its highest applications, presupposes the principle of individual
differentiation, to which we have already attached so much weight. This
principle is fundamental to fraternal as well as to paternal and filial
duty. For precisely to the extent that brothers are distinctly
individualized can they supplement each other and correlate their
mutual services. One can not indeed overlook the patent fact that
brothers who are unlike in nature frequently repel each other, and that
in such cases the very closeness of the relation often becomes a source
of extreme irritation, and even of positive agony. But, on the other
hand, there is no surer sign of moral ripeness than the ability to enter
into, to understand, to appreciate a nature totally unlike one's own,
and thus to some extent to appropriate its excellences. The very fact,
therefore, that we at first feel ourselves repelled should be taken as a
hint that this natural repulsion is to be overcome. For every type of
character needs its opposite to correct it. The idealist, for instance,
needs the realist, if he would keep his balance. And our uncongenial
brothers, precisely because they are at first uncongenial, if we will
but remember that they are, after all, our brothers, and that it is our
duty to come into harmonious relations with them, can best help us to
this fine self-conquest, this true enrichment and enlargement of our
moral being.
A word may be added as a caution to parents and teachers. The way to
create brotherly feeling among the young is to treat them impartially,
to love them with an equal love. Those who love and are beloved by the
same person are strongly induced to love one another. In the next place,
when disputes arise, as is perhaps unavoidable, the parent or teacher
should, as a rule, enter patiently into the cause and not cut off
inquiry because the whole matter seems trivial. The subject matter of
the dispute may be insignificant enough, but the satisfaction of the
sense of justice of the young is of the greatest significance. When the
sense of justice is outraged, be the cause never so trivial, a feeling
of distrust against the parent is generated, and of incipient hatred
against the brother who may have provoked the unjust decision.
I have yet to speak of the duties of older to younger brothers and
sisters. If it is difficult to serve two masters, it is hardly pleasant
to be asked to serve half a dozen. The youngest children in a large
family are often placed in this position. There is, in the first place,
the authority of the parents, which must be respected; then, in
addition, each of the grown-up sons and daughters is apt to try to
exercise a little authority on his or her own account. The younger ones
naturally resent this petty despotism, and disobedience and angry
recriminations are the unpleasant consequences. It is often necessary
that elder sons and daughters should have partial charge of the younger.
They can in all cases make their authority acceptable by representing it
as delegated, by having it understood that they regard themselves merely
as substitutes in the parents' place. There must be unity of influence
in the home, or else the moral development of the young will be sadly
interfered with. There must be only a single center of authority,
represented by the parents, and all minor exercise of authority should
be referred back to that center. "Father and mother wish me to help
you"; "Father and mother will be pleased if you do so and so; let me
try to show you how"--if the method of management implied in such words
as these be adopted, the younger children will look upon the elder as
their friends and be glad to accept advice and direction.
Lastly, a word about the relation between brothers and sisters, and
conversely. This relationship is qualified by the difference of sex. A
certain chivalry characterizes the attitude of the brother toward the
sister, a certain motherliness that of the sister toward the brother.
The relation may be and often is a very beautiful one. The peculiar
moral responsibility connected with it is that the sister is usually the
first woman whom the brother knows at all intimately and as an equal,
and that his notions of womanhood are largely influenced by the traits
which he sees in her, while the brother is usually the first man whom
the sister knows as a companion, and her ideas of men are colored by
what she sees in him.
To illustrate the fraternal relation I have been in the habit of
recalling the stories from the Old Testament which bear upon this
subject. I have also given an account of the life of the brothers Jacob
and William Grimm. There was only a year's difference between them.
Jacob Grimm, in the eulogy on William, which he delivered before the
Berlin Academy in the year 1860, says: "During the slowly creeping years
of our school life we slept in the same bed and occupied the same room.
There we sat at one and the same table studying our lessons. Later on
there were two tables and two beds in the same room; and later still,
during the entire period of our riper manhood, we still continued to
occupy two adjoining rooms, always under the same roof." All their
property, and even their books, they held in common; what belonged to
the one belonged to the other. They visited the university together in
the same year; they both took up, in deference to their mother's wish,
the same study, that of the law, which they alike hated, and then they
turned in common to the study of philology, in which both delighted and
both achieved such great distinction. They published their first
important works in the same year; and as they slept together in the same
bed when they were children, so now they sleep side by side in the
grave.
I refer to the story of Lear and his daughters to show that the common
love for the parents is necessary to sustain the love of brothers and
sisters toward one another. Lear had estranged the affection of Goneril
and Regan through his partiality for Cordelia. The two women, who had no
love for their father, hated each other; and Goneril, who was the first
to cast him out, poisoned her sister.
To illustrate the relations of brothers to sisters, I give an account of
the beautiful lives of Charles and Mary Lamb. To show the redeeming
power of womanhood as represented in a sister, I explain to older
pupils the story which underlies Goethe's drama of Iphigenia. Orestes is
sick; and what is his malady? His soul has been poisoned by remorse.
Believing himself to be the executive arm of justice, he committed a
great crime, and now he is torn by the pangs of conscience, and his mind
is forever dwelling on that scene in which he was a fatal actor. And how
does Iphigenia heal him? She heals him by the clear truthfulness of her
nature, which the play is designed to bring out. With the light of
genuine womanhood which emanates from her she illuminates anew his
darkened path. By the force of the good which he learns to recognize in
her he is led to a new trust in the redeeming power of the good in
himself, and thus to start out afresh in a life of courage, hope, and
active effort. The teacher should analyze and cause to be committed to
memory the various beautiful proverbs which bear upon the subject of
fraternal duty.
FOOTNOTES:
[17] It may also be pointed out to the pupil that a part of the task of
intellectual and moral training, which originally belongs entirely to
the parents, has by them been intrusted to the teachers, and that
something of the reverence which belongs to the former is now due to the
latter.
[18] Do not quarrel over your respective rights; rather be more eager to
secure the rights of your brother than your own. Do not triumph in your
brother's disgrace or taunt him with his failings, but rather seek to
build up his self-respect. Help one another in your tasks, etc.
XIV.
DUTIES TOWARD ALL MEN.
JUSTICE AND CHARITY.
JUSTICE.--The subject of justice is a difficult one to treat. Justice in
the legal sense is to be distinguished from justice in the moral sense.
We are concerned only with the latter. How much of it can we hope to
include in such a course of instruction as this? We can, I think,
explain the essential principle and give a few of its most important
applications. What is this principle? Human society is an organism, and
the perfection of it depends upon the degree to which the parts related
are differentiated. Unity of organization is the end, differentiation is
the means. The serving of universal ends is the aim, the emphasizing of
individuality the means. The principle which underlies the laws of
justice I take to be respect for individuality of others. And this may
be expressed in the rule, Respect the individuality of every human
being. It might, indeed, appear at first sight as if justice had to do
only with those points in which all men are alike, and took no notice of
the differences that subsist between them. Thus justice enjoins respect
for the life of others; and in regard to this all men are exactly on a
par, all men are equally entitled to live. But justice also commands us
to respect the convictions of others, however different they may be from
our own. And it is but a finer sense of justice which keeps us from
intruding on the privacy of others, which leads us to show a proper
consideration for the ways and idiosyncrasies of others, and in general
to refrain from encroaching on the personality of others. The principle
of justice may also be expressed in the rule, Do not interfere with the
individual development of any one.
APPLICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF JUSTICE.--
1. _Do not kill._ By taking away the life of a human being we should of
course cut off all chance of that person's further development. This
requires no comment. But certain casuistical questions arise in
connection with this command. Is it right to kill another in
self-defense? The difficulty involved might be put in this way: A
burglar breaks into your house by night and threatens to kill you. You
have a weapon at hand and can save yourself by killing him. Now it is
evident that one of two lives must be taken. But would it not be more
moral on your part to say: I, at least, will not break the commandment.
I would rather be killed than kill? This question serves to show to what
absurdities a purely formal principle in ethics can lead, as we have
already seen in the discussion of truthfulness. The problem of the duel
and that of the taking of the life of others in war also belong under
this head, but will be reserved for the advanced course.
2. _Respect the personal liberty of others._ Slavery, under whatever
form, is an outrage on justice. The slave is degraded to be the mere
instrument of his master's profit or pleasure. Let the teacher point out
in what particulars the slave is wronged, and show the evil effects of
the institution of slavery on the character of the master as well as of
the slave. Question--Is it right to speak of wage-slavery, for instance,
in cases where the hours of labor are so prolonged as to leave no time
for higher interests, or where the relations of the laborer to his
employer are such as to impair his moral independence?
3. _Respect the property of others._ Unless we are careful we may at
this point commit a grave wrong. Upon what moral considerations shall
the right of property be based? The school, especially the moral lessons
which are imparted in it, should certainly not be placed in the service
of vested interests. On the other hand, the school should not fill the
pupils' minds with economic theories, which they are incapable of
understanding, and of which the truth, the justice, the feasibility are
still hotly disputed. We are therefore taking a very responsible step in
introducing the idea of property at all into our moral lessons. And yet
it is too great and important to be ignored. Some writers have advanced
the theory that the right in question rests on labor, and they regard it
as a self-evident proposition, one which, therefore, might safely be
taught to the young, that every person is entitled to the products of
his labor. Jules Simon says (see Paul Janet, Elements of Morals, English
translation, p. 66): "This earth was worth nothing and produced
nothing. I dug the soil, I brought from a distance fertilizing earth; it
is now fertile. This fertility is my work; by fertilizing it, I made it
mine." American writers have eloquent passages to the same effect. But
this proposition certainly does not appear to me self-evident, nor even
true. Chiefly for the reason that "my labor" and "my skill" are not
original, but derivative factors in production. They are very largely
the result of the labor and the skill of generations that have preceded
me, that have built up in me this brain, this skill, this power of
application. The products of my labor would indeed belong to me if my
labor were really mine, if it were not to an incalculable extent the
consequent of social antecedents, in regard to which I can not claim the
least merit. The attempt to found the rewards of labor upon the merit of
the laborer seems to me a perfectly hopeless one.
Let me add that it is one thing to say that he who will not work shall
not eat, and a very different thing to say that he who works shall enjoy
what he has produced. The former statement merely signifies that he who
will not contribute his share toward sustaining and improving human
society is not entitled to any part in the advantages of the social
order, though the charity of his fellow-men may grant him, under certain
conditions and in the hope of changing his disposition, what he is not
entitled to as of right. But the question what the share of the laborer
ought to be is one that can not be settled in the rough-and-ready
manner above suggested, and the considerations involved are, in truth,
far too numerous and complex to be introduced at this stage. The whole
question will be reopened later on. For the present it must suffice to
state certain purely moral considerations on which the right of property
may be made to rest. The following are the ideas which I should seek to
develop: Property is justified by its uses. Its uses are to support the
existence and promote the mental and moral growth of man. The physical
life itself depends on property. Even in a communistic state the food
any one eats must be his property in the sense that every one else is
debarred from using it. The moral life of men depends on property. The
moral life is rooted in the institution of the family, and the family
could not exist without a separate domicile of its own and the means of
providing for its dependent members. The independence and the growth of
the intellect depend on property. In short, property is an indispensable
adjunct of _personality_. This I take to be its moral basis. What I here
indicate, however, is an ideal right which the existing state of society
by no means reflects. By what methods we may best approach this ideal,
whether by maintaining and improving the system of private property in
land or by state ownership, whether by capitalistic or socialistic
production, etc., are questions of means, not of ends, and raise
problems in social science with which here we have not to deal.
Question--If the present social arrangements are not morally
satisfactory, if e. g., certain persons possess property to which on
moral grounds they are not entitled, should not the commandment against
stealing be suspended so far as they are concerned? The present system
of rights, imperfect as it is, is the result of social evolution, and
denotes the high-water mark of the average ethical consciousness of the
world up to date. Respect for the existing system of rights, however,
imperfect as it is, is the prime condition of obtaining a better system.
4. _Respect the mental liberty of others._ Upon this rule of justice is
founded the right to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and what
is called the freedom of conscience. Point out the limitations of these
various rights which follow from the fact of their universality.
5. _Respect the reputation of your fellow-men._ Refrain from backbiting
and slander. Bridle your tongue. This undoubtedly is a rule of justice.
"Who steals my purse steals trash," etc. The respect of our fellow-men
is in itself a source of happiness and a moral prop, and, besides, the
greatest help in achieving the legitimate purposes of life. He who has
the confidence of others has wings to bear him along. He who is
suspected for any reason, true or false, strikes against invisible
barriers at every step. Nothing is so sensitive as character--a mere
breath may tarnish it. It is therefore the gravest kind of injury to our
neighbors to disseminate damaging rumors, to throw out dark hints and
suggestions with respect to them, to impugn their motives. But is it
not a duty to denounce evil and evil-doers and to put the innocent on
their guard against wolves in sheep's clothing? Yes, if we are sure that
our own motives are perfectly disinterested, that we are not in the
least prompted by personal spite or prejudice. For if we dislike a
person, as every one knows, we can not judge him fairly, we are prone to
attribute to him all manner of evil qualities and evil intents which
exist only in our own jaundiced imagination. Very often a person against
whom we had at first conceived a distinct dislike proves on nearer
acquaintance to be one whom we can esteem and even love. We should be
warned by such experiences to hold our judgments in suspense, and not to
allow injurious words to pass the lips. The vast moral importance of
being able to hold one's tongue, the golden resources of silence, should
be emphasized by the teacher.
A series of lessons on good manners may be introduced at this point. The
ceremonies of social intercourse, the various forms in which refined
people show their deference for each other, the rule not to obtrude self
in conversation, and the like, are so many illustrations of the respect
which we owe to the personality of our fellow-men. Good manners are the
aesthetic counterpart of good morals, and the connection between the two
can easily be made plain.
6. _Speak the truth._ Inward truthfulness is a self-regarding duty;
social truthfulness is a form of justice. Words represent facts. The
words we speak to our neighbor are used by him as building-stones in
the architecture of his daily conduct. We have no right to defeat the
purposes of his life, to weaken the dwelling he is erecting, by
supplying him with worthless building material.
Upon exactly the same ground is based the duty of keeping one's
promises, viz., that our fellow-men build on our promises. Promises made
in a legal form are called contracts and can be enforced. Promises not
made in legal form are equally binding from a moral point of view. It
should be borne in mind, however, that conditional promises are canceled
when the stipulated conditions do not occur, and, furthermore, that
there are certain tacit conditions implied in all promises whatsoever. A
person who has promised to visit a friend on a certain day and dies in
the interval is not supposed to have broken his promise; nor if any one
makes a similar promise and a heavy snowstorm should block the roads or
if he should be confined to his bed by sickness is he likely to be
accused of breaking his promise. The physical possibility of fulfilling
them is a tacit condition in all promises. It is also a tacit condition
in all promises that it shall be morally possible or consistent with
morality to keep them. A young man who has promised to join a gang of
burglars in an attack on a bank and who repents at the last moment is
morally justified in refusing to keep his pledge. His crime consisted in
having made the promise in the first place, not in refusing to fulfill
it at the last moment. A person, however, who promises to pay usurious
interest on a loan of money and who then takes advantage of the laws
against usury to escape payment is a double-dyed rogue, for his
intention is to cheat, and he uses the cloak of virtue as a screen in
order to cheat with impunity. Let the teacher discuss the casuistical
question whether it is right to keep a promise made to robbers--e. g.,
if we should fall into the hands of brigands, and they should make it a
condition of our release that we shall not betray their hiding-place.
Justice is based on positive respect for the individuality of others,
but its commands may all be expressed in the negative form: Do not kill,
do not infringe the liberty, the property of others, do not slander, do
not lie, etc. It is often held, however, that there is a positive as
well as a negative side to justice, and the two sides are respectively
expressed in the formulas: Neminem laede and suum cuique--Hurt no one
and give every one his due. Of positive or distributive justice we meet
with such examples as the following: In awarding a prize the jury is
bound in justice to give the award in favor of the most deserving
competitor. The head of a department in filling a vacancy is bound in
justice to avoid favoritism, to promote that one of his subordinates who
deserves promotion, etc. But it seems to me that this distinction is
unimportant. Give to each one his due is tantamount to Do not deprive
any one of what is due him. If the prize or the place belongs to A we
should, by withholding it from him, invade the rights of A as much as
if we took money out of his purse. The commands are negative, but the
virtue implied is positive enough, because it depends on positive
respect for human nature. Do not infringe upon the sacred territory of
another's personality is the rule of justice in all cases.
CHARITY.--How shall we distinguish charity from justice? It is said that
every one is justified in claiming from others what belongs to him as a
matter of right, but that no one can exact charity. The characteristic
mark of charity is supposed to be that it is freely given. But if I
happen to be rich and can afford to supply the need of another am I not
morally bound to do so, and has not my indigent neighbor a real claim
upon me? Again, it has been said that the term justice is applied to
claims which are capable of being formulated in general rules and
imposed alike on all men in their dealings with one another, while in
the case of charity both the measure and the object of it are to be
freely determined by each one. We are free, according to this view, to
decide whether a claim upon us exists or not; but, the claim once having
been admitted, it is as binding upon us as any of the demands of
justice. But, while this is true, I hold that nevertheless there exists
a clear distinction between the virtues of justice and charity. We owe
justice to our equals, charity to our inferiors. The word "inferior" is
to be understood in a carefully limited sense. An employer owes his
workmen, as a matter of justice, the wages he has agreed to pay. Though
they may be socially his inferiors, in regard to this transaction they
are his equals. They have agreed to render him certain services and he
has agreed to return them an equivalent.
Justice says Do not hinder the development of others; Charity says
Assist the development of others. The application of the rule of charity
will make its meaning clear.
1. Justice says do not destroy life; Charity says save life. Rescue from
the flames the inmates of a burning house; leap into the waves to save a
drowning fellow-creature. Such persons are dependent on your help. They
are therefore with respect to you in an inferior position.
Discuss with the class the limitations of this duty. I am not bound to
jump into the water, for instance, when I see a person drowning unless I
can swim. In fact, it would be culpable foolhardiness in me to do so.
Discuss the following casuistical case: A child is lying on the railroad
track and a locomotive is rapidly approaching. Am I bound to make the
attempt to draw it away from the track? Does it make any difference
whether I am single or the father of a family and have others dependent
on me? In general, the attempt to save should not be made unless there
is a distinct chance of succeeding without the sacrifice of one's own
life; but we are justified in taking great risks, and courage and
self-reliance are evinced in the degree of risk we are willing to take.
There are cases, however, in which the deliberate sacrifice of one life
for another is in the highest degree praiseworthy when, namely, the
life to be saved is regarded as far more precious than our own. Instance
the soldier who intercepts the thrust which is aimed at the life of his
general. Instance the parent who in the Johnstown flood was seen to push
his child to a place of safety and was then swept away by the current.