_PAPIAS OF HIERAPOLIS._
Dr. Lightfoot has devoted two long chapters to the evidence of Papias,
although with a good deal of divergence to other topics in the second.
I need not follow him minutely here, for I have treated the subject
fully in _Supernatural Religion_, [117:1] to which I beg leave to
refer any reader who is interested in the discussion; and this is
merely Dr. Lightfoot's reply. I will confine myself here to a few
words on the fundamental question at issue.
Papias, in the absence of other testimony, is an important witness of
whom theologians are naturally very tenacious, inasmuch as he is the
first writer who mentions the name of anyone who was believed to have
written a Gospel. It is true that what he says is of very little
weight, but, since no one else had said anything at all on the point,
his remarks merit attention which they would not otherwise receive.
Eusebius states that, in his last work, [117:2] "Exposition of the Lord's
Oracles" ([Greek: Logiôn kuriakôn exêgêsis]), Papias wrote as follows:
"And the elder said this also: 'Mark, having become the interpreter
of Peter, wrote down accurately everything that he remembered,
without, however, recording in order what was either said or done
by Christ. For neither did he hear the Lord, nor did he follow Him;
but afterwards, as I said, [attended] Peter, who adapted his
instructions to the needs [of his hearers], but had no design of
giving a connected account of the Lord's oracles [or discourses]
([Greek: all' ouch hôsper suntaxin tôn kuriakôn poioumenos logiôn]
or [Greek: logôn).' So, then, Mark made no mistake while he thus
wrote down some things as he remembered them; for he made it his
one care not to omit anything that he heard, or to set down any
false statement therein." [118:1]
The first question which suggests itself is: Does the description here
given correspond with the Gospel "according to Mark" which we now
possess? Can our second Gospel be considered a work composed "without
recording in order what was either said or done by Christ"? A negative
answer has been given by many eminent critics to these and similar
enquiries, and the application of the Presbyter's words to it has
consequently been denied by them. It does not follow from this that
there has been any refusal to accept the words of Papias as referring to
a work which may have been the basis of the second Gospel as we have it.
However, I propose to waive all this objection, for the sake of
argument, on the present occasion, and to consider what might be the
value of the evidence before us, if it be taken as referring to our
second Gospel.
In the first place, the tradition distinctly states that Mark, who
is said to have been its author, was neither an eye-witness of the
circumstances recorded, nor a hearer of the words of Jesus, but that
he merely recorded what he remembered of the casual teaching of Peter.
It is true that an assurance is added as to the general care and accuracy
of Mark in recording all that he heard and not making any false
statement, but this does not add much value to his record. No one
supposes that the writer of the second Gospel deliberately invented
what he has embodied in his work, and the certificate of character can
be received for nothing more than a general estimate of the speaker.
The testimony of the second Gospel is, according to this tradition,
confessedly at second hand, and consequently utterly inadequate to
attest miraculous pretensions. The tradition that Mark derived his
information from the preaching of Peter is not supported by internal
evidence, and has nothing extraneous to strengthen its probability.
Because some person, whose very identity is far from established, says
so, is not strong evidence of the fact. It was the earnest desire of
the early Christians to connect Apostles with the authorship of the
Gospels, and as Mark is represented as the interpreter of Peter, so
Luke, or the third evangelist, is connected more or less closely with
Paul, in forgetfulness of the circumstance that we have no reason
whatever for believing that Paul ever saw Jesus. Comparison of the
contents of the first three Gospels, moreover, not only does not render
more probable this account of the composition of the second synoptic as
it lies before us, but is really opposed to it. Into this I shall not
here go.
Setting aside, therefore, all the reasons for doubting the applicability
of the tradition recorded by Papias regarding the Gospel said to have
been written by Mark, I simply appeal to those who have rightly
appreciated the nature of the allegations for which evidence is required
as to the value of such a work, compiled by one who had neither himself
seen nor heard Jesus. It is quite unnecessary to proceed to the closer
examination of the supposed evidence.
"But concerning Matthew the following statement is made [by Papias]:
'So then Matthew ([Greek: Matthaios men oun]) composed the Oracles
in the Hebrew language, and each one interpreted them as he could.'"
[119:1]
Dr. Lightfoot points out that there is no absolute reason for supposing
that this statement, like the former, was made on the authority of the
Presbyter, and, although I think it probable that it was, I agree with
him in this. The doubt, however, is specially advanced because, the
statement of Papias being particularly inconvenient to apologists,
Dr. Lightfoot is evidently anxious to invalidate it. He accepts it in so
far as it seems to permit of his drawing certain inferences from it, but
for the rest he proceeds to weaken the testimony. "But it does not follow
that his account of the origin was correct. It may be; it may not have
been. This is just what we cannot decide, because we do not know what he
said." [120:1] What a pity it is that Dr. Lightfoot does not always
exercise this rigorous logic. If he did he would infallibly agree with
the conclusions of _Supernatural Religion_. I shall presently state what
inference Dr. Lightfoot wishes to draw from a statement the general
correctness of which he does not consider as at all certain. If this
doubt exist, however, of what value can the passage from Papias be as
evidence?
I cannot perceive that, if we do not reject it altogether on the ground
of possible or probable incorrectness, there can be any reasonable doubt
as to what the actual statement was. "Matthew composed the Oracles in
the Hebrew language," and not in Greek, "and each one interpreted them
as he could." The original work of Matthew was written in Hebrew: our
first synoptic is a Greek work: therefore it cannot possibly be the
original composition of Matthew, whoever Matthew may have been, but at
the best can only be a free translation. A free translation, I say,
because it does not bear any of the traces of close translation. Our
synoptic, indeed, does not purport to be a translation at all, but if
it be a version of the work referred to by Papias, or the Presbyter, a
translation it must be. As it is not in its original form, however, and
no one can affirm what its precise relation to the work of Matthew may
be, the whole value of the statement of Papias is lost.
The inference which Dr. Lightfoot considers himself entitled to draw
from the testimony of Papias is in most curious contrast with his
severe handling of that part of the testimony which does not suit him.
Papias, or the Presbyter, states regarding the Hebrew Oracles of
Matthew that "each one interpreted them as he could." The use of the
verb "interpreted" in the past tense, instead of "interprets" in the
present, he considers, clearly indicates that the time which Papias
contemplates is not the time when he writes his book. Each one
interpreted as he could when the Oracles were written, but the
necessity of which he speaks had passed away; and Dr. Lightfoot arrives
at the conclusion: "In other words, it implies the existence of a
recognised Greek translation _when Papias wrote_ ... But if a Greek
St. Matthew existed in the time of Papias we are forbidden by all
considerations of historical probability to suppose that it was any
other than our St. Matthew." [121:1] It is very probable that, at the
time when Papias wrote, there may have been several translations of the
"Oracles" and not merely one, but from this to the assertion that the
words imply a "recognised" version which was necessarily "our St.
Matthew" is a remarkable jump at conclusions. It is really not worth
while again to discuss the point. When imagination is allowed to
interpret the hidden meaning of such a statement the consequence cannot
well be predicated. This hypothesis still leaves us to account for the
substitution of a Greek Gospel for the Hebrew original of Matthew, and
Dr. Lightfoot does not assist us much. He demurs to my statement that
our first Gospel bears all the marks of an original, and cannot have
been translated from the Hebrew at all: "If he had said that it is not
a homogeneous Greek version of a homogeneous Hebrew original this would
have been nearer the truth." [122:1]
That Hebrew original is a sad stumbling-block, and it must be got rid
of at all costs. Dr. Lightfoot is full of resources. We have seen that
he has suggested that the account of Papias of the origin may not have
been correct. Regarding the translation or the Greek Gospel we do not
know exactly what Papias said. "He may have expressed himself in
language quite consistent with the phenomena." How unlimited a field
for conjecture is thus opened out. We do not know more of what Papias
said than Eusebius has recorded, and may therefore suppose that he may
have said something more, which may have been consistent with any
theory we may advance. "Or, on the other hand," Dr. Lightfoot
continues, "he may, as Hilgenfeld supposes, have made the mistake which
some later Fathers made of thinking that the Gospel according to the
Hebrews was the original of our St. Matthew." [122:2] Who would think
that this is the critic who vents so much righteous indignation upon me
for pointing out possible or probable alternative interpretations of
vague evidence extracted from the Fathers? It is true that Dr. Lightfoot
continues: "In the absence of adequate data, it is quite vain to
conjecture. But meanwhile we are not warranted in drawing any conclusion
unfavourable either to the accuracy of Papias or to the identity of
the document itself." [122:3] He thus seeks to reserve for himself
any support he thinks he can derive from the tradition of Papias,
and set aside exactly as much as he does not like. In fact, he clearly
demonstrates how exceedingly loose is all this evidence from the
Fathers, and with what ease one may either base magnificent conclusions
upon it, or drive a coach and four through the whole mass.
In admitting for a moment that Papias may have mistaken the Gospel
of the Hebrews "for the original of our St. Matthew," Dr. Lightfoot,
in his attempt to get rid of that unfortunate Hebrew work of Matthew,
has perhaps gone further than is safe for himself. Apart from the general
flavour of inaccuracy which he imparts to the testimony of Papias,
the obvious inference is suggested that, if he made this mistake,
Papias is far from being a witness for the accuracy of the translation
which Dr. Lightfoot supposes to have then been "recognised," and which
he declares to have been our first Gospel. It is well known at least
that, although the Gospel of the Hebrews bore more analogy to our
present Gospel "according to Matthew" than to any of the other three,
it very distinctly differed from it. If, therefore, Papias could
quietly accept our Greek Matthew as an equivalent for the Gospel
of the Hebrews, from which it presented considerable variation, we
are entitled to reject such a translation as evidence of the contents
of the original. That Papias was actually acquainted with the Gospel
according to the Hebrews may be inferred from the statement of Eusebius
that he relates "a story about a woman accused of many sins before the
Lord" (doubtless the same which is found in our copies of St. John's
Gospel, vii. 53-viii. 11), "which the Gospel according to the Hebrews
contains." [123:1] If he exercised any critical power at all, he could
not confound the Greek Matthew with it, and if he did not, what becomes
of Dr. Lightfoot's argument?
Dr. Lightfoot argues at considerable length against the interpretation,
accepted by many eminent critics, that the work ascribed to Matthew and
called the "Oracles" ([Greek: logia]) could not be the first synoptic
as we now possess it, but must have consisted mainly or entirely of
Discourses. The argument will be found in _Supernatural Religion_,
[124:1] and need not here be repeated. I will confine myself to some
points of Dr. Lightfoot's reply. He seems not to reject the suggestion
with so much vigour as might have been expected. "The theory is not
without its attractions," he says; "it promises a solution of some
difficulties; but hitherto it has not yielded any results which would
justify its acceptance." [124:2] Indeed, he proceeds to say that it "is
encumbered with the most serious difficulties." Dr. Lightfoot does not
think that only [Greek: logoi] ("discourses" or "sayings") could be
called [Greek: logia] ("oracles"), and says that usage does not warrant
the restriction. [124:3] I had contended that "however much the
signification (of the expression 'the oracles,' [Greek: ta logia])
became afterwards extended, it was not then at all applied to doings as
well as sayings," and that "there is no linguistic precedent for
straining the expression, used at that period, to mean anything beyond
a collection of sayings of Jesus, which were oracular or Divine."
[124:4] To this Dr. Lightfoot replies that if the objection has any
force it involves one or both of the two assumptions: "_first_, that
books which were regarded as Scripture could not at this early date be
called 'oracles,' unless they were occupied entirely with Divine
sayings; _secondly_, that the Gospel of St. Matthew, in particular,
could not at this time be regarded as Scripture. Both assumptions alike
are contradicted by facts." [125:1] The second point he considers
proved by the well-known passage in the Epistle of Barnabas. For the
discussion regarding it I beg leave to refer the reader to my volumes.
[125:2] I venture to say that it is impossible to prove that Matthew's
Gospel was, at that time, considered "Scripture," but, on the contrary,
that there are excellent reasons for affirming that it was not.
Regarding the first point Dr. Lightfoot asserts:
"The first is refuted by a large number of examples. St. Paul, for
instance, describes it as the special privilege of the Jews that
they had the keeping of 'the oracles of God' (Rom. iii. 2). Can we
suppose that he meant anything else but the Old Testament Scriptures
by this expression? Is it possible that he would exclude the books
of Genesis, of Joshua, of Samuel and Kings, or only include such
fragments of them as professed to give the direct sayings of God?
Would he, or would he not, comprise under the term the account of
the creation and fall (1 Cor. xi. 8 _sq._), of the wanderings in the
wilderness (1 Cor. x. 1 _sq._), of Sarah and Hagar (Gal. iv. 21
_sq._)? Does not the main part of his argument in the very next
chapter (Rom. iv.) depend more on the narrative of God's dealings
than His words? Again, when the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews
refers to 'the first principles of the oracles of God' (v. 12), his
meaning is explained by his practice; for he elicits the Divine
teaching quite as much from the history as from the direct precepts
of the Old Testament. But if the language of the New Testament
writers leaves any loophole for doubt, this is not the case with
their contemporary Philo. In one place, he speaks of the words in
Deut. x. 9, 'The Lord is his inheritance,' as an 'oracle' ([Greek:
logion]); in another he quotes as an 'oracle' ([Greek: logion]) the
_narrative_ in Gen. iv. 15: 'The Lord God set a mark upon Cain, lest
anyone finding him should kill him.' [125:3] From this and other
passages it is clear that with Philo an 'oracle' is a synonyme for a
Scripture. Similarly Clement of Rome writes: 'Ye know well the
sacred Scriptures, and have studied the oracles of God;' [125:4] and
immediately he recalls to their mind the account in Deut. ix. 12
_sq._, Exod. xxxii. 7 _sq._, of which the point is not any Divine
precept or prediction, but _the example of Moses_. A few years later
Polycarp speaks in condemnation of those who 'pervert the oracles of
the Lord." [126:1]
He then goes on to refer to Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and
Basil, but I need not follow him to these later writers, but confine
myself to that which I have quoted.
"When Paul writes in the Epistle to the Romans iii. 2, 'They were
entrusted with the oracles of God,' can he mean anything else but
the Old Testament Scriptures, including the historical books?" argues
Dr. Lightfoot. I maintain, on the contrary, that he certainly does not
refer to a collection of writings at all, but to the communications or
revelations of God, and, as the context shows, probably more immediately
to the Messianic prophecies. The advantage of the Jews, in fact,
according to Paul here, was that to them were first communicated the
Divine oracles: that they were made the medium of God's utterances to
mankind. There seems almost an echo of the expression in Acts vii. 38,
where Stephen is represented as saying to the Jews of their fathers on
Mount Sinai, "who received living oracles ([Greek: logia zônta]) to give
unto us." Of this nature were the "oracles of God" which were entrusted
to the Jews. Further, the phrase: "the first principles of the oracles
of God" (Heb. v. 12), is no application of the term to narrative, as
Dr. Lightfoot affirms, however much the author may illustrate his own
teaching by Old Testament history; but the writer of the Epistle clearly
explains his meaning in the first and second verses of his letter, when
he says: "God having spoken to the fathers in time past in the prophets,
at the end of these days spake unto us in His Son." Dr. Lightfoot also
urges that Philo applies the term "oracle" ([Greek: logion]) to the
_narrative_ in Gen. iv. 15, &c. The fact is, however, that Philo
considered almost every part of the Old Testament as allegorical, and
held that narrative or descriptive phrases veiled Divine oracles. When
he applies the term "oracle" to any of these it is not to the narrative,
but to the Divine utterance which he believes to be mystically contained
in it, and which he extracts and expounds in the usual extravagant
manner of Alexandrian typologists. Dr. Lightfoot does not refer to the
expression of 1 Pet. iv. 11, "Let him speak as the oracles of God"
([Greek: hôs logia Theou]), which shows the use of the word in the
New Testament. He does point out the passage in the "Epistle of Clement
of Rome," than which, in my opinion, nothing could more directly tell
against him. "Ye know well the sacred Scriptures and have studied the
oracles of God." The "oracles of God" are pointedly distinguished from
the sacred Scriptures, of which they form a part. These oracles are
contained in the "sacred Scriptures," but are not synonymous with the
whole of them. Dr. Lightfoot admits that we cannot say how much
"Polycarp" included in the expression: "pervert the oracles of the
Lord," but I maintain that it must be referred to the teaching of Jesus
regarding "a resurrection and a judgment," and not to historical books.
In replying to Dr. Lightfoot's chapter on the Silence of Eusebius, I
have said all that is necessary regarding the other Gospels in
connection with Papias. Papias is the most interesting witness we have
concerning the composition of the Gospels. He has not told us much, but
he has told us more than any previous writer. Dr. Lightfoot has not
scrupled to discredit his own witness, however, and he is quite right in
suggesting that no great reliance can be placed upon his testimony. It
comes to this: We cannot rely upon the correctness of the meagre account
of the Gospels supposed to have been written by Mark and Matthew, and we
have no other upon which to fall back. Regarding the other two Gospels,
we have no information whatever from Papias, whether correct or
incorrect, and altogether this Father does little or nothing towards
establishing the credibility of miracles and the reality of Divine
Revelation.