A FOOTHOLD IN TEXAS.
Banks now wished and proposed to move on Mobile, which he rightly
supposed to be defended by about 5,000 men.(1) This had indeed
been among the objects specially contemplated by his first instructions
from the government, and in the progress of events had now become
the next in natural order. Grant and Farragut were of the same
mind; but other ideas had arisen, and now the government, anxious
to avert the impending risk of European complications, deemed it
of the first importance that the flag of the nation should, without
delay, be restored at some point in Texas. The place and the plan
were left discretionary with Banks, but peremptory orders were
given him to carry out the object.(2)
Texas had no military value at that moment. To have overrun the
whole State would hardly have shortened the war by a single day.
The possession of Mobile, on the other hand, would, besides its
direct consequences, have exercised an important if not a vital
influence upon the critical operations in the central theatre of
war; would have taken from the Confederates their only remaining
line of railway communication between the Atlantic seaboard and
the States bordering on the Mississippi; would have weakened the
well-nigh fatal concentration against Rosecrans at Chickamauga and
Chattanooga; would have eased the hard task of Sherman in his
progress to Atlanta; and would have given him a safe line of retreat
in the event of misfortune. What was it, then, that persuaded the
government to put aside its designs on Mobile, to give up the
offensive, to refrain from gathering the fruits of its successes
on the Mississippi, in order to embark in the pursuit of objects
avowedly "other than military"?
A series of acts and events, more or less menacing in character,
seemed to indicate a concerted purpose on the part of some, at
least, of the leading nations of Europe to interfere in the domestic
affairs of the United States against the government of the United
States. The powerful rams, intended for the recapture of New
Orleans, that were being almost openly built to the order of the
Confederacy in the port of Liverpool, in the very shipyards whence
the _Alabama_ had gone to sea, were approaching completion. Other
iron-clads, not less powerful, were under construction in France,
with the personal connivance of the Emperor, under the flimsy
pretence that they were intended for the imperial government of
China. Finally, on the 10th of June, casting all promises and
pretexts to the winds, the French troops had marched into the
capital of Mexico, made themselves masters of the country, vamped
up a sham throne, and upon it set an Austrian puppet. That Napoleon
III. nursed among his favorite dreams the vision of a Latin empire
in America, built upon the ruins of Mexican liberty and taking in
at least the fairest portion of the Louisiana that his illustrious
uncle had parted with so cheaply, was well known. Against the
inconvenient spread of his ambition the occupation of some part,
of any part, of Texas, was intended as a diplomatic caution. That
the warning cast its shadow even upon the dark mind of Louis Napoleon
Bonaparte there can be no doubt; yet in the meantime there had
occurred in quick succession three events that must have sounded
in his ears with tones that even his dull imagination could not
easily misunderstand. These were Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Port
Hudson. He had not the least notion of helping the unsuccessful.
The whole Confederate force under Kirby Smith in the trans-Mississippi
region numbered at this time about 33,000 effective. Of these,
about 4,000 were in the Indian country, 8,000 in Arkansas, less
than 14,000 in Western Louisiana, and rather less than 7,000 in
Texas. Of the forces in Louisiana under Taylor, about 3,000 were
in the extreme northern district. Magruder, whose headquarters
were at Houston, and who commanded not only the whole of Texas but
nominally New Mexico and Arizona besides, was keeping rather more
than two thirds of his forces for the defence of Galveston and the
line of the Sabine, while the remainder were distributed on the
Rio Grande, at Corpus Christi, San Antonio, and Indianola; he had
not 2,000 men together anywhere, nor could even Kirby Smith have
concentrated 20,000 at any single point without giving up all the
rest of the vast territory confided to his care.
At the end of August Banks had nearly 37,000 officers and men for
duty. Of these, about 13,000 belonged to the Thirteenth Corps and
about 6,500 to that portion of the Nineteenth Corps, being the
First and Third divisions, that was concentrated and ready for
active service in the field. The defences of New Orleans, including
La Fourche, absorbed 7,000; Port Hudson, 5,500; the rest were
holding Baton Rouge, Key West, and Pensacola.
Yielding his own views as to Mobile, Banks entered heartily into
the project of the government for gaining a foothold in Texas.
Learning from the Navy that the mouth of the Sabine was but feebly
defended, while the entrance was practicable for gunboats of light
draught, he conceived the plan of descending suddenly upon the
coast at that point with a force sufficient to march to Houston
and take Galveston in reverse. He selected the troops, and collected
the transports and the stores. When he was ready he gave the
command of the expedition to Franklin, and caused Beckwith to
replace Emory in command of the defences of New Orleans, to enable
him to rejoin his division for service in the field.
Franklin had the brigades under Love and Merritt of Weitzel's First
division, with Bainbridge's, Closson's, and Bradbury's batteries,
and the two brigades, Nickerson's and McMillan's, of Emory's Third
division, with Duryea's, Trull's, and Hebard's batteries. For
cavalry there were the two squadrons of the 1st Texas. Commodore
Bell, who then commanded the West Gulf Squadron, gave the command
of the gunboats, destined to keep down the fire of the shore
batteries and cover the landing of the troops, to Lieutenant
Frederick Crocker, from whose personal observation while serving
on the blockade the information that led to the choice of the point
of attack had been largely drawn. Crocker, besides his own vessel,
the _Clifton_, had the _Sachem_, Lieutenant Amos Johnson; the
_Arizona_, Acting-Master Howard Tibbetts; the _Granite City_,
Acting-Master C. W. Lamson. Crocker's belief was that the defences
ashore and afloat consisted of two 32-pounder guns in battery, and
two small steamboats converted into rams.
Franklin's orders were to proceed to Sabine Pass; there, if the
Navy should be able to secure the landing, he was to debark his
whole force rapidly, take up a strong position, seize Beaumont, or
some other point on the railroad to Houston, and then reconnoitre
the enemy to learn their position and strength. He was not to go
farther into the country until reinforced. After landing, he was
to turn back the transports to Brashear, where Benton's division
of the Thirteenth Corps would be found waiting to join him.
After many delays, due to the state and inadequacy of the transports,
which, besides ten ocean steamers, fit and unfit, included six
river steamers wholly of the latter class, Weitzel sailed from New
Orleans on the evening of the 4th of September. Leaving the
Southwest Pass on the morning of the 5th, under convoy of the
_Arizona_, and steering westward, he was joined, early on the
following morning, off Berwick Bay, by the _Clifton_ and the
_Sachem_. A detachment of about 100 sharp-shooters, mainly from
Companies B and G of the 75th New York, under Lieutenants Root and
Cox, was then sent aboard the _Clifton_, and to the _Sachem_ an
officer and 25 men from the 161st New York.
About daylight on the 7th, Crocker became convinced that he had
overrun his distance and gone beyond Sabine Pass; but when all the
vessels had put about and for three or four hours had been steering
to the eastward, he found himself off the entrance to the Calcasieu,
thirty miles east of the Sabine. Then he and Weitzel agreed that,
under the circumstances, the best thing to be done was to intercept
the remainder of the expedition, supposed to be following, under
the immediate command of Franklin, and assembling the whole force
where they were to wait until the next morning, the 8th of September,
for the attempt at Sabine Pass. But the arrangement had been that
the attack by the gunboats to cover Weitzel's landing was to be
made early on the morning of the 7th. Accordingly Franklin, with
his part of the fleet, carrying the supporting force, had already
passed Berwick Bay; in fact, at eleven o'clock he was off Sabine
Pass; and the _Suffolk_, bearing the headquarters flag of the
Nineteenth Corps, had crossed the bar and was about to run in, the
others following, when Franklin perceived that his advance had not
yet come up, and therefore stopped the movement. In the afternoon
Weitzel, seeing nothing of Franklin's fleet, made up his mind that
he must have gone by, and once more setting his face toward the
west, joined Franklin off the Sabine about nine o'clock that
evening.
After the full and open notice thus given the enemy, all thought
of anything like a surprise was at an end; yet it was agreed to go
on and make the attempt the next morning. Accordingly, at daylight
on the 8th, Crocker, with the _Clifton_ and the other gunboats,
followed by Weitzel with the 75th New York on the transport steamer
_Charles Thomas_, entered the harbor, and after reconnoitring the
landing-place and the defences, signalled the rest of the fleet to
run in. Weitzel put a picked force of five hundred men on the
transport _General Banks_, and following in the wake of the four
gun-boats, made ready to land about a thousand yards below the fort.
Shortly before four o'clock the gunboats moved to the attack.
Above the swamp through which the Sabine finds an outlet to the
Gulf, the shore lies low and barren. The fort or sand battery was
placed at the turn about one half mile below the hamlet called
Sabine City, opposite the upper end of the oyster reef that for
nearly a mile divides the channel into two parts, each narrow and
neither straight. The _Sachem_, followed by the _Arizona_, took
the eastern or Louisiana channel, and was hardly under fire before
a shot struck her steampipe and completely disabled her. The
_Clifton_ moved at full speed up the western or Texas channel until,
when almost directly under the guns of the fort, she also received
a shot through her boilers, grounding at the same time; and thus,
nearly at the same instant, before the action had fairly begun,
the two leading gunboats were completely disabled and at the mercy
of the enemy. The Louisiana channel was too narrow for the _Arizona_
to pass the _Sachem_ or to turn about; so at the moment when the
_Clifton_ received her fatal injury, the _Arizona_ was backing down
the eastern channel to ascend the western to her assistance; but
in doing this she also took the ground. The _Sachem_ hauled down
her colors and hoisted the white flag at the fore, and after bravely
continuing the fight for twenty minutes longer the _Clifton_ followed
suit.
The place where the _Clifton_ grounded was fairly in range of the
beach where Weitzel was expected to land his troops. There may
have been a minute, or even ten, during which it might have been
possible for Weitzel, breaking away from the concerted plan, to
have thrown his picked men ashore while the attention of the
Confederates was fixed upon the _Clifton_; yet, although this
criticism has been suggested by high authority, the point would
have been a fine one at best; and under the actual circumstances,
with the _Granite City_ in the channel ahead, the _Arizona_ aground,
and the guns of the _Sachem_ and the _Clifton_ about to be added
to those with which the enemy had opened the action, the problem
becomes one of pure speculation. What is clear is that the landing
depended upon the gunboats; that these were cruelly beaten before
they had a chance to prove themselves; and that nothing really
remained to do but what was actually done: that is, to give up
the expedition and go home.
It is true that the orders under which Franklin was acting indicated
that if he found a landing impracticable at Sabine Pass he was to
attempt to land at some other place near by; and it is also true
that the infantry might have been set ashore almost anywhere in
the soft salt marsh that serves for the neighboring coasts of
Louisiana and Texas; but this must have been without their guns
and wagons and with no fresh water save what they carried with them
until they should have moved successfully into the interior; while
on the transports the stock of water was already running so low
that the men and animals were on short allowance. Therefore, with
the loss of 3 officers and 94 men captured, of the 75th New York,
6 killed, 2 drowned, and 4 wounded, and 200 mules and 200,000
rations thrown into the sea, the expedition returned to New Orleans,
whence, by reason of unseaworthiness of transports, part of it had
not yet started. The transports came back in a sorry plight, the
_Cahawba_ on one wheel, the river steamboat _Laurel Hill_ without
her smokestacks, and all the others of her class with their frail
sides stove. The _Clifton_ and the _Sachem_, whose losses are but
partially reported, lost 10 killed, 9 wounded, and 39 missing.
Nearly all the rest of their crews were taken prisoners.
The Confederate work, known as Fort Griffin, mounted six guns, of
which two were 32-pounder smooth bores, two 24-pounder smooth bores,
and two 32-pounder howitzers, manned by a single company of Cook's
regiment of Texas artillery, whose strength is stated variously,
though with great precision, as 40, 41, 42, and 44 men. This
company was commanded by Lieutenant Richard W. Dowling, and the
post by Captain Frederick H. Odlum. There was a supporting body
of about 200 men, as well as the gunboat _Uncle Ben_, but Dowling's
company was the only force actually engaged. They received, and
certainly deserved, the thanks of the Confederate Congress.
Still intent on executing the instructions of the government, and
having in mind Halleck's strong preference for an overland operation,
Banks at once gave orders to concentrate at Brashear for a movement
up the Teche as far as Lafayette, or Vermilion, and thence across
the plains by Niblett's Bluff into Texas. The route by the
Atchafalaya and the Red River, Halleck's favorite, was now
impracticable, for both rivers were at their lowest stage, and the
great length of this line put out of the question the movement of
any large force dependent upon land transport.
During the last fortnight of September, Banks concentrated Weitzel's
and Emory's divisions of the Nineteenth Corps, under Franklin, on
the lower Teche, near Camp Bisland, supporting them with Washburn's
and McGinnis's divisions of the Thirteenth Corps, under Ord. The
cavalry division under A. L. Lee covered the front towards New
Iberia.
Emory being forced to go North on sick-leave, his division was
commanded by McMillan from the 17th of September until the 6th of
October, when Grover relieved him after turning over the Fourth
division to Beckwith.
Birge, with his reorganized brigade, occupied La Fourche, with
headquarters at Thibodeaux.
Sharpe's brigade of Weitzel's division remained at Baton Rouge,
with Gooding as the post commander.
Burbridge's division of the Thirteenth Corps remained at Carrollton,
while Herron's, at the time of the Sabine Pass expedition, had been
posted at Morganza to observe and prevent any fresh movement by the
Confederates across the upper Atchafalaya.
This division was about 2,500 strong, and Herron, being ill, had
just turned over the command to Dana, when on the 29th of September
Green swept down with Speight's and Mouton's brigades and the
battalions of Waller and Rountree upon the outposts on Bayou
Fordoche, at Sterling's plantation, killed 16, wounded 45, and took
454 prisoners, including nearly the full strength of the 19th Iowa
and 26th Indiana. Green's loss was 26 killed, 85 wounded, and 10
missing; in all, 212.
On the 3d of October Franklin broke camp at Bisland and moved by
easy marches to a position near the south bank of the Bayou Carencro,
meeting with no resistance beyond slight skirmishing at the crossing
of the Vermilion. On the 11th the Nineteenth Corps encamped within
two miles of the Carencro, its daily marches having been, on the
3d to Franklin, twelve miles; on the 4th to Sorrell's plantation,
eleven miles; on the 5th to Olivier's, near New Iberia, thirteen
miles; on the 8th to the Vermilion, fifteen miles; on the 9th,
crossing the Vermilion, eight miles; on the 11th ten miles; in all,
sixty-nine miles.
Ord with the Thirteenth Corps, meanwhile augmented by Burbridge's
division from Carrollton, set out from Berwick at the same time
that Franklin left Bisland, and, following at an interval of a
day's march, encamped on the 10th of October on the Vermilion. On
the 14th Ord closed up on Franklin at the Carencro. A week later,
Ord being ill, Washburn took command of the detachment of the
Thirteenth Corps, his division falling to Lawler.
Banks with his staff left New Orleans on the 7th of October. On
the following afternoon he joined the forces near New Iberia,
remaining near headquarters in the field until the evening of the
11th, when he returned to New Orleans. Stone stayed two days longer
and then followed his chief. This left Franklin in command of all
the forces in Western Louisiana, numbering about 19,500 for duty,
namely, 11,000 of the Thirteenth Corps, 6,000 of the Nineteenth
Corps, and 2,500 of the cavalry division. Banks's object in
returning to New Orleans was to organize a second expedition for
the coast of Texas. The advance to the Carencro had not only
brought his army face to face with Taylor's forces, but also with
the well-known conditions that would have to be met and overcome
in the movement beyond the Sabine. All idea of this march of more
than two hundred miles across a barren country, with no water in
the summer and fall, while in the winter and spring there is plenty
of water but no road, was now given up once for all. Besides the
natural obstacles, there was Magruder to be reckoned with at the
end of the march and Taylor in the rear.
Taylor had now about 11,000 effectives in the divisions of Mouton,
Walker, and Green, with eleven batteries. To occupy him and to
push him farther away, Franklin marched to Opelousas on the 21st
of October, skirmishing by the way, and until the end of the month
continued to occupy a position covering that town and Barré's
Landing.
On the 26th of October, with a force of about 4,000 effectives of
the Second division of the Thirteenth Corps under Dana, augmented
by the 13th and 15th Maine, the 1st Engineers and 16th infantry of
the Corps d'Afrique, and the 1st Texas cavalry, Banks embarked at
New Orleans for the mouth of the Rio Grande. After long delays
and great peril from bad weather, the expedition landed at Brazos
Santiago between the 3d and 5th of November, and on the 6th occupied
Point Isabel and Brownsville, distant thirty miles on the main land.
Having thus at last secured the foothold in Texas so urgently
desired by the government, Banks, who had now entered heartily into
the expansive scheme, set about occupying successively all the
passes or inlets that connect the Gulf of Mexico with the land-locked
lagoons or sounds of the Texas coast from the Rio Grande to the
Sabine.
Accordingly, he sent for the rest of the Thirteenth Corps, and by
the end of December had taken possession of the fringe of the coast
as far east and north as Matagorda Bay. So far he had met with
little opposition, the Confederate force in this part of Texas
being small. The Brazos and Galveston were still to be gained,
and here, if anywhere in Texas, a vigorous resistance was to be
counted on. Banks was bending everything to the attempt when, as
the new year opened, the government stopped him, and turned his
head in a new direction.
During these operations on the Texas coast the 13th Maine, commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel Hesseltine, and the 15th Maine formed part
of the Second division of the Thirteenth Corps. Both regiments
did good service, especially under Ransom, in the expedition that,
led by Washburn, landed on Mustang Island on the 16th of November,
took the Confederate battery commanding Aransas Pass, and then,
crossing to Matagorda Island, rapidly reduced Fort Esperanza, and
thus gained the control of Matagorda Bay before the month was out.
(1) Banks to Halleck, July 30 and August 1, 1863: "Official
Records," vol. xxvi., part I, pp. 661, 666.
(2) Halleck to Banks, July 24, 1863, July 31st, August 6th, August
10th, August 12th: "Official Records," vol. xxvi., part I, pp.
652, 664, 672, 673, 675.