PLEASANT HILL.
The scenes and events of the 8th produced a deep effect on Banks.
At first he was disposed to look on the campaign as lost. Whatever
hope he might have had that morning of taking or even reaching
Shreveport within the time fixed for the breaking up of the
expedition, was at an end before night fell. Not only must A. J.
Smith be sent back to Vicksburg within two days, but Banks himself
must be on the Mississippi with his whole force ready to move
against Mobile by the 1st of May. Such were his orders from Grant,
peremptory and repeated. Therefore Banks at once made up his mind
to retreat to Grand Ecore, and sent messenger after messenger across
the country to tell Kilby Smith and Porter what had happened and
what he was about to do. In thus deciding he chose the second best
course, and the one that Taylor wished for; it would have been far
better to cover Blair's Landing and thus make sure of the safety
as well as the support of the gunboats and Kilby Smith.
Pleasant Hill was a village of a dozen houses dispersed about a
knoll in a clearing. Beside the main highway between Natchitoches
and Shreveport, by which Banks had come and was now going back,
fairly good roads radiate to Fort Jesup and Many on the south to
the crossings of the Sabine on the west, and on the north and east
towards the Red River. The nearest point on the river was Blair's
Landing, distant sixteen miles from Pleasant Hill by the road and
forty-five miles by water above Grand Ecore.
Though a good place to fight a battle, Pleasant Hill was not a
position that could be held for any length of time, even if there
had been an object in holding it. It was too far even from the
immediate base of supplies, and there was no water to be had save
from the cisterns in the village. These were merely sufficient,
in ordinary times, for the storage of rain water for the daily use
of the inhabitants. Now two armies had been drawing from them,
and there was not enough left in them to supply the wants of Banks's
men, to say nothing of the animals, for a single day; and for this
reason, if for no other, it was impossible for the army to stay
there an hour longer than was really necessary to cover a safe and
orderly withdrawal of the train.
Accordingly, early on the 9th of April, Banks gave orders for the
wagon train to be set in motion toward Grand Ecore, escorted by
Lee with the cavalry and Dickey's colored brigade, and put his army
into position at Pleasant Hill to cover the movement.
Churchill with Tappan and Parsons had accomplished the march of
twenty miles from Keachie to Mansfield too late in the evening of
the 8th to take any part in the battle of Sabine Cross-Roads. At
two o'clock the next morning he marched toward the front in order
to arrive on the ground in time to renew the fight. By the earliest
light of morning Taylor saw that his adversary had already left
the field. Then he promptly advanced his whole force, feeling his
way as he went. Green led with the cavalry; next came Churchill
with his own division, under Tappan; then Parsons, Walker, and
Polignac. The morning was wellnigh spent, when Taylor with the
head of his column drew near Pleasant Hill and discovered his
adversary in position. The last of his infantry did not come up
until after noon. Churchill's men were so fagged by their early
start and their long march of forty-five miles since the morning
of the 8th that Taylor thought it best to give them two hours' rest
before attempting anything more.
Two miles to the southward, across the main road, stood Emory,
firmly holding the right of the Union lines. Dwight's brigade
formed the extreme right flank, thrown back and resting on a wooded
ravine that runs almost parallel with the road. Squarely across
the road and somewhat more advanced, in the skirt of the wood before
the village, commanding an open approach, was posted Shaw's brigade,
detached from Mower's Third division, to strengthen the exposed
front of Emory. Benedict occupied a ditch traversing a slight
hollow, the course of which was nearly perpendicular to the Logansport
road, on which his right rested in echelon behind the left of Shaw.
Benedict's front was generally hidden by a light growth of reed
and willow, but his left was in the open and was completely exposed.
Grow's battery, under Southworth, held the hill between Dwight and
Shaw, and Closson's battery, under Franck Taylor, was planted so
as to fire over the heads of Benedict's men. McMillan's brigade
was in reserve behind Dwight and Shaw. The position thus occupied
by Emory was a short distance north of the village in front of the
fork of the roads that lead to Mansfield and to Logansport.
About four hundred yards behind Benedict, and slightly overlapping
his left, the line was prolonged by A. J. Smith, with the two
divisions of Mower, strongly posted in the wood, to cover the
crossing of the roads to Fort Jesup, to Natchitoches, and to Blair's
Landing. Near Mower's right, Closson placed Hebard's battery.
The extreme left flank on the Fort Jesup road was for a time held
by Cameron; but, through some uncertainly or misunderstanding of
orders, he appears to have considered himself charged with the duty
of protecting the right flank and rear of the retreating trains,
rather than the left flank of the army. Accordingly five o'clock
found him with the wagons, two hours' march from the field of
battle.
Lucas, with about 500 picked men of his own brigade, taken from
the 16th Indiana, the 6th Missouri, and the 14th New York, and a
like number from Gooding's brigade, was detached from the cavalry
division for service under the immediate orders of Franklin. With
these detachments Lucas skilfully watched all the approaches.
Thus matters rested until the afternoon was well advanced, the long
train steadily rolling on its way, and the prospects of being
molested seeming to grow by degrees fainter as hour after hour
passed and gave no sign of movement on the part of the Confederates.
Taylor formed his line of battle and set his troops in motion
between three and four o'clock in the afternoon. Bee with two
brigades of cavalry was on the left or east of the Mansfield road,
supported by Polignac, on whose division had fallen the heaviest
losses of the day before. On the right or west of the road was
Walker, while Churchill, with three regiments of cavalry on his
right flank, moved under cover and out of sight on the right or
south of the upper road to the Sabine.
As early as the previous evening Taylor had considered the chances
of Banks's retreat on Blair's Landing, and had sent a detachment
of cavalry to gather intelligence of such a movement and to seize
the crossing of Bayou Pierre. Now, hearing nothing from this
detachment, he sent Major, with his own brigade and Bagby's, to
the right of the Union army in time to seize and hold the road to
the landing.
Taylor's intention was that Churchill should gain the Fort Jesup
road and fall upon the flank and rear of the Union army, while at
the same instant Walker was to deliver a direct attack in echelon
of brigades from the right. As soon as Churchill should have thrown
the Union left into disorder, Bee was to charge down the Mansfield
road, while Major and Bagby were to turn the flank of Emory.
It was after three o'clock when Churchill took up his line of march
through the woods, Parsons leading. Whether for want of a good
map of the country or from whatever cause, it seems probable that,
when the head of Churchill's column had gained the lower Sabine
road, which enters Pleasant Hill from the southwest, he mistook it
for the Fort Jesup road, which approaches the village from the
south. Thus, changing front to the left, the double lines of
Parsons and Tappan charged swiftly down on the left flank and
diagonally upon the front of Benedict, instead of falling, as Taylor
meant, upon the flank and rear of Mower. Emory says the attack
began at a quarter after five; other reports name an earlier hour.
However that may be, night was approaching, and the Union army had
practically given up the idea of being attacked that day, when
suddenly the battle began.
Benedict's position was, unavoidably, a bad one, and this oblique
order of attack was singularly adapted for searching out its
weakness. When once Benedict's skirmishers had been driven back
through the skirt of the woods that masked his right and centre,
Churchill's men had but to descend the slope, firing as they came
on, but without checking their pace, and it was a mere question of
minutes when the defenders of a line so exposed and overlapped must
be crushed by the weight of thrice their numbers. For one brief
moment, indeed, the fight was hand to hand; then Benedict's men
were driven out of the ditch, and forced in more or less disorder
up the reverse slope. So they drifted to the cover of the wood,
where Mower lay in wait, and there by regiments they re-formed and
sought fresh places in the front of battle; for Benedict had fallen,
and the night followed so quickly that darkness had closed in before
the discreet and zealous Fessenden had gathered the brigade and
held it well in hand. The whole brigade bore the searching test
like good soldiers, yet conspicuous in steadiness under the shock
and in prompt recovery were the 30th Maine and the 173d New York,
inspired by the example and the leadership of Fessenden and of
Conrady.
When Green heard the sound of Churchill's musketry he launched Bee
with Debray's and Buchel's regiments in an impetuous charge against
the left of Shaw's line; but this wild swoop was quickly stopped
by the muskets of the 14th Iowa and the 24th Missouri at close
range. Many saddles were emptied; Bee, Buchel, and Debray were
among the victims, and in great disorder the beaten remnants fled.
Eighteen guns, among them, sad to say, trophies of Sabine Cross-Roads,
concentrated their fire upon the six pieces of Southworth and
presently overcame him by sheer weight. The giving way of
Benedict had already exposed Shaw's left when Walker closed with
him. Vigorously attacked in front, and menaced in flank, Shaw made
a stout fight, but he was in great danger of being cut off. Not
a moment too soon A. J. Smith recalled him.
When Shaw gave back, Dwight suddenly found himself attacked in
front by Walker and in flank and rear by Major. At this trying
moment the 114th New York and the 153d New York were covering the
fork of the roads to Mansfield and to Logansport, while beyond the
Mansfield road, on the right, stood the 116th New York. To protect
the left and right flanks of this little line, Dwight quickly moved
the 29th Maine and the 161st New York. Fortunately his men stood
firm under the trial of a fire that seemed to come from all quarters
at once. For a moment, indeed, the exultant and still advancing
Confederates seemed masters of the plain. Along the whole Union
front nothing was to be seen in place save Dwight's men far off on
the right, standing as it were on a rocky islet, with the gray
floods surging on every side.
But far away, out of sight from the plain, an event had already
occurred that was to cost the Confederates the battle. Parsons,
following up the overthrow of Benedict, offered his own right flank
to Lynch, who stood alert and observant in the skirt of the woods,
beyond the left of Mower. Lynch struck hard and began doubling up
the Missourians. Seeing this, and noting the condition of affairs
on the other flank, A. J. Smith instantly ordered forward his whole
line. Shaw had already re-formed his brigade on the right of Mower.
Across Dwight's rear Emory was leading McMillan from his position
in reserve, to restore the line on Dwight's left. Then, just at
the instant when to one standing on the plain the day must have
seemed hopelessly lost, the long lines of A. J. Smith, with Mower
riding at the head, were seen coming out of the woods and sweeping,
with unbroken front and steady tread, down upon the front and flank
of the enemy. To the right of this splendid line McMillan joined
his brigade, and among its intervals here and there the rallied
fragments of Benedict's brigade found places. Under this impetuous
onset, Parsons and Tappan and Walker melted away, and before anything
could be done with Polignac, the whole Confederate army was in
hopeless confusion. Their disordered ranks were pushed back about
a mile, with a loss of five guns, and after nightfall Taylor's
infantry and part of his cavalry fell back six miles to the stream
on which Emory had encamped on the morning of the previous day,
while the cavalry retired to Mansfield, but Taylor himself slept
near the field of battle with the remnant of Debray's troopers.
In the superb right wheel, three of the guns lost at Sabine
Cross-Roads were retaken.
As soon as the news of the battle of Sabine Cross-Roads reached
Kirby Smith at Shreveport, he rode to the front and joined Taylor
after nightfall on the 9th of April. The earliest Confederate
despatches and orders of Kirby Smith and Taylor claimed a signal
and glorious victory, and to this view Taylor seems to have adhered;
but in a report dated August 28, 1864, Smith says, in giving his
reasons for not adopting Taylor's ambitious plan of pursuing Banks
to New Orleans, that Taylor's troops
"were finally repulsed and thrown into confusion . . . The Missouri
and Arkansas troops, with the brigade of Walker's division, were
broken and scattered. The enemy recovered cannon which we had
captured, and two of our pieces were left in his hands. To my
great relief I found in the morning that the enemy had fallen back
during the night. . . . Our troops were completely paralyzed by
the repulse at Pleasant Hill."
In an article written in 1888 (1) he adds:
"Our repulse at Pleasant Hill was so complete and our command was
so disorganized that had Banks followed up his success vigorously
he would have met with but feeble opposition to his advance on
Shreveport. . . . Polignac's (previously Mouton's) division of
Louisiana infantry was all that was intact of Taylor's force. . . .
Our troops were completely paralyzed and disorganized by the
repulse at Pleasant Hill."
Again, in an intercepted letter, very clear and outspoken, Lieutenant
Edward Cunningham, one of Kirby Smith's aides-de-camp, is even more
emphatic:
"That it was impossible for us to pursue Banks immediately--under
four or five days--cannot be gainsaid. It was impossible . . .
because we had been beaten, demoralized, paralyzed, in the fight
of the 9th."
The losses of the Union army in the battle of Pleasant Hill were
152 killed, 859 wounded, 495 missing; in all, 1,506. Of these,
nearly one half fell upon Emory's division, which reported 8 officers
and 47 men killed, 19 officers and 275 men wounded, 4 officers and
374 men missing; in all, 725. The Confederate losses were estimated
by Taylor at 1,500.
Each side claims to have fought a superior force, yet the numbers
engaged seem to have been nearly equal. Including the thousand
horsemen, who were not seriously engaged at any time during the
day, and in the battle not at all, the Union army can hardly have
numbered more than 13,000 nor less than 11,000. Taylor's force
must have been about the same, for, although Kirby Smith's figures
account for 16,000, on the one hand the attrition of battle and
march is to be reckoned, and on the other hand Taylor himself owns
to 12,000.
(1) "Century War Book," vol. iv., p. 372.