PRINCIPLES of GOVERNMENT _and_ COMMERCE.
All mankind are, by nature, free, and have a right to enjoy life,
liberty and property.
One person has no right to take from another his life, health, peace, or
good name; to take away or lessen his freedom of thinking and acting, or
to injure his estate in the smallest degree.
A collection of individuals forms a _society_; and every society must
have _government_, to prevent one man from hurting another, and to
punish such as commit crimes. Every person's safety requires that he
should submit to be governed; for if one man may do harm without
suffering punishment, every man has the same right, and no person can be
safe.
It is necessary therefore that there should be laws to control every
man. Laws should be made by consent or concurrence of the greatest part
of the society.
The whole body of people in society is the sovereign power or state;
which is called, the body politic. Every man forms a part of this state,
and so has a share in the sovereignty; at the same time, as an
individual, he is a subject of the state.
When a society is large, the whole state cannot meet together for the
purpose of making laws; the people therefore agree to appoint deputies,
or representativs, to act for them. When these agents are chosen and met
together, they represent the whole state, and act as the sovereign
power. The people resign their own authority to their representativs;
the acts of these deputies are in effect the acts of the people; and the
people have no right to refuse obedience.
It is as wrong to refuse obedience to the laws made by our
_representativs_, as it would be to break laws made by _ourselves_. If
a law is bad and produces general harm, the people may appoint new
deputies to repeal it; but while it is a law, it is the act and will of
the sovereign power, and ought to be obeyed.
The people in free governments, make their own laws by agents or
representativs, and appoint the executiv officers. An executiv officer
is armed with the authority of the whole state and cannot be resisted.
He cannot do wrong, unless he goes beyond the bounds of the laws.
An executiv officer can hardly be too arbitrary; for if the laws are
good, they should be strictly executed and religiously obeyed: If they
are bad, the people can alter or repeal them; or if the officer goes
beyond his powers, he is accountable to those who appoint him. A neglect
of good and wholesome laws is the bane of society.
Judges and all executiv officers should be made as much as possible,
independent of the will of the people at large. They should be chosen by
the representativs of the people and answerable to them only: For if
they are elected by the people, they are apt to be swayed by fear and
affection; they may dispense with the laws, to favor their friends, or
secure their office. Besides, their election is apt to occasion party
spirit, cabals, bribery and public disorder. These are great evils in a
state, and defeat the purposes of government.
The people have a right to advise their representativs in certain cases,
in which they may be well informed. But this right cannot often be
exercised with propriety or safety: Nor should their instructions be
binding on their representativs: For the people, most of whom live
remote from each other, cannot always be acquainted with the general
interest of the state; they cannot know all the reasons and arguments
which may be offered for, or against a measure, by people in distant
parts of the state; they cannot tell at home, how they _themselves_
would think and act, in a general assembly of _all_ the citizens.
In this situation, if the people of a certain district, bind their
representativ to vote in a particular manner, they may bind him to do
_wrong_. They make up their minds, upon a partial view of facts, and
form a resolution, which they themselves, on a fair state of all the
facts, in the general assembly, might see reasons to change. There have
been instances, in which these binding, positiv instructions, have
obliged a representativ to give his vote, contrary to the conviction of
his own mind and what he thought the good of the state; consequently his
vote was a violation of his oath.
But the opinions of the people should, if possible, be collected; for
the general sense of a nation is commonly right. When people are well
informed, their general opinion is perhaps always right. But they may be
uninformed or misinformed and consequently their measures may be
repugnant to their own interest. This is often the case, with particular
districts of people; and hence the bad policy of giving binding
instructions to representativs. The sense of a nation is collected by
the opinions of people in particular districts; but as some of these
opinions may be wrong, a representativ should be left with discretionary
powers to act for the good of the state.
Representativs are chosen by the inhabitants of certain districts,
because this is most convenient: But when they act as lawgivers, they
act for the whole state. When a man is considering the propriety of a
general measure, he is not to be influenced by the interest of a single
district or part of a state; but by the collectiv interest of the whole
state. A good lawgiver will not ask solely what is _my_ interest, or the
interest of _my_ town or constituents? but, what will promote the
interest of the community; '_what will produce the greatest possible
good, to the greatest number of people_?'
When a legislativ body makes _laws_, it acts for _itself_ only, and can
alter or repeal the laws when they become inconvenient. But when it
makes _grants_ or _contracts_, it act as a party, and cannot take back
its grant, or change the nature of its contracts, without the consent of
the other party. A state has no more right to neglect or refuse to
fulfil its engagements, than an individual. There may be an exception
in the case of a grant, for if a state has made a grant, which, contrary
to its expectations, clearly endangers the safety of the community, it
may resume that grant. The public safety is a consideration superior to
all others. But the danger must be great and obvious; it must be
generally seen and felt, before the state can be justified in recalling
its grant. To take back a gift, or break a contract, for small causes or
slight inconveniencies, is a most wanton abuse of power. Bargains,
conveyances, and voluntary grants, where two parties are concerned, are
_sacred things_; they are the supports of social confidence and
security; they ought not to be sported with, because one party is
stronger than the other; they should be religiously observed.
As the state has no right to break its own promises, so it has no right
to alter the promises of individuals. When one man has engaged to pay
his debt in wheat, and his creditor expects the promise to be fulfiled,
the legislature has no right to say, the debt shall be paid in flax or
horses. Such an act saps all the supports of good faith between man and
man; it is the worst kind of tyranny.
For this reason, all _tender laws_, which oblige a creditor to take, for
his debt, some article which he never intended nor engaged to take, are
highly _unjust_ and _tyrannical_. The intention of the contracting
parties should be strictly regarded; the state may enforce that
intention, but can never have a right to interfere and defeat it. A
legislature has no right to put a bargain on any footing, but that on
which the parties _have_ placed it or _are willing_ to place it.
If a state is poor, and people owe more money than can be procured, a
legislature may perhaps go so far as to suspend the collection of debts;
or to ordain that a certain part only of the debts shall be recoverable
immediately, and the payment of the remainder suspended. This may ease
the debtors; but can be justified in extreme cases only, when the people
are generally and greatly involved.
A people should not generally be in debt: The consumers of goods should
not get credit. Heavy and numerous debts are great evils to a state. If
the people will giv and take extensiv credit, the state should check
their imprudence, by putting debts out of the protection of law. When it
becomes a practice to collect debts by law, it is a proof of corruption
and degeneracy among the people. Laws and courts are necessary to settle
controverted points between man and man; but a man should pay an
acknowledged debt, not because there is a law to oblige him, but because
it is _just_ and _honest_, and because he has PROMISED to pay it.
Money, or a medium in trade, is necessary in all great states; but _too
much_ is a greater evil than _too little_. When people can get money
without labor, they neglect business and become idle, prodigal and
vicious; and when they have nothing but money, they are poor indeed.
Spain was ruined by its mines of gold and silver in South America. That
kingdom possessed all the money in Europe, and yet was the _poorest_; it
will never be rich and flourishing, till its mines are exhausted. The
discovery of rich mines in this country, would be the greatest
misfortune, that can befall the United States.
Money is a mere representativ of property; it is the _change_ which
facilitates trade. But the _wealth_ of a country is its _produce_; and
its strength consists in the number of its industrious inhabitants. A
man cannot become rich, unless he earns more than he spends. It is the
same with a country. The labouring men are the support of a nation.
The value of money depends on the quantity in circulation. A medium of
trade respects all commercial nations; and like water, it will find its
level. Money will go where it is wanted, if the people have any thing to
purchase it. If one state or country has more money than another, it is
a proof that the people are more industrious or saving. It would be
happy for the world, if no more money could be made: There is already
too much. Silver is become very burdensome, merely because there is too
much in the world. If there were but one quarter of the money which now
circulates, one quarter of a dollar would buy as much as a dollar will
now.
Hence the mistaken policy of those people who attempt to increase the
medium of trade by coinage or by a paper currency. They can add to the
quantity, as much as they please; but not to the value. If America were
shut out from all intercourse with other nations, and ten millions of
dollars were circulating in the country, every article of life would
have a certain price. If in this case, wheat should be one dollar a
bushel, let the money be instantly doubled, the price of wheat would
then be two dollars, and the price of every article would rise in the
same proportion. So that twenty millions of dollars would be worth no
more than ten, because they would buy no more of the useful commodities:
America would be no richer in the one case than in the other.
But as there is a communication with other nations, a million of
dollars, added to the circulating specie, does not increase the
permanent medium in quantity; for just so much money as is added, will
leave the country. If there is too much money in a country, the price of
labor will rise, and the produce cannot find market abroad without a
loss. This was the case with American produce, at the close of the war.
If money is scarce in a country, the price of labor will be low, and
consequently the produce of that country will be cheap at home, and a
great profit will be made on the exportation. This profit will be
returned, partly in goods and partly in money, and the country is
enriched.
But the great principle, which should constitute the corner stone of
government, is _public justice_. The fountain head should be pure, or
the streams will be foul indeed. That Legislatures, or bodies politic,
should make laws, annex penalties for disobedience, institute courts for
deciding controversies and trying offenders, and execute punishments on
those that are convicted; yet at the same time neglect to do justice
themselves by paying their own debts; this is of all absurdities the
most glaring. To compel individuals to perform contracts and yet break
their own solemn promises; to punish individuals for neglect, and yet
set a general example of delinquency, is to undermine the foundation of
social confidence, and shake every principle of commutativ justice.
These are general principles in government and trade, and ought to be
deeply impressed upon the minds of every American.
No. III.