I duly received your letter of the 14th instant, and can only
answer you briefly and generally from memory; that a combined
operation of the land and naval forces of France in America,
for the year 1781, was preconcerted the year before; that the
point of attack was not absolutely agreed upon,[b] because it
could not be foreknown where the enemy would be most
susceptible of impression; and because we (having the command
of the water with sufficient means of conveyance) could
transport ourselves to any spot with the greatest celerity;
that it was determined by me, nearly twelve months before
hand, at all hazards, to give out and cause it to be believed
by the highest military as well as civil officers, that New
York was the destined place of attack, for the important
purpose of inducing the eastern and middle States to make
greater exertions in furnishing specific supplies, than they
otherwise would have done, as well as for the interesting
purpose of rendering the enemy less prepared elsewhere; that
by these means, and these alone, artillery, boats, stores,
and provisions, were in seasonable preparation to move with
the utmost rapidity to any part of the continent; for the
difficulty consisted more in providing, than knowing how to
apply the military apparatus; that before the arrival of the
Count de Grasse, it was the fixed determination _to strike
the enemy in the most vulnerable quarter_, so as to ensure
success with moral certainty, as our affairs were then in the
most ruinous train imaginable; that New York was thought to
be beyond our effort, and consequently that the only
hesitation that remained, was between an attack upon the
British army in Virginia and that in Charleston: And finally,
that, by the intervention of several communications, and some
incidents which cannot be detailed in a letter, the hostile
post in Virginia, from being a _provisional and strongly
expected_, became the _definitiv and certain object_ of the
campaign.
[b] Because it would be easy for the Count de
Grasse, in good time before his departure from the
West Indies, to giv notice, by expressing at what
place he could most conveniently first touch to
receive advice.
I only add, that it never was in contemplation to attack New
York, unless the garrison should first have been so far
degarnished to carry on the southern operations, as to render
our success in the siege of that place, as infallible as any
future military event can ever be made. For I repeat it, and
dwell upon it again, some splendid advantage (whether upon a
larger or smaller scale was almost immaterial) was so
essentially necessary, to revive the expiring hopes and
languid exertions of the country, at the crisis in question,
that I never would have consented to embark in any
enterprise, wherein, from the most rational plan and accurate
calculations, the favorable issue should not have appeared as
clear to my view as a ray of light. The failure of an attempt
against the posts of the enemy, could, in no other possible
situation during the war, have been so fatal to our cause.
That much trouble was taken and finesse used to misguide and
bewilder Sir Henry Clinton, in regard to the real object, by
fictitious communications, as well as by making a deceptiv
provision of ovens, forage, and boats, in his neighborhood,
is certain: Nor were less pains taken to deceive our own
army; for I had always conceived, where the imposition did
not completely take place at home, it could never
sufficiently succeed abroad.
Your desire of obtaining truth, is very laudable; I wish I
had more leisure to gratify it, as I am equally solicitous
the undisguised verity should be known. Many circumstances
will unavoidably be misconceived and misrepresented.
Notwithstanding most of the papers, which may properly be
deemed official, are preserved; yet the knowlege of
innumerable things, of a more delicate and secret nature, is
confined to the perishable remembrance of some few of the
present generation.
With esteem, I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,