SCHEME OF INVASION RENEWED.

It must be in the memory of most who recollect the period, that the

kingdom of Great Britain was seldom less provided against invasion than

at the commencement of this second war; and that an embarkation from the

ports of Holland, if undertaken instantly after the war had broken out,

might have escaped our blockading squadrons, and have at least shown

what a French army could have done on British ground, at a moment when

the alarm was general, and the country in an unprepared state. But it

is probable that Bonaparte himself was as much unprovided as England

for the sudden breach of the treaty of Amiens--an event brought about

more by the influence of passion than of policy; so that its

consequences were as unexpected in his calculations as in those of Great

Britain. Besides, he had not diminished to himself the dangers of the

undertaking, by which he must have staked his military renown, his

power, which he held chiefly as the consequence of his reputation,

perhaps his life, upon a desperate game, which, though he had already

twice contemplated it, he had not yet found hardihood enough seriously

to enter upon.

He now, however, at length bent himself, with the whole strength of his

mind, and the whole force of his empire, to prepare for this final and

decisive undertaking. The gun-boats in the Bay of Gibraltar, where calms

are frequent, had sometimes in the course of the former war been able to

do considerable damage to the English vessels of war, when they could

not use their sails. Such small craft, therefore, were supposed the

proper force for covering the intended descent. They were built in

different harbours, and brought together by crawling along the French

shore, and keeping under the protection of the batteries, which were now

established on every cape, almost as if the sea-coast of the channel on

the French side had been the lines of a besieged city, no one point of

which could with prudence be left undefended by cannon. Boulogne was

pitched upon as the centre port, from which the expedition was to sail.

By incredible exertions, Bonaparte had rendered its harbour and roads

capable of containing two thousand vessels of various descriptions. The

smaller sea-ports of Vimereux, Ambleteuse, and Etaples, Dieppe, Havre,

St. Valeri, Caen, Gravelines, and Dunkirk, were likewise filled with

shipping. Flushing and Ostend were occupied by a separate flotilla.

Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort, were each the station of as strong a naval

squadron as France, had still the means to send to sea.

A land army was assembled of the most formidable description, whether we

regard the high military character of the troops, the extent and

perfection of their appointments, or their numerical strength. The

coast, from the mouth of the Seine to the Texel, was covered with

forces; and Soult, Ney, Davoust, and Victor, names that were then the

pride and the dread of war, were appointed to command the army of

England, (for that menacing title was once more, assumed,) and execute

those manoeuvres, planned and superintended by Bonaparte, the issue of

which was to be the blotting out of Britain from the rank of

independent nations.

Far from being alarmed at this formidable demonstration of force,

England prepared for her resistance with an energy becoming her ancient

rank in Europe, and far surpassing in its efforts any extent of military

preparation before heard of in her history. To nearly one hundred

thousand troops of the line, were added eighty thousand and upwards of

militia, which scarce yielded to the regulars in point of discipline.

The volunteer force, by which every citizen was permitted and invited to

add his efforts to the defence of the country, was far more numerous

than during the last war, was better officered also, and rendered every

way more effective. It was computed to amount to three hundred and fifty

thousand men, who, if we regard the shortness of the time and the nature

of the service, had attained considerable practice in the use and

management of their arms. Other classes of men were embodied, and

destined to act as pioneers, drivers of wagons, and in the like

services. On a sudden, the land seemed converted to an immense camp, the

whole nation into soldiers, and the good old king himself into a

general-in-chief. All peaceful considerations appeared for a time to be

thrown aside; and the voice, calling the nation to defend their dearest

rights, sounded not only in Parliament, and in meetings convoked to

second the measures of defence, but was heard in the places of public

amusement, and mingled even with the voice of devotion--not unbecoming

surely, since to defend our country is to defend our religion.

Beacons were erected in conspicuous points, corresponding with each

other, all around and all through the island; and morning and evening,

one might have said, every eye was turned towards them to watch for the

fatal and momentous signal. Partial alarms were given to different

places, from the mistakes to which such arrangements must necessarily be

liable; and the ready spirit which animated every species of troops

where such signals called to arms, was of the most satisfactory

description, and afforded the most perfect assurance, that the heart of

every man was in the cause of his country.

Amidst her preparations by land, England did not neglect or relax her

precautions on the element she calls her own. She covered the ocean with

five hundred and seventy ships of war of various descriptions.

Divisions of her fleet blocked up every French port in the channel; and

the army destined to invade our shores, might see the British flag

flying in every direction on the horizon, waiting for their issuing from

the harbour, as birds of prey may be seen floating in the air above the

animal which they design to pounce upon. Sometimes the British frigates

and sloops of war stood in, and cannonaded or threw shells into Havre,

Dieppe, Granville, and Boulogne itself. Sometimes the seamen and marines

landed, cut out vessels, destroyed signal posts, and dismantled

batteries. Such events were trifling, and it was to be regretted that

they cost the lives of gallant men; but although they produced no direct

results of consequence, yet they had their use in encouraging the

spirits of our sailors, and damping the confidence of the enemy, who

must at length have looked forward with more doubt than hope to the

invasion of the English coast, when the utmost vigilance could not

prevent their experiencing insults upon their own.

During this period of menaced attack and arranged defence, Bonaparte

visited Boulogne, and seemed active in preparing his soldiers for the

grand effort. He reviewed them in an unusual manner, teaching them to

execute several manoeuvres by night; and experiments were also made upon

the best mode of arranging the soldiers in the flat-bottomed boats, and

of embarking and disembarking them with celerity. Omens were resorted to

for keeping up the enthusiasm which the presence of the First Consul

naturally inspired. A Roman battle-axe was said to be found when they

removed the earth to pitch Bonaparte's tent or barrack; and medals of

William the Conqueror were produced, as having been dug up upon the same

honoured spot. These were pleasant bodings, yet perhaps did not

altogether, in the minds of the soldiers, counterbalance the sense of

insecurity impressed on them by the prospect of being packed together in

these miserable chaloupes, and exposed to the fire of an enemy so

superior at sea, that during the chief consul's review of the

fortifications, their frigates stood in shore with composure, and fired

at him and his suite as at a mark. The men who had braved the perils of

the Alps and of the Egyptian deserts, might yet be allowed to feel alarm

at a species of danger which seemed so inevitable, and which they had no

adequate means of repelling by force of arms.

A circumstance which seemed to render the expedition in a great measure

hopeless, was the ease with which the English could maintain a constant

watch upon their operations within the port of Boulogne. The least

appearance of stir or preparation, to embark troops, or get ready for

sea, was promptly sent by signal to the English coast, and the numerous

British cruisers were instantly on the alert to attend their motions.

Nelson had, in fact, during the last war, declared the sailing of a

hostile armament from Boulogne to be a most forlorn undertaking, on

account of cross tides and other disadvantages, together with the

certainty of the flotilla being lost if there were the least wind

west-north-west. "As for rowing," he adds, "that is impossible.--It is

perfectly right to be prepared for a mad government," continued this

incontestable judge of maritime possibilities; "but with the active

force which has been given me, I may pronounce it almost impracticable."

Before quitting the subject, we may notice, that Bonaparte seems not to

have entertained the least doubts of success, could he have succeeded in

disembarking his army. A single general action was to decide the fate of

England. Five days were to bring Napoleon to London, where he was to

perform the part of William the Third; but with more generosity and

disinterestedness. He was to call a meeting of the inhabitants, restore

them what he calls their rights, and destroy the oligarchical faction. A

few months would not, according to his account, have elapsed, ere the

two nations, late such determined enemies, would have been identified by

their principles, their maxims, their interests. The full explanation of

this gibberish, (for it can be termed no better, even proceeding from

the lips of Napoleon,) is to be found elsewhere, when he spoke a

language more genuine than that of the _Moniteur_ and the bulletins.

"England," he said, "must have ended, by becoming an appendage to the

France of _my_ system. Nature has made it one of our islands, as well as

Oleron and Corsica."

It is impossible not to pursue the train of reflections which Bonaparte

continued to pour forth to the companion of his exile, on the rock of

Saint Helena. When England was conquered, and identified with France in

maxims and principles, according to one form of expression, or rendered

an appendage and dependency, according to another phrase, the reader may

suppose that Bonaparte would have considered his mission as

accomplished. Alas! it was not much more than commenced. "I would have

departed from thence [from subjugated Britain] to carry the work of

European regeneration [that is, the extention of his own arbitrary

authority] from south to north, under the Republican colours, for I was

then Chief Consul, in the same manner which I was more lately on the

point of achieving it under the monarchical forms." When we find such

ideas retaining hold of Napoleon's imagination, and arising to his

tongue after his irretrievable fall, it is impossible to avoid

exclaiming, Did ambition ever conceive so wild a dream, and had so wild

a vision ever a termination so disastrous and humiliating!

It may be expected that something should be here said, upon the chances

which Britain would have had of defending herself successfully against

the army of invaders. We are willing to acknowledge that the risk must

have been dreadful; and that Bonaparte, with his genius and his army,

must have inflicted severe calamities upon a country which had so long

enjoyed the blessings of peace. But the people were unanimous in their

purpose of defence, and their forces composed of materials to which

Bonaparte did more justice when he came to be better acquainted with

them. Of the three British nations, the English have since shown

themselves possessed of the same steady valour which won the fields of

Cressy and Agincourt, Blenheim and Minden--the Irish have not lost the

fiery enthusiasm which has distinguished them in all the countries of

Europe--nor have the Scots degenerated from the stubborn courage with

which their ancestors for two thousand years maintained their

independence against a superior enemy. Even if London had been lost, we

would not, under so great a calamity, have despaired of the freedom of

the country; for the war would in all probability have assumed that

popular and national character which sooner or later wears out an

invading army. Neither does the confidence with which Bonaparte affirms

the conviction of his winning the first battle, appear go certainly well

founded. This, at least, we know, that the resolution of the country was

fully bent up to the hazard; and those who remember the period will bear

us witness, that the desire that the French would make the attempt, was

a general feeling through all classes, because they had every reason to

hope that the issue might be such as for ever to silence the threat

of invasion.

The next most important occurrence that claims our notice in this

volume, and which fully delineates the nature and character of this

wonderful and ambitious individual, is the account of his declaration as

Emperor of France, and his subsequent Coronation.

The Mirror of Literature, Amusement, and Instruction. Volume 10, No. 263, Supplementary Number (1827) · 第 9 / 16 题