BATON ROUGE.
On the 26th of July, the troops landed at Baton Rouge. In the five
weeks that had elapsed since their departure their effective strength
had been diminished, by privations, by severe labor, and by the
effects of a deadly climate, from 3,200 to about 800. For more
than three months, ever since their re-embarkation at Ship Island
on the 10th of April, they had undergone hardships such as have
seldom fallen to the lot of soldiers, in a campaign whose existence
is scarcely known and whose name has been wellnigh forgotten; but
their time for rest and recreation had not yet come.
No sooner did Van Dorn see the allied fleets of Davis and Farragut
turning their backs on one another and steaming one to the north
and the other to the south, than he determined to take the initiative.
His preparations had been already made in anticipation of this
event. He now ordered Breckinridge to hasten with his division to
the attack of Baton Rouge, and even as the fleet got under way,
the train bearing Breckinridge's troops was also in motion.
Breckinridge received his orders on the 26th, and arrived at Camp
Moore by the railway on the 28th. At Jackson he had been told that
he would receive rations sufficient for ten days, but he could get
no more than half the quantity. Van Dorn had estimated the Union
force to be met at Baton Rouge as about 5,000, and had calculated
that Breckinridge would find himself strong enough to dislodge the
Union army and drive it away. In fact, Van Dorn estimated
Breckinridge's division, including 1,000 men under Brigadier-General
Ruggles that were to meet him at Camp Moore, at 6,000 men. The
_Arkansas_ was to join in the attack, and she was justly considered
a full offset to any naval force the Union commander would be likely
to have stationed at Baton Rouge. Breckinridge left Vicksburg with
less than 4,000. On the 30th of July he reports his total effective
force, including Ruggles, at 3,600. The same day he marched on
Baton Rouge, and on the 4th of August encamped at the crossing of
the Comite, distant about ten miles from his objective. His morning
report of that day shows but 3,000 effectives, according to the
methods by which effective strength was commonly counted by the
Confederates.
The distance from Camp Moore to Baton Rouge is about sixty miles,
and the march had been thus retarded to await the co-operation of
the _Arkansas_. This Breckinridge was finally assured he might
expect at daylight on the morning of the 5th of August. The
_Arkansas_ had in fact left Vicksburg on the 3d.
Van Dorn's object obviously was by crushing Williams to regain
control of the Mississippi from Vicksburg to Baton Rouge, to break
the blockade of Red River and to open the way for the recapture of
New Orleans. Williams was expecting the attack and awaited the
result with calmness.
At Baton Rouge the Mississippi washes for the last time the base
of the high and steep bluffs that for so many hundreds of miles
have followed the coasts of the great river and formed the contour
of its left bank, overlooking its swift yellow waters and the vast
lowlands of the western shore. The bluff is lower at Baton Rouge
than it is above and slopes more gently to the water's edge; and
here the highland draws back from the river and gradually fades
away in a southeasterly direction toward the Gulf, while the surface
of the country becomes more open and less broken. The stiff
post-tertiary clays that compose the soil of these bluffs were in
many places covered with a rich growth of timber, great magnolias
and beautiful live oaks replacing the rank cottonwood and tangled
willows of the lowlands, as well as the giant cypresses of the
impenetrable swamps, with their mournful hangings of Spanish moss,
and the wild grape binding them fast in a deadly embrace.
Six roads led out of the town in various directions. Of these the
most northerly was the road from Bayou Sara. Passing behind the
town its course continued toward the south along the river. Between
these outstretched arms ran the road to Clinton, the Greenwell
Springs road, by which the Confederates had come, the Perkins road,
and the Clay Cut road.
In numbers the opposing forces were nearly equal. The Confederates
went into action with about 2,600, without counting the partisan
rangers and militia, numbering 400 or 500 more. Williams had about
2,500 fighting men. He had eighteen guns, the Confederates eleven.
On both sides the men were enfeebled by malaria and exposure; yet
the Confederates had left their sick behind, while the Union force
included convalescents that came out of the hospital to take part
in the battle. "There were not 1,200," said Weitzel after the
battle, "who could have marched five miles. None of our men had
been in battle; very few had been under fire." Among the Confederates
were many of the veterans of Shiloh and more of the triumphant
defenders of Vicksburg. The advantages of position was slight on
either side. On the one hand Williams was forced to post his left
with regard to the expected attack of the _Arkansas_, so that in
the centre his line fell behind the camps. To offset this his
right rested securely on the gunboats. As it turned out the
_Arkansas_ was not encountered, and the gunboats told off to meet
her were therefore able to render material assistance on the left
by their oblique fire across Williams' front.
Breckinridge commanded four picked brigades, three selected from
his own division and one of Martin L. Smith's Vicksburg brigades,
the whole organized in two divisions, under Brigadier-Generals
Charles Clark and Daniel Ruggles. Clark had the brigades of
Brigadier-General Bernard H. Helm and Colonel Thomas B. Smith, of
the 20th Tennessee, with the Hudson battery and Cobb's battery.
Ruggles had the brigades of Colonel A. P. Thompson, of the 3d
Kentucky, and Colonel Henry W. Allen, of the 4th Louisiana, with
Semmes's battery. From right to left the order of attack ran,
Helm, Smith, Thompson, Allen. Clark moved on the right of the
Greenwell Springs road, and Ruggles on the left. Scott's cavalry
was posted on the extreme left, four guns of Semmes's battery
occupied the centre of Ruggles's division, while in Clark's centre
were the four guns of the Hudson battery and one of Cobb's; the
other two having been disabled in a panic during the night march
before the battle. On the extreme right the Clinton road was
picketed and held by a detachment of infantry and rangers and the
remaining section of Semmes's battery.
To meet the expected attack, Williams had posted his troops in rear
of the arsenal and of the town, occupying an irregular line,
generally parallel to the Bayou Sara road, and extending from the
Bayou Grosse, on the left, to and beyond the intersection of the
Perkins and Clay Cut roads, on the right. On the extreme left,
behind the Bayou Grosse, was the 4th Wisconsin, commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Bean. Next, but on the left bank of the bayou,
stood the 9th Connecticut. Next, and on the left of the Greenwell
Springs road, the 14th Maine. On the right of that road was posted
the 21st Indiana, under Lieutenant-Colonel Keith, with three guns
attached to the regiment, under Lieutenant J. H. Brown. Across
the Perkins and Clay Cut roads the 6th Michigan was formed, under
command of Captain Charles E. Clarke, while in the rear of the
interval between the 6th Michigan and the 21st Indiana stood the
7th Vermont. The extreme right and rear were covered by the 30th
Massachusetts in column, supporting Nims's battery, under Lieutenant
Trull. On the centre and left were planted the guns of Everett's
battery, under Carruth, and of Manning's 4th Massachusetts battery.
The left flank was supported by the _Essex_, Commander William D.
Porter; the _Cayuga_, Lieutenant Harrison; and the _Sumter_,
Lieutenant Erben; the right flank by the _Kineo_, Lieutenant-Commander
Ransom, and _Katahdin_, Lieutenant Roe.
These dispositions were planned expressly to meet the expected
attack by the ram _Arkansas_, and in that view the arrangement was
probably the best that the formation of the ground permitted. But
the fighting line was very far advanced; the camps still farther;
the reserve on the right was posted quite a mile and a half behind
the capitol, and, as at Shiloh, no portion of the line was fortified
or protected in any way, though the field was an open plain and
the converging roads gave to the attacking party a wide choice of
position.
About daylight Breckinridge moved to the attack in a summer fog so
dense that those engaged could at first distinguish neither friend
nor enemy. The blow fell first, and heavily, upon the centre and
right, held by the 14th Maine, 21st Indiana, and 6th Michigan. As
our troops were pressed back by the vigor of the first onset, the
exposed camps of the 14th Maine, 7th Vermont, and 21st Indiana fell
into the hands of the Confederates. The 9th Connecticut, with
Manning's battery, moved to the support of the 14th Maine and 21st
Indiana, on the right of the former, and the 4th Wisconsin formed
on the left of the 14th. Further to the right, the 30th Massachusetts
advanced to the support of the 21st Indiana and 6th Michigan,
covering the interval between the two battalions to replace the
7th Vermont. In the first fighting in the darkness and the fog
this regiment had been roughly handled; its colonel fell, a momentary
confusion followed, and the regiment drifted back into a convenient
position, where it was soon reformed, under Captain Porter. Nims
brought his guns into battery on the right of the 6th Michigan.
The battle was short, but the fighting was severe; both sides
suffered heavily, and each fell into some disorder. At different
moments both wings of the Confederate force were broken, and fell
back in something not very unlike panic. The colors of the 4th
Louisiana were captured by the 6th Michigan. As the fog lifted,
under the influence of the increasing heat, it became clear to both
sides that the attack had failed. The force of the fierce Confederate
outset was quite spent. The Union lines, however thinned and
shattered, remained in possession of the prize. "It was now ten
o'clock," says Breckinridge. "We had listened in vain for the guns
of the _Arkansas_: I saw around me not more than 1,000 exhausted
men." The battle was over. Indeed it had been over for some hours;
these words probably indicate the period when the Confederate
commander gave up his last hope.
The _Arkansas_, disabled within sight of the goal by an accident
to her machinery, was run ashore and destroyed by her commander to
save her from capture. The Confederate losses were about 84 killed,
313 wounded, and 56 missing; total, 453. Clark was severely wounded
and made prisoner. Allen was killed, and two other brigade commanders
wounded. Helm, Hunt, and Thompson had been previously disabled by
an accident during the night panic.
The Union losses were 84 killed, 266 wounded, and 33 missing; total,
383. The heaviest loss fell upon the 21st Indiana, which suffered
126 casualties, and upon the 14th Maine, which reported 118. Of
the killed, 36, or nearly one half, belonged to the 14th Maine,
while more than two thirds of the killed and nearly two thirds of
the total belonged to that regiment and the 21st Indiana. The 4th
Wisconsin, being posted quite to the left of the point of attack,
was not engaged.
Colonel G. T. Roberts, of the 7th Vermont, fell early in the action,
and near its close Williams was instantly killed while urging his
men to the attack. In him his little brigade lost the only commander
present of experience in war; the country, a brave and accomplished
soldier. If he was, as must be confessed, arbitrary, at times
unreasonable, and often harsh, in his treatment of his untrained
volunteers, yet many who then thought his discipline too severe to
be endured, lived to know, and by their conduct vindicate, the
value of his training.
The Confederates appear to have suffered to some extent during the
last attack, until the lines drew too near together, from the fire
of the _Essex_ and her consorts. Ransom also speaks of having
shelled the enemy with great effect during the afternoon from the
_Kineo_ and _Katahdin_, accurately directed by signals from the
capitol; but no other account even mentions any firing at that
period of the day; the effect cannot, therefore, have been severe,
and it seems probable that the troops against whom it was directed
may have been some outlying party.
Cahill's seniority entitled him to the command after Williams fell,
yet during the remainder of the battle Dudley seems to have commanded
the troops actually engaged. Shortly after the close of the action
Cahill assumed the command and sent word to Butler of the state of
affairs.
The Confederates were still to be seen upon the field of battle.
Their force was naturally enough over-estimated. Another attack
was expected during the afternoon, and reinforcements were urgently
called for. Butler had none to give without putting New Orleans
itself in peril. However, during the evening he determined to
release from arrest a number of officers who had been deprived of
their swords by Williams at various times, and for various causes,
mainly growing out of the confused and as yet rather unsettled
policy of the government in reference to the treatment of the
negroes, and to send all these officers to Baton Rouge. Among them
were Colonel Paine of the 4th Wisconsin and Colonel Clark of the
6th Michigan. Since the 11th of June Paine had been in arrest; an
arrest of a character peculiar and perhaps unprecedented in the
history of armies. Whenever danger was to be faced, or unusual
duty to be performed, he might wear his sword and command his men,
but the moment the duty or the danger was at an end he must go back
into arrest. Paine, who was an extremely conscientious officer,
as well as a man of high character and firmness of purpose, had
from the first taken strong ground against the use of any portion
of his force in aid of the claims of the master to the service of
the slave. Williams, strict in his idea of obedience due his
superiors, not less than in his notions of obedience due to him by
his own inferiors in rank, stood upon his construction of the law
and the orders of the War Department, as they then existed; hence
in the natural course of events inevitably arose more than one
irreconcilable difference of opinion. Paine was now ordered to go
at once to Baton Rouge and take command. He was told by Butler to
burn the town and the capitol. The library, the paintings, the
statuary, and the relics were to be spared, as well as the charitable
institutions of the town. The books, the paintings, and the statue
of Washington, he was to send to New Orleans; he was then to evacuate
Baton Rouge and retire with his whole force to New Orleans.
At midnight on the 6th of August Paine arrived at Baton Rouge.
There he found every thing quiet, with the troops in camp on an
interior and shorter line, but expecting another attack. There
was in fact an alarm before morning came, but nothing happened.
On the 7th Paine took command and set about putting the town in
complete condition for an effective defence. With his accustomed
care and energy he soon rectified the lines and entrenched them
with twenty-four guns in position, and, in co-operation with the
navy, concerted every measure for an effective defence, even against
large numbers.
Breckinridge, however, after continuing to menace Baton Rouge for
some days, had, by Van Dorn's orders, retired to Port Hudson, and
was now engaged in fortifying that position. Ruggles was sent
there on the 12th of August. The next day Breckinridge received
orders from Van Dorn, then at Jackson, to follow with his whole
force. "Port Hudson," Van Dorn said, "must be held if possible."
"Port Hudson," remarks Breckinridge, in his report of the battle
of Baton Rouge, "is one of the strongest points on the Mississippi,
which Baton Rouge is not, and batteries there will command the
river more completely than at Vicksburg."
Meanwhile Butler had changed his mind with regard to the evacuation
of Baton Rouge, and had directed Paine to hold the place for the
present. With an accuracy unusual at this period, Butler estimated
Breckinridge's entire force at 5,000 men and fourteen guns. On
the 13th the defences were complete, the entrenchments forming two
sides of a triangle of which the river was the base and the cemetery
mound the apex. The troops stood to arms at three o'clock every
morning; one fourth of the force was constantly under arms, day
and night, at its station. At two points on each face of the
entrenchment flags were planted by day and lights by night, to
indicate to the gunboats their line of fire.
On the 16th of August Butler renewed his orders to burn and evacuate
Baton Rouge. Its retention up to this time he had avowedly regarded
as having political rather than military importance. Now he wrote
to Paine: "I am constrained to come to the conclusion that it is
necessary to evacuate Baton Rouge. . . . Begin the movement quietly
and rapidly; get every thing off except your men, and then see to
it that the town is destroyed. After mature deliberation I deem
this a military necessity of the highest order."
Against these orders Paine made an earnest appeal, based upon
considerations partly humane, partly military. He was so far
successful that Butler was induced to countermand the order to
burn. The movement was not to be delayed on account of the statue
of Washington. However, the statue had been already packed. It
is now in the Patent Office at the national capital. All the books
and paintings were brought off, "except," to quote from Paine's
diary, "the portrait of James Buchanan, which we left hanging in
the State House for his friends." Finally, on the 20th, Paine
evacuated Baton Rouge, and on the following day reached the lines
of Carrollton, known as Camp Parapet, and turned over his command
to Phelps.