"Travellers and 'apologists' alike now more commonly identify Sychar
with the village bearing the Arabic name Askar. This fact is not
mentioned by our author. He says moreover, 'It is admitted that
there was no such place (as Sychar, [Greek: Suchár]), and apologetic
ingenuity is severely taxed to explain the difficulty.' _This is
altogether untrue_. Others besides 'apologists' point to passages in
the Talmud which speak of 'the well of Suchar (or Sochar or
Sichar);' see Neubauer, 'La Géographie du Talmud,' p. 169 f. Our
author refers in his note to an article by Delitzsch, ('_Zeitschr.
J. Luth. Theol._,' 1856, p. 240 f.) _He cannot have read the
article, for these Talmudic references are its main purport_."
[30:3]
I may perhaps be allowed to refer, first, to the two sentences which
I have taken the liberty of putting in italics. If it be possible
for an apologist to apologise, an apology is surely due to the readers
of the "Contemporary Review," at least, for this style of criticism,
to which, I doubt not, they are as little accustomed as I am myself.
There is no satisfying Dr. Lightfoot. I give him references, and
he accuses me of "literary browbeating" and "subtle intimidation;"
I do not give references, and he gives me the lie. I refer to the
article of Delitzsch in support of my specific statement that he
rejects the identification of Sychar with Sichem, and apparently
because I do not quote the whole study Dr. Lightfoot courteously
asserts that I cannot have read it. [31:1]
My statement [31:2] is, that it is admitted that there was no such place
as Sychar--I ought to have added, "except by apologists who never admit
anything"--but I thought that in saying: "and apologetic ingenuity is
severely taxed to explain the difficulty," I had sufficiently excepted
apologists, and indicated that many assertions and conjectures are
advanced by them for that purpose. I mention that the conjecture which
identifies Sychar and Sichem is rejected by some, refer to Credner's
supposition that the alteration may be due to some error committed by a
secretary in writing down the Gospel from the dictation of the Apostle,
and that Sichem is meant, and I state the "nickname" hypothesis of
Hengstenberg and others. It is undeniable that, with the exception of
some vague references in the Talmud to a somewhat similar, but not
identical, name, the locality of which is quite uncertain, no place
bearing, or having borne, the designation of Sychar is known. The
ordinary apologetic theory, as Dr. Lightfoot may find "in any common
source of information,"--Dr. Smith's "Dictionary of the Bible," for
instance--is the delightfully comprehensive one: "Sychar was either a
name applied to the town of Shechem, or it was an independent place."
This authority, however, goes clean against Dr. Lightfoot's assertion,
for it continues: "The first of these alternatives is now almost
universally accepted." Lightfoot [32:1] considered Sychar a mere
alteration of the name Sichem, both representing the same place.
He found a reference in the Talmud to "_Ain Socar_," and with great
hesitation he associated the name with Sychar. "May we not venture"
to render it "the well of Sychar"? And after detailed extracts and
explanations he says: "And now let the reader give us his judgment
as to its name and place, whether it doth not seem to have some relation
with our 'well of Sychar.' It may be disputed on either side." Wieseler,
who first, in more recent times, developed the conjectures of Lightfoot,
argues: "In the first place, there can be no doubt that by [Greek:
Suchar] Sichem is meant," and he adds, a few lines after: "Regarding
this there is no controversy amongst interpreters." He totally rejects
the idea of such in alteration of the name occurring in translation,
which he says is "unprecedented." He therefore concludes that in
[Greek: Suchar] we have _another_ name for Sichem. He merely submits
this, however, as "a new hypothesis to the judgment of the reader,"
[32:2] which alone shows the uncertainty of the suggestion. Lightfoot
and Wieseler are substantially followed by Olshausen, [32:3] De Wette,
[32:4] Hug, [32:5] Bunsen, [32:6] Riggenbach, [32:7] Godet, [32:8]
and others. Bleek, [32:9] in spite of the arguments of Delitzsch and
Ewald, and their Talmudic researches, considers that the old town
of Sichem is meant. Delitzsch, [32:10] Ewald, [32:11] Lange, [32:12]
Meyer, [32:13] and others think that Sychar was near to, but distinct
from, Sichem. Lücke [33:1] is very undecided. He recognises the
extraordinary difference in the name Sychar. He does not favourably
receive Lightfoot's arguments regarding an alteration of the name of
Sichem, nor his conjectures as to the relation of the place mentioned
in the Talmud to Sichem, which he thinks is "very doubtful," and he
seems to incline rather to an accidental corruption of Sichem into
Sychar, although he feels the great difficulties in the way of such
an explanation. Ewald condemns the "Talmudische Studien" of Delitzsch
as generally more complicating than clearing up difficulties, and
his views as commonly incorrect, and, whilst agreeing with him that
Sychar cannot be the same place as Sichem, he points out that the
site of the _valley of the_ well of the Talmud is certainly doubtful.
[33:2] He explains his own views, however, more clearly in another
place:--
"That this (Sychar) cannot be the large, ancient Sikhem, which, at
the time when the Gospel was written, was probably already generally
called _Neapolis_ in Greek writings, has been already stated; it is
the place still called with an altered Arabic name _Al 'Askar_, east
of Naplûs. It is indeed difficult to prove that Sychar could stand
for Sikhem, either through change of pronunciation, or for any other
reason, and the addition [Greek: legomenê] does not indicate, here any
more than in xi. 54, so large and generally known a town as Sikhem.
or Flavia Neapolis." [33:3]
Mr. Sanday, [33:4] of whose able work Dr. Lightfoot directly speaks,
says:--
"The name Sychar is not the common one, Sichem, but is a mock title
(='liar' or 'drunkard') that was given to the town by the Jews.
[33:5] This is a clear reminiscence of the vernacular that the
Apostle spoke in his youth, and is a strong touch of nature. It is
not quite certain that the name Sychar has this force, but the
hypothesis is in itself more likely than, &c.... It is not,
however, by any means improbable that Sychar may represent, not
Sichem, but the modern village Askar, which is somewhat nearer to
Jacob's Well."
To quote one of the latest "travellers and apologists," Dr. Farrar says:
"From what the name Sychar is derived is uncertain. The word [Greek:
legomenos] in St. John seems to imply a sobriquet. It may be 'a lie,'
'drunken,' or 'a sepulchre.' Sychar may possibly have been a village
nearer the well than Sichem, on the site of the village now called El
Askar." [34:1] As Dr. Lightfoot specially mentions Neubauer, his opinion
may be substantially given in a single sentence: "La Mischna mentionne
un endroit appelé 'la plaine d'En-Sokher,' qui est peut-être le Sychar
de l'Evangile." He had a few lines before said: "Il est donc plus
logique de ne pas identifier Sychar avec Sichem." [34:2] Now, with
regard to all these theories, and especially in so far as they connect
Sychar with El Askar, let me quote a few more words in conclusion, from
a "common source of information:"--
"On the other hand there is an etymological difficulty in the way of
this identification. _'Askar_ begins with the letter 'Ain, which
Sychar does not appear to have contained; a letter too stubborn and
enduring to be easily either dropped or assumed in a name ... These
considerations have been stated not so much with the hope of leading
to any conclusion on the identity of Sychar, which seems hopeless,
as with the desire to show that the ordinary explanation is not
nearly so obvious as it is usually assumed to be." [34:3]
Mr. Grove is very right.
I have been careful only to quote from writers who are either
"apologetic," or far from belonging to heterodox schools. Is it not
perfectly clear that no place of the name of Sychar can be reasonably
identified? The case, in fact, simply stands thus:--As the Gospel
mentions a town called Sychar, apologists maintain that there must have
been such a place, and attempt by various theories to find a site for
it. It is certain, however, that even in the days of St. Jerome there
was no real trace of such a town, and apologists and travellers have
not since been able to discover it, except in their own imaginations.
With regard to the insinuation that the references given in my notes
constitute a "subtle mode of intimidation" and "literary browbeating,"
Canon Lightfoot omits to say that I as fully and candidly refer to those
who maintain views wholly different from my own, as to those who support
me. It is very possible, considering the number of these references,
that I may have committed some errors, and I can only say that I shall
very thankfully receive from Dr. Lightfoot any corrections which he may
be good enough to point out. Instead of intimidation and browbeating,
my sole desire has been to indicate to all who may be anxious further
to examine questions in debate, works in which they may find them
discussed. It is time that the system of advancing apologetic opinions
with perfect assurance, and without a hint that they are disputed by
anyone, should come to an end, and that earnest men should be made
acquainted with the true state of the case. As Dr. Mozley rightly and
honestly says: "The majority of mankind, perhaps, owe their belief
rather to the outward influence of custom and education than to any
strong principle of faith within; and it is to be feared that many,
if they came to perceive how wonderful what they believed was, would
not find their belief so easy and so matter-of-course a thing as
they appear to find it." [36:1]
I shall not here follow Dr. Lightfoot into his general remarks
regarding my 'conclusions,' nor shall I proceed, in this article, to
discuss the dilemma in which he attempts to involve me through his
misunderstanding and consequent misstatement, of my views regarding the
Supreme Being. I am almost inclined to think that I can have the
pleasure of agreeing with him in one important point, at least, before
coming to a close. When I read the curiously modified statement that I
have "studiously avoided committing myself to a belief in a universal
Father, or a moral Governor, or even in a Personal God," it seems clear
to me that the _Supernatural Religion_ about which Dr. Lightfoot has
been writing cannot be my work, but is simply a work of his own
imagination. That work cannot possibly have contained, for instance,
the chapter on "Anthropomorphic Divinity," [36:2] in which, on the
contrary, I studiously commit myself to very decided disbelief in such
a "Personal God" as he means. In no way inconsistent with that chapter
are my concluding remarks, contrasting with the spasmodic Jewish
Divinity a Supreme Being manifested in the operation of invariable
laws--whose very invariability is the guarantee of beneficence and
security. If Dr. Lightfoot, however, succeeded in convicting me of
inconsistency in those final expressions, there could be no doubt which
view must logically be abandoned, and it would be a new sensation to
secure the approval of a divine by the unhesitating destruction of the
last page of my work.
Dr. Lightfoot, again, refers to Mr. Mill's "Three Essays on Religion,"
but he does not appear to have very deeply studied that work. I confess
that I do not entirely agree with some views therein expressed, and I
hope that, hereafter, I may have an opportunity of explaining what they
are; but I am surprised that Dr. Lightfoot has failed to observe how
singularly that great Thinker supports the general results of
_Supernatural Religion_, to the point even of a frequent agreement
almost in words. If Dr. Lightfoot had studied Mill a little more
closely, he would not have committed the serious error of arguing:
"Obviously, if the author has established his conclusions in the first
part, the second and third are altogether superfluous. It is somewhat
strange, therefore, that more than three-fourths of the whole work
should be devoted to this needless task." [37:1] Now my argument in the
first part is not that miracles are impossible--a thesis which it is
quite unnecessary to maintain--but the much more simple one that
miracles are _antecedently_ incredible. Having shown that they are so,
and appreciated the true nature of the allegation of miracles, and the
amount of evidence requisite to establish it, I proceed to examine the
evidence which is actually produced in support of the assertion that,
although miracles are antecedently incredible, they nevertheless took
place. Mr. Mill clearly supports me in this course. He states the main
principle of my argument thus: "A revelation, therefore, cannot be
proved divine unless by external evidence; that is, by the exhibition of
supernatural facts. And we have to consider, whether it is possible to
prove supernatural facts, and if it is, what evidence is required to
prove them." [37:2] Mr. Mill decides that it is possible to prove the
occurrence of a supernatural fact, if it actually occurred, and after
showing the great preponderance of evidence against miracles, he says:
"Against this weight of negative evidence we have to set such positive
evidence as is produced in attestation of exceptions; in other words,
the positive evidences of miracles. And I have already admitted that
this evidence might conceivably have been such as to make the exception
equally certain with the rule." [38:1] Mr. Mill's opinion of the
evidence actually produced is not flattering, and may be compared with
my results:
"But the evidence of miracles, at least to Protestant Christians, is
not, in our day, of this cogent description. It is not the evidence
of our senses, but of witnesses, and even this not at first hand,
but resting on the attestation of books and traditions. And even in
the case of the original eye-witnesses, the supernatural facts
asserted on their alleged testimony are not of the transcendent
character supposed in our example, about the nature of which, or the
impossibility of their having had a natural origin, there could be
little room for doubt. On the contrary, the recorded miracles are,
in the first place, generally such as it would have been extremely
difficult to verify as matters of fact, and in the next place, are
hardly ever beyond the possibility of having been brought about by
human means or by the spontaneous agencies of nature." [38:2]
It is to substantiate the statements made here, and, in fact, to
confirm the philosophical conclusion by the historical proof, that I
enter into an examination of the four Gospels, as the chief witnesses
for miracles. To those who have already ascertained the frivolous
nature of that testimony it may, no doubt, seem useless labour to
examine it in detail; but it is scarcely conceivable that an
ecclesiastic who professes to base his faith upon those records should
represent such a process as useless. In endeavouring to place me on the
forks of a dilemma, in fact, Dr. Lightfoot has betrayed that he
altogether fails to appreciate the question at issue, or to comprehend
the position of miracles in relation to philosophical and historical
enquiry. Instead of being "altogether superfluous," my examination of
witnesses, in the second and third parts, has more correctly been
represented by able critics as incomplete, from the omission of the
remaining documents of the New Testament. I foresaw, and myself to some
degree admitted, the justice of this argument; [39:1] but my work being
already bulky enough, I reserved to another volume the completion of
the enquiry.
I cannot close this article without expressing my regret that so much
which is personal and unworthy has been introduced into the discussion
of a great and profoundly important subject. Dr. Lightfoot is too able
and too earnest a man not to recognise that no occasional errors or
faults in a writer can really affect the validity of his argument, and
instead of mere general and desultory efforts to do some damage to me,
it would be much more to the purpose were he seriously to endeavour to
refute my reasoning. I have no desire to escape hard hitting or to avoid
fair fight, and I feel unfeigned respect for many of my critics who,
differing _toto coelo_ from my views, have with vigorous ability
attacked my arguments without altogether forgetting the courtesy due
even to an enemy. Dr. Lightfoot will not find me inattentive to
courteous reasoning, nor indifferent to earnest criticism, and, whatever
he may think, I promise him that no one will be more ready respectfully
to follow every serious line of argument than the author of
_Supernatural Religion_.