Broad Chalke[60]. He informs us that "in virtue of the identity of
Thought with Being the primitive Trinity represented neither three
originant principles nor three transient phases, but three eternal
subsistences in one Divine Mind.... The Divine Consciousness or Wisdom,
consubstantial with the Eternal Will, becoming personal in the Son of
Man, is the express image of the FATHER; and JESUS actually, but also
Mankind ideally, is the SON of GOD." (pp. 88-9.) Since this has "almost
a Brahmanical sound" (p. 89.) even to the Vicar of Broad Chalke, we are
content to pass it by in mute astonishment. He proceeds: "Both spiritual
affection and metaphysical reasoning forbid us to confine Revelations
like those of CHRIST to the first half century of our era; but shew at
least affinities of our faith existing in men's minds, anterior to
Christianity, and renewed with deep echo from living hearts in many a
generation." (p. 82.) Was our SAVIOUR then a fabulous personage,--a
virtuous principle,--and not a Man?... "Again. We find the evidences of
our canonical books and of the patristic authors nearest to them, are
sufficient to prove illustration in outward act of principles
perpetually true, but not adequate to guarantee narratives inherently
incredible or precepts evidently wrong." (pp. 82-3.) Are then the sacred
"narratives" "inherently incredible?" or the Divine "precepts"
"evidently wrong?"--These are, we presume, among the "traditional
fictions about our Canon" (p. 83.) at which the Theological Professor
sneers. "Hence we are obliged to assume in ourselves a verifying
faculty,"--(p. 83,) and so, Dr. Williams and Dr. Temple shake hands[61].
An instance of the exercise of this faculty is immediately subjoined.
"The verse 'And no man hath ascended up to Heaven, but he that came
down,' is intelligible as a free comment near the end of the first
century; but has no meaning in our Lord's mouth at a time when the
Ascension had not been heard of." (p. 84.)--"The Apocalypse" in like
manner, to "cease to be a riddle," must be "taken as a series of
poetical visions which represent the outpouring of the vials of wrath
upon the City where our LORD was slain." (p. 84.) ... (Is it possible
that a Minister of the Gospel of CHRIST can speak thus concerning the
Divine record?) ... "The second of the Petrine Epistles, having alike
external and internal evidence against its genuineness, is necessarily
surrendered as a whole." (p. 84.) (Can a man solemnly sign the vith
Article, and yet so write?)--"A philosophical view [of the doctrine of
the Trinity] recommends itself as easiest to believe." (p. 87.) The
"view" expressed in the Athanasian Creed is we presume that which is
stigmatized as "one felt to be so irrational, that it calls in the aid
of terror." (p. 87.) The Reverend writer does not _name_ the Athanasian
Creed, indeed. It is not the general fashion of Essayists and
Reviewers,--from Dr. Temple to Professor Jowett,--to speak plainly. But
common sense asks,--If Dr. Williams does _not_ allude to the Creed in
question, what _does_ he allude to? And common honesty adds,--How is
such an allusion to that formula consistent with subscription to Art.
viii.?
The Sacrament of Baptism, (he says,) has "degenerated into a magical
form," (p. 86,) since it has "become twisted into a false analogy with
circumcision,"--(twisted, at all events, by St. Paul[62]!)--and it is
merely an "Augustinian notion" that "a curse is inherited by
Infants."--How, one humbly asks, does the Reverend writer reconcile it
to his conscience not only to have signed the ixth Article, but to
employ the Baptismal Service, and to teach the little ones of the flock
their Catechism?
On reaching the last page of the present Essay, one is irresistibly led
to remark that if a single word could convey an adequate notion of the
author's manner, that word would be _Insolence_. When Dr. Williams would
express difference of opinion, he has recourse to violence and bluster:
when he would patronize, he is sure to make himself unspeakably
offensive. But he seldom agrees with anybody, even with disciples of the
same school with himself,--as Messrs. Bunsen and Arnold, Coleridge and
Francis Newman. Professor Mansel is "a mere gladiator hitting in the
dark," whose "blows fall heaviest on what it was his duty to defend."
(p. 67.) Dr. Pusey receives a menacing intimation of what his Commentary
must _not_ be. Davison's reasoning labours under the inconvenient defect
of an unproved minor premiss. (p. 66.) The majestic memory of Bp.
Pearson is insulted by this vulgar man, and the fairness of his
citations are impeached. (p. 72.)--Bp. Butler is declared to have turned
aside from an unwelcome idea (!), literature not being his strong
point (!) (p. 65.)--Justin, (p. 64,)--Augustine, (p. 65,)--Jerome, (pp.
65, 71,)--Anselm, (p. 67,)--all come in for a share of the
Vice-Principal of Lampeter's contempt. Even the Apologist of _Essays and
Reviews_ is constrained to admit that "anything more" _un_becoming "than
some of Dr. Williams's remarks we have never read, in writings
professing to be written seriously[63]."
But faults of mind and manner, however gross, do but disqualify a writer
for being the associate of men of taste and good breeding; and blemishes
of style are, at least, venial. Not so easily to be excused is the
deplorable spectacle of a Minister of the Gospel, a Doctor of Divinity
and Vice-Principal of a Theological College, lending all his critical
powers, (which yet seem to be of the most indifferent description,) in
order to undermine the authority of GOD'S Word. He has been asked,--"Do
you unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New
Testament?" and he has answered,--"I do believe them." He has been
asked, "Will you be ready, with all diligence, to banish and drive away
all erroneous and strange doctrines contrary to GOD'S Word?" and he has
made reply,--"I will, the LORD being my helper." He has solemnly
declared his trust that he was "_inwardly moved by the HOLY GHOST to
take upon himself this office and ministration_."--Yet this is the man
who explains away Miracles, denies Prophecy, and idealizes Scripture;
the man who disparages the formulæ he uses daily, mutilates the Canon,
and evacuates the most solemn doctrines of the Church!
I have now said as much as I think necessary concerning Dr. Williams's
Essay. The entire refutation of such a tissue of groundless assertions
and unfounded statements, and unscholarlike criticisms, and
unphilosophical views,--would fill many volumes. It is to be feared also
that, to _him_, the result would not be convincing after all. To have
stated in brief outline, as I have already done, the leading positions
to which he commits himself, ought to suffice. The mere exhibition of
such principles (?) ought to be their own abundant refutation.... GOD
give the unhappy author repentance of his errors!--And will not men
believe that in the pages of the present Essay is to be seen the lawful
development, and inevitable result of the opinions advocated _in every
other part_ of the present volume? I perceive scarcely any _essential_
difference between the views of any of these seven writers. All are
moving along the same fatal road; and are simply at different stages of
the journey. But they conduct themselves wondrous differently in their
progress, certainly; Dr. Williams being immeasurably the most offensive
of the seven,--the only one who, besides seeming blasphemous, can truly
be called _vulgar_.
* * * * *
III. The third Essay in the present volume is by "the REV. BADEN POWELL,
M.A., F.R.S., Savilian Professor of Geometry in the University of
Oxford,"--a gentleman with whose labours I shall deal briefly and gently
for two reasons. His assertions admit of summary refutation; and he has
already, (alas!) passed beyond the limit of earthly Criticism. I desire
to add concerning him, that in the private relations of life he was a
friendly and amiable person.
The solemn circumstance already adverted to, would have kept me silent
altogether. When a writer is no longer able to defend himself, it is
ungenerous to attack him: and at a time when he knows far more wonders
than are dreamed of by any one on the Earth's surface, it seems
unbecoming to stand reasoning over his grave about an "antecedent
probability." But I am addressing not the dead, but the living,--to
whom, in the pages of 'Essays and Reviews,' Professor Powell "being dead
yet speaketh."
He entitles his contribution,--"On the Study of the Evidences of
Christianity:" but, as often happens with performances of the like
nature, the title of his Essay gives a wrong notion of its contents. It
ought to have been called "The Validity of THE EVIDENCE FROM MIRACLES
considered," or rather "denied."
There is nothing new in the present attack on the Miracles of Scripture.
The author disposes of them by a single assertion. "What is alleged,"
(he says,) "is a case of the supernatural. _But no testimony can reach
to the supernatural._" (p. 107.) The inference is obvious.--Again: "an
event may be so incredible intrinsically as to _set aside any degree of
testimony_." (p. 106.) Such an event he declares a Miracle to be; and
explains that "from the nature of our antecedent convictions, the
probability of _some_ kind of mistake or deception _somewhere_, though
we know not _where_, is greater than the probability of the event really
happening in _the way_, and from _the causes_ assigned." (pp. 106-7.)
This merely amounts to asserting that the antecedent improbability of
Miracles is so great as to make them incredible. The writer does not
attempt to establish this point. "The present discussion," (he says,)
"is not intended to be of a controversial kind; it is purely
contemplative and theoretical." (p. 100.) And yet, he _cannot_ suppose
that the Universal Church will surrender its convictions and reverse its
deliberate judgment, at the merely "contemplative and theoretical"
suggestions of an individual, however respectable he may happen to be.
Against his mere assertion, we claim a right to set the result of Bp.
Butler's careful investigation of the same subject:--"_That there
certainly is no such presumption against Miracles, as to render them in
any wise incredible_: that, on the contrary, our being able to discern
reasons for them, gives a positive credibility to the history of them,
in cases where those reasons hold: and that it is by no means certain
that there is any peculiar presumption at all, from analogy, even in the
lowest degree, against Miracles, as distinguished from other
extraordinary phenomena[64]."
Professor Powell's objection against Miracles is, in fact, practically
that of the infidel Hume; who asserted "that no testimony for any kind
of Miracle can ever possibly amount to a probability, much less to a
proof." He argued that Miracles, being contrary to general experience,
are incapable of proof. He maintained also, (with Spinoza,) that
Miracles, being contrary to the established laws of Nature, imply, in
the very character of them, a palpable contradiction. This latter
position seems to be identical with that adopted by Professor Powell.
In a certain place, this author finds fault with "the too frequent
assumption ... of the part of the ... _Advocate_, when the character to
be sustained should be rather that of the unbiassed _Judge_." (p. 95.)
But what are we to think of the judicial fairness of one who is not only
Advocate and Judge in his own cause; but who even turns the Witnesses
out of Court; and will listen to no evidence,--on the plea that it
_cannot_ be trustworthy; or at least, that it _shall_ be unavailing?--"I
express myself with caution," (says Bp. Butler, with reference to
arguments against the credibility of Revelation,) "lest I should be
mistaken to vilify Reason; which is indeed the only faculty we have
wherewith to judge concerning anything, even Revelation itself: or be
misunderstood to assert that a supposed revelation cannot be proved
false, from internal characters. For it may contain clear immoralities,
or contradictions; and either of these would prove it false. Nor will I
take upon me to affirm, that nothing else can possibly render any
supposed revelation incredible. Yet still the observation is, I think,
true beyond doubt; that _objections against Christianity, as
distinguished from objections against its evidence, are frivolous[65]_."
That a certain occurrence or phenomenon "is due to supernatural causes,"
Professor Powell maintains is "entirely dependent on the previous belief
and assumptions of the parties." (p. 107.) He forgets that he grounds
his own denial of the possibility of a Miracle, on nothing stronger than
"the nature of" his own "antecedent convictions." Thus, the question
becomes merely a personal one between Mr. Baden Powell and the Apostles
of CHRIST. The reasonableness of the "antecedent convictions" in the one
case have to be set against the reasonableness of the "antecedent
convictions" in the other. Either party, (according to this view,) has
its own "previous belief and assumptions;" which, in the one case, are
known to have produced conviction; in the other, they are unhappily
found to have resulted in a rejection of Miracles. But then it happens,
unfortunately, that in the case of the Apostles and others, conviction
of the truth of our LORD'S Miracles was based on _knowledge_, and
_experience of a matter of fact_: in the case of Professor Powell,
disbelief is founded on certain "antecedent convictions" only: namely,
"the inconceivableness of imagined interruptions of natural Order, or
supposed suspensions of the Laws of matter." (p. 110.) He is never tired
of repeating that "in an age of physical research like the present, all
highly cultivated minds and duly advanced intellects (!) have imbibed,
more or less, the lessons of the Inductive Philosophy; and have, at
least in some measure, learned to appreciate the grand foundation
conception of universal Law:" (p. 133:) that "the entire range of the
Inductive Philosophy is at once based upon, and in every instance tends
to confirm, by immense accumulation of evidence, the grand truth of the
universal Order and constancy of natural causes, as a primary law of
belief; so strongly entertained and fixed in the mind of every truly
inductive inquirer, that he cannot even conceive the possibility of its
failure." (p. 109.)
I gladly avail myself of a page from the writings of a thoughtful writer
of our own, who, half a century ago, reviewed the very errors which are
being so industriously reproduced among ourselves at this
day,--certainly not with more ability than of old:--"Let us examine a
little farther into the weight of the argument derived from the supposed
immutability of the Laws of Nature. It has constantly been the theme of
modern Unbelievers, that the course of Nature is fixed, eternal,
unalterable; and that nothing which is supposed to violate it can
possibly take place. Now, we may readily allow, that the course of
Nature is unalterable by _human_ power; nay, even by the power of any
_created_ being whatsoever. But the question is,--Are these Laws
unalterable _by Him who made them_? Proof of this is requisite, before
the argument from the immutability of the Laws of Nature can have the
least force. We may safely assert, however, that proof of this is
absolutely impossible.--'Facts,' it may be said, 'daily passing before
us, warrant us in _supposing_ its laws to be unchangeable.' Perhaps so.
But if a thousand or more facts have occurred, since the Creation of the
World, in which those Laws appear to have been over-ruled, or suspended,
is such a conclusion _then_ warrantable? Even if there had never been a
single instance of a Miracle recorded, since the Creation; yet the
conclusion would not be just or logical, that no such thing is possible.
But with such a multiplicity of instances to the contrary as are already
on record, it is no better than a shameless assertion, in direct
opposition to the evidence of men's senses and experience. Nay, more;
the argument is _atheistical_. For, either GOD made and ordained these
Laws of Nature; and may, consequently, at His pleasure, unmake or
suspend them: or else, these laws are self-framed, and Nature is
independent of the GOD of Nature; which is saying, in other words, that
the material Universe is not governed by any Supreme Intelligence.
"This latter opinion appears, indeed, to be the tenet of all who resort
to arguments of this kind, in opposition to the credibility of Miracles.
Thus it is said, [by Hume,] that every effect must have a cause; and
that, therefore, a Miracle must have a cause in _Nature_; otherwise, it
cannot be effected.--But, is not the _Will of_ GOD, without any other
agency, or predisposing cause, sufficient for the purpose? When GOD
created the World out of nothing, what pre-existing cause was there,
except His own omnipotent Will to produce the effect? Why then is not
the same Will sufficient to work Miracles?
"'But,' says another Sophist, [Spinoza,]--'GOD is the Author of the Laws
of Nature; so that whatever opposes those Laws, is necessarily
_repugnant to the Divine nature_: if, therefore, we believe that GOD may
act in a manner contrary to those laws, we, in effect, believe that He
may do what is contrary to _His own nature_; which is absurd and
impossible.'
"The reasoning turns upon the supposition that GOD is actuated by an
absolute _necessity_ of His Nature, and not by his _Will_: or, rather,
that He hath neither Will, nor Intellect. Otherwise, it were easy to
perceive, that in suspending the operation of His own Laws, GOD cannot
be charged with doing anything contradictory to _His own_ nature; since
He may justly be supposed to have as good reasons for _departing_ from
those Laws, as for _framing_ them: and as we know not why He framed them
in such a manner, and no otherwise; so He may have the best and wisest
reasons for the suspension of them, which it is not for us to call in
question. To speak of the Supreme Being as actuated by a kind of
physical necessity, and not by His _Will_, is to confound the GOD of
Nature with Nature itself; which is the very essence of Atheism, and
never can be reconciled with any just notions of the Deity, as a Being
of intellectual and moral perfections[66]."
_It is by no means inconceivable_, therefore, that the great Cause of
Creation, and first Author of Law should interfere at any given time in
the established Order of Nature. Moreover, it is irrational, on
sufficient testimony, to disbelieve that He has sometimes so interposed.
To deny that this is conceivable, is to make GOD inferior to His own
decree; to pronounce it incredible that the Lawgiver should be superior
to His own Laws. "The universal subordination of causation," (p. 134,)
we as freely admit as the Professor himself: but then we contend that
_everything else_ must be subordinate to the _First great Cause of all_.
Worse than unphilosophical is it to argue as the Professor presumes to
do, concerning the MOST HIGH; but unphilosophical in the strictest sense
it is. For it is to reason about Him, (the finite concerning the
Infinite!) as if we understood Him; we, who can barely decipher a
little part of His works! A few more remarks on this subject will be
found in my viith Sermon.
We are anxious to know if the whole of the case is really before us. A
few more extracts from Professor Powell's Essay seem necessary to do
full justice to his view of the matter:--"All moral evidence must
essentially have respect to the parties to be convinced. 'Signs' might
be adapted peculiarly _to the state of moral or intellectual progress of
one age_, or one class of persons, and not be suited to that of
others.... And it is to the entire difference in the ideas,
prepossessions, modes, and grounds of belief in those times, that we may
trace the reason why Miracles, which would be incredible _now_, were not
so in the age, and under the circumstances, in which they are stated to
have occurred." (p. 117.) ... "An evidential appeal which in a long past
age was convincing, as made to _the state of knowledge in that age_[67],
might have not only no effect, but even an injurious tendency, if urged
in the present, and referring to what is at variance with existing
scientific conceptions; just as the arguments of the present age would
have been unintelligible to a former."
"In a period of advanced physical knowledge, the reference to what was
believed in past times, if at variance with principles now acknowledged,
could afford little ground of appeal: in fact, would damage the argument
rather than assist it." (p. 126.)
"It becomes imperatively necessary, that such views should be suggested
as may be really suitable to better informed minds, and may meet the
increasing demands of an age pretending at least to greater
enlightenment." (p. 126.)
There is nothing in the additional suggestions thus thrown out which in
reality affects the question at issue. Certain antecedent considerations
were before insisted on, which (it was said) "must be paramount to all
attestation." (p. 107.) These have been disposed of. The writer now
tells us that he does not question "_the honesty_ or _veracity_ of the
testimony, or the reality of the _impressions_ on the minds of the
witnesses." (p. 106.) It remains to inquire therefore to what natural
causes, events which were once thought miraculous, may reasonably be
referred; since the so-called Miracles of the imperfectly-informed age
of our LORD and His Apostles will not endure the scrutiny of the present
age of scientific enlightenment.
But this, unless it be a proposal to open the whole question afresh,--to
examine _the Miracles themselves_,--to consider them one by one,--to
inquire into their exact nature,--and to investigate their attendant
circumstances,--is unmeaning. For we cannot, as reasonable men, dismiss
a vast body of august events, differing so considerably one from
another, with a vague inuendo that there was probably "some kind of
mistake or deception somewhere, though we do not know where:" (p. 106:)
a hint that natural events may have been regarded as supernatural by an
unscientific age, (which I believe was Schleiermacher's view:) and so
forth. The two miraculous Draughts of fishes,--the Stater found in the
fish's mouth,--the stilling of the Storm,--might perhaps, by a little
rhetorical sophistry, in unscrupulous hands, be so disposed of. But the
_Creative Power_ displayed on the two occasions of a miraculous feeding
of thousands,--the giving of sight to a man born blind,--the calling of
Lazarus out of the grave where he had been for four days buried;--these
are transactions which resist every attempt of the enemy to explain
away, as unscientific misconceptions. They may be powerless to produce
conviction in some _now_, as they were powerless to produce conviction
in some _then_: but they cannot be set aside by an insinuation. There
could not have been any mistake when the Five Thousand were fed with
five loaves, and twelve baskets full were gathered up; or when the Four
Thousand were fed with seven loaves, and fragments enough to fill seven
baskets remained over[68]. There was no room for deception in the case
of the man born blind; for _that_ case immediately underwent a judicial
scrutiny[69]. Lazarus bound hand and foot with grave-clothes required
that the bystanders should "loose him and let him go[70]:" but from that
moment, neither supposed scientific necessity, nor antecedent
considerations, nor the ordinary course of Nature, nor any other
creature, will avail to bind him any more!
This may suffice on the subject of Professor Powell's Essay. On the
great question itself, I have said something in my Seventh Sermon, to
which the reader is requested to refer.--The performance now under
consideration abounds in incorrect statements, while it revives not a
few exploded objections; but I have considered the only points in it
which are material.
Thus the author assumes "that, unlike the _essential Doctrines_ of
Christianity, 'the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever,' those
_external accessories_, [Miracles, for example,] constitute a subject
which of necessity is perpetually taking somewhat at least of a new
form, with the successive phases of opinion and knowledge." (p. 94.)
But, (waiving for the moment the impossibility of severing the Doctrines
of the Gospel from the miraculous evidence that our LORD was a Teacher
sent from Heaven[71]), it requires no ability to perceive that although
"opinion" should alter daily, and "knowledge" increase ever so much,
yet, events professing to be miraculous, being plain _matters of fact_,
are to-day exactly what and where they were many centuries ago. Physical
Science may pretend (with Paulus) to explain them on natural principles,
truly; and while she does so, the world is sure to give her a patient,
even an indulgent hearing. But then she must let it be known _what_ she
proposes to explain, and _how_ she proposes to explain it. She must be
so indulgent also, as to listen while we, in turn, shew her _on what_
grounds we find it impossible to accept her Theory. "The inevitable
progress of research," (says this author,) "must, within a longer or
shorter period, unravel _all that seems most marvellous_; and what is at
present least understood will become as familiarly known to the Science
of the future, as those points which a few centuries ago, were involved
in equal obscurity, but are now thoroughly understood." (p. 109.) Such a
vaticination as regards Miracles, is, to say the least, premature; and
until it can appeal to incipient accomplishment, it must be regarded as
nugatory also. I am not aware, that as yet one single Miracle has been
struck off the list; yet Miracles have now been before the world a long
time, and they have not wanted enemies either.