EXPLANATION _of the_ REEZONS, _why_ MARRIAGE _iz_ PROHIBITED _between_
NATURAL RELATIONS.
Much haz been said and written to ascertain between what relations
marriage ought to be permitted. The civil, the canon, and the English
laws, differ az to the degrees of consanguinity necessary to render this
connection improper. A detail of the arguments on this subject, and even
a recapitulation of the decrees of ecclesiastical councils, in the erly
ages of the church, would be tedious and uninteresting. I shall only
offer a few thoughts of my own on the question, with a view to
illustrate a single point, which haz been agitated in modern times, and
on which the different American states hav passed different decisions.
The point iz, whether a man should be permitted to marry hiz former
wife's sister. In some states this iz permitted; in others, prohibited.
Thoze who favor the prohibition, ground their reezon on the Levitical
law, which says a man shall not marry hiz wife's sister, during the life
of hiz wife, to vex her. This prohibition, while it restrains a man from
having two sisters for wives at the same time, among a peeple where
poligamy waz permitted, iz a negativ pregnant, and a strong argument
that a man waz allowed, after the deth of a wife, to marry her sister.
The Jewish law, however divine, waz designed for a particular nation,
and iz no farther binding upon other nations, than it respects the
natural and social duties. In no one particular, hav men been more
mistaken, than in explaining divine commands. It haz been sufficient for
them to reseiv a law into the wil of God, without examining into the
reezons for which the law waz revealed. They seem to hav inverted the
foundation of moral obligation, in supposing the moral law to derive its
propriety and fitness originally from the wil of Deity, rather than from
the nature of things. They talk about the fitness and unfitness of
things, independent, not only of society, but of God himself. Such wild
notions, I presume, are not common. There could be no fitness nor
unfitness of things, before things were made; nor could right and rong
exist without social beings. The moral duties therefore are not right,
merely because they are commanded by God; but they are commanded by him,
because they are right. The propriety or fitness of them depends on the
very nature of society; and this fitness, which waz coeval with
creation, waz the ground of the divine command.[150]
[150] It may be said, that _moral right_ and _rong_ must
ultimately be resolved into the wil of Deity, because society
itself depends on hiz wil. This iz conceded; I only contend
that moral fitness and unfitness result _immediately_ from
the state of created beings, with relation to eech other, and
not from any arbitrary rules imposed by Deity, subsequent to
creation.
The law of Moses, regulating marriages, waz founded on this propriety or
fitness of things. A divine command givs a sanction to the law; but the
propriety of it existed prior to the command. The reezons for
prohibiting marriage between certain relations are important; yet they
seem not to be understood. It haz been sufficient, in discussing this
point, to say, _such iz the law of God_; and few attempts hav been made
to find the reezons of it, by which alone its extent and authority can
be ascertained.
There are two rules, furnished by the laws of nature, for regulating
matrimonial connections. The first iz, that marriage, which iz a social
and civil connection, should not interfere with a natural relation, so
az to defeet or destroy its duties and rights. Thus it iz highly
improper that an aunt should marry her nephew, or a grandfather hiz
grand daughter; because the duties and rights of the natural relation,
would be superseded by the positiv duties and rights of the civil
connection.
The other rule iz much more important. It iz a law of nature that
vegetables should degenerate, if planted continually on the same soil.
Hence the change of seeds among farmers. Animals degenerate on the same
principle. The physical causes of this law of nature, are perhaps among
the arcana of creation; but the effects are obvious; and it iz
surprizing that modern writers on law and ethics should pass over almost
the only reezons of prohibiting marriage between blood relations.
Consanguinity, and not affinity, iz the ground of the prohibition.[151]
[151] By the ancient laws of England, relations in the same
degree, whether by consanguinity or affinity, were placed
exactly on a footing. See the suttle reezoning by which the
prohibitions were supported, in Reeve's History of the
English Laws, Vol. IV.
It iz no crime for brothers and sisters to intermarry, except the fatal
consequences to society; for were it generally practised, men would soon
become a race of pigmies. It iz no crime for brothers and sisters
children to intermarry, and this iz often practised; but such near blood
connections often produce imperfect children. The common peeple hav
hence drawn an argument to proov such connections criminal; considering
weakness, sickness and deformity in the offspring az judgements upon the
parents. Superstition iz often awake, when reezon iz asleep. It iz just
az criminal for a man to marry hiz cousin, az it iz to sow flax every
year on the same ground; but when he does this, he must not complain, if
he haz an indifferent crop.
Here then the question occurs, iz it proper for a man to marry hiz
wife's sister? The answer iz plain. The practice does not interfere with
any law of nature or society; and there iz not the smallest impropriety
in a man's marrying ten sisters of hiz wife in succession. There iz no
natural relation destroyed; there iz no relation by blood; and _cessante
ratione, cessat et ipsa Lex_; the law ceeses when the reezon of it
ceeses.
No. XXVII.