THE CROSSING OF CANE RIVER.
Banks broke camp at Grand Ecore at five o'clock in the afternoon
of the 21st of April and turned over the direction and control of
the march to Franklin.
The cavalry corps, now commanded by Arnold, was separated by
brigades. Gooding took the advance; Crebs, who had succeeded to
Robinson's command, rode with Birge; E. J. Davis, with Dudley's
brigade, covered the right flank; and Lucas, reporting to A. J.
Smith, formed the rear-guard.
Birge led the main column with a temporary division formed of the
13th Connecticut and the 1st Louisiana of his own brigade under
Fiske, the 38th Massachusetts and the 128th New York of Sharpe's
brigade under James Smith, and Fessenden's brigade of Emory's
division. Next were the trains, in the same order as the troops.
Emory followed with the brigades of Beal and McMillan and the
artillery reserve under Closson. Then came Cameron, and last A.
J. Smith, in the order of Kilby Smith and Mower.
Crossing Cane River about two miles below Grand Ecore, the line of
march traversed the length of the long island formed by the two
branches of the Red River, and recrossed the right arm at Monett's
Ferry. For the whole distance the army was once more separated
from the fleet.
It was half-past one on the morning of the 22d before the last of
the wagons had effected the first crossing of Cane River. By three
o'clock Emory was on the south bank, and A. J. Smith at five.
As early as the 14th of April, at Mansfield, Kirby Smith had
withdrawn Churchill and Walker from Taylor and sent them to aid in
driving Steele back into Arkansas. This left Taylor only the
infantry of Polignac, reduced to 2,000 muskets, and the reorganized
cavalry corps under Wharton, comprising the divisions of Bee, Major,
and William Steele. With this handful, Taylor undertook to hurry
Banks by blocking his communications and beating up his out-posts;
but just at that moment Banks moved and thus, by the merest chance,
brought Bee and Major, with four brigades and four batteries,
directly across his path, on the high ground at Monett's bluff,
commanding the ford and the ferry. At three o'clock in the afternoon
of the 22d, Wharton with Steele's division, supported by Polignac,
engaged Lucas sharply, compelling A. J. Smith to deploy and the
rest of the column to halt for an hour; and thus began a series of
almost continuous skirmishes that lasted nearly to Alexandria, yet
without material result.
At seven o'clock in the evening of the 22d of April, Birge halted
for the night two miles beyond Cloutierville. Under orders inspired
by the urgency, he had been pushing on at all speed to seize the
crossing; in spite of the heat and the dust, he had led the column
at the furious pace of thirty-eight miles, perhaps forty, in
twenty-six hours; but Gooding had already found the Confederates in
strong possession, and now it seemed clear that the passage must be
forced. At nine o'clock Emory and Cameron closed on Birge and halted,
and at three in the morning A. J. Smith came up.
At daylight on the 23d of April, Franklin moved down to the ferry
and began to reconnoitre. His wound had now become so painful as
to disable him; accordingly, after maturing his plans, he turned
over his command to Emory, with orders to dislodge the enemy and
to open the way. With equal skill, care, and vigor, Emory instantly
set about this critical task, upon which the fate of the army may
almost to have said depended, and with this the safety of the fleet.
The grounds on which the Union army found itself was, like the
whole island, low and flat and largely covered with a thick growth
of cane and willow. Near the river the soil was moreover swampy
and the brakes were for the most part impenetrable. On the high
bluff opposite, masked by the trees, stood Bee with the brigades
of Debray and Terrell, Major with his two brigades under Baylor
and Bagby, and the twenty-four guns of McMahon, Moseley, West, and
Nettles. The position was too strong and too difficult of approach
to be taken by a direct attack save at a great cost. Through the
labyrinthine morass that lay between the ferry and the river's
mouth Bailey and E. J. Davis searched in vain for a practicable
ford. Nothing remained but to try the other flank.
Birge with his temporary division augmented by Cameron's, without
artillery and with no horsemen save a few mounted men of the 13th
Connecticut, was to march back, to ford Cane River two miles above
the bluff, and by a wide detour to sweep down upon the Confederate
left.
To amuse the enemy and to draw his attention away from Birge, Emory,
who had yielded his division to McMillan, caused him to deploy the
First and Second brigades under Beal and Rust, and to threaten the
crossing directly in front, while Closson advanced his guns and
kept up a steady and well judged fire against the Confederate
position on the hill.
Birge took up the line of march at nine o'clock. His progress was
greatly delayed not only by the passage of Cane River, where the
water was waist-deep, but also by the swampy and broken ground,
and by the dense undergrowth through which he had to force his way.
Thus the afternoon was well advanced before he found the position
of the Confederates on a hill, with their right flank resting on
a deep ravine, and their left upon a marsh and a small lake, drained
by a muddy bayou that wound about the foot of the hill. Up to this
point Fiske had led the advance. Now, in deploying, after emerging
from the thicket, he found himself before the enemy's centre, while
Fessenden confronted their left. Fiske formed his men in two lines,
the 13th Connecticut and the 1st Louisiana in front, supported by
James Smith with the 38th Massachusetts and the 128th New York.
To Fessenden Birge gave the duty of carrying the hill.
Behind a hedge and a high fence Fessenden deployed his brigade from
right to left in the order of the 165th New York, the 173d New
York, the 30th Maine, and the 162d New York. Directly before them,
on the other side of the fence, was an open field inclining toward
the front in a gentle slope, and traversed at the foot by a second
and stouter fence, beyond which a sandy knoll arose, covered with
trees, bushes, and fallen timber. On the crest the enemy stood,
Bee having changed front to the left and rear as soon as he made
out the movement of Birge.
Stopping but to throw down the fence, at the word Fessenden's whole
line ran across the field to the foot of the hill. There the
brigade quickly re-formed for the ascent, and then, with Fessenden
at the head, charged stiffly up the difficult slope straight in
the teeth of the hot fire of Bee's dismounted troopers. Many fell,
among them Fessenden with a bad hurt, the 165th New York found
itself hindered by the marsh, but gallantly led on by Hubbard, by
Conrady, and by Blanchard the 30th Maine, the 173d New York, and
the 162d New York won the crest and opened fire on the retreating
foe. Once more halting to re-form his lines, Birge swept on, gained
the farther hill without much trouble, and moving to the left
uncovered the crossing. Birge's loss in this engagement was about
200, of whom 153 were in Fessenden's brigade, and of these 86 in
the 30th Maine. In leading the charge across the open ground
Fessenden was severely wounded in the leg, and the command of his
brigade fell to Lieutenant-Colonel Blanchard.
As soon as Emory, on the north bank of Cane River, heard the noise
of the battle on the opposite heights, he posted five guns under
Closson (two of Hinkle's twenty-pounder Parrotts, one gun of Nields'
1st Delaware, one of Hebard's 1st Vermont, and one of the 25th New
York battery), to silence the Confederate artillery on their right,
in front of the crossing, well supported by the 116th New York,
and deployed his skirmishers as if for an assault. Tempted by the
exposed position of these guns, Bee sent a detachment across the
river to capture them, but Love easily threw off the attack; and,
seeing this, Chrysler, whose regiment, the 2d New York Veteran
Cavalry, was dismounted in skirmishing order on the left, at once
led his men in pursuit and seized the crossing.
Bee retreated rapidly to Beasley's, thirty miles away to the
southward on the Fort Jesup road, without making any further effort
to stay or trouble the retreat of Banks.
Word coming from Davis that he had been unable to find a crossing
below, Emory, when he saw the enemy in retreat, sent Chrysler and
Crebs in pursuit, supported by Cameron. However, this came to
nothing, for Chrysler naturally enough followed the small Confederate
rear-guard that held to the main road toward Alexandria.
The pontoon bridge was at once laid, and being completed soon after
dark, the march was continued by night, McMillan, with Beal and
Rust, moving six miles to the reversed front to cover the trains.
About ten o'clock on the same morning Wharton charged down on Kilby
Smith, who was moving up to the rear of A. J. Smith's command and
of the army, but was driven off after a fight lasting an hour.
By two o'clock on the afternoon of April 24th, Beal's men being on
the south bank of Cane River, the bridge was taken up and the march
continued without further molestation by Cotile and Henderson's
Hill, the head of the column resting at night near the Bayou
Rapides.
Marching thence at six o'clock on the morning of the 25th of April,
the head of the column arrived at Alexandria at two o'clock that
afternoon, and on the following day A. J. Smith brought up the
rear. Here the fleet, with the exception of the ill-fated _Eastport_,
was found lying in safety, yet unfortunately above the falls.
Here, too, early on the 27th came Hunter, with fresh and very
positive orders from Grant to Banks, bearing date the 17th, requiring
him to bring the expedition to an immediate end, to turn over his
command at once to the next in rank, and to go himself to New
Orleans. In truth, this was but the culmination of an earnest and
persistent wish on Grant's part, shown even as far back as the
beginning of the campaign, to replace Banks in command by Hunter
or another. When, afterward, Grant came to learn of the perilous
situation of the fleet, and moreover perceived that none of the
troops engaged in the expedition could be in time to take part in
the spring campaigns east of the Mississippi, he suspended these
orders, and, without recalling that portion of them that required
Banks to go to New Orleans, directed the operations for the rescue
of the navy to go on under the senior commander present. In any
case, however, it was now clearly impossible to abandon the fleet
in its dangerous and helpless position above the rapids, with the
river falling, and an active enemy on both banks.
And Steele,--where was Steele all this time? Having rejected
Banks's advice to join him near Alexandria, marching by way of
Monroe and so down the Ouachita, Steele set out from Little Rock
on the 24th of March, moved by his right on Arkadelphia, and arrived
there on the 28th. His object in preferring this direction was,
not only to avoid the heavy roads in the low lands of the Ouachita,
but to take up Thayer, who was already on the march from Fort Smith,
thus making a fourth concentration in the enemy's country. The
exigencies of the wretched farce called a State election in Arkansas
had reduced Steele's effective force by fully 3,000, so that he
now moved with barely 7,000 of all arms, and six batteries. Opposed
to Steele was Price, with the cavalry divisions of Fagan and
Marmaduke, the former at Spring Hill to meet the advance from
Arkadelphia, and the latter at Camden, to guard the line of the
Ouachita. To strengthen himself, Price drew in Cabell and Maxey,
who with three brigades were at first engaged in watching Thayer.
On the 1st of April, hearing nothing from Thayer, Steele advanced
from Arkadelphia, crossed the Little Missouri at Elkin's Ferry on
the 3d, was joined by Thayer on the 6th, and on the 10th had a
sharp engagement with an outlying brigade, under Shelby, of Price's
army. Price was then at Prairie d'Ane, covering the crossing of
the roads that led to Camden and to Shreveport, but on the evening
of the 11th he drew back beyond the prairie to a strong position
eight miles north of Washington. To have followed Price would have
been to put Steele's long and lengthening line of communication at
the mercy of Marmaduke. This was what Price wanted; but when, on
the 12th, Steele saw the road to Camden left open, he promptly took
it, and, harried by Price in his rear, and not seriously impeded
by Marmaduke in his front, he marched into Camden on the 15th, and
occupied the strong line of the Confederate defences. This was
four days after the return of Banks to Grand Ecore, which of course
put an end to any farther advance of Steele in the direction of
Shreveport, and while he was waiting for authentic news, Price was
busy on his line of communication with Pine Bluff, and Kirby Smith,
with Churchill and Walker, was moving rapidly to join Price. On
the 20th of April Kirby Smith appeared before the lines of Camden;
but Steele had already begun his inevitable retreat a few hours
earlier, and having destroyed the bridge across the Ouachita, gained
so long a start that he was enabled make good the difficult crossing
of the Saline at Jenkins's Ferry, but only after a hard fight on
the 30th of April with the combined forces of Smith and Price.
Finally, the 2d of May saw Steele back at Little Rock with his army
half starved, greatly reduced in men and material in these six
ineffectual weeks, thinking no longer of Halleck's wide schemes of
conquest, or even of Grant's wish to hold the line of the Red River,
but rather hoping for some stroke of good fortune to enable him to
defend the line of the Arkansas and to keep Price out of Missouri.