great cities and to keep
any possible enemy at a distance. So successfully has the British Navy
done its work that many generations of Englishmen have grown up
without hearing the sound of a gun fired in anger. Every other nation
in Europe has heard the tramp of foreign soldiery in the lifetime of
men still living and felt the pain and shame of invasion.
“Five times in the history of England the British Navy has stood
between the would-be master of Europe and the attainment of his
ambition. Charlemagne, Charles V., Philip II. of Spain, Louis XIV. of
France, and Napoleon--all aspired to universal dominion. Each of these
Sovereigns in turn was checked in his soaring plans by British sea
power.”
When the British peoples awoke to the fact that they owed it to
themselves and their past to join in humbling another tyrant, they
gained confidence in the task which confronted them from the glorious
record of the past achievements of those who, relying upon command of
the sea, had crushed in the dust the mightiest rulers that had ever
tried to impose their yoke on humanity.
[Illustration]
_H.M.S. Orion._
_Photo: Sport & General._
=ORION CLASS.=
ORION, CONQUEROR, MONARCH, THUNDERER.
Displacement: 22,500 tons.
Speed: 22 knots; Guns: 10 13·5in., 16 4in.; Torpedo tubes: 3.
[Illustration]
Astern fire: Broadside: Ahead fire:
4 13·5in. 10 13·5in. 4 13·5in.
In a spirit of calmness, patience and courage the British people took up
the task which their sense of honour forced upon them all
unwillingly. Glancing back over the record of naval progress during the
earlier years of the twentieth century we cannot fail to recognise that,
in spite of many cross currents and eddies of public opinion, fate had
been preparing the British peoples, all unconsciously, for the
arbitrament of a war on the issue of which would depend all the
interests, tangible and intangible, of the four hundred and forty
million subjects of the King--their freedom, their rights to self
government, their world-wide trade, and that atmosphere which
distinguishes the British Empire from every other empire which has ever
existed. In the years of peace men had often asked themselves whether a
new crisis would produce the men of destiny to defend the traditions we
had inherited from our forefathers. While peace still reigned, they
little realised that the men of destiny were quietly, but persistently,
working out our salvation. When the hour struck England was fully
prepared, confident in her sea power, to take up the gage in defence of
all the democracies of the world against the tyrant Power which sought
to impose the iron caste of militarism and materialism upon nations that
had outgrown mediæval conditions.
If we would realise the bearing of British naval policy in the years
which preceded the outbreak of war, we shall do well to cast aside all
party bias and personal animosities and study the sequence of events
after the manner of the historian who collates the material to his hand,
analyses it without fear or favour, and sets down his conclusions in
all faithfulness. Pursuing this course we are carried back to the year
1897. Since the German Emperor had ascended the throne in 1888, he had
endeavoured to communicate to his subjects the essential truths as to
the influence of sea power upon history which he had read in Admiral
Mahan’s early books. His educational campaign was a failure. In spite of
all the efforts of Admiral von Hollmann, the Minister of Marine, the
Reichstag refused to vote increased supplies to the Navy. At last, when
he had been finally repulsed, first by the Budget Committee and then by
the Reichstag itself, Admiral von Hollmann retired admitting defeat.
The Emperor found a successor in a naval officer who, then unknown, was
in a few years to change radically the opinion of Germans on the value
of a fleet. Born on March 19th, 1849, at Custrin, and the son of a
judge, Alfred Tirpitz became a naval cadet in 1865, and was afterwards
at the Naval Academy from 1874 to 1876. He subsequently devoted much
attention to the torpedo branch of the service, and was mainly
responsible for the torpedo organisation and the tactical use of
torpedoes in the German Navy--a work which British officers regard with
admiration.[1] Subsequently he became Inspector of her Torpedo Service,
and was the first Flotilla Chief of the Torpedo Flotillas. Later he was
appointed Chief of the Staff at the naval station in the Baltic and of
the Supreme Command of the German Fleet. During these earlier years of
his sea career, Admiral Tirpitz made several long voyages. He is
regarded as an eminent tactician, and is the author of the rules for
German naval tactics as now in use in the Navy. In 1895 he was promoted
to the rank of Rear-Admiral, and became Vice-Admiral in 1899. In 1896
and 1897 he commanded the cruiser squadron in East Asia, and immediately
after became Secretary of State of the Imperial Navy Office. In the
following year he was made a Minister of State and Naval Secretary, and
in 1901 received the hereditary rank of nobility, entitling him to the
use of the honorific prefix “Von.”
[1] German Sea Power: Its Rise, Progress and Economic Basis, by
Archibald Hurd and Henry Castle (London: John Murray 1913).
With the advent of this sailor-statesman to the Marineamt, the whole
course of German naval policy changed, and in 1898 the first German Navy
Act was passed authorising a navy on a standard which far exceeded
anything hitherto attained. It provided for the following ships:
THE BATTLE FLEET
19 battleships (2 as material reserve).
8 armoured coast defence vessels.
6 large cruisers.
16 small cruisers.
FOREIGN SERVICE FLEET
LARGE CRUISERS
For East Africa 2
For Central and South America 1
Material reserve 3
--
Total 6
SMALL CRUISERS
For East Asia 3
For Central and South America 3
For East Africa 2
For the South Seas 2
Material reserve 4
--
Total 14
1 Station ship.
This dramatic departure in German naval policy aroused hardly a ripple
of interest in England. Then occurred the South African War, the seizure
of the “Bundesrat,” and other incidents which were utilised by the
German Emperor, the Marine Minister, and the official Press Bureau, with
its wide extending agencies for inflaming public opinion throughout the
German Empire against the British Navy. The ground having been well
prepared, in 1900 the naval measure of 1898, which was to have covered
a period of six years, was superseded by another Navy Act, practically
doubling the establishment of ships and men. This is not the time, nor
does space permit, to trace the evolution of German naval policy during
subsequent years or to analyse the successive Navy Acts which were
passed as political circumstances favoured further expansion. The
story--and it is a fascinating narrative in the light of after
events--may be read elsewhere. The fact to be noted is that the British
peoples generally viewed the early indications of German naval policy
without suspicion or distrust. Most men found it impossible to believe
that any Power could hope to challenge the naval supremacy which had
been won at such great sacrifice at the Battle of Trafalgar, and which
the British people had continued to enjoy virtually without challenge
throughout the nineteenth century.
Happily, the hour when preparations had to be made, if made at all, to
maintain in face of any rivalry our sea command, produced the man. In
the autumn of 1901 Lord Selborne, then First Lord of the Admiralty, paid
a special visit to Malta to discuss the naval situation with a naval
officer with whose name not a thousand people in the British Isles were
then familiar. Sir John Fisher had, as recently as 1899, taken over the
command of the Mediterranean Squadron; he had already made a great name
in the service as a man of original thought and great courage,
possessing a genius for naval politics and naval administration. He had
represented the British Navy at the Hague Peace Conference, but he
might have walked from end to end of London, and not a dozen people
would have recognised him. In the following March, thanks to Lord
Selborne, he became Second Sea Lord, and a naval revolution was
inaugurated. Elsewhere I have recapitulated the remarkable Navy of the
renaissance of British sea power.[2]
[2] _Fortnightly Review_, September, 1914.
First, attention was devoted to the _personnel_. New schemes of training
for officers and men and for the Naval Reserve were introduced. A new
force--the Royal Fleet Reserve--was established, consisting of naval
seamen and other ratings who had served afloat for five years or more; a
Volunteer Naval Reserve was initiated; steps were taken to revise the
administration of the naval establishments ashore, and to reduce the
proportion of officers and men engaged in peace duties, freeing them for
service in ships afloat. On the anniversary of Trafalgar in 1904, after
a short period in command at Portsmouth in order to supervise personally
the reforms in training and manning policy already introduced, Sir John
Fisher--Lord Fisher as he is now known--returned to the Admiralty as
First Sea Lord. Instantly, with the support of Lord Selborne and Mr.
Balfour, then Prime Minister, to whom all honour is due, the new Board
proceeded to carry into effect vast correlated schemes for the
redistribution of the fleets at sea and the more rapid mobilisation of
ships in reserve, the reorganisation of the Admiralty, and the
re-adjustment of our world naval policy to the new conditions in
accordance with a plan of action which the new First Sea Lord had
prepared months in advance.
Our principal sea frontier has been the Mediterranean. It was necessary
to change it, and the operation had to be carried out without causing
undue alarm to our neighbours--at that time we had no particular
friends, though the foundations of the Entente were already being laid.
Without asking your leave from Parliament, the great administrative
engine, to which Lord Fisher supplied fuel, proceeded to carry out the
most gigantic task to which any Governmental Department ever put its
hand. Overseas squadrons which had no strategic purpose were
disestablished; unimportant dockyards were reduced to cadres; ships too
weak to fight and too slow to run away were recalled; a whole fleet of
old ships, which were eating up money and adding nothing to our
strength, were scrapped; the vessels in reserve were provided with
nucleus crews. With a single eye to the end in view--victory in the main
strategical theatres--conservative influences which strove to impede
reform were beaten down. With the officers and men taken out of the weak
ships, and others who were wrenched from comfortable employment ashore,
a great fleet on our new frontier was organised.
In the preamble to the German Navy Act of 1900 it had been stated:
“It is not absolutely necessary that the German Battle Fleet should be
as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, for a great naval
Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its
striking force against us. But even if it should succeed in meeting us
with considerable superiority of strength, the defeat of a strong
German Fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of
the victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world
would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet.”
Lord Fisher had not studied the progress of the German naval movement
without realising that in this passage was to be found the secret of the
strategic plan which the German naval authorities had formed. With the
instinct of a great strategist, he reorganised the whole world-wide
machinery of the British Navy, in order to suit the new circumstances
then developing.
The war in the Far East had shown that changes were necessary in the
design of British ships of all classes. The First Sea Lord insisted that
the matter should have immediate attention, and a powerful committee of
naval officers, shipbuilders, and scientists began its sittings at the
Admiralty. The moment its report was available, Parliament was asked for
authority to lay down groups of ships of new types, of which the
“Dreadnought” was the most famous. _In the preceding six years, sixteen
battleships had been laid down for Great Britain, while Germany had
begun thirteen; our sea power, as computed in modern ships of the line,
had already begun to shrink._ Secretly and rapidly, four units of the
new type--the “Dreadnought,” with her swift sisters, the “Indomitable,”
“Inflexible,” and “Invincible”--were rushed to completion. No battleship
building abroad carried more than four big guns; the “Dreadnought” had
ten big guns, and her swift consorts eight.[3] Thus was the work of
rebuilding the British Fleet initiated. Destroyers of a new type were
placed in hand, and redoubled progress was made in the construction of
submarines, which Lord Fisher was the first to realise were essential to
this country, and were capable of immense development as offensive
engines of warfare. We gained a lead of eighteen months over other
Powers by the determined policy adopted.
[3] It is officially admitted by the United States Navy Department
that it had prepared plans for a ship similar in armament to the
Dreadnought in 1904, and was awaiting the approval of Congress before
beginning construction. American officers had come to the same
conclusions as to the inevitable tendency of battleship design as the
British Admiralty.
Owing to the delay imposed by the necessity of obtaining the consent
of Congress, the United States lost the advantage; in the exercise of
its powers, the British Admiralty acted directly the designs of the
new ships were ready.
Just as the task of rebuilding the Fleet had been initiated, a change of
Government occurred, and there was reason to fear that the stupendous
task of reorganising and re-creating the bases of our naval power would
be delayed, if not abandoned. In Lord Fisher the nation had,
fortunately, a man of iron will. Though Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman,
above all things desirous of arresting the rivalry in naval armaments,
was Prime Minister, and Lord Tweedmouth was First Lord of the Admiralty,
Lord Fisher, supported by his colleagues on the Board, insisted on
essentials. Delays occurred in German shipbuilding, and the Admiralty
agreed that British shipbuilding could be delayed. In 1906, 1907, and
1908 only eight Dreadnoughts were begun. Subsequent events tend to show
that this policy was a political mistake, though we eventually obtained
more powerful ships by the delay. Germany was encouraged to believe that
under a Liberal Administration she could overtake us. _Between 1906 and
1908 inclusive we laid down eight large ships of the Dreadnought type;
and Germany laid down nine, and began to accelerate her programme of
1909._
Then occurred a momentous change in British affairs. Lord Tweedmouth,
after the famous incident of the German Emperor’s letter, retired from
office (1908), and his place was taken by Mr. Reginald McKenna, who was
to show that a rigid regard for economy was not incompatible with a high
standard of patriotism. In association with the Sea Lords, he surveyed
the naval situation. In the following March occurred the naval crisis.
Germany had accelerated her construction, and our sea power was in
peril. The whole Board of Admiralty determined that there was no room
for compromise. Mr. McKenna, it is now no secret, found arrayed against
him a large section of the Cabinet when he put forward the stupendous
programme of 1909, making provision for eight Dreadnoughts, six
protected cruisers, twenty destroyers, and a number of submarines. The
naval crisis was accompanied by a Cabinet crisis, in spite of the fact
that Sir Edward Grey, as Foreign Secretary, gave the naval authorities
his full support. _Unknown to the nation, the Admiralty resigned, and
for a time the Navy had no superior authority._ This dramatic act won
the day. The Cabinet was converted; the necessity for prompt, energetic
action was proved. The most in the way of compromise to which the Board
would agree was a postponement in announcing the construction of four of
the eight armoured ships. But from the first there was no doubt that,
unless there was a sudden change in German policy, the whole octette
would be built. When the programme was presented to the House of
Commons, the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey gave to Mr. McKenna
their wholehearted support; either the Government had to be driven from
office, or the Liberal Party had to agree to the immense commitment
represented in the Navy Estimates. The programme was agreed to.
This, however, is only half the story. Neither the Government nor the
Admiralty was in a position to tell the country that, though all the
ships were not to be laid down at once, they would all be laid down in
regular rotation, in order that they might be ready in ample time to
meet the situation which was developing. Perhaps it was well in the
circumstances that this fact was not revealed. Public opinion became
active. The whole patriotic sentiment of the country was roused, and the
jingle was heard on a thousand platforms, “We want eight and we won’t
wait.” The Admiralty, which had already determined upon its policy,
remained silent and refused to hasten the construction of the ships.
Quietly, but firmly, the Board resisted pressure, realising that it, and
it only, was in possession of all the facts. Secrecy is the basis of
peace as well as war strategy. The naval authorities were unable to
defend themselves by announcing that they were on the eve of obtaining a
powerful weapon which could not be ready for the ships if they were laid
down at once. By waiting the Navy was to gain the most powerful gun in
the world.
In order to keep pace with progress in Germany, it was necessary to lay
down two of the eight ships in July, and be satisfied with the 12-inch
guns (projectile of 850 lbs.) for these units. The construction of the
other six vessels was postponed in order that they might receive the new
13·5-inch gun, with a projectile of about 1,400 lbs. Two of the
Dreadnoughts were began at Portsmouth and Devonport Dockyards in the
following November, and the contracts for the remaining four were not
placed until the spring, for the simple reason that the delivery of the
new guns and mountings and their equipment could not be secured for the
vessels, even if their hulls were started without a moment’s delay. Thus
we obtained six battleships which are still unique; in no other Navy is
so powerful a gun to be found to-day as the British 13·5-inch weapon. In
1910 and in 1911 Mr. McKenna again fought for national safety, and he
won the essential provision for the Fleet. He risked his all in defence
of our sea power. He was probably during those years of struggle the
most unpopular Minister the Liberal Party ever had. What has been the
sequel of his tenacity and courage and patriotism? What has been gained
owing to the bold front which Lord Fisher presented, as First Sea Lord,
supported by his colleagues? Sixteen of the eighteen battleships and
battle-cruisers of the Dreadnought type, the fifteen protected cruisers,
and the sixty destroyers, with a group of submarines, which the Board
over which Mr. McKenna presided secured, constituted the spearhead of
the British Fleet when the crisis came and war had to be declared
against Germany in defence of our plighted word.
With the addition of one more chapter, this story of the renaissance of
British sea power is complete. In the autumn of 1911, over seven years
after Lord Fisher had begun to shake the Navy into renewed life,
encouraged Sir Percy Scott in his gunnery reforms, and brought to the
Board the splendid intellect of Sir John Jellicoe, Mr. Winston Churchill
replaced Mr. McKenna as First Lord. Thus the youngest statesman of the
English-speaking world realised his ambition. Lord Fisher, under the age
clause, had already been compelled to vacate his seat on the Board,
retiring with a peerage, and his successor, Sir Arthur Wilson, was also
on the eve of retirement. Mr. McKenna had to be freed to take over the
Welsh Church Bill and to place his legal mind at the service of the
country at the Home Office. He had done his work and done it well. Mr.
Winston Churchill proved the ideal man to put the finishing touches to
the great task which had been initiated during Lord Selborne’s period of
office. Perhaps the keynote of his administration is to be found in the
attention which he devoted to the organisation of the War Staff, the
elements of which had been created by former Boards, and the
readjustment of the pay of officers and men. No service is efficient for
war in which there exists a rankling feeling of injustice. The rates of
pay of officers and men were revised and increased; facilities were
opened up for men of the lower deck to reach commissioned rank. About
20,000 officers and men were added to the active service of the Fleet.
At the same time with the ships provided by former Boards, the
organisation of the ships in Home waters was placed on a higher standard
of efficiency, particular attention being devoted to the organisation of
the older ships so as to keep them efficient for war. The Naval Air
Service was established, and its development pressed forward with all
speed. Thus the work of reform and the task of changing the front of the
British Navy had been brought to completion, or virtual completion, at
the moment when Germany, by a concatenation of circumstances, was forced
into a position where she had to fight the greatest of sea Powers, or
admit the defeat of all her ambitions.
A study of the sequence of events which immediately preceded the
outbreak of hostilities is hardly less interesting than the earlier and
dramatic incidents which enabled us to face the supreme crisis in our
history with a measure of assured confidence. On March 17th, 1914, Mr.
Winston Churchill spoke in the House of Commons on the Navy Estimates.
It is common knowledge that he had just fought a stern battle in the
Cabinet for adequate supplies, and it was assumed at the time, from
various incidents, that he had been compelled to submit to some
measure of retrenchment. He received, however, Cabinet authority
to ask Parliament for the largest sum ever devoted to naval
defence--£51,500,000. In the course of his speech on these Estimates he
made the announcement that there would be no naval manœuvres in 1914. He
stated:
“We have decided to substitute this year for the grand manœuvres--not,
of course, for the numberless exercises the Fleet is always carrying
out--a general mobilisation of the Third Fleet.[4] We are calling up
the whole of the Royal Fleet Reserve for a period of eleven days, and
those who come up for that period will be excused training next year,
and will receive £1 bounty in addition to their regular pay.
“We have had a most admirable response. 10,170 men, seamen, and
others, and 1,409 marines, are required to man the ships of the Third
Fleet. We have already, in the few days our circular has been out,
received replies from 10,334 men volunteers, and from 3,321 marines. I
think that reflects great credit on the spirit of the Reserve
generally, and also reflects credit upon the employers, who must have
greatly facilitated this operation all over the country. I hereby
extend to them the thanks of the Admiralty.
“This test is one of the most important that could possibly be made,
and it is really surprising to me that it has never been undertaken
before. The cost, including the bounty of £1, will be about £50,000.
Having no grand manœuvres yields a saving of £230,000, so there is a
net saving on the substitution of £180,000.”
[4] The Third Fleet consists of the oldest ships of the Navy
maintained in peace with skeleton crews.
It was hardly surprising in the circumstances that many persons thought
the Admiralty was bent merely upon economy. If the naval authorities had
had foreknowledge of the course of events they could not, in fact, have
adopted a wiser course. From March onwards, week by week down to the
middle of July, the elaborate and complicated drafting arrangements were
examined and readjusted. Then, after the assassinations at Sarajevo and
on the eve of the final developments on the Continent, which were to
make war inevitable, the test mobilisation was carried out. The
principal ships passed before the King off the Nab Lightship, a column
of seaplanes and aeroplanes circling high above the ships, and then
disappeared in the Channel to carry out what were believed to be peace
exercises, but were, in fact, to prove the manœuvres preliminary to war.
Later in the same week, the vessels of the Patrol Flotillas were engaged
in testing a new scheme for sealing this narrow exit to the North Sea.
[Illustration]
_H.M.S. Neptune._
_Photo: Sport & General._
=NEPTUNE CLASS.=
COLOSSUS, NEPTUNE, HERCULES (slight differences).
Displacement: 19,200 to 20,000 tons.
Speed: 22 knots; Guns: 10 12in., 16 4in.; Torpedo tubes: 3.
[Illustration]
Astern fire: Broadside: Ahead fire:
8 12in. 10 12in. 6 12in.
A week afterwards the thunderbolt fell; the crisis found the First and
Second Fleets ready in all respects for war, and, after additional
reserves had been called out on Sunday, August 2nd, the Admiralty was
able to give the nation a certificate that by 4 a.m. the following
morning the British Navy had been raised from a peace footing to a war
footing, and was fully mobilised.
Immediately the curtain fell, hiding from view the movements of all
British men-of-war, not only in the main strategical theatre, but in the
outer seas. Two battleships, which had just been completed for Turkey by
those whom Mr. G. H. Perris had denounced only a short time before in
his pamphlet as the “War Traders,” were taken over by the Admiralty,
proving valuable accessions to our naval strength. Two swift
destroyer-leaders were also compulsorily purchased from Chile, the
appointment of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe as supreme British Admiral of
the Home Fleets was announced, and all the preliminaries to the great
war drama on the sea were completed without delay, confusion, or panic.
The nation will remember in gratitude the courage and decision exhibited
by Mr. Churchill in the hour of supreme crisis. He proved himself a
statesman.
This is not the place to relate the story of the renaissance of British
military power. The virtue of the measures adopted by Lord Haldane as
Secretary for War lay in the fact that he did homage to the essential
principle which must underlie all schemes of defence by an island
kingdom, which is the nerve centre of a maritime Empire. As in
Opposition he had been foremost in advertising our dependence upon the
sea, so in office, as Minister responsible for the Army, he based all
his schemes on the assumption that the British Army is the projectile of
a supreme fleet, to be hurled oversea as soon as the naval authority is
able to give guarantee of safe passage. It was in the light of this
essential truth that the Expeditionary Force was organised, and the
Volunteers converted into the Territorial Army. Mistakes were, no doubt,
made; no man who avoids them can ever expect to do anything. But at
practically no additional expense, and without, therefore, withdrawing a
penny from the necessary provision of the fleet, Lord Haldane initiated
and completed military schemes, the value of which became apparent when
we were confronted with the necessity of entering upon a contest with
two of the great military powers of Europe, which possessed fleets of
such a standing that they could offer challenge to our supremacy afloat.
The survey of British naval policy in the years immediately preceding
the war would be incomplete were no reference made to the fact, of which
we were insistently reminded when hostilities opened, that sea power,
even more than military power, must stand defeated from the very outset,
unless it is supplemented by economic power. In the past the weakness of
all democracies when faced by war has been apparent. However great the
power on the sea, however formidable the military arm ashore, the real
strength of a people lies in itself. It must be ready on the instant to
organise every department of life on a war basis. Armed forces which
have not behind them a resolute community are robbed of more than half
their power. A feeling of panic is always apt to infect a democracy, and
then under the palsy of fear the tendency is for pressure to be brought
to bear on the supreme naval and military authorities, with the result
that strategic plans, matured in peace, become confused and ineffective.
An illustration of the influence of the fears of the civil population
upon war policy was furnished during the Spanish-American War. Under the
pressure of nervous public opinion, the Naval Board was compelled to
depart from the sound strategy of concentration upon the main objective,
and to dissipate no little of the power at its command in order to
provide some measure of local protection for various coast towns.
Fortunately, British naval policy had been developed on lines which
minimised this peril, and our economic resources had been surveyed, and
adequate preparations made to afford to our sea power every possible
economic support. As to the first, fear of invasion or raids, the coast
and port guard ships, with little more than skeleton crews, had been
abolished; in their place patrol flotillas of destroyers and submarines
had been created to keep an efficient and active watch and ward along
the sea frontier which the enemy at our door might threaten. This
provision was supplemented by the mobilisation of all our national
resources, under the direction of the Committee of Imperial Defence.
When Mr. Balfour founded this body he builded better than he knew. When
war came not only were the main fleets not tied to our shores, but every
department of State had before it a complete plan of the duty which it
had to perform in order to give that national support to the fleet,
without which it could not hope to achieve victory.
During the years which immediately preceded war the Committee of
Imperial Defence was quietly at work co-ordinating the naval and
military arms, and laying the foundation of a wide-spreading
organisation. On July 25th, 1912, Mr. Asquith, in a speech in the House
of Commons, gave the nation some conception of the character of one
aspect of the work which was then being quietly performed by this small
body, unrecognised by our Constitution, and regarded, as it had been
since its birth, with no little suspicion and distrust. Mr. Asquith
related that the Committee of Imperial Defence had appointed what was
styled “a sub-committee for the co-ordination of departmental action at
the outbreak of war.” Describing this particular work of the Committee
of Imperial Defence, Mr. Asquith added:
“This sub-committee, which is composed of the principal officials of
the various Departments of State, has, after many months of continuous
labour, compiled a War-Book. We call it a War-Book--and it is a book
which definitely assigns to each Department--not merely the War Office
and the Admiralty, but the Home Office, the Board of Trade, and every
Department of the State--its responsibility for action under every
head of war policy. The Departments themselves, in pursuance of the
instructions given by the War-Book, have drafted all the
proclamations, Orders in Council, letters, telegrams, notices, and so
forth, which can be foreseen. Every possible provision has been made
to avoid delay in setting in force the machinery in the unhappy event
of war taking place. It has been thought necessary to make this
Committee permanent, in order that these war arrangements may be
constantly kept up to date.”
What happened in the last days of July, 1914? During the period of
strained relations, the War-Book was opened, and every official in every
State Department concerned--eleven in all--had before him a precise
statement of exactly what contribution he had to make in mobilising the
State as an economic factor for war. Proclamations, Orders in Council,
letters, and telegrams flowed forth throughout the British Isles, and to
the uttermost parts of the Empire, in accordance with the pre-arranged
plan which had been so assiduously elaborated. Hardly had the Navy been
mobilised, the Army Reserves called out to complete the regular Army,
and the Territorials embodied, than the nation realised that, without
confusion, it had itself been placed upon a war footing. The creation of
the British War-Book must be acclaimed as a monument to the
perspicacity of Mr. Asquith and the Ministers who assisted him on the
Committee of Defence, and to the splendid labours of the Secretary of
the Committee, Captain Maurice Hankey, C.B., and the small staff
associated with him. This organisation, which owed so much to the “staff
mind” of its former secretary, Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Ottley, imposed
upon the nation a charge of only about £5,000 a year, which was returned
increased by a thousandfold when the crisis came, and the United
Kingdom, existing under the most artificial conditions owing to its
dependence on the sea for food and raw materials, was prepared, for the
first time in its history, to offer to its fleets and armies the
wholehearted and organised support of the richest nation in the world.
When the curtain fell upon the seas, the nation had the assurance that
everything which foresight could suggest had been done to make secure
our essential supremacy. The newspapers preserved a discreet silence as
the Home Fleets took up their stations in the main strategical area.
They were convinced, by irrefutable evidence, that adequate power had
been concentrated in this theatre to enable the North Sea to be sealed,
thus confining the main operations of the naval war to one of the
smallest water areas in the world.
Those who study the conspectus of British sea power at the moment when
the fog of war hid from view all that was occurring in distant waters
would miss the real significance of the picture which British sea power
presented at this dramatic moment if they failed to recognise the means
by which the British Navy was able to impose an iron grip upon the great
highways which are the life blood of British commerce. When war occurred
the British sea power was predominant in all the outer seas in contrast
with every other Power engaged in hostilities. At every point the
British fleet was supreme in contrast with every other Power now engaged
in hostilities. Austria and Italy were hardly represented outside the
Mediterranean; Germany had only one armoured ship and two small cruisers
in the Mediterranean and a few small cruisers in the Atlantic; in the
Pacific, though she had the largest squadron of any Continental Power,
the Admiralty regarded our forces as being at least twice as strong.
This balance of strength was maintained in accordance with the terms of
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
From the moment of the ultimatum all the Empire was at war. At a hundred
and one points of naval and military importance a state of war existed.
Wherever the British flag was flying--and it flies over about one
quarter of the habitable globe--officers and men of the sea and land
services stood awaiting the development of events.
What precise orders were issued by the Admiralty cannot be revealed, but
telegrams which were received during the early days of hostilities
indicated that at all the great junctions of the Empire sections of the
British Navy had been concentrated, and their commanding officers
directed to omit no measure necessary to maintain the lifeline of the
Empire.
Under the scheme of concentration which for ten years previously had
been the outstanding feature, not only of British naval policy, but of
the naval policy of all the Great Powers of Europe, the number of ships
in distant seas had been reduced, but the fighting value of the British
units was higher than ever before. The character of the British naval
representation outside home waters when war began may be appreciated
from the following official statement of the composition of the
squadrons which were held on the leash by the Admiralty, awaiting the
development of events:
MEDITERRANEAN FLEET.
BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON.--Inflexible (Flag), Indefatigable,
Indomitable.
ARMOURED CRUISER SQUADRON.--Defence (Flag), Black Prince, Duke of
Edinburgh, Warrior.
CRUISERS.--Chatham, Dublin, Gloucester, Weymouth.
ATTACHED SHIPS.--Hussar, Imogene.
DESTROYER FLOTILLA.--Blenheim (Depot Ship), Basilisk, Beagle, Bulldog,
Foxhound, Grampus, Grasshopper, Harpy, Mosquito, Pincher, Racoon,
Rattlesnake, Renard, Savage, Scorpion, Scourge, Wolverine.
SUBMARINES.--B 9, B 10, B 11.
TORPEDO BOATS.--Nos. 044, 045, 046, 063, 064, 070.
GIBRALTAR.
SUBMARINES.--B 6, B 7, B 8.
TORPEDO BOATS.--83, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96.
EASTERN FLEET.
EAST INDIES SQUADRON.--Battleship Swiftsure (Flag), cruisers
Dartmouth, Fox; sloops Alert, Espiègle, Odin, Sphinx.
CHINA SQUADRON.--Battleship Triumph; armoured cruisers Minotaur
(Flag), Hampshire; cruisers Newcastle, Yarmouth; gunboats, etc.,
Alacrity, Bramble, Britomart, Cadmus, Clio, Thistle.
NEW ZEALAND DIVISION.--Cruisers Philomel, Psyche, Pyramus, Torch.
ATTACHED TO CHINA SQUADRON.
DESTROYERS.--Chelmer, Colne, Fame, Jed, Kennet, Ribble, Usk, Welland.
SUBMARINES.--C 36, C 37, C 38.
TORPEDO BOATS.--Nos. 035, 036, 037, 038.
RIVER GUNBOATS.--Kinsha, Moorhen, Nightingale, Robin, Sandpiper,
Snipe, Teal, Woodcock, Woodlark, Widgeon.
AUSTRALIAN FLEET.
BATTLE CRUISERS.--Australia (Flag.)
CRUISERS.--Encounter, Melbourne, Sydney.
DESTROYERS.--Parramatta, Warrego, Yarra.
SUBMARINES.--AE 1, AE 2.
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.
CRUISERS.--Hyacinth (Flag), Pegasus, Astræa.
WEST COAST OF AFRICA.
GUNBOAT.--Dwarf.
S.E. COAST OF AMERICA.
CRUISER.--Glasgow.
WEST COAST OF AMERICA.
SLOOPS.--Algerine, Shearwater.
WEST ATLANTIC.
ARMOURED CRUISERS.--Suffolk, Berwick, Essex, Lancaster; cruiser
Bristol.
This narrative of the opening phases of the war between six of the great
fleets of the world would be incomplete were no reference made to the
conditions of the German Fleet. A month before the final cleavage
between the two nations, Kiel had kept high festival in honour of the
British Navy. At the invitation of the German Government, Vice-Admiral
Sir George Warrender had taken some of the finest battleships of the
British Navy into this German port. During the Regatta Week official
Germany entertained the officers and men with the utmost hospitality,
and, for a time, the Emperor had his flag, the flag of an honorary
admiral of the British Navy, flying from the mainmast of one of the
latest “Dreadnoughts,” the “King George V.,” and was in technical
command of this important section of the Home Fleet. Luncheons, dinners,
and receptions filled the days over which the yacht racing extended, and
when Sir George Warrender steamed out of Kiel to meet at a rendezvous at
sea the British squadron, under Rear-Admiral Sir David Beatty, which had
been visiting the Baltic ports of Russia, and the other squadrons which
had been entertained by the peoples of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden,
every indication encouraged the belief that peace was more completely
assured than at any time during this century.
The Kiel festivities at an end, the High Sea Fleet, reinforced by a
number of reserve ships, put to sea for its summer cruise in Norwegian
waters. The Emperor, in the Royal Yacht “Hohenzollern,” also left for
the coast of Norway. These were the conditions when the bolt fell. Can
it be doubted that, when in after years and in full knowledge, the
history of the war is written, it will be concluded that Germany, in
giving her support to Austria-Hungary, had no thought that this would
involve her use of her fleet against the greatest sea Power of the
world? With much labour, and at great sacrifice, she had created a
formidable diplomatic weapon to be brandished in the eyes of a timid and
commercially-minded people--and such she believed the British people to
be; but it was not a fleet of sufficient standing to face the greatest
sea Power with confidence.
The war occurred at an unpropitious moment not only for Germany, but for
her ally, Austria-Hungary, so far as sea power was concerned. This
country had, it is true, almost completed her first programme of four
“Dreadnoughts,” but her navy was still deficient in cruisers--possessing
six only--as well as in torpedo craft. In combination Austria-Hungary
and Italy could have faced the naval forces of France and Great Britain
in the Mediterranean, but in isolation the former’s position was from
the first well-nigh hopeless, and her ships retired to Pola at the
outbreak of the war.
The French fleet was in good condition to take the seas. Under the spur
furnished by German acts and German words it had been strengthened in
ships and men, its administration ashore remodelled, and its fleets at
sea reorganised. The Republican Government had confided the supreme
command of its battle forces to one of the most conspicuously able
sailors of the period, Admiral Boué du Lapeyrère, and could enter on the
war in its naval aspects with confidence and courage.
Russia was not so fortunate. She had only comparatively recently taken
serious steps to replace the fleet she lost in the war with Japan. A
ship-building project, known as the “Minor Programme,” was being carried
out, but so far none of the vessels it comprised had become available
for service. When war occurred, four “Dreadnoughts,” which were begun as
far back as 1909, were not yet ready, and seven others were on the
stocks, but not yet launched. Eight small cruisers laid down under the
“Minor Programme” were building, two of them in a German yard, and the
remainder in Russia, and there was besides a large flotilla of torpedo
craft under construction. With all these vessels in commission, the
Russian Navy would have become once more a factor to be reckoned with.
As it happened, Russia faced the war practically without any
considerable sea power.
When hostilities had begun, a dramatic incident reminded the world that
Japan, the ally of Great Britain in the Far East, was not viewing the
course of events unconcerned. On Monday, August 16th, it was announced
that the Japanese Government had delivered an ultimatum to Germany in
the following terms:
“We consider it highly important and necessary in the present
situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbance of
peace in the Far East, and to safeguard general interests as
contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great
Britain.
“In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the
establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial
Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to give
advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following
two propositions:
1. Withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters the German
men-o’-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those
which cannot be withdrawn.
2. To deliver on a date not later than September 15th to the Imperial
Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire
leased territory of Kiau-Chau, with a view to the eventual restoration
of the same to China.
“The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that in
the event of its not receiving by noon on August 23rd an answer from
the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of
the above advices offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, Japan
will be compelled to take such action as it may deem necessary to meet
the situation.”
When Germany was confronted with heavy odds, Japan remembered the events
following the war of 1894-5, when this Power, having joined in robbing
her of the spoil of her victory over China, herself entered into
possession of Kiao Chau, as the price for the lives of two murdered
missionaries.
Thus, at the touch of German arrogance, four great sea Powers of the
world arrayed themselves against her--the British, French, and Russian
fleets in European waters, and the great navy of Japan in the Pacific.
In this wise did the struggle for the command of the sea open. Germany
reaped as she had sown. Since 1898 she had boasted how she would
challenge the greatest sea Power. When the day and hour came it was not
the British fleet only, but the navies of France, Russia, and Japan
which confronted her. By her words and acts she had alienated the
sympathies of every nation except her ally, Austria-Hungary. The war
began with her fleets and squadrons sheltering behind the forts of her
naval bases, and with a few cruisers in the Atlantic being hunted by an
overpowering force of British and French ships. Such was the fruit of
her diplomacy and her forward naval policy; her shipping suffered
instant strangulation; her colonies were divorced from the Motherland,
and she was confronted with the approaching ruin of that world-politic
which had been her pride and inspiration.
[Illustration]
_H.M.S. Vanguard._
_Photo: Sport & General._
=VANGUARD CLASS.=
ST. VINCENT, VANGUARD, COLLINGWOOD.
Displacement: 19,250 tons.
Speed: 22 knots; Guns: 10 12in., 18 4in.; Torpedo tubes: 3.
[Illustration]
Astern fire: Broadside: Ahead fire:
6 12in. 8 12in. 6 12in.
CHAPTER I
THE RELATIVE STANDING OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS
The relative strength of the British and German navies at the moment
when war was declared is of historical interest.
The appended particulars have been prepared from “Fighting Ships, 1914,”
and brought up-to-date by the inclusion of the two Turkish battleships
and the two Chilian destroyer leaders, which were purchased on the
outbreak of hostilities by the British Government.
BRITISH NAVY.
Super-Dreadnought battleships 11
Super-Dreadnought battle-cruisers 3
-- 14
Dreadnought battleships 13
Dreadnought battle-cruisers 5
-- 18
--
Total of ships of Dreadnought era: 32
(Three more super-Dreadnoughts near completion, and due to commission
late in 1914.)
Pre-Dreadnoughts:
Powerful ships all completed between 1905 and 1908 8
Older and less powerful ships completed between 1895
and 1904 30
--
38
--
Total battleships 70
Armoured Cruisers:
Big, heavily-armed ships completed between 1905 and
1908 9
“County” class, slower and less powerful, completed
between 1903 and 1905 15
“Drake” and “Cressy” class, bigger and better, but
slightly older ships, completed between 1901 and 1903 10
--
Total armoured cruisers 34
Cruisers:
Big protected cruisers, “Diadem” class, 21 knots, 6in.
guns (1889-1902) 6
Older and smaller (1890-1892) 9
-- 15
Fast Light Cruisers:
“Arethusa” class, 3,500 tons, 30 knots, burning oil,
completed 1914 8
“Town” class, 5,400 to 4,800 tons, 25 knots (1910-
1914) 15
25-knot ships, round about 300 tons (1903-1907) 15
-- 30
20-knot ships, 2,100 to 5,400 tons (1896-1900) 16
19-knot ships, 5,600 tons (1895-1896) 9
Older ships, 2,500 to 4,300 tons, 16·5 to 19·5 knots
(1890-1893) 9
--
Total protected cruisers 87
Destroyers, 36 to 25½ knots (1893-1914) 227
Torpedo-boats, 26 to 20 knots (1885-1908) 109
Submarines, from 1,000 to 200 tons, speed from 20 to
11·5 knots surface, 12 to 7 knots submerged (1904-1913) 75
Minelayers 7
Repair Ships 3
It need hardly be added that a number of these vessels--including the
two Pre-Dreadnought battleships “Swiftsure” and “Triumph” and groups of
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines--were on duty in the outer seas
when war opened.
GERMAN FLEET.
Super-Dreadnoughts (3 building) None
Dreadnought battleships 13
Dreadnought battle-cruisers 5
-- 18
(Three other battleships are due to commission in 1914.)
Pre-Dreadnought battleships (1891-1908) 22
Old coast defence battleships (1889-1893) 8
Armoured cruisers (1897-1909) 8,900 to 15,500 tons,
24·5 to 19 knots 9
Big protected cruisers (1892-1910), 6,000 tons, 19 knots 6
24-knot cruisers (1904-1913), 3,000 to 5,000 tons 25
-- 31
(Most of these ships have belt armour as thick as that
of the British “County” class of armoured cruisers.)
Small cruisers, 21 knots (1893-1910) 12
Destroyers (1889-1913), 34 to 26 knots 152
Torpedo-boats (1887-1898), 26 to 22 knots 45
Submarines, about equal to British in size and speed 30 to 40
Minelayers 2
All the German Navy, except one battle-cruiser, two armoured cruisers,
and a few light cruisers, were concentrated in the North Sea and Baltic
when war occurred.