GENTLEMEN,

Your long and elaborate publication, assigning the reasons for your

refusing to subscribe the ratification of the _new Federal

Constitution_, has made its appearance in the public papers, and, I

flatter myself, will be read throughout the United States. It will feed

the flame of opposition among the weak, the wicked, the designing, and

the factious; but it will make many new converts to the proposed

government, and furnish the old friends of it with new weapons of

defence. The very attempt to excite uneasiness and disturbance in a

State, about a measure legally and constitutionally adopted, after a

long and ample discussion in a convention of the people's delegates,

will create suspicions of the goodness of your cause. My address to you

will not be so lengthy as your publication; your arguments are _few_,

altho your harangue is _long_ and _insidious_.

You begin with telling the world, that _no defect was discovered in the

present confederation, till after the war_. Why did you not publish the

truth? You know, gentlemen, that during six years of the war, we had _no

confederation at all_. You know that the war commenced in April, 1775,

and that we had _no confederation_ till March, 1781. You know (for some

of you are men of abilities and reading) or ought to know, a principle

of _fear_, in time of war, operates more powerfully in binding together

the States which have a common interest, than all the parchment compacts

on earth. Could we, then, discover the defects of our present

confederation, with _two years'_ experience only, and an enemy in our

country? You know we could not.

I will not undertake to detect the falsehood of every assertion, or the

fallacy of all your reasoning on each article. In the most of them the

public will anticipate any thing I could say, and confute your arguments

as fast as they read them. But, gentlemen, your reasoning against the

_new Constitution_ resembles that of Mr. Hume on miracles. You begin

with some _gratis dicta_, which are denied; you assume _premises_ which

are _totally false_, and then reason on them with great address. Your

whole reasoning, and that of all the opposers of the federal government,

is built on this _false principle_, that the _federal Legislature_ will

be a body _distinct from_ and _independent of_ the people. Unless your

opposition is grounded on _that principle_, it stands on _nothing_; and

on any _other_ supposition, your arguments are but _declamatory

nonsense_.

But the principle is false. The Congress, under the proposed

constitution, will have the _same interest_ as the people; they are _a

part_ of the people; their interest is _inseparable_ from that of the

people; and this union of interest will eternally remain, while the

right of election shall continue in the people. Over this right Congress

will have no control: The time and manner of exercising that right are

very wisely vested in Congress; otherwise a delinquent State might

embarrass the measures of the Union. The safety of the public requires

that the federal body should prevent any particular delinquency; but the

_right of election_ is above their control; it _must_ remain in the

people, and be exercised once in two, four or six years. A body thus

organized, with thirteen Legislatures watching their measures, and

several millions of jealous eyes inspecting their conduct, would not be

apt to betray their constituents. Yet this is not the best ground of

safety. The first and almost only principle that governs men, is

_interest_. _Love of our country_ is a powerful auxiliary motiv to

patriotic actions; but rarely or never operates against _private

interest_. The only requisit to secure liberty, is to connect the

_interest_ of the _governors_ with that of the _governed_. Blend these

interests; make them inseparable, and both are safe from voluntary

invasion. How shall this union be formed? This question is answered. The

union is formed by the equal principles on which the people of these

States hold their property and their rights. But how shall this union of

interests be perpetuated? The answer is easy; bar all perpetuities of

estates; prevent any exclusiv rights; preserve all preferment dependent

on the choice of the people; suffer no power to exist independent on the

people or their representativs. While there exists no power in a State,

which is independent of the will of the electors, the rights of the

people are secure. The only barrier against tyranny, that is necessary

in any State, is _the election of legislators_ by the yeomanry of that

State. Preserve _that_, and every privilege is safe. The legislators

thus chosen to represent the people, should have all the power that the

people would have, were they assembled in one body to deliberate upon

public measures. The distinction between the powers of the _people_ and

of their _representativs_ in the Legislature, is as absurd in _theory_,

as it proves pernicious in _practice_. A distinction, which has already

countenanced and supported _one rebellion_ in America; has prevented

many _good_ measures; has produced many _bad_; has created animosities

in many States, and embarrassments in all.[43] It has taught the people

a lesson, which, if they continue to practise, will bring laws into

contempt, and frequently mark our country with blood.

[43] Some of the bills of rights in America declare, that the

people have a right to meet together, and consult for the

public safety; that their legislators are responsible to

them; that they are servants, &c. Such declarations give

people an idea, that as individuals, or in town meetings,

they have a power paramount to that of the Legislature. No

wonder, that with such ideas, they attempt to resist law.

You object, gentlemen, to the powers vested in Congress. Permit me, to

ask you, where will you limit their powers? What bounds will you

prescribe? You will reply--_we will reserve certain rights, which we

deem invaluable, and restrain our rulers from abridging them_. But,

gentlemen, let me ask you, how will you define these rights? would you

say, _the liberty of the press shall not be restrained_? Well, what is

this liberty of the press? Is it an unlimited licence to publish _any

thing and every thing_ with impunity? If so, the author and printer of

any treatise, however obscene and blasphemous, will be screened from

punishment. You know, gentlemen, that there are books extant, so

shockingly and infamously obscene and so daringly blasphemous, that no

society on earth would be vindicable in suffering the publishers to pass

unpunished. You certainly know that such cases _have_ happened, and

_may_ happen again: Nay, you know that they are _probable_. Would not

that indefinite expression, _the liberty of the press_, extend to the

justification of every _possible publication_? Yes, gentlemen, you know,

that under such a general license, a man who should publish a treatise

to _prove his Maker a knave_, must be screened from legal punishment. I

shudder at the thought! But the truth must not be concealed. The

constitutions of several States _guarantee that very license_.

But if you attempt to define the _liberty of the press_, and ascertain

what cases shall fall within that privilege, during the course of

centuries, where will you _begin_? Or rather, where will you _end_?

Here, gentlemen, you will be puzzled. Some publications certainly _may_

be a breach of civil law: You will not have the effrontery to deny a

truth so obvious and intuitivly evident. Admit that principle; and

unless you can define precisely the cases, which are, and are not a

breach of law, you have no right to say, the liberty of the press shall

not be restrained; for such a license would warrant _any breach of law_.

Rather than hazard such an abuse of privilege, is it not better to leave

the right altogether with your rulers and your posterity? No attempts

have ever been made by a legislativ body in America, to abridge that

privilege; and in this free enlightened country, no attempts could

succeed, unless the public should be convinced that an abuse of it would

warrant the restriction. Should this ever be the case, you have no right

to say, that a future Legislature, or that posterity shall not abridge

the privilege, or punish its abuses.

But you say, that trial by jury is an unalienable right, that ought not

to be trusted with our rulers. Why not? If it is such a darling

privilege, will not Congress be as fond of it, as their constituents? An

elevation into that council, does not render a man insensible to his

privileges, nor place him beyond the necessity of securing them. A

member of Congress is liable to all the operations of law, except during

his attendance on public business; and should he consent to a law,

annihilating any right whatever, he deprives himself, his family and

estate, of the benefit resulting from that right, as well as his

constituents. This circumstance alone, is a sufficient security.

But, why this outcry about juries? If the people esteem them so highly,

why do they ever neglect them, and suffer the trial by them to go into

disuse? In some States, _Courts of Admiralty_ have no juries, nor Courts

of Chancery at all. In the City Courts of some States, juries are rarely

or never called, altho the parties may demand them; and one State, at

least, has lately passed an act, empowering the parties to submit both

_law_ and _fact_ to the court. It is found, that the judgment of a court

gives as much satisfaction, as the verdict of a jury; for the court are

as good judges of fact, as juries, and much better judges of law. I have

no desire to abolish trials by jury, altho the original design and

excellence of them, is in many cases superseded. While the people remain

attached to this mode of deciding causes, I am confident, that no

Congress can wrest the privilege from them.

But, gentlemen, our legal proceedings want a reform. Involved in all the

mazes of perplexity, which the chicanery of lawyers could invent, in the

course of five hundred years, our road to justice and redressis

tedious, fatiguing and expensiv. Our judicial proceedings are capable of

being simplified, and improved in almost every particular. For mercy's

sake, gentlemen, do not shut the door against improvement. If the people

of America, should ever spurn the shackles of opinion, and venture to

leave the road, which is so overgrown with briers and thorns, as to

strip a man's clothes from his back as he passes, I am certain they can

devise a more easy, safe, and expeditious mode of administering the

laws, than that which harasses every poor mortal, that is wretched

enough to want _legal_ justice. In States where very respectable

merchants, have repeatedly told me, they had rather lose a debt of fifty

pounds, than attempt to recover it by a legal process, one would think

that men, who value liberty and property, would not restrain any

government from suggesting a remedy for such disorders.

Another right, which you would place beyond the reach of Congress, is

the writ of _habeas corpus_. Will you say that this right may not be

suspended in _any_ case? You dare not. If it may be suspended in any

case, and the Congress are to judge of the necessity, what security have

you in a declaration in its favor? You had much better say nothing upon

the subject.

But you are frightened at a standing army. I beg you, gentlemen, to

define a _standing army_. If you would refuse to giv Congress power to

raise troops, to guard our frontiers, and garrison forts, or in short,

to enlist men for any purpose, then we understand you; you tie the hands

of your rulers, so that they cannot defend you against any invasion.

This is protection, indeed! But if Congress can raise a body of troops

for a year, they can raise them for a _hundred years_, and your

declaration against _standing armies_ can have no other effect, than to

prevent Congress from denominating their troops, a _standing army_. You

would only introduce into this country the English farce of mechanically

passing an annual bill for the support of troops which are never

disbanded.

You object to the indefinite power of taxation in Congress. You must

then limit the exercise of that power by the sums of money to be raised;

or leaving the sums indefinite, must prescribe the _particular mode_ in

which, and the _articles_ on which the money is to be raised. But the

sums cannot be ascertained, because the necessities of the States cannot

be foreseen nor defined. It is beyond even _your_ wisdom and profound

knowlege, gentlemen, to ascertain the public exigencies, and reduce them

to the provisions of a constitution. And if you would prescribe the mode

of raising money, you will meet with equal difficulty. The different

States have different modes of taxation, and I question much whether

even _your_ skill, gentlemen, could invent a uniform system that would

fit easy upon every State. It must therefore be left to experiment, with

a power that can correct the errors of a system, and suit it to the

habits of the people. And if no uniform mode will answer this purpose,

it will be in the power of Congress to lay taxes in each State,

according to its particular practice.

You know that requisitions on the States are ineffectual; that they

cannot be rendered effectual, but by a compulsory power in Congress;

that without an efficient power to raise money, government cannot secure

person, property or justice; that such power is as safely lodged in your

_Representativs_ in Congress, as it is in your _Representativs_ in your

distinct Legislatures.

You would likewise restrain Congress from requiring _excessiv bail_ or

imposing _excessiv fines_ and _unusual punishment_. But unless you can,

in every possible instance, previously define the words _excessiv_ and

_unusual_; if you leave the discretion of Congress to define them on

occasion, any restriction of their power by a general indefinit

expression, is a nullity--mere _formal nonsense_. What consummate

arrogance must you possess, to presume you can _now_ make _better_

provision for the government of these States, during the course of ages

and centuries, than the future Legislatures can, on the spur of the

occasion! Yet your whole reasoning on the subject implies this

arrogance, and a presumption that you have a right to legislate for

posterity!

But to complete the list of unalienable rights, you would insert a

clause in your declaration, _that every body shall, in good weather,

hunt on his own land, and catch fish in rivers that are public

property_. Here, gentlemen, you must have exerted the whole force of

your genius! Not even the _all important_ subject of _legislating for a

world_, can restrain my laughter at this clause! As a supplement to that

article of your bill of rights, I would suggest the following

restriction:--"That Congress shall never restrain any inhabitant of

America from eating and drinking, _at seasonable times_, or prevent his

lying on his _left side_, in a long winter's night, or even on his back,

when he is fatigued by lying on his _right_." This article is of just as

much consequence as the eighth clause of your proposed bill of rights.

But to be more serious, gentlemen, you must have had in idea the forest

laws in Europe, when you inserted that article; for no circumstance that

ever took place in America, could have suggested the thought of a

declaration in favor of hunting and fishing. Will you forever persist in

error? Do you not reflect that the state of property in America, is

directly the reverse of what it is in Europe? Do you not consider, that

the forest laws in Europe originated in _feudal tyranny_, of which not a

trace is to be found in America? Do you not know that in this country

almost every farmer is lord of his own soil? That instead of suffering

under the oppression of a monarch and nobles, a class of haughty

masters, totally independent of the people, almost every man in America

is a _lord himself_, enjoying his property in fee? Where then the

necessity of laws to secure hunting and fishing? You may just as well

ask for a clause, giving license for every man to till _his own land_,

or milk _his own cows_. The barons in Europe procured forest laws to

secure the right of hunting on _their own land_, from the intrusion of

those who had no property in lands. But the distribution of land in

America, not only supersedes the necessity of any laws upon this

subject, but renders them absolutely trifling. The same laws which

secure the property in land, secure to the owner the right of using it

as he pleases.

But you are frightened at the prospect of a _consolidation of the

States_. I differ from you very widely. I am afraid, after all our

attempts to unite the States, that contending interests, and the pride

of State sovereignties, will either prevent our union, or render our

federal government weak, slow and inefficient. The danger is all on this

side. If any thing under heaven now endangers our liberties and

independence, it is that single circumstance.

You harp upon that clause of the new constitution, which declares, that

the laws of the United States, &c. shall be the supreme law of the land;

when you know that the powers of the Congress are defined, to extend

only to those matters which are in their nature and effects, _general_.

You know, the Congress cannot meddle with the internal police of any

State, or abridge its sovereignty. And you know, at the same time, that

in all general concerns, the laws of Congress must be _supreme_, or they

must be _nothing_.

No. XIV.