OF IDEAS OF POWER.
The definition of art which I have just given, requires me to determine
what kinds of ideas can be received from works of art, and which of
these are the greatest, before proceeding to any practical application
of the test.
Sec. 1. What classes of ideas are conveyable by art.
I think that all the sources of pleasure, or any other good, to be
derived from works of art, may be referred to five distinct heads.
I. Ideas of Power.--The perception or conception of the mental or
bodily powers by which the work has been produced.
II. Ideas of Imitation.--The perception that the thing produced
resembles something else.
III. Ideas of Truth.--The perception of faithfulness in a statement
of facts by the thing produced.
IV. Ideas of Beauty.--The perception of beauty, either in the thing
produced, or in what it suggests or resembles.
V. Ideas of Relation.--The perception of intellectual relations, in
the thing produced, or in what it suggests or resembles.
I shall briefly distinguish the nature and effects of each of these
classes of ideas.
Sec. 2. Ideas of power vary much in relative dignity.
I. Ideas of Power.--These are the simple perception of the mental or
bodily powers exerted in the production of any work of art. According to
the dignity and degree of the power perceived is the dignity of the
idea; but the whole class of ideas is received by the intellect, and
they excite the best of the moral feelings, veneration, and the desire
of exertion. As a species, therefore, they are one of the noblest
connected with art; but the differences in degree of dignity among
themselves are infinite, being correspondent with every order of
power,--from that of the fingers to that of the most exalted intellect.
Thus, when we see an Indian's paddle carved from the handle to the
blade, we have a conception of prolonged manual labor, and are gratified
in proportion to the supposed expenditure of time and exertion. These
are, indeed, powers of a low order, yet the pleasure arising from the
conception of them enters very largely indeed into our admiration of all
elaborate ornament, architectural decoration, etc. The delight with
which we look on the fretted front of Rouen Cathedral depends in no
small degree on the simple perception of time employed and labor
expended in its production. But it is a right, that is, an ennobling
pleasure, even in this its lowest phase; and even the pleasure felt by
those persons who praise a drawing for its "finish," or its "work,"
which is one precisely of the same kind, would be right, if it did not
imply a want of perception of the higher powers which render work
unnecessary. If to the evidence of labor be added that of strength or
dexterity, the sensation of power is yet increased; if to strength and
dexterity be added that of ingenuity and judgment, it is multiplied
tenfold, and so on, through all the subjects of action of body or mind,
we receive the more exalted pleasure from the more exalted power.
Sec. 3. But are received from whatever has been the subject of power. The
meaning of the word "excellence."
So far the nature and effects of ideas of power cannot but be admitted
by all. But the circumstance which I wish especially to insist upon,
with respect to them, is one which may not, perhaps, be so readily
allowed, namely, that they are independent of the nature or worthiness
of the object from which they are received, and that whatever has been
the subject of a great power, whether there be intrinsic and apparent
worthiness in itself or not, bears with it the evidence of having been
so, and is capable of giving the ideas of power, and the consequent
pleasures, in their full degree. For observe, that a thing is not
properly said to have been the result of a great power, on which only
some part of that power has been expended. A nut may be cracked by a
steam-engine, but it has not, in being so, been the subject of the power
of the engine. And thus it is falsely said of great men, that they waste
their lofty powers on unworthy objects: the object may be dangerous or
useless, but, as far as the phrase has reference to difficulty of
performance, it cannot be unworthy of the power which it brings into
exertion, because nothing can become a subject of action to a greater
power which can be accomplished by a less, any more than bodily strength
can be exerted where there is nothing to resist it.
So then, men may let their great powers lie dormant, while they employ
their mean and petty powers on mean and petty objects; but it is
physically impossible to employ a great power, except on a great object.
Consequently, wherever power of any kind or degree has been exerted, the
marks and evidence of it are stamped upon its results: it is impossible
that it should be lost or wasted, or without record, even in the
"estimation of a hair:" and therefore, whatever has been the subject of
a great power bears about with it the image of that which created it,
and is what is commonly called "excellent." And this is the true meaning
of the word excellent, as distinguished from the terms, "beautiful,"
"useful," "good," etc.; and we shall always, in future, use the word
excellent, as signifying that the thing to which it is applied required
a great power for its production.[3]
Sec. 4. What is necessary to the distinguishing of excellence.
The faculty of perceiving what powers are required for the production of
a thing, is the faculty of perceiving excellence. It is this faculty in
which men, even of the most cultivated taste, must always be wanting,
unless they have added practice to reflection; because none can estimate
the power manifested in victory, unless they have personally measured
the strength to be overcome. Though, therefore, it is possible, by the
cultivation of sensibility and judgment, to become capable of
distinguishing what is beautiful, it is totally impossible, without
practice and knowledge, to distinguish or feel what is excellent. The
beauty or the truth of Titian's flesh-tint may be appreciated by all;
but it is only to the artist, whose multiplied hours of toil have not
reached the slightest resemblance of one of its tones, that its
_excellence_ is manifest.
Sec. 5. The pleasure attendant on conquering difficulties is right.
Wherever, then, difficulty has been overcome, there is excellence: and
therefore, in order to prove excellent, we have only to prove the
difficulty of its production: whether it be useful or beautiful is
another question; its excellence depends on its difficulty alone. For is
it a false or diseased taste which looks for the overcoming of
difficulties, and has pleasure in it, even without any view to resultant
good. It has been made part of our moral nature that we should have a
pleasure in encountering and conquering opposition, for the sake of the
struggle and the victory, not for the sake of any after result; and not
only our own victory, but the perception of that of another, is in all
cases the source of pure and ennobling pleasure. And if we often hear it
said, and truly said, that an artist has erred by seeking rather to show
his skill in overcoming technical difficulties, than to reach a great
end, be it observed that he is only blamed because he has sought to
conquer an inferior difficulty rather than a great one; for it is much
easier to overcome technical difficulties than to reach a great end.
Whenever the visible victory over difficulties is found painful or in
false taste, it is owing to the preference of an inferior to a great
difficulty, or to the false estimate of what is difficult and what is
not. It is far more difficult to be simple than to be complicated; far
more difficult to sacrifice skill and cease exertion in the proper
place, than to expend both indiscriminately. We shall find, in the
course of our investigation, that beauty and difficulty go together; and
that they are only mean and paltry difficulties which it is wrong or
contemptible to wrestle with. Be it remembered then--Power is never
wasted. Whatever power has been employed, produces excellence in
proportion to its own dignity and exertion; and the faculty of
perceiving this exertion, and appreciating this dignity, is the faculty
of perceiving excellence.
FOOTNOTES
[3] Of course the word "excellent" is primarily a mere synonym with
"surpassing," and when applied to persons, has the general meaning
given by Johnson--"the state of abounding in any good quality." But
when applied to things it has always reference to the power by which
they are produced. We talk of excellent music or poetry, because it
is difficult to compose or write such, but never of excellent
flowers, because all flowers being the result of the same power,
must be equally excellent. We distinguish them only as beautiful or
useful, and therefore, as there is no other one word to signify that
quality of a thing produced by which it pleases us merely as the
result of power, and as the term "excellent" is more frequently used
in this sense than in any other, I choose to limit it at once to
this sense, and I wish it, when I use it in future, to be so
understood.