THE RED RIVER.
Seven months had thus been spent in desultory adventures and in
multitudinous preparations without a serious military object, and
still the capture of Mobile was to be put off, and still the dream
of a foothold in Texas was to be pursued. As for Texas, if the
government had, especially at this time, any settled plan, it is
by no means easy to make out what it was. In the previous July
the occupation of some point in Texas had been put forward by
Halleck as an object of paramount importance. At first the particular
place and manner were of no consequence; yet, when the mouth of
the Rio Grande had been seized, with the effect of cutting off the
contraband trade of Matamoras, Seward, who may be supposed to have
known the diplomatic purposes of the government, was frankly
delighted, while Halleck, who must be regarded as expressing its
military views, was as frankly disgusted. Finally, when not one
foothold but many footholds had been gained along the coast of
Texas, Halleck wound up the long correspondence (1) by renewing
his instructions of the previous summer, looking to a combined
naval and military operation on the Red River upon a scale even
greater than that originally contemplated; for now, besides the
great fleet of ironclads under Porter, the project was to absorb
the available strength of three armies. Banks was to move northward
by the Atchafalaya; Steele was to advance from the line of the
Arkansas; and from Vicksburg Grant was to send Sherman, with such
troops as he could spare. Grant, Banks, Sherman, and Steele, as
well as Admiral Porter, received corresponding instructions at the
same time, and, understanding them in the same sense, the Red River
expedition was fairly launched.
Once committed to the scheme, Banks devoted himself loyally to the
arrangements necessary for prosecuting it on a scale at least
commensurate with the magnitude of the undertaking and with the
expectations of the government, as he understood them. Texas was
to be his objective, and he was the lead his army up the Red River,
as the shortest and best way to Texas. From the outset he was
committed to the use of a large body of cavalry able to operate on
the plains that lie beyond the Sabine, as well as to overcome the
opposition of the mounted forces of the Confederacy in that region.
Not only was forage scarce in the Red River country, but Shreveport
once taken and passed, the march would lie for three hundred miles
across a desert; an immense forage train was therefore indispensable.
It was also reasonable to suppose that, before passing Shreveport,
the combined armies of the Confederacy in the trans-Mississippi
would have to be met and beaten, and for this end a large force of
infantry and artillery must also form part of the expedition, at
least as far as Shreveport. The co-operation of the Navy was
necessary, in its turn, if only to keep open the long line of supply
by the Red River. Finally the usual time of the highest water in
the upper Red River fixed the date of the movement.
Sherman came from Vicksburg to New Orleans on the 1st of March,
and within a few hours reached a distinct agreement with Banks as
to the aid expected from the Army of the Tennessee. Admiral Porter
had already arranged to be at the mouth of the Red River with a
large fleet of gunboats in time for the rising of the waters; and
now Sherman promised to send with the fleet ten thousand picked
men of his army, to be at Alexandria on the 17th of March. Banks,
on his part, agreed that his troops, marching north by the Teche,
should meet Sherman's at Alexandria. Steele, who was at Little
Rock, undertook to move at the same time to meet the combined forces
and the fleet on the Red River. Confronting Steele was Price;
across Banks's line of advance stood Taylor; with the whole or any
part of his force, Sherman and Porter might have to reckon, and in
any case Fort De Russy must be neutralized or reduced before they
could get to Alexandria.
Thus upon a given day two armies and a fleet, hundreds of miles
apart, were to concentrate at a remote point far within the enemy's
lines, situated on a river always difficult and uncertain of
navigation, and now obstructed and fortified. Not often in the
history of war is the same fundamental principle twice violated in
the same campaign; yet here it was so, and even in the same orders,
for after once concentrating within the enemy's lines at Alexandria,
the united forces of Banks, Sherman, and Porter were actually to
meet those of Steele within the enemy's lines at Shreveport, where
Kirby Smith, strongly fortified moreover, was within three hundred
miles, roughly speaking, of either Banks or Steele, while Steele
was separated from Banks by nearly five hundred miles of hostile
territory, practically unknown to any one in the Union armies, and
neither commander could communicate with the other save by rivers
in their rear, over a long circuit, destined to lengthen with each
day's march, as they should approach their common enemy in his
central stronghold.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about all this was Sherman's
ready and express assent to the disregard of the first rule of the
great art of which he had always been an earnest student and long
past a master; yet it is to be observed that Sherman knew the Red
River country better than any one in the Union armies; he knew well
the scanty numbers and the scattered state of the hostile forces;
with him, as well as with Admiral Porter, this movement had long
been a favorite; he had indeed hoped and expected to undertake it
himself; but he evidently had in mind a quick and bold movement,
having for its object the destruction of the Confederate depots
and workshops at Shreveport, without giving the enemy notice,
breathing space, or time to concentrate. But this was not to be.
On learning, at New Orleans, that Banks meant to command in person,
Sherman naturally gave up all thought of accompanying the expedition,
and went back to Vicksburg to get his troops ready. The contingent
he had promised to send from the Army of the Tennessee he now made
up of two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, united under Mower,
with Kilby Smith's division of the Seventeenth Corps, and the
command of the whole he gave to A. J. Smith.
As early as the 2d of March Porter assembled at the mouth of the
Red River a great fleet of nineteen ironclads, including fifteen
of the heavier class and four of the lighter. The fleet carried
162 guns, of which 62 were of the higher calibres, from 80-pounder
rifles up to 11-inch Dahlgrens, and the combined weight of projectiles
was but little less than five tons.
On the 10th of March, A. J. Smith embarked his force at Vicksburg
on an admirably organized fleet of nineteen river transports,
controlled by a simple system of signals from the flagship _Clara
Bell_. When, the next day, Smith joined Porter at the mouth of
the Red River, six days were still left until the time when Banks
had agreed to be at Alexandria with his army. Sherman's orders to
Smith required him to make use of the interval by co-operating with
the navy in an expedition up the Black and the Washita, for the
destruction of Harrisonburg, but Porter had already done the work
single-handed. Naturally supposing that Banks's troops were in
march up the Teche toward the point of meeting, although they knew
that Banks himself was still detained at New Orleans, Smith and
Porter determined at once to take or turn Fort De Russy, and then
to push on to Alexandria. On the morning of the 12th of March,
the combined fleet entered the Red River. At the head of the
Atchafalaya, Porter, with nine of the gunboats, turned off to the
left and descended that stream as far as Simmesport, followed by
the army transports, while Phelps, with the _Eastport_ and the
remainder of the fleet, continued the ascent of the Red River, with
a view of threatening Fort De Russy, and occupying the attention
of its defenders until Smith could land and march across country
to attack them.
On the morning of the 13th of March Smith landed, and toward
nightfall took up the line of march for Fort De Russy, distant by
land twenty-eight miles, although by the windings of the river
nearly seventy. In his front, Smith found Scurry's brigade of
Walker's division partly entrenched on Yellow Bayou; but Mower
quickly brushed Scurry aside, and Walker, after observing the
strength of his enemy, concentrated on the Bayou De Glaze, to avoid
being shut up in the elbow at Marksville, as well as to get Mouton
in support; and thus the way was open to Smith. On the afternoon
of the 14th, Mower arrived before Fort De Russy, and just before
nightfall the brigades of Lynch and Shaw swept over the parapet
and forced a surrender, with a loss of 3 killed and 35 wounded.
The captures included 25 officers and 292 men, and ten guns, of
which two were 9-inch Dahlgrens from the spoils of the _Indianola_
and the _Harriet Lane_, once more restored to their first owners.
Phelps, who had with great energy burst through the formidable raft
nine miles below Fort De Russy, came up in _Eastport_ in time to
fire one shot from his 100-pounder Parrott, and to see the white
flag displayed.
When this news reached him, Porter at once ordered his fastest
boats to hasten to Alexandria. The advance of the fleet arrived
off the town on the 15th of March, just as the last of the Confederate
boats were making good their escape above the falls. Kilby Smith
and his division followed on the transports with the remainder of
the fleet, and, landing at Alexandria during the afternoon of the
16th, relieved the naval detachment sent ashore some hours earlier
to occupy the town. On the 18th of March, A. J. Smith marched in
with Mower's two divisions. Thus the advance of Porter's fleet
was in Alexandria two days, and the head of A. J. Smith's column
one day, ahead of the appointed time.
Walker retreated on Natchitoches, accompanied by Gray's brigade of
Mouton's division from the Huffpower. Taylor, quitting his
headquarters at Alexandria, called in Polignac's brigade from the
line of the Tensas and concentrated his force at Carroll Jones's
plantation, on the road between Opelousas and Fort Jesup, distant
forty-six miles in a south-southeasterly direction from Natchitoches,
twelve miles south from Cotile, and twenty miles southwesterly from
Alexandria. Here he was in a good position for receiving supplies
and reinforcements, for covering Natchitoches, and for observing
any approach of the Union forces either from Opelousas or from
Alexandria.
Meanwhile Banks had called in from Texas the divisions of Cameron
and Ransom of the Thirteenth Corps and sent them to join Franklin
on the lower Teche. The command of this detachment being given to
Ransom, his division fell to Landram. Lee's cavalry was given the
same direction, excepting Fonda's brigade, which stayed at Port
Hudson. His last brigade, that of Dudley, marched from Donaldsonville
on the 6th of March, crossed Berwick Bay on the 9th, and arrived
at the cavalry camp near Franklin on the 10th. Cameron's wagons
reached him at Berwick on the 12th, and he marched to join the army
in the field on the morning of the 13th. On the evening of the
same day Lee led the advance of the army from the town of Franklin,
but, his column being quite nine miles long, it was not until the
following morning that his rear-guard filed into the road. On the
morning of the 15th of March he was followed by Emory and Ransom.
Lee arrived at Alexandria on the 19th, Emory on the 25th, and Ransom
on the 26th. The troops were, with some exceptions among the newly
mounted regiments, in admirable condition, all were in fine spirits,
and the long march of one hundred and sixty miles was well ordered
and well executed, without confusion, haste, or delay, so that
when, with closed ranks and bands playing, and with measured tread
and all intervals observed, the column entered Alexandria, the
appearance of the men drew exclamations of admiration even from
critics the least friendly.
When the news of A. J. Smith's and Porter's arrival in the Red
River and of the capture of Fort De Russy reached New Orleans on
the 16th of March, it found Banks himself preparing to set out on
the following morning to join Franklin near New Iberia. He at once
despatched Stone to Alexandria by the river, and following him on
the 23d on the transport steamer _Black Hawk_, arrived at Alexandria
on the 24th, and took command of the combined forces of Franklin
and A. J. Smith.
Grover, as has been said, was to have moved with Franklin, or close
upon his heels, but the 7th of March had come before the first
preparatory orders were given for the movement of Sharpe's brigade
from Baton Rouge, and not until the 10th was Grover told to
concentrate his division at Thibodeaux. His route was now changed
to the river. Accordingly Sharpe's brigade debarked at Alexandria
on the 26th, and the Second brigade under Molineux on the 28th,
but Nickerson stayed for a fortnight longer at Carrollton.
Vincent, who with the 2d Louisiana cavalry had been watching and
reporting Lee's movement and regularly falling back before his
advance, joined Taylor at Carroll Jones's on the 19th. Then Taylor
sent Vincent with his regiment and Edgar's battery to watch the
crossing of Bayou Jean de Jean and to hold the road by which Banks
was expected to advance on Shreveport. Vincent encamped on the
high ground known as Henderson's Hill, commanding the junction of
the Bayou Rapides and Cotile twenty-three miles above Alexandria.
Here he was in the air, and A. J. Smith, realizing the importance
of seizing the passage without loss of time, at once proceeded to
dislodge him. Accordingly, on the 21st of March he sent out Mower
with his two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps and Lucas's brigade
of cavalry. Mower made his dispositions with great skill and
promptness, and that night, during a heavy storm of rain and hail,
completely surprised Vincent's camp and captured the whole regiment
bodily, together with four guns of Edgar's battery. A few of
Vincent's men managed to escape in the darkness and confusion, but
about 250 were brought in and with them 200 horses. This was a
heavy blow to Taylor, since it deprived him of the only cavalry he
had with him and thus of the means of scouting until Green should
come from Texas. Mower returned to Alexandria on the 22d, and
Taylor, probably unwilling to risk a surprise in his exposed
position, withdrew about thirty miles to Kisatchie, still covering
the Fort Jesup road; but a week later he sent his cavalry northward
twenty-six miles to Natchitoches and with his infantry retired to
Pleasant Hill.
Banks has been blamed for his delay in meeting A. J. Smith and
Porter at Alexandria, yet, whatever may be the theoretical merits
of such a criticism, in fact no loss of time that occurred up to
the moment of quitting Alexandria had the least influence on the
course of the campaign, for even after the concentration was
completed the river, though very slowly rising by inches, was still
so low that the gunboats were unable to pass the rapids. The
_Eastport_ hung nearly three days on the rocks in imminent peril,
and at last had to be hauled off by main force, a whole brigade
swaying on her hawsers to the rhythm of the field music. This was
on the 26th of March, and the _Eastport_ was the first of the
gunboats to pass the rapids, the Admiral being naturally unwilling
to expose the boats of lighter draught as well as of lighter armament
to the risk of capture if sent up alone. The hospital steamer
_Woodford_, which was the first boat to follow the _Eastport_, was
wrecked in the attempt. The next five boats took three days to
pass, nor was it until the 3d of April that the last of the twelve
gunboats and thirty transports, selected to accompany the expedition
to Shreveport, floated in safety above the obstructions. Several
of the transports drew too much water to permit them to pass the
rapids; these, therefore, stayed below, and with them the remaining
seven gunboats.
And now occurred the first important departure from the original
plan of operations. The season of high water had been looked
forward to as insuring constant communication along the whole length
of the Red River as far as the fleet should be able to ascend.
But the Red is a treacherous river at best, and this year it was
at its worst. There was to be no March rise worth speaking about.
Thus the rapids presented an obstacle, impassable, or only to be
passed with difficulty; the bare rocks divided the fleet in twain,
the only communication was overland by the road around the falls.
The supplies had to be landed at Alexandria, loaded into wagons,
hauled around, and re-shipped, and this made it necessary to
establish depots in the town as well as above the falls, and to
leave behind Grover's division, 4,000 strong, to protect the stores
and the carry. At the same time McPherson recalled Ellet's marine
brigade to Vicksburg, and thus the expedition lost a second detachment
of 3,000 men; but this loss was partly made up by Dickey's brigade
of colored troops, 1,500 strong, which joined the column from the
garrison of Port Hudson. Withal the force was ample, for at the
end of March there were 31,000 officers and men for duty, including
about 4,800 under Ransom, 6,600 under Emory, 9,000 under A. J.
Smith, and Lee's cavalry, 4,600. Here was a superb fighting column
of 25,000 officers and men of all arms, with ninety guns. This
more than met the calculations of Banks and Sherman on which the
campaign was undertaken. In the three columns there were to be
40,000 men; of these, Sherman was to furnish 10,000, Banks 15,000,
and Steele 15,000.
Steele had already sent word that he could not be counted upon for
more than 7,000, all told. He had expected to march from Little
Rock by the 14th of March on Arkadelphia, there to be joined by
Thayer moving at the same time from Fort Smith. Thayer marched on
the 21st with 4,000 effectives and 14 guns, Steele on the 23d with
7,500 effectives and 16 guns; besides these, he left Clayton with
1,600 men and 11 guns to hold Pine Bluff.
We have seen how, in one movement, three divergent ideas were being
carried out without either having been distinctly decided on: a
foothold in Texas, an overland occupation in force, and a swift
raid by the river. To these there was now to be added a fourth
idea, in itself sound, yet fatally inconsistent with the others.
On the 27th of March, before setting out from Alexandria, Banks
received, by special messenger, the orders of Lieutenant-General
Grant, dated the 15th of March, on taking command of the armies of
the United States. For the first time during the war, all the
armies were to move as one, with a single purpose, ruled by a single
will; along the whole line, from the Mississippi to the Atlantic,
a combined movement was to take place early in May, and in this
the entire effective force of the Department of the Gulf was to
take part. A. J. Smith was to join the Army of the Tennessee for
the Atlanta campaign, and Banks was to go against Mobile. Sherman
had lent A. J. Smith to Banks for thirty days. This limit Grant
was willing to extend by ten or fifteen days, but if Shreveport
were not to be taken by that time--that is, by the 25th of April
at the very latest,--then Banks was to send A. J. Smith's detachment
back to Vicksburg in season to arrive there at the date originally
named--that is, by the 10th of April,--even if this should lead to
the abandonment of the expedition. The orders for the expedition
given by Halleck, while occupying nominally the supreme command
that had now in truth fallen into the strong hand of Grant, were
not revoked; the expedition was to go on; only, to make sure that
it should not be gone too long, it was to be put in irons.
Grant may easily be excused if, while as yet hardly warm in the
saddle, he hesitated to revoke orders that he must have known to
be those of the President himself; yet, since a door must be either
open or shut it would have been far better to revoke the orders
than to trammel their execution with conditions so hard that Banks
might well have thrown up the campaign then and there. However,
Banks on his part had good reason to know the wishes of the government
and not less the consequences of disregarding them; moreover, as
the case must have presented itself to him, there was an off chance
that Kirby Smith might not be able to concentrate in time to save
Shreveport; another, still more remote, that he might give up the
place without a fight; and a third, more unlikely than either, that
Steele might join Banks in time to make short work of it, or at
all events to make Banks strong enough to spare A. J. Smith by the
appointed time. Two weeks remained until the earliest date set
for A. J. Smith to be at Vicksburg; twenty-nine days to the latest
day allowed for the taking of Shreveport. In his dilemma Banks
decided to run these chances.
After seeing the first of the gunboats safely over the falls, on
the 26th of March Banks set his column in motion. A. J. Smith
marched on Cotile Landing to wait for his boats. On the 28th Lee,
with the main body of the cavalry, preceded Smith to Henderson's
Hill, in order to hold the road and the crossing of Bayou Jean de
Jean. Franklin with Emory and Ransom and the main supply trains
followed on the same day.
Twenty miles above Cotile Landing the Red River divides, and, for
sixty miles, until Grand Ecore is reached, the waters flow in two
unequal channels; the most southerly of these, along which the road
runs, is known as Cane River, or Old Red River. This was formerly
the main stream, but the more northerly branch, at once deeper and
less tortuous, now forms the only navigable channel, and is called
the Rigolets du Bon Dieu, or more familiarly the Bon Dieu.
Lee crossed Cane River at Monett's Ferry, and, recrossing above
Cloutierville, entered Natchitoches on the 31st of March. At
Monett's Ferry on the 29th, Cloutierville on the 30th, and again
at Natchitoches he encountered slight opposition from the enemy's
skirmishers.
Franklin, marching by the same road, encamped at Natchitoches on
the 2d of April.
Embarking on his transports as they came, A. J. Smith set out from
Cotile Landing on the 2d of April in company with Porter's fleet,
and landed at Grand Ecore on the 3d.
The river was still rising slowly, and it was not until the 7th of
April that Porter considered the draught of water sufficient to
justify him in going farther. Then, leaving at Grand Ecore the
six heavy boats that had come with him thus far, he began the ascent
of the upper reach of the river with the _Carondelet, Fort Hindman,
Lexington, Osage, Neosho_, and _Chillicothe_, convoying and closely
followed by a fleet of twenty transports, bearing Kilby Smith's
division and a large quantity of military stores of all kinds.
Porter expected to be at Springfield Landing, 110 miles above Grand
Ecore, on the 9th. On arriving there, Kilby Smith was to reconnoitre
towards Springfield, and if practicable, to send a regiment to
seize the bridge across the Bayou Pierre in the direction of
Mansfield.
On the 6th of April, as soon as the movement of the fleet was
decided on, Banks resumed the march on Shreveport. Shortly after
leaving Natchitoches the main road, with which the road from Grand
Ecore unites, strikes off from the river toward the west to avoid
Spanish Lake, and, traversing a barren wilderness, affords neither
position nor resting-place until Shreveport is reached. Banks
meant to be at Mansfield, holding the roads that there converge,
simultaneously with the arrival at the fleet at Springfield Landing.
Lee, who was encamped at Natchitoches with the brigades of Lucas,
Robinson, and Dudley, led the advance, and marching twenty-three
miles encamped that night at Crump's Corner. Ransom broke camp at
Natchitoches at six o'clock in the morning, and marched sixteen
miles. Emory followed closely upon Ransom. A. J. Smith remained
at Grand Ecore till the next day, to await the departure of the
fleet, and then marching eight miles on the Shreveport road fell
into the rear of the column. Dickey's colored brigade formed the
guard of the main wagon train, and Gooding's brigade of cavalry
covered the rear and left flank. From this time Lee's movements
were to be directed by Franklin.
Meanwhile, between the 3d and 5th of April, Taylor, after consuming
the forage for twenty miles around Pleasant Hill, had withdrawn
his infantry to Mansfield. Green's cavalry, long expected, was
now beginning to come in, largely augmented, from Texas, whither
it had been hastily sent, early in the winter, to meet the threatened
invasion from the coast.
On the morning of the 7th of April, Lee advanced on Pleasant Hill,
Robinson leading, supported by Lucas. Robinson easily drove before
him the advance guard of the Confederate cavalry until about two
o'clock in the afternoon, at Wilson's farm, three miles beyond
Pleasant Hill, he came upon the main body of Green's force, comprising
Major's brigade, under Lane, posted in the skirt of the wood, on
rising ground, behind a clearing. Robinson dismounted his men and
engaged the enemy, who resisted so firmly that Lucas was sent to
Robinson's support just in time to save him from being driven off
the field by a determined charge. Lucas likewise dismounted his
men, and the two brigades, charging together afoot, drove the
Confederates from their position, and pursued them to Carroll's
saw-mill, on the southerly branch of Bayou St. Patrice, about seven
miles beyond Pleasant Hill, where, toward nightfall, they made a
strong stand. In this action, Lee took 23 prisoners, and suffered
a loss of 11 killed, 42 wounded, and 9 missing.
Ransom marched at half-past five in the morning, and at two o'clock
in the afternoon the head of his column was at Pleasant Hill,
nineteen miles distant, where he went into camp, having overtaken
the cavalry train during the march, and Dudley's brigade at the
close. Emory, closely following Ransom, arrived at Pleasant Hill
about five o'clock in the afternoon, and went into camp. The last
of the infantry and all the wagons were much retarded by a heavy
storm that broke over the rear of the column and cut up the road
badly. The night was far spent when Ransom's train joined him,
and Emory's, in spite of every exertion, could not be brought up
until late on the following morning. A. J. Smith was now a good
day's march behind Ransom and Emory.
When Lee found himself so obstinately opposed, and so hindered by
these dilatory tactics, he sent a message to Franklin, through
Banks's senior aide-de-camp, who had been riding with the advance,
asking that a brigade of infantry might be sent forward to his
assistance. Lee's view was that the infantry, advancing in skirmish
order, could make better progress than the cavalry, which, in a
country so thickly wooded, found itself reduced to the same tactics,
with the added drawback that as often as they dislodged the enemy
they had to run back after their horses before they could follow.
Franklin declined to accede to this request without orders, justly
reflecting that infantry thus advanced at night, after a hard day's
march, must be worn out in the attempt to keep touch with the
cavalry, while, in the history of these mixed forces, the instances
are rare indeed in which the mounted men have not, after bringing
on the action, left it, as the proper thing, for the infantry to
finish. However, late in the evening Banks joined Franklin, and
an hour or two before midnight ordered him to send a brigade to
Lee, to report to him at dawn. Upon this Franklin directed Ransom
to send either a brigade or a division, at his discretion, and
Ransom, in his turn, ordered Landram to take Emerson's brigade of
his division and join the cavalry for the service indicated.
(1) January 4, 1864--Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part ii., p. 15.