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International Education Series
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INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION SERIES
THE MORAL INSTRUCTION OF CHILDREN
BY
FELIX ADLER
NEW YORK
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY
1892
COPYRIGHT, 1892,
BY D. APPLETON AND COMPANY.
ELECTROTYPED AND PRINTED
AT THE APPLETON PRESS, U.S.A.
EDITOR'S PREFACE.
Moral education is everywhere acknowledged to be the most important part
of all education; but there has not been the same agreement in regard to
the best means of securing it in the school. This has been due in part
to a want of insight into the twofold nature of this sort of education;
for instruction in morals includes two things: the formation of right
ideas and the formation of right habits. Right ideas are necessary to
guide the will, but right habits are the product of the will itself.
It is possible to have right ideas to some extent without the
corresponding moral habits. On this account the formation of correct
habits has been esteemed by some to be the chief thing. But unconscious
habits--mere use and wont--do not seem to deserve the title of moral in
its highest sense. The moral act should be a considerate one, and rest
on the adoption of principles to guide one's actions.
To those who lay stress on the practical side and demand the formation
of correct habits, the school as it is seems to be a great ethical
instrumentality. To those who see in theoretical instruction the only
true basis of moral character, the existing school methods seem sadly
deficient.
The school as it is looks first after its discipline, and next after its
instruction. Discipline concerns the behavior, and instruction concerns
the intellectual progress of the pupil. That part of moral education
which relates to habits of good behavior is much better provided for in
the school than any part of intellectual education.
There is, however, a conflict here between old and new ideals. The
old-fashioned school regarded obedience to authority the one essential;
the new ideal regards insight into the reasonableness of moral commands
the chief end. It is said, with truth, that a habit of unreasoning
obedience does not fit one for the exigencies of modern life, with its
partisan appeals to the individual and its perpetual display of grounds
and reasons, specious and otherwise, in the newspapers. The unreasoning
obedience to a moral guide in school may become in after life
unreasoning obedience to a demagogue or to a leader in crime.
It is not obedience to external authority that we need so much as
enlightened moral sense, and yet there remains and will remain much good
in the old-fashioned habit of implicit obedience.
The new education aims at building up self-control and individual
insight. It substitutes the internal authority of conscience for the
external authority of the master. It claims by this to educate the
citizen fitted for the exercise of suffrage in a free government. He
will weigh political and social questions in his mind, and decide for
himself. He will be apt to reject the scheme of the demagogue. While the
old-fashioned school-master relied on the rod to sustain his external
authority, he produced, it is said, a reaction against all authority in
the minds of strong-willed pupils. The new education saves the
strong-willed pupil from this tension against constituted authority, and
makes him law-abiding from the beginning.
It will be admitted that the school under both its forms--old as well as
new--secures in the main the formation of the cardinal moral habits. It
is obliged to insist on regularity, punctuality, silence, and industry
as indispensable for the performance of its school tasks. A private
tutor may permit his charge to neglect all these things, and yet secure
some progress in studies carried on by fits and starts, with noise and
zeal to-day, followed by indolence to-morrow. But a school, on account
of its numbers, must insist on the semi-mechanical virtues of
regularity, punctuality, silence, and industry. Although these are
semi-mechanical in their nature, for with much practice they become
unconscious habits, yet they furnish the very ground-work of all
combinations of man with his fellow-men. They are fundamental conditions
of social life. The increase of city population, consequent on the
growth of productive industry and the substitution of machines for hand
labor, renders necessary the universal prevalence of these cardinal
virtues of the school.
Even the management of machines requires that sort of alertness which
comes from regularity and punctuality. The travel on the railroad, the
management of steam-engines, the necessities of concerted action,
require punctuality and rhythmic action.
The school habit of silence means considerate regard for the rights of
fellow-workmen. They must not be interfered with; their attention must
not be distracted from their several tasks. A rational self-restraint
grows out of this school habit--rational, because it rests on
considerateness for the work of others. This is a great lesson in
co-operation. Morals in their essence deal with the relation of man to
his fellow-men, and rest on a considerateness for the rights of others.
"Do unto others," etc., sums up the moral code.
Industry, likewise, takes a high rank as a citizen's virtue. By it man
learns to re-enforce the moments by the hours, and the days by the
years. He learns how the puny individual can conquer great obstacles.
The school demands of the youth a difficult kind of industry. He must
think and remember, giving close and unremitting attention to subjects
strange and far off from his daily life. He must do this in order to
discover eventually that these strange and far-off matters are connected
in a close manner to his own history and destiny.
There is another phase of the pupil's industry that has an important
bearing on morals. All his intellectual work in the class has to do with
critical accuracy, and respect for the truth. Loose statements and
careless logical inference meet with severe reproof.
Finally, there is an enforced politeness and courtesy toward teachers
and fellow-pupils--at least to the extent of preventing quarrels. This
is directly tributary to the highest of virtues, namely, kindness and
generosity.
All these moral phases mentioned have to do with the side of school
discipline rather than instruction, and they do not necessarily have any
bearing on the theory of morals or on ethical philosophy, except in the
fact that they make a very strong impression on the mind of the youth,
and cause him to feel that he is a member of a moral order. He learns
that moral demands are far more stern than the demands of the body for
food or drink or repose. The school thus does much to change the pupil
from a natural being to a spiritual being. Physical nature becomes
subordinated to the interests of human nature.
Notwithstanding the fact that the school is so efficient as a means of
training in moral habits, it is as yet only a small influence in the
realm of moral theory. Even our colleges and universities, it must be
confessed, do little in this respect, although there has been of late an
effort to increase in the programmes the amount of time devoted to
ethical study. The cause of this is the divorce of moral theory from
theology. All was easy so long as ethics was directly associated with
the prevailing religious confession. The separation of Church and
State, slowly progressing everywhere since the middle ages, has at
length touched the question of education.
The attempt to find an independent basis for ethics in the science of
sociology has developed conflicting systems. The college student is
rarely strengthened in his faith in moral theories by his theoretic
study. Too often his faith is sapped. Those who master a spiritual
philosophy are strengthened; the many who drift toward a so-called
"scientific" basis are led to weaken their moral convictions to the
standpoint of fashion, or custom, or utility.
Meanwhile the demand of the age to separate Church from State becomes
more and more exacting. Religious instruction has almost entirely ceased
in the public schools, and it is rapidly disappearing from the
programmes of colleges and preparatory schools, and few academies are
now scenes of religious revival, as once was common.
The publishers of this series are glad, therefore, to offer a book so
timely and full of helpful suggestions as this of Mr. Adler. It is hoped
that it may open for many teachers a new road to theoretic instruction
in morality, and at the same time re-enforce the study of literature in
our schools.
W. T. HARRIS.
WASHINGTON, D.C., _July, 1892_.
PREFATORY NOTE.
The following lectures were delivered in the School of Applied Ethics
during its first session in 1891, at Plymouth, Mass. A few of the
lectures have been condensed, in order to bring more clearly into view
the logical scheme which underlies the plan of instruction here
outlined. The others are published substantially as delivered.
I am deeply conscious of the difficulties of the problem which I have
ventured to approach, and realize that any contribution toward its
solution, at the present time, must be most imperfect. I should, for my
part, have preferred to wait longer before submitting my thought to
teachers and parents. But I have been persuaded that even in its present
shape it may be of some use. I earnestly hope that, at all events, it
may serve to help on the rising tide of interest in moral education, and
may stimulate to further inquiry.
FELIX ADLER.
CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTORY LECTURES.
PAGE
I. The Problem of Unsectarian Moral Instruction 3
II. The Efficient Motives of Good Conduct 17
III. Opportunities for Moral Training in the Daily School 27
IV. The Classification of Duties 37
V. The Moral Outfit of Children on entering School 47
PRIMARY COURSE.
VI. The Use of Fairy Tales 64
VII. The Use of Fables 80
VIII. Supplementary Remarks on Fables 96
IX. Selected Stories from the Bible 106
X. The Odyssey and the Iliad 146
GRAMMAR COURSE.
LESSONS ON DUTY.
XI. The Duty of acquiring Knowledge 169
XII. Duties which relate to the Physical Life and the Feelings 185
XIII. Duties which relate to Others (Filial and Fraternal Duties) 202
XIV. Duties toward all Men (Justice and Charity) 218
XV. The Elements of Civic Duty 236
XVI. The Use of Proverbs and Speeches 245
XVII. Individualization of Moral Teaching 249
APPENDIX.
The Influence of Manual Training on Character 257
INTRODUCTORY LECTURES.
I.
THE PROBLEM OF UNSECTARIAN MORAL INSTRUCTION.
It will be the aim of the present course of lectures to give in outline
the subject-matter of moral instruction for children from six to
fourteen or fifteen years of age, and to discuss the methods according
to which this kind of instruction should be imparted. At the outset,
however, we are confronted by what certainly is a grave difficulty, and
to many may appear an insuperable one. The opinion is widely held that
morality depends on religious sanctions, and that right conduct can not
be taught--especially not to children--except it be under the authority
of some sort of religious belief. To those who think in this way the
very phrase, unsectarian moral teaching, is suspicious, as savoring of
infidelity. And the attempt to mark off a neutral moral zone, outside
the domains of the churches, is apt to be regarded as masking a covert
design on religion itself.
The principle of unsectarian moral instruction, however, is neither
irreligious nor anti-religious. In fact--as will appear later on--it
rests on purely educational grounds, with which the religious bias of
the educator has nothing whatever to do. But there are also grounds of
expediency which, at least in the United States, compel us, whether we
care to do so or not, to face this problem of unsectarian moral
education, and to these let us first give our attention. Even if we were
to admit, for argument's sake, the correctness of the proposition that
moral truths can only be taught as corollaries of some form of religious
belief, the question would at once present itself to the educator, To
which form of religious belief shall he give the preference? I am
speaking now of the public schools of the United States.
These schools are supported out of the general fund of taxation to which
all citizens are compelled to contribute. Clearly it would be an act of
gross injustice to force a citizen belonging to one denomination to pay
for instilling the doctrines of some other into the minds of the
young--in other words, to compel him to support and assist in spreading
religious ideas in which he does not believe. This would be an outrage
on the freedom of conscience. But the act of injustice would become
simply monstrous if parents were to be compelled to help indoctrinate
their own children with such religious opinions as are repugnant to
them.
There is no state religion in the United States. In the eyes of the
state all shades of belief and disbelief are on a par. There are in this
country Catholics, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists,
Jews, etc. They are alike citizens. They contribute alike toward the
maintenance of the public schools. With what show of fairness, then,
could the belief of any one of these sects be adopted by the state as a
basis for the inculcation of moral truths? The case seems, on the face
of it, a hopeless one. But the following devices have been suggested to
remove, or rather to circumvent, the difficulty.
_First Device._--Let representatives of the various theistic churches,
including Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, meet in council. Let them
eliminate all those points in respect to which they differ, and
formulate a common creed containing only those articles on which they
can agree. Such a creed would include, for instance, the belief in the
existence of Deity, in the immortality of the soul, and in future reward
and punishment. Upon this as a foundation let the edifice of moral
instruction be erected. There are, however, two obvious objections to
this plan. In the first place, this "Dreibund" of Catholicism,
Protestantism, and Judaism would leave out of account the party of the
agnostics, whose views may indeed be erroneous, or even detestable, but
whose rights as citizens ought not the less on that account to be
respected. "_Neminem laede_," hurt no one, is a cardinal rule of justice,
and should be observed by the friends of religion in their dealings with
their opponents as well as with one another. The agnostic party has
grown to quite considerable dimensions in the United States. But, if it
had not, if there were only a single person who held such opinions, and
he a citizen, any attempt on the part of the majority to trample upon
the rights of this one person would still be inexcusable. In the sphere
of political action the majority rules, and must rule; in matters that
touch the conscience the smallest minority possesses rights on which
even an overwhelming majority arrayed on the opposite side can not
afford to trespass. It is one of the most notable achievements of the
American commonwealths that they have so distinctly separated between
the domain of religion and of politics, adopting in the one case the
maxim of coercion by majority rule, in the other allowing the full
measure of individual liberty. From this standpoint there should be no
departure.
But the second objection is even more cogent. It is proposed to
eliminate the differences which separate the various sects, and to
formulate their points of agreement into a common creed. But does it not
occur to those who propose this plan that the very life of a religion is
to be found precisely in those points in which it differs from its
neighbors, and that an abstract scheme of belief, such as has been
sketched, would, in truth, satisfy no one? Thus, out of respect for the
sentiments of the Jews, it is proposed to omit the doctrines of the
divinity of Christ and of the atonement. But would any earnest Christian
give his assent, even provisionally, to a creed from which those
quintessential doctrines of Christianity have been left out? When the
Christian maintains that morality must be based on religion, does he not
mean, above all, on the belief in Christ? Is it not indispensable, from
his point of view, that the figure of the Saviour shall stand in the
foreground of moral inculcation and exhortation? Again, when the
Catholic affirms that the moral teaching of the young must be based on
religion, is it to be supposed for an instant that he would accept as
satisfying his conception of religion a skeleton creed like that above
mentioned, denuded of all those peculiar dogmas which make religion in
his eyes beautiful and dear? This first device, therefore, is to be
rejected. It is unjust to the agnostics, and it will never content the
really religious persons of any denomination. It could prove acceptable
only to theists pure and simple, whose creed is practically limited to
the three articles mentioned; namely, the belief in Deity, immortality,
and future punishment and reward. But this class constitutes a small
fraction of the community; and it would be absurd, under the specious
plea of reconciling the various creeds, in effect to impose the
rationalistic opinions of a few on the whole community.
The _second device_ seems to promise better results. It provides that
religious and moral instruction combined shall be given in the public
schools under the auspices of the several denominations. According to
this plan, the pupils are to be divided, for purposes of moral
instruction, into separate classes, according to their sectarian
affiliations, and are to be taught separately by their own clergymen or
by teachers acting under instructions from the latter. The high
authority of Germany is invoked in support of this plan. If I am
correctly informed, the president of one of our leading universities
has recently spoken in favor of it, and it is likely that an attempt
will be made to introduce it in the United States. Already in some of
our reformatory schools and other public institutions separate religious
services are held by the ministers of the various sects, and we may
expect that an analogous arrangement will be proposed with respect to
moral teaching in the common schools. It is necessary, therefore, to pay
some attention to the German system, and to explain the reasons which
have induced or compelled the Germans to adopt the compromise just
described. The chief points to be noted are these: In Germany, church
and state are united. The King of Prussia, for instance, is the head of
the Evangelical Church. This constitutes a vital difference between
America and Germany. Secondly, in Germany the schools existed before the
state took charge of them. The school system was founded by the Church,
and the problem which confronted the Government was how to convert
church schools into state schools. An attempt was made to do this by
limiting the influence of the clergy, which formerly had been
all-powerful and all-pervasive, to certain branches and certain hours of
instruction, thereby securing the supremacy of the state in respect to
all other branches and at all other hours. In America, on the other
hand, the state founded the schools _ab initio_. In Germany the state
has actually encroached upon the Church, has entered church schools and
reconstructed them in its own interest. To adopt the German system in
America would be to permit the Church to encroach upon the state, to
enter state schools and subordinate them to sectarian purposes. The
example of Germany can not, therefore, be quoted as a precedent in
point. The system of compromise in Germany marks an advance in the
direction of increasing state influence. Its adoption in this country
would mark a retrograde movement in the direction of increasing church
influence.
Nor can the system, when considered on its own merits, be called a happy
one. Prof. Gneist, in his valuable treatise, Die Konfessionelle Schule
(which may be read by those who desire to inform themselves on the
historical evolution of the Prussian system), maintains that scientific
instruction must be unsectarian, while religious instruction must be
sectarian. I agree to both his propositions. But to my mind it follows
that, if religious instruction must be sectarian, it ought not to have a
place in state schools, at least not in a country in which the
separation of church and state is complete. Moreover, the limitation of
religious teaching to a few hours a week can never satisfy the earnest
sectarian. If he wants religion in the schools at all, then he will also
want that specific kind of religious influence which he favors to
permeate the whole school. He will insist that history shall be taught
from his point of view, that the readers shall breathe the spirit of his
faith, that the science teaching shall be made to harmonize with its
doctrines, etc. What a paltry concession, indeed, to open the door to
the clergyman twice or three times a week, and to permit him to teach
the catechism to the pupils, while the rest of the teaching is withdrawn
from his control, and is perhaps informed by a spirit alien to his! This
kind of compromise can never heartily be indorsed; it may be accepted
under pressure, but submission to it will always be under protest.[1]
The third arrangement that has been suggested is that each sect shall
build its own schools, and draw upon the fund supplied by taxation
proportionately to the number of children educated. But to this there
are again two great objections: First, it is the duty of the state to
see to it that a high educational standard shall be maintained in the
schools, and that the money spent on them shall bear fruit in raising
the general intelligence of the community. But the experience of the
past proves conclusively that in sectarian schools, especially where
there are no rival unsectarian institutions to force them into
competition, the preponderance of zeal and interest is so markedly on
the side of religious teaching that the secular branches unavoidably
suffer.[2] If it is said that the state may prescribe rules and set up
standards of its own, to which the sectarian schools shall be held to
conform, we ask, Who is to secure such conformance? The various sects,
once having gained possession of the public funds, would resent the
interference of the State. The Inspectors who might be appointed would
never be allowed to exercise any real control, and the rules which the
State might prescribe would remain dead letter.
In the second place, under such an arrangement, the highest purpose for
which the public schools exist would be defeated. Sectarian schools tend
to separate the members of the various denominations from one another,
and to hinder the growth of that spirit of national unity which it is,
on the other hand, the prime duty of the public school to create and
foster. The support of a system of public education out of the proceeds
of taxation is justifiable in the last analysis as a measure dictated to
the State by the law of self-preservation. The State maintains public
schools in order to preserve itself--i. e., its unity. And this is
especially true in a republic. In a monarchy the strong arm of the
reigning dynasty, supported by a ruling class, may perhaps suppress
discord, and hold the antagonistic elements among the people in
subjection by sheer force. In a republic only the spirit of unity among
the people themselves can keep them a people. And this spirit is
fostered in public schools, where children of all classes and sects are
brought into daily, friendly contact, and where together they are
indoctrinated into the history, tradition, and aspirations of the nation
to which they belong.
What then? We have seen that we can not encourage, that we can not
permit, the establishment of sectarian schools at the public expense. We
have also seen that we can not teach religion in the public schools.
Must we, therefore, abandon altogether the hope of teaching the elements
of morals? Is not moral education conceded to be one of the most
important, if not the most important, of all branches of education? Must
we forego the splendid opportunities afforded by the daily schools for
this purpose? Is there not a way of imparting moral instruction without
giving just offense to any religious belief or any religious believer,
or doing violence to the rights of any sect or of any party whatsoever?
The correct answer to this question would be the solution of the problem
of unsectarian moral education. I can merely state my answer to-day, in
the hope that the entire course before us may substantiate it. The
answer, as I conceive it, is this: It is the business of the moral
instructor in the school to deliver to his pupils the subject-matter of
morality, but not to deal with the sanctions of it; to give his pupils a
clearer understanding of what _is_ right and what _is_ wrong, but not to
enter into the question why the right should be done and the wrong
avoided. For example, let us suppose that the teacher is treating of
veracity. He says to the pupil, Thou shalt not lie. He takes it for
granted that the pupil feels the force of this commandment, and
acknowledges that he ought to yield obedience to it. For my part, I
should suspect of quibbling and dishonest intention any boy or girl who
would ask me, Why ought I not to lie? I should hold up before such a
child the Ought in all its awful majesty. The right to reason about
these matters can not be conceded until after the mind has attained a
certain maturity. And as a matter of fact every good child agrees with
the teacher unhesitatingly when he says, It is wrong to lie. There is an
answering echo in its heart which confirms the teacher's words. But
what, then, is it my business as a moral teacher to do? In the first
place, to deepen the impression of the wrongfulness of lying, and the
sacredness of truth, by the spirit in which I approach the subject. My
first business is to convey the spirit of moral reverence to my pupils.
In the next place, I ought to quicken the pupil's perceptions of what is
right and wrong, in the case supposed, of what is truth and what is
falsehood. Accordingly, I should analyze the different species of lies,
with a view of putting the pupils on their guard against the spirit of
falsehood, however it may disguise itself. I should try to make my
pupils see that, whenever they intentionally convey a false impression,
they are guilty of falsehood. I should try to make their minds
intelligent and their consciences sensitive in the matter of
truth-telling, so that they may avoid those numerous ambiguities of
which children are so fond, and which are practiced even by adults. I
should endeavor to tonic their moral nature with respect to
truthfulness. In the next place, I should point out to them the most
frequent motives which lead to lying, so that, by being warned against
the causes, they may the more readily escape the evil consequences. For
example, cowardice is one cause of lying. By making the pupil ashamed of
cowardice, we can often cure him of the tendency to falsehood. A
redundant imagination is another cause of lying, envy is another cause,
selfishness in all its forms is a principal cause, etc. I should say to
the moral teacher: Direct the pupil's attention to the various dangerous
tendencies in his nature, which tempt him into the ways of falsehood.
Furthermore, explain to your pupils the consequences of falsehood: the
loss of the confidence of our fellow-men, which is the immediate and
palpable result of being detected in a lie; the injuries inflicted on
others; the loosening of the bonds of mutual trust in society at large;
the loss of self-respect on the part of the liar; the fatal necessity of
multiplying lies, of inventing new falsehoods to make good the first,
etc. A vast amount of good, I am persuaded, can be done in this way by
stimulating the moral nature, by enabling the scholar to detect the
finer shades of right and wrong, helping him to trace temptation to its
source, and erecting in his mind barriers against evil-doing, founded on
a realizing sense of its consequences.
In a similar if not exactly the same way, all the other principal
topics of practical morality can be handled. The conscience can be
enlightened, strengthened, guided, and all this can be done without once
raising the question why it is wrong to do what is forbidden. That it is
wrong should rather, as I have said, be assumed. The ultimate grounds of
moral obligation need never be discussed in school. It is the business
of religion and philosophy to propose theories, or to formulate articles
of belief with respect to the ultimate sources and sanctions of duty.
Religion says we ought to do right because it is the will of God, or for
the love of Christ. Philosophy says we should do right for utilitarian
or transcendental reasons, or in obedience to the law of evolution, etc.
The moral teacher, fortunately, is not called upon to choose between
these various metaphysical and theological asseverations. As an
individual he may subscribe to any one of them, but as a teacher he is
bound to remain within the safe limits of his own province. He is not to
explain why we should do the right, but to make the young people who are
intrusted to his charge see more clearly what is right, and to instill
into them his own love of and respect for the right. There is a body of
moral truth upon which all good men, of whatever sect or opinion, are
agreed: _it is the business of the public schools to deliver to their
pupils this common fund of moral truth_. But I must hasten to add, to
deliver it not in the style of the preacher, but according to the
methods of the pedagogue--i. e., in a systematic way, the moral lessons
being graded to suit the varying ages and capacities of the pupils, and
the illustrative material being sorted and arranged in like manner.
Conceive the modern educational methods to have been applied to that
stock of moral truths which all good men accept, and you will have the
material for the moral lessons which are needed in a public school.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Since the above was written, the draft of the _Volksschulgesetz_
submitted to the Prussian Legislature, and the excited debates to which
it gave rise, have supplied a striking confirmation of the views
expressed in the text. Nothing could be more mistaken than to propose
for imitation elsewhere the German "solution" of the problem of moral
teaching in schools, especially at a time when the Germans themselves
are taking great pains to make it clear that they are as far as possible
from having found a solution.
[2] During the reactionary period which followed the Revolution of 1848,
the school regulations of Kur-Hessen provided that twenty hours a week
be devoted in the Volkschulen to religious teaching.
II.
THE EFFICIENT MOTIVES OF GOOD CONDUCT.
There are persons in whom moral principle seems to have completely
triumphed; whose conduct, so far as one can judge, is determined solely
by moral rules; but whom, nevertheless, we do not wholly admire. We feel
instinctively that there is in their virtue a certain flaw--the absence
of a saving grace. They are too rigorous, too much the slaves of duty.
They lack geniality.
Like religion, morality has its fanatics. Thus, there is in the
temperance movement a class of fanatics who look at every public
question from the point of view of temperance reform, and from that
only. There are also woman's-rights fanatics, social purity fanatics,
etc. The moral fanatic in every case is a person whose attention is
wholly engrossed by some one moral interest, and who sees this out of
its relation to other moral interests. The end he has in view may be in
itself highly laudable, but the exaggerated emphasis put upon it, the
one-sided pursuit of it, is a mischievous error.
Observe, further, that there are degrees of moral fanaticism. The
fanatic of the first degree, to whom Emerson addresses the words, "What
right have you, sir, to your one virtue?" has just been described. He
is a person who exalts some one moral rule at the expense of the others.
A fanatic of a higher order is he who exalts the whole body of moral
rules at the expense of human instincts and desires. He is a person who
always acts according to rule; who introduces moral considerations into
every detail of life; who rides the moral hobby; in whose eyes the
infinite complexity of human affairs has only one aspect, namely, the
moral; who is never satisfied unless at every step he feels the strain
of the bridle of conscience; who is incapable of spontaneous action and
of _naive_ enjoyment. It is believed that there are not a few persons of
this description in the United States, and especially in the New England
States--fanatics on the moral side, examples of a one-sided development
in the direction of moral formalism. We must be very careful, when
insisting on the authority of moral ideas, lest we encourage in the
young a tendency of this sort. The hearts of children are very pliable;
it is easily possible to produce on them too deep an impression: to give
them at the outset a fatal twist, all the more since at a certain age
many young people are prone to exaggerated introspection and
self-questioning. But it may be asked: Are not moral principles really
clothed with supreme authority? Ought we not, indeed, to keep the
standard of righteousness constantly before our eyes; in brief, is it
possible to be too moral? Evidently we have reached a point where a
distinction requires to be drawn.
Ethics is a science of relations. The things related are human
interests, human ends. The ideal which ethics proposes to itself is the
unity of ends, just as the ideal of science is the unity of causes. The
ends of the natural man are the subject-matter with which ethics deals.
The ends of the natural man are not to be crushed or wiped out, but to
be brought into right relations with one another. The ends of the
natural man are to be respected from an ethical point of view, so long
as they remain within their proper limits. The moral laws are formulas
expressing relations of equality or subordination, or superordination.
The moral virtue of our acts consists in the respect which we pay to the
system of relationships thus prescribed, in the willingness with which
we co-ordinate our interests with those of others, or subordinate them
to those of others, as the exigencies of the moral situation may
require.
But the point on which it is now necessary to fix our attention is that
when morality has once sanctioned any of the ends of life, the natural
man may be left to pursue them without interference on the part of the
moralist. When morality has marked out the boundaries within which the
given end shall be pursued, its work so far is done; except, indeed,
that we are always to keep an eye upon those boundaries, and that the
sense of their existence should pervade the whole atmosphere of our
lives.[3] A few illustrations will make my meaning clear. There is a
moral rule which says that we should eat to live; not, conversely, live
to eat. This means that we should regulate our food in such a way that
the body may become a fit instrument for the higher purposes of
existence, and that the time and attention bestowed upon the matter of
eating shall not be so great as to divert us from other and more
necessary objects. But, these limits being established, it does not
follow that it is wrong or unspiritual to enjoy a meal. The senses, even
the lowest of them, are permitted to have free play within the bounds
prescribed. Nor, again, should we try rigidly to determine the choice of
food according to moral considerations. It would be ridiculous to
attempt to do so. The choice of food within a wide range depends
entirely on taste, and has nothing to do with moral considerations
(whether, for instance, we should have squash or beans for dinner).
Those who are deeply impressed with the importance of moral rules are
often betrayed into applying them to the veriest minutiae of conduct. Did
they remember that ethics is a science of relations, or, what amounts to
the same thing, a science of limits, they would be saved such pedantry.
Undoubtedly there are moral _adiaphora_. The fact that such exist has
been a stumbling-block in the way of those who believe that morality
ought to cover the whole of conduct. The definition of ethics as a
science of relations or limits removes this stumbling-block. Ethics
stands at the frontier. With what goes on in the interior it does not
interfere, except in so far as the limitations it prescribes are an
interference. Take another illustration. Ethics condemns vanity and
whatever ministers to vanity--as, e. g., undue attention to dress and
adornment of the person--on the ground that this implies an immoral
subordination of the inner to the outer, of the higher to the lesser
ends. But, to lay down a cast-iron rule as to how much one has a right
to expend on dress, can not be the office of ethics, on account of the
infinite variety of conditions and occupations which subsists among men.
And the attempt to prescribe a single fashion of dress, by sumptuary
laws or otherwise, would impair that freedom of taste which it is the
business of the moralist to respect. Again, every one knows with what
bitterness the moral rigorists of all ages have condemned the impulse
which attracts the sexes toward one another, and how often they have
tried, though vainly, to crush it. But here, again, the true attitude is
indicated by the definition of ethics as a science of limits. The moral
law prescribes bounds within which this emotional force shall be free to
operate, and claims for it the holy name of love, so long as it remains
within the bounds prescribed, and, being within, remains conscious of
them. That is what is meant when we speak of spiritualizing the
feelings. The feelings are spiritualized when they move within certain
limits, and when the sense of the existence of these limits penetrates
them, and thereby imparts to them a new and nobler quality. And, because
such limitation is felt to be satisfying and elevating, the system of
correlations which we call ethical, and which, abstractly stated, would
fail to interest, does by this means find an entrance into the human
heart, and awakens in it the sense of the sublimity and the blessedness
of the moral commands.
There are two defects of the moral fanatic which can now be signalized:
First, he wrongly believes that whatever is not of morality is against
it. He therefore is tempted to frown upon the natural pleasures; to
banish them if he can, and, if not, to admit them only within the
narrowest possible limits as a reluctant concession to the weakness of
human nature. In consequence, the moral fanatic commits the enormity of
introducing the taint of the sense of sin into the most innocent
enjoyments, and thus perverts and distorts the conscience. Secondly, he
is always inclined to seek a moral reason for that which has only a
natural one; to forget that, like the great conquerors of antiquity,
Morality respects the laws of the several realms which it unites into a
single empire, and guarantees to each the unimpaired maintenance of its
local customs. These remarks are intended to serve as a general caution.
I find that young people, when they have become awakened on ethical
subjects, often betray a tendency toward moral asceticism. I find that
teachers, in the earnest desire to impress the laws of the moral empire,
are sometimes betrayed into disregarding the provincial laws of the
senses, the intellect, and the feelings; are apt to go too far in
applying moral prescriptions to the minutiae of conduct; are apt to leave
the impression that pleasant things, just because they are pleasant, are
therefore sinful.
But we have now to take a further step, which will bring us close to our
special subject for to-day, viz., the efficient motives of good conduct.
The non-moral faculties are not only not anti-moral, as has been shown,
but, when appealed to in the right way, they lend to Morality a
friendly, an almost indispensable support. The aesthetic, the
intellectual, and the emotional faculty have not in themselves a moral
quality, but when used as auxiliaries they pave the way for moral
considerations pure and simple, and have in this sense an immense
propaedeutic value. Without entering in this place into the philosophy of
aesthetics, it is enough to say that the beautiful, like the good,
results from and depends on the observance of certain limits and certain
relations. And it will not seem far-fetched to suggest that pupils who
have been trained to appreciate moderation, restraint and harmony of
relations in external objects, will be predisposed to apply analogous
measures to matters of conduct, and that a standard of valuation will
thus be created in their minds which must prove favorable to right
action. AEsthetics may become a pedagogue unto ethics. The same
pedagogical function may be claimed for the intellect. The intellect
traces the connection between causes and effects. Applied to conduct, it
shows the connection between acts and their consequences. It is the
faculty which counsels prudence. One does not need to accept the
egoistic theory of morals to concede that self-interest is an ally of
morality, that Prudence and Virtue travel hand in hand a certain
distance on the same road. Not, indeed, until the ideal state shall have
been reached will the dictates of the two ever coincide entirely; but to
a certain extent the coincidence already exists, and the moral teacher
is justified in availing himself of it as far as it goes.
To take a very simple case--a child handles a knife which it has been
told not to touch, and cuts his fingers. Morally speaking, his fault is
disobedience. He would have been equally guilty if he had escaped
injury. But he would hardly be so ready to obey another time, if he had
been less sharply reminded of the usefulness of obedience. It is wrong
to lie--wrong on purely moral grounds, with which self-interest has
nothing to do. But for all that we can not dispense with the lesson
contained in the well-known fable of the boy who cried, "Wolf!" It is
wrong to steal on purely moral grounds. But even a child can be made to
understand that the thief, as Emerson puts it, "steals from himself,"
and that, besides being a rogue, he is deficient in enlightened
self-interest. The maxim that honesty is the best policy is true enough
so far as the facts are concerned, which come under the observation of
children, though one may question whether it be true absolutely.