The questions since opened have been in regard to slavery,--in ways

which Jefferson never dreamed of,--the comparative power of the North

and South, matters of finance, tariffs, and internal improvements,

involving the deepest problems of political economy, education, and

constitutional law; and as time moves on, new questions will arise to

puzzle the profoundest intellects; but the question of the ascendency of

the people is settled beyond all human calculations. And it is in this

matter especially that Jefferson left his mark on the institutions of

his country,--as the champion of democracy, rather than as the champion

of the abstract rights of man which he and Patrick Henry and Samuel

Adams had asserted, in opposition to the tyranny of Great Britain in her

treatment of the Colonies. And here he went beyond Puritan New England,

which sought the ascendency of the wisest and the best, when the

aristocracy of intellect and virtue should bear sway instead of the

unenlightened masses. Historians talk about the aristocracy of the

Southern planters, but this was an offshoot of the aristocracy of

feudalism,--the dominion of favored classes over the enslaved, the poor,

and the miserable. New England aristocracy was the rule of the wisest

and the best, extending to the remotest hamlets, in which the people

discussed the elemental principles of Magna Charta and the liberties of

Saxon yeomen. This was the aristocracy which had for its defenders such

men as the Adamses, the Shermans, and the Langdons,--something new in

the history of governments and empires, which was really subverted by

the doctrines of Rousseau and the leaders of the French Revolution, whom

Jefferson admired and followed.

Jefferson, however, practically believed in the aristocracy of mind, and

gave his preference to men of learning and refinement, rather than men

of wealth and rank. He was a democrat only in the recognition of the

people as the source of future political power, and hence in the belief

of the ultimate triumph of the Democratic party, which it was his work

to organize and lead. Foreseeing how dangerous the triumph of a vulgar

and ignorant mob would be, he tried to provide for educating the people,

on the same principle that we would to-day educate the colored race. The

great hobby of his life was education. He thus spent the best part of

his latter years in founding and directing the University of Virginia,

including a plan for popular education as well. To all schemes of

education he lent a willing ear; but it was the last thing which

aristocratic Southern planters desired,--the elevation of the poor

whites, or political equality. Though a planter, Jefferson was more in

sympathy with New England ideas, as to the intellectual improvement of

the people and its relation to universal suffrage, than with the

Southern gentlemen with whom he associated. Hamilton did not so much

care for the education of the people as he did for the ascendency of

those who were already educated, especially if wealthy. Property, in his

eyes, had great consideration, as with all the influential magnates of

the North. Jefferson thought more of men than of their surroundings, and

thus became popular with ordinary people in a lower stratum of social

life. Hamilton was popular only with the rich, the learned, and the

powerful, and stood no chance in the race with Jefferson for popular

favor, wherever universal suffrage was established, any more than did

John Adams, whose ideas concerning social distinctions, and the

ascendency of learning and virtue in matters of government, were

decidedly aristocratic.

It is hard to say whether Jefferson or Hamilton was the wiser in his

political theories, nor is it certain which was the more astute and

far-reaching in his calculations as to the future ascendency of

political parties. Down to the Civil War the Democrats had things

largely their own way; since then, the Republican party--lineal

descendant of the Federals, through the Whigs--have borne sway until

within very recent years, when there has developed a strong reaction

against the centralizing tendency compacted by the rallying of the

people about the government to resist disunion in 1860-65.

Jefferson became Vice-President on the final retirement of Washington to

private life in 1797, when Adams was made President. The vice-presidency

was a position of dignity rather than of power, and not so much desired

by ambitious men as the office of governor in a great State. What took

place of importance in the political field during the presidency of

Adams has already been treated. As Vice-President, Jefferson had but

little to do officially, but he was as busy as ever with his pen, and in

pulling political wires,--especially in doing all he could to obstruct

legislation along the lines laid down by the Federal leaders. Of course,

like other leaders, he was aiming at the presidency, and I think he was

the only man in our history who ever reached this high office by

persistent personal efforts to secure it. Burr failed, in spite of his

great abilities, as well as Hamilton, Calhoun, Clay, Benton, Webster,

Douglas, Seward, and Blaine. All the later presidents have been men who

when nominated as candidates for the presidency were comparatively

unknown and unimportant in the eyes of the nation,--selected not for

abilities, but as the most "available" candidates; although some of them

proved to be men of greater talent and fitness than was generally

supposed. The people accepted them, but did not select them, any more

than Saul and David were chosen by the people of Israel. Political

leaders selected them for party purposes, and rather because they were

unknown than because they were known; while greater men, who had the

national eye upon them for services and abilities, had created too many

enemies, secret or open, for successful competition. An English member

of Parliament, of transcendent talent, if superior to all other members

for eloquence, wisdom, and tact, is pretty certain of climbing to the

premiership, like Canning, Peel, Disraeli, and Gladstone. Probably no

American, for a long time to come, can reasonably hope to reach the

presidency because he has ambitiously and persistently labored for it,

whatever may be his merits or services. In a country of wide extent like

the United States, where the representatives of the people and the

States in Congress are the real rulers, perhaps this is well.

But even Jefferson did not inordinately seek or desire the presidency.

The office quite as earnestly sought him, as the most popular man in the

country, who had proved himself to be a man of great abilities in the

various positions he had previously filled, and as honest as he was

patriotic. He had few personal enemies. His enemies were the leaders of

the Federal party, if we except Aaron Burr, in whose honesty few

believed. The lies which the bitter and hostile Federalists told about

Jefferson were lost on the great majority of the people, who believed

in him.

Jefferson was inaugurated as president in 1801, and selected an able

Cabinet, with his friend and disciple James Madison as Secretary of

State, and Albert Gallatin, an experienced financier, a Swiss by birth,

as Secretary of the Treasury. He at once made important changes in all

matters of etiquette and forms, introducing greater simplicity,

abolishing levees, titles, and state ceremonials, and making himself

more accessible to the people. His hospitality was greater than that of

any preceding or succeeding president. He lived in the White House more

like a Virginian planter than a great public functionary, wearing plain

clothes, and receiving foreign ministers without the usual formalities,

much to their chagrin. He also prevailed on Congress to reduce the army

and navy, retaining a force only large enough to maintain law and order.

He set the example of removing important officers hostile to his

administration, although he did not make sweeping changes, as did

General Jackson afterward, on the avowed ground that "spoils belong to

victors,"--thus increasing the bitterness of partisanship.

The most important act of Jefferson's administration was the purchase

of Louisiana from France for fifteen millions of dollars. Bonaparte had

intended, after that great territory had been ceded to him by Spain, to

make a military colony at New Orleans, and thus control the Mississippi

and its branches; but as he wanted money, and as his ambition centred in

European conquests, he was easily won over by the American diplomatists

to forego the possession of that territory, the importance of which he

probably did not appreciate, and it became a part of the United States.

James Monroe and Robert Livingston closed the bargain with the First

Consul, and were promptly sustained by the administration, although they

had really exceeded their instructions. Bonaparte is reported to have

said of this transaction: "This accession of territory strengthens

forever the power of the United States. I have given to England a

maritime rival that will sooner or later humble her pride."

By this purchase, which Jefferson had much at heart, the United States

secured, not only millions of square miles of territory, but the control

of the Gulf of Mexico. This fortunate acquisition prevented those

entangling disputes and hostilities which would have taken place whether

Spain or France owned Louisiana. Doubtless, Jefferson laid himself open

to censure from the Federalists for assuming unconstitutional powers in

this purchase; but the greatness of the service more than balanced the

irregularity, and the ridicule and abuse from his political enemies fell

harmless. No one can question that his prompt action, whether

technically legal or illegal, was both wise and necessary; it

practically gave to the United States the undisputed possession of the

vast territory between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains.

Moreover, the President's enlightened encouragement of the explorations

of Lewis and Clarke's expedition across the Rocky Mountains to the

Pacific Ocean, led to the ultimate occupancy of California and the west

coast itself.

The next event of national interest connected with the administration of

Jefferson in his long term of eight years (for he was re-elected

president, and began his second term in 1805), was the enterprise of

Aaron Burr, with a view of establishing a monarchy in Mexico. It was

fortunately defeated, and the disappointed and ambitious politician

narrowly escaped being convicted of high treason. He was saved only by

the unaccountable intrigues of the Federalists at a time of intense

party warfare. Jefferson would have punished this unscrupulous intriguer

if he could; but Burr was defended by counsel of extraordinary

ability,--chiefly Federalist lawyers, at the head of whom was Luther

Martin of Maryland, probably the best lawyer in the country,

notwithstanding his dissipated habits. Martin was one of those few

drinking men whose brains are not clouded by liquor. He could argue a

case after having drunk brandy enough to intoxicate any ordinary man,

and be the brighter for it. Burr also brought to bear the resources of

his own extraordinary intellect, by way of quiet suggestions to

his counsel.

This remarkable man was born at Newark, N.J., in 1756, and was the son

of the Rev. Aaron Burr, president of Princeton College. He was a

grandson of the celebrated Jonathan Edwards, the most original and

powerful metaphysical intellect known to the religious history of this

country, who confirmed Calvinism as the creed of New England Puritans.

The young Burr, on the death of his father and grandfather, inherited

what was then considered as a fortune, and was graduated at Princeton in

1772, with no enviable reputation, being noted for his idleness and

habits bordering on dissipation. He was a handsome and sprightly young

man of sixteen, a favorite with women of all ages. He made choice of the

profession of law, and commenced the study under Tappan Reeve of

Elizabethtown. After the battle of Bunker Hill he entered the army at

Boston, but, tired of inactivity, joined Arnold's expedition to Quebec,

where he distinguished himself by his bravery. Ill-health compelled him

to leave the army after four years service,--the youngest colonel in the

army. He was no admirer of Washington, regarding him as "a farmer and

Indian-fighter rather than a soldier." He favored the cabal against him,

headed by Gates and Conway. Washington, while ready to acknowledge

Burr's military abilities, always distrusted him, and withheld from him

the rank of brigadier.

On leaving the army, at the age of twenty-three, Burr resumed his

studies of the law, and was admitted to the Albany bar after brief

preparation. Conscious of his talents, he soon after settled in New

York, and enjoyed a lucrative practice, the rival of Alexander Hamilton,

being employed with him on all important cases. He had married, in 1782,

the widow of an English officer, a Mrs. Provost, a lady older than

he,--with uncommon accomplishments. In 1784 he was chosen a member of

the New York Legislature, and was on intimate terms with the Clintons,

the Livingstons, the Van Rennselaers, and the Schuylers. In 1789 he was

made Attorney-General of the State during the administration of Governor

George Clinton. His popularity was as great as were his talents, and in

1791 he was elected to the United States Senate over General Philip

Schuyler, and became the leader of the Republican party, with increasing

popularity and influence. In 1796 he was a presidential candidate, and

in 1800, being again a candidate for the presidency, he received

seventy-three votes in the House of Representatives,--the same number

that were cast for Jefferson. He would, doubtless, have been elected

president but for the efforts of Hamilton, who threw his influence in

favor of Jefferson, Democrat as he was, as the safer man of the two.

Burr never forgave his rival at the bar for this, and henceforward the

deepest enmity rankled in his soul for the great Federalist leader.

As Vice-President, Burr was marked for his political intrigues, and

incurred the distrust if not the hostility of Jefferson, who neglected

Burr's friends and bestowed political favors on his enemies. Disgusted

with the inactivity to which his office doomed him, Burr pulled every

wire to be elected governor of New York; but the opposition of the great

Democratic families caused his defeat, which was soon followed by his

assassination of Hamilton, called a duel. Universal execration for this

hideous crime drove him for a time from New York, although he was still

Vice-President. But his political career was ended, although his

ambition was undiminished.

Then, seeing that his influence in the Eastern and Middle States was

hopelessly lost, Burr looked for a theatre of new cabals, and turned his

eyes to the West, opened to public view by the purchase of Louisiana.

In the preparation of his plans he went first to New Orleans, then a

French settlement, where he was lionized, returning by way of Nashville,

Frankfort, Lexington, and St. Louis. At the latter post he found General

Wilkinson, to whom he communicated his scheme of founding an empire in

the West,--a most desperate undertaking. On an island of the Ohio, near

Marietta, he visited its owner, called Blennerhasset, a restless and

worthless Irishman, whom he induced to follow his fortunes.

The adventurers contracted for fifteen boats and enlisted quite a number

of people to descend the Mississippi and make New Orleans their

rallying-point, supposing that the Western population were dissatisfied

with the government and were ready to secede and establish a new

republic, or empire, to include Mexico; also relying on the aid of

General Wilkinson at St. Louis. But they miscalculated: Wilkinson was

true to his colors; the people whom they had seduced gradually dropped

off; the territorial magistrates became suspicious and alarmed, and the

governor of the Territory communicated his fears to the President, who

at once issued a proclamation to arrest the supposed conspirators, who

had fled when their enterprise had failed.

Burr was seized near Natchez, and was tried for conspiracy; but the

trial came to nothing. He contrived to escape in the night, but was

again arrested in Alabama, and sent to Richmond to be tried for treason.

As has been said, he was acquitted, by a jury of which John Randolph was

foreman, with the sympathy of all the women, of whom he was a favorite

to the day of his death. The trial lasted six months, and Jefferson did

all he could to convict him, with the assistance of William Wirt, just

rising into notice.

Although acquitted, Burr was a ruined man. His day of receptions and

popularity was over. His sad but splendid career came to an inglorious

close. Feeling unsafe in his own country, he wandered abroad, at times

treated with great distinction wherever he went, but always arousing

suspicions. He was obliged to leave England, and wandered as a fugitive

from country to country, without money or real friends. At Paris and

London he suffered extreme poverty, although admired in society. At last

he returned to New York, utterly destitute, and resumed the practice of

the law, but was without social position and generally avoided. He

succeeded in 1832 in winning the hand of a wealthy widow, but he spent

her money so freely that she left him. After the separation he supported

himself with great difficulty, but retained his elegant manner and

fascinating conversation, until he died in the house of a lady friend in

1836, and was buried at Princeton by the side of his father and

grandfather.

Our history narrates no fall from an exalted position more melancholy,

or more richly deserved, than his. Without being dissipated, he was a

bad and unprincipled man from the start. He might have been the pride of

his country, like Hamilton and Jefferson, being the equal of both in

abilities, and at one time in popularity. The school-books have given to

him and to Benedict Arnold an infamous immortality, comparing the one

with Cain, and the other with Judas Iscariot.

The most important measure connected with Jefferson's long

administration was the Non-importation Act, commonly called the Embargo.

It proved in the end a mistake, and shed no glory on the fame of the

President; and yet it perhaps prevented a war, or at least delayed it.

The peace of 1783 and the acknowledgment of American independence did

not restore friendly relations between England and the United States. It

was not in human nature that a proud and powerful state like England

should see the disruption of her empire and her fairest foreign

possession torn from her without embittered feelings, leading to acts

which could not be justified by international law or by enlightened

reason. Accordingly, the government of Great Britain treated the

American envoys with rudeness, insolence, and contempt, much to their

chagrin and the indignation of Americans generally. It also adopted

measures exceedingly injurious to American commerce. France and England

being at war, the Americans, as neutrals, secured most of the carrying

trade, to the disgust of British merchants; and, declaring mutual

blockade, both French and English cruisers began to capture American

trading-ships, the English being especially outrageous in their doings.

Said Jefferson, in his annual message in 1805: "Our coasts have been

infested and our harbors watched by private armed vessels. They have

captured in the very entrance of our harbors, as well as on the high

seas, not only the vessels of our friends coming to trade with us, but

our own also. They have carried them off under pretence of legal

adjudication; but not daring to approach a court of justice, they have

plundered and sunk them by the way, or in obscure places where no

evidence could arise against them, maltreated the crews, and abandoned

them in boats in the open sea, or on desert shores without food or

covering." In view of these things, the President recommended the

building of gunboats and the reorganization of the militia, and called

attention to materials in the navy-yards for constructing battleships.

The English even went further and set up a claim to the right of search;

sailors were taken from American ships to be impressed into their naval

service, on the plea--generally unfounded--that they were British

subjects and deserters. At last British audacity went so far as to

attack an American frigate at Hampton Roads, and carry away four alleged

British sailors, three of whom were American born. The English doctrine

that no man could expatriate himself was not allowed by America, where

immigrants and new citizens were always welcome; but in the case of

native Americans there could be no question as to their citizenship.

This outrage aroused indignation from one end of the country to the

other, and a large party clamored for war.

But the policy of Jefferson was pacific. He abhorred war, and entered

into negotiations, which came to nothing. Nor, to his mind, was the

country prepared for war. We had neither army nor navy to speak of. It

was plain that we should be beaten on the land and on the sea. Much as

he hated England, he preferred to temporize, and build a few

gunboats,--which everybody laughed at.

Nor did the French government behave much better than the English. It

looked upon the United States as an unsettled and weak country, to be

robbed with impunity. At last, driven from the high seas, the Americans

could rely only on the coasting-trade. "One half the mercantile world

was sealed up by the British, and the other half by the French."

Jefferson now appealed to Congress, and the result was the

Non-importation Act, or Embargo, forbidding Americans to trade with

France and England. This policy was intended as a pressure on English

merchants. But it was a half-measure and did not affect British

legislation, which had for its object the utter annihilation of American

commerce. Neither France nor England was hurt seriously by the Embargo,

while our ships lay rotting at the wharves, and our merchants found that

their occupation was gone. The New England merchants were discouraged

and discontented. It was not they who wished to see their ships shut up

by a doubtful policy. They would have preferred to run risks rather than

be idle. But Jefferson paid no heed to their grumblings, feeling that he

was exhibiting to foreign powers unusual forbearance. It is singular

that he persevered in a policy that nearly the whole body of merchants

censured and regarded as a failure; but he did, and Congress was

subservient to his decrees. No succeeding president ever had the

influence over Congress that he had. He was almost a dictator. He found

opposition only among the Federalists, whose power was gone forever.

At last, when the farmers and planters joined with the shipping

interests in complaining of the Embargo, Jefferson was persuaded that it

was a failure, and three days before his administration closed it was

repealed by Congress. But even this measure did not hurt the party

which he had marshalled with such transcendent tact; for his friend and

disciple, James Madison, was elected to succeed him in 1809.

The Embargo had had one result: it deferred the war with Great Britain

to the next administration. That conflict of 1812-15 was not a glorious

war for America except on the ocean. It was not entered upon by the

British with any hope of the conquest of the country, but to do all the

harm they could to the people who had achieved their independence. On

the part of the United States it was simply a choice between insult,

insolence, and injury on the one hand, and on the other the expenditure

of money and loss of life, which would bear as hard on England as on the

United States. Both parties at last wearied of a contest which promised

no permanent settlement of interests or principles. The Federalists

deprecated it from the beginning. The Republican-Democracy sustained it

from the instinct of national honor. Probably it could not have been

avoided without the surrender of national dignity. It was the last of

our wars with Great Britain. Future difficulties will doubtless be

settled by arbitration, or not settled at all, in spite of mutual

ill-will. England and America cannot afford to fight. Our late Civil War

demonstrated this,--when, with all the ill-feeling between the two

nations, war was averted. The interests of trade may mollify and soften

international jealousies, but only forbearance and the cultivation of

mutual and common interests can eradicate the sentiments of

mutual dislike.

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