Every trooper in Palestine knew that a great campaign would be launched

in the early autumn. General Allenby would, according to the camp-fire

strategists, “hop in” during the brief season between the extreme heat

and the beginning of the heavy rains in November. Further, the C. in C.

would, in all probability, assail the enemy line at the full of the

moon, so that we should have light for the great cavalry night marches

that were anticipated. But it is doubtful whether any soldier in

Palestine, who was not in the official secret, forecasted a scheme so

bold as that General Allenby had resolved upon. Certainly, none dared to

hope for a triumph so dazzlingly swift and complete.

THE WONDERFUL FORTNIGHT

The great campaign opened at dawn on the morning of 19th September,

1918. A fortnight after General Allenby flung his artillery bombardment

at the enemy line, the great Turkish and German force in Western and

Eastern Palestine had been destroyed, and our prisoners numbered 75,000.

Of the 4th, 7th, and 8th Turkish Armies south of Damascus only a few

thousand foot-sore, hunted men escaped. Practically every gun, the great

bulk of the machine guns, nearly all the small-arms, and transport,

every aerodrome and its mechanical equipment and nearly every aeroplane,

an intricate and widespread telephone and telegraph system, large dumps

of munitions and every kind of supplies—all had, in fourteen swift and

dramatic days, been stripped from an enemy who for four years had

resisted our efforts to smash him. It was a military overthrow so sudden

and so absolute that it is perhaps without parallel in the history of

war. And it is still more remarkable because it was achieved at a cost

so trifling.

[Illustration:

TURKS MARCHING OUT OF OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM AT BEGINNING OF WAR, 1914

(_Captured German Photograph_)

]

[Illustration:

GAZA

]

[Illustration:

THE MOUNT OF TEMPTATION

]

[Illustration:

ALL THE WORLD OVER

]

It was a stupendous result, gained by a simple scheme. The strategy was

strikingly bold, but perhaps the most impressive thing about General

Allenby’s triumph was the superb manner in which his plan was carried

through. The campaign went with a bang from the moment the line was

broken until Damascus, more than 150 miles distant, was taken. It

galloped all the way. There was never a moment’s indecision, never a

semblance of fumbling. Here was a British Army at its best, every man

efficient, every man enthusiastic.

The scheme was obviously the conception of a confident leader of horse.

General Allenby is a cavalryman, and he had under his command the most

powerful cavalry force in the war. And he knew the quality of his

mounted men. All of the Australians and New Zealanders and Yeomanry had

been in the sixty-mile drive from Gaza, of the previous year, and most

of them had been in the saddle in Egypt and Palestine for two and a half

years. The dashing Indian cavalry had been with him for many months and

had given many examples of their speed and love of battle. Again and

again in the summer their advanced patrols had galloped down bodies of

Turks, and their terrible use of the lance in those little actions had a

highly useful effect on Turkish nerves. The cavalry was General

Allenby’s special weapon for the campaign, but in addition, he had a

substantial and fit force of veteran infantry. He had, too, a

particularly brilliant lot of airmen, and in his supply services he

possessed a vast organization of railway, motor, camel, horse, mule and

donkey transport, which was efficient and resourceful in the highest

degree, and had already performed miracles.

Altogether the British Army of Palestine was, when the final campaign

opened, as near to perfection as any force ever was. All ranks were

veterans and all were animated by that spirit which every army feels

when confident of victory and happy in its leaders.

A BOLD SCHEME

This was the scheme. We faced the Turks on a fifty-mile line running

from a point on the Mediterranean coast about twelve miles north of

Jaffa south-eastward across the Plain of Sharon, thence eastward over

the Mountains of Samaria at a height of 1500 to 2000 feet, falling to

1000 feet below sea-level where it crossed the Jordan Valley, and

terminating in the foothills of the Mountains of Gilead. The Sharon

Plain sector was some fifteen miles in length, across Samaria fifteen

miles, and the stretch in the Jordan Valley about eighteen. The Turkish

position was a strong one. On Samaria, or the Central Palestine Range,

south of Nablus, the enemy had ideal defensive country, rugged and

broken, yet well served by rail—on the north-west to Haifa, and on the

north-east across the Jordan at Beisan and by way of Damascus to Turkey;

he had also good roads to Haifa and to Damascus by way of Nazareth.

To push the Turk on the mountains by a frontal attack would have meant

at best the gradual withdrawal of his forces. In Jordan Valley the

enemy’s safety lay in the fact that his guns on the foothills of either

side covered the limited ground which was practicable for horse and

transport. And, even if we had galloped up Jordan Valley, it would have

been extremely difficult from there to swing in behind the Turkish

position on the Central Range. General Allenby took the Plain of Sharon

for his great enterprise. Forty miles behind the Turkish position the

Jordan Valley and the Plain of Sharon are joined to the Esdraelon

Plain—the old Plain of Armageddon. In other words, the Jordan and Sharon

and Esdraelon formed a half-circle round the main central Turkish

position on the mountains. All the enemy lines of communication led

across Esdraelon. If we could seize the Plain swiftly, cut the railways

and hold the roads, the Turkish army west of the Jordan was in our

hands. It was a scheme calculated to test the mettle of any army. If we

were to succeed, every branch of the service had to show at its best.

First our airmen had to destroy or drive off the German aeroplanes and

so keep the enemy ignorant of our plans; then the artillery barrage had

to make the way possible for our infantry; in its turn, the infantry

had, in one rush, to drive a gap for our cavalry, and the cavalry,

galloping through the gap, had to cover fifty miles and reach Esdraelon

Plain on the night of the first day. Lastly, the cavalry must hold the

communications they had cut, and to do so, they had to be fed. The

transport necessary for feeding tens of thousands of men and horse had

to travel almost as fast as the cavalry. The scheme had to go through to

time-table or it might not go through at all. If the artillery had

failed to do its work in a swift half-hour’s bombardment, or if the

infantry had faltered, the enemy would have had time to redistribute his

forces, and General Allenby might have been robbed of his victory.

[Illustration:

MAGDHABA, SHOWING THE WADY BED ABOUT ONE MILE FROM TURKISH BUILDINGS

_By Lieut. G. W. Lambert_

]

[Illustration]

CAMOUFLAGE

General Allenby took no chances. He followed the sound principle of

fighting under the best possible conditions. By the aid of clever and

greatly successful bluff, the Commander-in-Chief delivered his smashing

blow at an unexpected point of the Turkish line. The enemy was led to

believe that the British offensive would fall on the eastern sector.

While a huge force of cavalry, artillery and infantry was being smuggled

by night marches to the Plain of Sharon on the west, active and amusing

camouflage preparations were being made in the Jordan Valley. For

instance, many dummy camps were brought into existence, and large

numbers of realistic canvas horses were tethered in them. Mules drawing

sledges were driven about in the dust to suggest heavy traffic. Fast’s

Hotel at Jerusalem, then being conducted for officers by the Canteen

Board, was ostentatiously emptied of its inmates, two sentry-boxes were

placed at the entrance, and a whisper was started in the bazaars that

the hotel would be General Allenby’s advanced headquarters during the

coming offensive. Simultaneously, the Arabs east of the Jordan made

realistic sham preparations for an attack on Amman, out on the Hedjaz.

They put down a big base, engaged in bold reconnaissance, and cut the

line between Amman and Damascus. The deception of the enemy was

complete. We know now that he expected and prepared for the blow on the

east, and was stiffening his defences there until a few hours before our

bombardment opened on the west, near the Mediterranean.

The airmen materially assisted in this hoodwinking. During the eight

weeks preceding the offensive, the German air service was practically

driven out of the sky. Fifteen machines were destroyed or forced down

and enemy aerodromes were bombed. So complete was our ascendancy that

not an enemy plane was seen over the threatened sector for eight days

before the offensive began.

Blind as to our movement of troops, and mistaken by fifty miles as to

where his line was to be assailed, the enemy’s plight was further

accentuated by the destruction of his communications on the very evening

of the bombardment. Pulling out at night from their sham camp near

Amman, the Arabs rushed away up north, and cut the railway and telegraph

communications between Deraa and the great Turkish base at Damascus.

This left the enemy on his whole front without supplies for the fight.

Other telegraph lines further west were severed at the same time, and a

bomb from an Australian plane on the night before our advance destroyed

his great forward telephone exchange at Nablus, which dislocated all his

lateral communications. When our guns opened at dawn on 19th September,

the Turks were already in a desperate plight.

THE NIGHT BEFORE

On the night before the bombardment there was an atmosphere of perfect

confidence in our camp close behind the line. Every man was moved by the

prospect of a successful adventure, which would give vast immediate

results and have an incalculable influence on the world war. The

tropical intensity of Jordan Valley, where the Australian Brigades, with

one exception, and some of the British and Indian cavalry had spent the

whole summer, had left its mark. We had suffered much from malaria and

other fevers, which, it was feared, might recur when we moved into the

cooler north. The horses were, if not in poor condition, certainly on

the light side; but these things were forgotten as the critical day

approached. The Australian Mounted Division, commanded by Major-General

Hodgson, and now made up entirely of Light Horse, except for one

dashing, picturesque regiment of French Colonial regulars, had recently

been armed with swords. The period of training in the new arm was very

brief—for many Regiments only a few hours; but the men taking very

keenly to it, soon reached a high standard of efficiency. Every trooper

was excited at the thought of a true cavalry charge. The Anzac Mounted

Division was still in the line in Jordan Valley.

During many nights before the push every road on the coastal sector was

crowded with slow-moving, well-ordered traffic. By day all was normal,

except for significant glimpses of camps in the wide olive groves around

Ludd, and in the orchards and orange groves about Jaffa. But as darkness

fell the whole countryside would become thronged with masses of horse

and foot and guns, and every kind of transport, groping their way

through blinding clouds of dust. The roads were impassable outside the

organized columns; the night was loud with the shouts of drivers

speaking divers languages. A few hours before the great push began this

night traffic culminated in a general move northward, the cavalry moving

up close behind the infantry, and the supplies following the cavalry.

Every road was massed with motor-lorries and horse transport; every

track with endless strings of camels. Each unit in the great army was

pressing up as closely as possible to the starting gate.

[Illustration:

TURKISH PRISONERS AT BEERSHEBA

STREET MARKET, JERUSALEM

Inset—JERICHO

Showing the pretty little Garden Oasis

LIGHT HORSE CROSSING JORDAN

]

[Illustration:

IN THE JORDAN VALLEY

]

[Illustration:

SPRING WATER, CLEAR AND COLD

]

The bombardment opened at dawn, a heavy barrage. For half an hour the

startled Turks were battered in their trenches. Then, abruptly, the

bombardment ceased. “Now the infantry,” said a Brigadier of horse “and

then!...”

THE ADVANCE

Our battalions leaped forward as the gunnery died away, and carried the

Turkish trenches after a brief struggle. They simply overwhelmed the

enemy riflemen, and even the German machine gunners and Austrian

artillerymen, after a wild burst of bad shooting, were forced to flight

or submission. Within half an hour the infantry had made a gap for the

great force of Indian and Yeomanry cavalry waiting near the coast, and

soon afterwards they opened another a few miles inland. The expectant

horsemen jumped off like thoroughbreds from the barrier.

THE GREAT RIDE BEGINS

They rode away in the sunrise, the advanced squadrons trotting out after

the ground scouts, the flank patrols galloping wide; Brigade after

Brigade rode out over the rolling sandhills. The men were eager, the

horses fought for their heads. The swords of the Yeomanry flashed and

Indian lances glinted from each successive skyline. It was like a war

scene of the picture galleries. Quickening the pace, the Regiments raced

on past our guns, most of which were already limbered-up for the

pursuit. The infantry, busy with their prisoners, cheered them as they

passed, and soon they were speeding down on Turks who had fled from the

onslaught of the infantry. But their sport with sword and lance was

brief. In this Sharon sector, the enemy had no forward reserves, no

second-line trenches. The Turkish front here had depended for its safety

on a one trench system. From the crossing of the trenches until they

reached the Esdraelon Plain, late in the night, the cavalry encountered

no resistance. Once or twice they sighted small bodies of the enemy and

made for them at the gallop. But the Turks would not give battle. Before

the campaign was three hours old there began the long series of almost

bloodless surrenders which were to be the most amazing feature of the

sleepless fortnight.

The perfection of our organization was revealed very early. The cavalry

was scarcely clear of the trench system before scores of field guns were

rumbling in their wake. And, pressing on after the artillery by many

tracks, good and bad, went mile after mile of camels and wheeled

transport. Where the cavalry went the supplies must follow; and the

cavalry rode from forty to fifty miles between sunrise and midnight.

With nothing to check them, their pace was controlled only by the

endurance of their horses. The men rode light; they carried only one

blanket, and that as a saddle-cloth. Tent sheets and waterproofs were

forbidden. It was a wild ride against time. But horses were loaded with

three days’ rations, and few carried less than 250lbs.—many of them more

than 280lbs.

ESDRAELON PLAIN

At dawn next morning the Yeomanry were across the Esdraelon Plain and in

Nazareth, where they caught most of the garrison of 3000 and the whole

population still in their beds. They secured the town at the expense of

eighteen casualties. By noon the Esdraelon Plain was in our hands, and

the Turkish Army in Western Palestine left without a line of

communication or retreat, except at Beisan on the north-east corner of

the trap; and the capture of Beisan was already assured. How completely

the enemy was deceived, and how light were his forces on the sector

broken for the cavalry, is shown by the fact that on the first day,

although our horse travelled fully forty miles on a wide front, only 900

prisoners were taken by them. Next day, as the net closed round the

forward enemy forces on the Central Range, and they attempted to retreat

across the Esdraelon Plain, our cavalry took upwards of 12,000.

DOOMED TURKISH ARMY

At the beginning of the second day, we contained the Turkish western

army on the south, west and north. The Anzac Mounted Division, which is

two-thirds Australian and the balance New Zealanders, and a light

infantry force, all under Major-General Sir E. W. C. Chaytor, were moved

up the Jordan Valley on the east of the Turks and so the net was

completed. But the task of the Anzacs was difficult. Before they could

move, the enemy guns dominating the narrow ground on either side of the

river had to be silenced or shifted. This meant that the Turks had to

begin their retreat on the Samarian Range before the Division could race

them for the crossings. Not until the second day did this come about,

and then the Anzacs, riding fast, closed the fords and the Turkish

Western Army was doomed. Forty hours after the fight commenced, as the

second day was closing, the enemy began to stream down the tracks

leading on to the Esdraelon Plain from his forward mountain position. He

had already abandoned guns and transport, a tragedy which he owed mainly

to the appalling havoc wrought with bombs and machine guns by our

airmen.

At dusk on the second day a large force was reported to be heading

towards Jenin, on the northern edge of the Esdraelon Plain. General

Chauvel, who was directing the battle from Megiddo (now Lejjun), the

actual site of ancient Armageddon, at once ordered the 3rd Light Horse

Brigade to move to the attack. An hour later, the Brigade had captured a

mass of prisoners, who subsequently counted out at more than 7000; and

we had the first evidence of the demoralization of the enemy. As the

Brigade approached Jenin, with the 10th Light Horse Regiment (Western

Australians) leading and the 9th (chiefly South Australians) working

round to the rear of the village, the Turks ran out and surrendered in

thousands. We had one officer and one man wounded. The only shots fired

at us came from nine German riflemen, who fought to a finish, although

two of our machine guns were laid on them at a range of sixty yards. The

plan had put our troops into certain positions and the Turks, as at sham

fight, recognizing the checkmate, were surrendering without bloodshed.

Any resistance which followed on the long ride to Damascus came almost

entirely from the Germans.

CUT OFF

An endeavour has been made in the preceding pages to show how the

galloping cavalry cordon was thrown round the main enemy position on the

Samarian Range. Before the close of the second day, our horsemen,

stoutly armed with machine guns and automatic rifles, in addition to

rifle and sword and lance, and further strengthened by many batteries of

horse artillery, held all the roads and railways behind the Turks and

Germans. The enemy was practically cut off from supplies and retreat.

Worse than that, he was already irretrievably smashed by the attack of

the British and Indian infantry on his front. Recoiling from this blow,

and hastening to reach the Esdraelon Plain before the cavalry completed

the net, he was caught by our airmen in narrow mountain passes,

subjected to terrible bombing and harassing machine gun fire, and forced

to abandon most of his guns and transport. At the same time, the 5th

Australian Light Horse Brigade under Brigadier-General Macarthur Onslow,

accompanied by one regiment of French cavalry, was thrown in during the

first day on his right flank, about halfway between the old front line

and the Esdraelon Plain. The Australians, moving very fast, scattered

with their swords a force several thousand strong north of Tul Keram and

took two thousand prisoners. Then, riding all night, they cut the enemy

frontline railway close behind Nablus. A few hours later, the Brigade

captured Nablus itself.

[Illustration: OUTLINE MAP OF PALESTINE]

TERRIBLE AIR WORK

But before this the airmen had commenced their work in the passes. When

our infantry broke the enemy’s line on the Plain of Sharon, many

thousands of Turks, who were on the foothills eastward of the gap our

cavalry had galloped through, had endeavoured to swing round and retreat

to the highlands of Samaria. But the movement was at once detected by

the Australian airmen. The Turks, with their transport, were seen to be

heading for a narrow defile leading up from Tul Keram to Anebta. Using

their wireless, the airmen called up aerodromes where dozens of British

and Australian pilots were awaiting the signal. The doomed column,

extending over upwards of two miles, was deep in the pass when the first

flight arrived with its bombs. Beginning on the leading troops and

vehicles, the airmen, flying low, had, in a few minutes, blocked the

narrow track. Pilot after pilot, flying in perfect order, dropped his

bombs, and then, assisted by the observers, raked the unfortunate Turks

with machine guns. Their ammunition exhausted, the airmen sped back to

their aerodrome for more, and returned again to the slaughter. Some

pilots made four trips on that day. While the airmen attacked the

column, the 5th Light Horse Brigade came up over the hills on either

side of the track, and caught the Turks with their swords as they

attempted to escape. Blocked in front, the battered, distracted

procession closed up and telescoped, and fires broke out among the

massed and broken vehicles.

Still more appalling, because of the greater magnitude of the disaster,

was the fate of a column between Balata and Fermeh on its way down the

range towards Beisan, on the Jordan. Flying over Samaria, you appreciate

the opportunities which this retreating army offered to the airmen. The

stony hills are not so rugged as in Judea, but they are still too steep

to permit masses of troops to move off the narrow roads. These roads

wind along beside the wadies and are flanked nearly all the way by

abrupt hillsides. The Balata column contained the bulk of the enemy’s

forward transport. It stretched, slow-moving and in full view from the

air, over seven or eight miles of the confined track. An Australian

reconnaissance pilot sighted it soon after dawn and, an hour later,

dozens of British and Australian bombers and machine gunners, flying

within a few hundred feet of the ground, were smashing it to splinters.

Again they began at the head, and forced the helpless drivers to pile up

from the rear. For hours the bombing was continued. Here the airmen

worked unaided by any other arm of the service, and they had wrecked or

disabled the whole of the transport before the infantry came up from the

south and took the dazed survivors. The broken material afterwards

collected in the pass included 90 guns, 840 four-wheeled and 76

two-wheeled horse and cattle vehicles, 50 motor-lorries and a large

number of miscellaneous transport, such as water carts and travelling

kitchens. The horror of the scene during the bombardment and afterwards

need not be dwelt upon. As the bombs rained down with pitiless

regularity, scores of lorries and wagons were overturned and dashed to

pieces as they went hurtling down into the rocky beds of the wadies.

Included in the column were large formations of infantry, and these and

the drivers, rushing from the track to escape the bombs, were shot down

by airmen. These air attacks were repeated many times on a similar scale

in the first two days.

FINE STAFF WORK

Rarely have the various services of an army worked in such perfect

accord. The infantry drove the enemy from his front, the Australian and

French cavalry, at the same moment, struck from the flank at his very

heart at Nablus; as he attempted to retreat in good order, the airmen

wrecked him from the skies, and, in a few hours, turned his army into a

shell-shocked rabble, with few guns or munitions, and little food. The

wretched Turks, in their tens of thousands, urged on by officers, came

at last to the outlets into the Esdraelon Plain. When first the cavalry

galloped down upon them, and they surrendered in hordes without the

least attempt at resistance, we were astonished. It was not until we

learned what had happened in the mountains that we understood the tragic

state of their morale.

Australia in Palestine · 第 2 / 9 段